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For Thomas Bartscherer, who agreed at a
late moment to join in the struggle of this
infinite project and who assisted me greatly,
at times bringing me back to earth when I
flew into the meteoric heights of Nietzsche
and Hölderlin’s songs and at times allowing
me to soar there.
For Daniel Berthold, who has guided me
along the philosophic path with rigor,
diligence and kindness for four years, and
whose help and support in this project have
been profound and constant.
For Ann Lauterbach, my longtime mentor in
the space between theory and literature, who
taught me to remain with grace in the
changeable disquiet of that gap. It was she
who advised me to use this title, originally
destined for a chapter, for the project as a
whole.
F o r R o b e r t K e l l y, w h o s e p o e t i c a l
encouragement unceasingly reminded me to
thrust myself again in the volcano of
Nietzsche’s thought not only as philosopher
but always, too, as poet—
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take the air inside you
as a set of axioms
grinding on each other,
the dead thinking in us
is what we call thinking.
[…]
Now help him think,
the dead are hard of hearing
hence music, that special
art of being dead
for the benefit of the living.
—Robert Kelly, Untitled (“Help Nietzsche thinking”)

Would I like to be a comet? I think so.
They are swift as birds, they flower
With fire, childlike in purity. To desire
More than this is beyond human measure.
—Friedrich Hölderlin, Untitled (“In Lovely Blue”)

Do I still hear you, my voice? You whisper when you curse? And yet your curse should cause the
bowels of this world to burst! But it continues to live and merely stares at me all the more
brilliantly and coldly with its pitiless stars; it continues to live, dumb and blind as ever, and the
only thing that dies is—the human being. —And yet!
—Friedrich Nietzsche, “Oedipus: Soliloquies of the Last Philosopher”

Friedrich Nietzsche: Notebook U-I-5 Spring 1873
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Preface
Soliloquies and Songs:
The Philosopher’s Birth
Young Friedrich Nietzsche stands continually over an abyss: an abyss between poetry and
philosophy, between art and science, between myth and knowledge, between a world in
dissolution and the promise of a rising culture. It is a yawning chasm between finite past and
infinite future, between the life of the ancients and the life of the moderns—between the mode of
the soliloquy and that of the song. Hence the title, Songs of the Last Philosopher, in part
borrowed from a fragment of Nietzsche’s (called: “Soliloquies of the Last Philosopher”) and in
part renewed by my own perspective and the impulse that Nietzsche’s task as a boundary figure
—perhaps as a tragic hero, a last philosopher—was in great part to weave music and poetry,
these rich artistic sources that open and expose the emptiness of the ground of so-called
philosophical reason, into the discourse of that very reason: to push philosophy outside itself.
Such songs lead to a madness—the madness of the unexpected—from which arises, as a need,
the embrace of cosmic chance and eternal transformation across the tragedy of time. This is also
the madness of action, posed in opposition to the sphere of thought. In order for philosophy to
enter the world, to change it, it must freely exercise the mobile plasticity of the art instincts of
nature, as Nietzsche calls them. Heraclitus’ enigmas, too, are songs.
*
Nietzsche’s early philosophy shall form the object of this work. It is a philosophy rife
with contradictions. Most stunning, arresting, thoroughgoing of these contradictions is that
between the drives within the young philosopher towards metaphysics and towards science. I
have endeavored to show this contradiction, as well as the innumerable others, of which this
5

constitutes, in a sense, the root, neither as a dialectical opposition nor as an irreconcilable
schizophrenia, but, in keeping with the philosopher’s early thought, as a dissonant harmony—an
ἀγών in the pervasive sense this had for the ancients.
Nietzsche’s early philological study of the Greeks before Plato was not merely an
academic endeavor; rather, it was necessitated by a crisis in culture, indeed by what the
blossoming philosopher perceived to be a lack of culture in his contemporary Germany. He saw
his time as an age of degeneracy, where the rise of philistinism and the radical separation of
science, art, philosophy and philology threatened to so homogenize his people that the very
possibility of unity and vitality in the nation was eradicated from the national horizon. Not only
Germany, but indeed, modern Europe as a whole, for Nietzsche, did not exist, but merely
subsisted in a blind and painful disunity, and herein lay, for him, the tragic nature of his time.
Nietzsche perceived the imminent death of metaphysics, or rather, the radical impossibility of
metaphysics in his era, in his contemporary Germany. We mustn’t forget that this work was
contemporary with the Franco-Prussian War, in which Nietzsche served as a medical orderly and,
after perceiving this war’s fascistic effects, turned against it. At the opening of the war, in July
1870, Nietzsche wrote to his friend, Erwin Rohde: “Our entire threadbare culture is plunging at
the breast of the horrible demon.” (B 3, 130) This demon he called “military genius” (1, 775;
TGS).1 He consequently believed, initially, that this explosion of Dionysian strife, the force of
this military genius, would be capable of reviving culture. Yet, after experiencing the horrors of
war and contracting dystentery and diphtheria, he began to view this war, rather, as a
subordination of culture to the state. He wrote to Carl von Gersdorff in November, 1870: “I now

1

Cited in Rüdiger Safranski, Nietzsche, trans. Shelley Frisch (New York-London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002), 67.
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consider Prussia a power that is extremely dangerous for culture” (B 3, 155).2 Nietzsche’s
philological work coincides with the unification of Germany; the question of the possibility of a
culture proper to Germany is, indeed, highly contemporary. His response to this question,
however, was to be an untimely one, primarily involving a return to the rich source of ancient
Greek culture.
Nietzsche’s main concern, therefore, in his writing of the early 1870s, as a professor of
philology at the University of Basel, was to open wide the possibility of creating culture. This
entailed, in his view, a radical transformation of philology, then circumscribed by esoteric
academicism, so that it could finally unite with philosophy, with art and with science, to
reestablish the systemic unity internal to culture. He therefore contrives a series of figures and
formulas destined to bring about this end—this restored harmony of national life. These figures
emerge, moreover, from his study of the “pre-Platonic” Greek philosophers. Traveling with a
great mobility of spirit between the cosmic visions of these early philosophers, of which
Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus are the most important to him, Nietzsche developed, from
the ground of their tragic and secret fecundities, a series of theories on the role of the philosopher
in the creation of culture. This hypothetical philosopher is conceived in a sense that owes much
both to the genius of Schopenhauer, and to the Greek tragic hero.
Nietzsche and Jacob Burckhardt both conceived the ἀγών—the contest or competition—
as the central aspect of ancient Greek culture. Burckhardt, one of the leading historians of the
19th century, who, like Nietzsche, advocated a rigorous historical relativism, had held a position
at Basel since 1844, the year of Nietzsche’s birth, and the two enjoyed a mutual respect and
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Cited in Safranski, Nietzsche, 70.
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friendship upon the young philologist’s arrival at the university. Yet these two thinkers came to
the realization of the ἀγών separately—Nietzsche had already formulated the theory prior to his
arrival at Basel and it was perhaps in great part this illumination that bound these thinkers to one
another.3 Burckhardt’s book, The Greeks and Greek Civilization (Griechische Kulturgeschichte),
contains a chapter called “The Agonal Age,” in which he advances this theory of the ἀγών as the
dominant principle of Greek life. In 1872, Nietzsche wrote an essay called “Homer’s
contest” (Homer’s Wettkampf) in which he also made this claim.
Though the ἀγών is, for both Burckhardt and Nietzsche, thought as a paradigm that
informs every sphere of ancient Greek life, from the state to the arena to the oracle to the theater,
there are two essential components of the agonal theory shared by these two moderns. The first is
the importance of the opposition between a good and a bad goddess Eris (strife), of which
Hesiod speaks in his Works and Days, and the second is the prohibition of any absolute victory
between the contestants. With respect to the first of these points, Burckhardt claims that the good
Eris was both most central to the Greeks and prior to the bad Eris: “The good Eris was the first to
be born (while the bad was only a variant fostering war and conflict) and Hesiod seems to find
her not only in human life but also in elemental Nature, for Cronos had placed her among the
very roots of the earth [Gaia]. It is the good Eris who awakens even the indolent and unskilled to
industry; seeing others rich, they too bestir themselves to plough and plat and order their houses,
so that neighbor vies with neighbor in striving for wealth.”4 Thus did this Eris work to incite men
to competitive production. The Eris of destruction and war, on the other hand, could always be

3

Cf. Jacob Burckhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, ed. Oswyn Murray, trans. Sheila Stern (New York: St.
Martin’s Griffin, 1999), xxxii.
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Burckhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, 165.
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traced back to this originary Eris. Nietzsche’s emphasis falls, rather, on the importance of the
competitive jealousy awakened by the good Eris: “The Greek is envious and does not experience
this characteristic as a blemish, but as the effect of a benevolent deity: what a gulf of ethical
judgement between us and him!”5 These two goddesses of strife can thus be accessed through
one another—the regime of bad Eris can always be reversed into a regime of the good Eris.
Nietzsche also insists upon the political significance of the ἀγών, emphasizing “the feeling that
the contest is vital, if the well-being of the state is to continue.” It was for this reason that the
contest could never allow an absolute victory. Taking an inspiration from Heraclitus, Nietzsche
formulates this law of the Greek contest. Upon the banishing of Hermodor, the Ephesian sage
said: “Amongst us, nobody should be the best; but if somebody is, let him be somewhere else,
with other people.”6 From this vantage point, Nietzsche writes: “For why should nobody be the
best? Because with that, the contest would dry up and the permanent basis of life in the Hellenic
state would be endangered.”7 The ἀγών that Nietzsche and Burckhardt theorize thus defines itself
against the dialectic, conceived in the speculative sense, and this in two ways. Firstly, through
this reversibility between a nihilistic (bad) strife and a life-affirming (good) strife, and secondly
through the necessity that this ἀγών continue eternally, without any conqueror ever prevailing. It
is because of this exclusion of victory that the Hegelian Aufhebung, the process by which the
dialectic passes over to a higher stratum through the mastering of one side by the other, is
impossible in the process of the ἀγών.

5

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Genealogy of Morality” and Other Writings, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol
Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), “Homer’s Contest,” 174-181, 177.
6

Heraclitus, frag. 121. Cited in Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” 178.
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Nietzsche, “Homer’s Contest,” 178.
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Rather, between the contestants of the Greek ἀγών, there is a relation of duplicity which
Nietzsche had employed in his theorization of the two art instincts of nature, the Apollonian and
the Dionysian, in The Birth of Tragedy. These two instincts are defined by the impossibility of
their existence without one another—they are complementary forces which, in their primordial
struggle, eternally exist—their competition constitutes the very genesis of tragic art. Hence, they
express themselves through one another, just as man expresses himself through nature and nature
manifests itself in the form of man. The ἀγών thus carries the aspect of a circular economy
between life and art. At times, the two sides of the contest blend and lose themselves in one
another, becoming indistinguishable. These are moments of reconciliation. Yet following such
harmonic moments, they must again separate and return to their relation of strife. Extending this
agonal paradigm far beyond Burckhardt’s use, Nietzsche employs it to define the very attitude
toward antiquity that the modern philologist must cultivate. The ἀγών, an antagonistic and
primordial phenomenon is, in a certain perspective, the key to the Nietzsche’s early thought.
The return to the Greeks for the creation of novelty was by no means a project foreign to
German philosophy. It was, indeed, this very return that had characterized the German Romantic
movement. Specifically, the high valuation of ancient tragedy as the source of cultural
transformation and transition, indeed as the paradigm of the dialectic, was at the very heart of the
birth of speculative philosophy as well as of German Romantic literature. Some fifty years after
the death of that philosophical movement, Nietzsche finds himself, in the early 1870s, in close
conversation and harmony with these predecessors. It is as if he found Schiller, Goethe,
Hölderlin to be his true contemporaries, and it is to their constellation of problems and dangers
that he responds.

10

The second fragment toward Nietzsche’s unwritten Untimely Meditation, “We
Philologists” (Wir Philologen) reads:
Passage on Faust
Hölderlin
Finish Empedocles8
The importance of Hölderlin, as at once the modern tragedian and a figure of the modern tragic
hero is, I shall be arguing, central to Nietzsche’s philological project. Nietzsche inherits the very
archetype of the tragic hero as a herald of the culture to come from Hölderlin—this theory finds
its ground in the case of Empedocles, the poet-philosopher who endeavored to save his people by
thrusting himself into the flames of Mount Etna. Hölderlin’s unfinished Trauerspiel, The Death
of Empedocles had made an impression on Nietzsche at a young age, evinced by a letter he wrote
at sixteen, addressed to a hypothetical attacker of Hölderlin, his “favorite poet.” Taking
Hölderlin’s subversion of his contemporary speculative philosophy as a point of departure, I shall
exhibit how the spirit of Hölderlin, whose tragic death in madness took place only a year before
Nietzsche’s birth, inspired the blossoming philosopher in his scientific-artistic-philosophical
project. From Hölderlin, too, Nietzsche inherits the instinct toward tragic time—both for the
ancients, in the rhythm of their tragedies, and for the moderns in their discontinuous dream of
continuity. In the onrush of this time, the figure of the philosopher as tragic hero forms the
radical cut, the caesura between a world of dissolution and a new culture. And it is precisely
through his failure as a cultural reformer that he comes to constitute this chasm. The uncanny
consonance between the tragic fates of Hölderlin and Nietzsche in long-endured madness—their
respective descents into shadow-life, the first audible, productive and the second silent, evidently

8

Friedrich Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, ed. and trans. William Arrowsmith (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1990), 321.
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haunts this discussion. Although the question of this consonance is of profound concern to me, it
is not within the scope of the present project to formulate a response to it.
While there is an extreme, agonal tension between the metaphysical and the scientific
views of life in Nietzsche’s early work, his instinct toward a rejection of metaphysics entirely is
central to his thought—this is particularly evident in his notebooks. I will therefore draw in great
part from posthumously published fragments as well as from works published
contemporaneously to their composition, or written with the intention of publication, and notes
for courses given at Basel. There are thus various levels of textual direction, the intricacies of
which I do not address. At a basic hermeneutic level, one might say that the addressee of these
writings changes from form to form. The fragments would be addressed, then, to Nietzsche
himself, as he takes on other voices to converse with himself, to experiment with his own
thinking and to push at the limits of the spheres he moves within in the mode of an often-tragic
solitude. The published works would be addressed to an audience to come—a community or a
“we” that their very writing seeks to bring about, and to the few contemporary souls strong
enough to receive the boldness of their claims; Richard and Cosima Wagner, Erwin Rohde and
Carl von Gersdorff would number among these rare readers. The lecture notes, for their part,
would constitute an address to Nietzsche’s small circle of students—indeed, many of his lectures
of the early 1870s were delivered to no more than ten students. This was largely because,
following the publication of The Birth of Tragedy in 1872, condemned by Wilamowitz, Ritschl
and others as “fantasy philology” and “witty carousing,” Nietzsche’s student following at Basel
was greatly diminished.9 To postulate the degree of truth or faithfulness of the philosopher to

9

Cf. Safranski, Nietzsche, 83-84.
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himself in these different forms of writing is nearly impossible. Rather, I might suggest that the
posthumous fragments carry most profoundly the trace of Nietzsche’s own becoming—the
constant fluctuations of his self, of his multiple selves, and of their propositions, often
contradictory, balanced on the limit between madness and reason.
The rejection of metaphysics, then, begins as a quiet, clandestine thought in the intimacy
between Nietzsche and himself—the most dangerous thought, the most tragic thought, and, in a
manner that he would later elucidate in its fullness, the most necessary thought to his time. The
possessor of this poisonous, secret knowledge is the tragic philosopher. He attains this
knowledge of the impossibility of metaphysics by an excess of consciousness—both of his time
and of himself—which leads him to the foundational act capable of creating community: that of
self-sacrifice. It is through the tragic thinking and the tragic songs of Hölderlin that Nietzsche
comes to this sacrifice.
The present essay begins by tracing the configuration of Nietzsche’s early work, in which
science and metaphysics struggle against each other in the ideal organization of a culture. It then
moves through Hölderlin, to grasp the significance of the tragedy’s temporality and of the tragic
hero’s role in the creation of culture, and ends by following Nietzsche’s theories of time and
rhythm to the significance of the tragic hero for him, as the sacrificer of the metaphysical, and
thereby, too, as the prophet of new community.

*
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In 1887, Nietzsche would write, in a fragment:
To explore the whole sphere of the modern soul, to have sat in its every nook—
my ambition, my torture, and my happiness.
Really to overcome pessimism—a Goethean eye full of love and good will as the
result.
KSA 12: 9 [117]10
We may perhaps justly say that this instinct runs through the philosopher’s work, ignited early in
the figure—among many others—of the comet.

10

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. R.J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Vintage Books, 1968), 532.
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1
Philosopher as Comet
The young Nietzsche envisioned the philosopher as a wandering soul, a solitary spark in
the night of an impoverished world, an open, limitless song that captures eternities in his
incessant movement to fill living with power—this philosopher, above all, is the supreme
untimely creature. In his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873), written in the wake
of The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche speaks of the modern philosopher as a comet, the sole
soaring entity in a dissolving, barbaric sky whose stars have been reduced to uniformity and
identity, all possibility of unity, community between them obscured. While these faded stars
belong to a world in which all that is alive has become measurable, calculable, commensurable,
condemned to a self-inflicted destiny divested of singularity, the philosopher springs forth
inhumanly, as that necessary hero who infinitely escapes all form of measure and who travels
across solar systems at unthinkable, incalculable speeds. If the fertile culture of the Greeks
engendered philosophers who harmonized with their entire cosmos in a necessary way, what can
the modern philosopher’s task, in a world divested of such unified harmony, possibly amount to?

Only a culture [Kultur] such as the Greeks possessed can answer our questions as to the
task of the philosopher, and only it, I repeat, can justify philosophy at all, because it alone
knows and can demonstrate why and how the philosopher is not a chance random
wanderer, exiled to this place or that. There is a steely necessity which binds the
philosopher to a genuine culture. But what if such a culture does not exist? Then the
philosopher is a comet [Komet], incalculable and therefore terror-inspiring. When all is
well, he shines like a stellar object of the first magnitude in the solar system of culture
[Sonnensysteme der Kultur]. That is why the Greeks justify philosophers. Only among
them, they are not comets. 11

11

Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan (Lanham: Regenery
Publishing, 1962) § 1, 33-34.
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Culture, for Neitzsche, is characterized by “vital unity.”12 In the absence of this unity, the
philosopher, a monstrous heavenly body, must strive toward the creation of a new, unheard-of
culture, an undiscovered species of necessity whose face lies veiled beneath the soil of the
modern age. In his project to expose it, the philosopher strives against the current of his time, as
a crepuscular prophet. And might the comet’s tail, that unknown flame, brush against the surface
of the earth in an infinitesimal instant of irreversible catastrophe whose result can only be radical
transformation, a resurgence of the long-buried force of life? Here is the question this Nietzsche
dares to pose to us.
This indeterminate determination of the philosopher as comet comes to light, we must
remember, in the field of philology, at a moment in the flowering of this science when it is
virtually indistinguishable from Hellenism. Nietzsche had been appointed a chair in philology at
Basel University in 1869, at the age of 24. For him, therefore, this proposition is at once
philosophical, anthropological, artistic and prophetic. In his notes for a course on philology in
1871, Nietzsche wrote: “Comprehension of Antiquity, full penetration of love.”13 This penetration
demands first of all that we “experience our difference with it”14 —the unsurpassable abyss
between the Modern and the Ancient worlds must be not only understood but undergone in order
for philology, and philosophy, to be possible. This experience, vastly changeable, must thus also
be constantly redefined, reevaluated, reestablished. The invisible historical fabric that binds us to
and separates us from the Greeks is rewoven and rediscovered with every change in the flux of

12

Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, 105.
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Friedrich Nietzsche, Introduction aux leçons sur l’Œdipe-Roi de Sophocle et introduction aux études de philologie
classique, trans. Françoise Dastur and Michel Haar (Paris: Encre marine, 1994), 93.
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Nietzsche, L’Œdipe-Roi de Sophocle, 98.
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life. Giorgio Colli writes with passion of the young Nietzsche: “Whoever has drawn such a
wealth from these far-off spheres becomes an explosive force for the present [… .]”15
Nietzsche’s book on the philosophers of the Greek tragic age followed a course given at
Basel in 1872-1873 on the “Pre-Platonic Philosophers,” a term coined by Nietzsche. Philosophy
in the Tragic Age of the Greeks and The Pre-Platonic Philosophers run along two opposing
tracks: while the former maintains a metaphysical and artistic investment through a fidelity to
Schopenhauer and to Wagner, treating Hercalitus and his aesthetic cosmodicy as the acme
ancient Greek philosophy, in keeping with the tone of The Birth of Tragedy, the latter tends
decidedly away from metaphysics, toward a scientific goal, and takes Democritus and his
atomism as the acme of this history. Both art and science, however, as we will discover, are
necessary to Nietzsche’s philological project—primarily a cultural project.
In his inaugural address at Basel University, delivered on May 28, 1869, and titled Homer
and Classical Philology, Nietzsche claims: “Homer, as composer of the Iliad and the Odyssey, is
an aesthetic judgement.”16 That is to say, Homer is a modern creation, projected onto an
unknowable Greek world, outside the reach of our experience. For Nietzsche, Homer is a great
poet, but he cannot be the man whom we call Homer; rather, he is a myth created by the soul of
the Greek people. The Iliad and the Odyssey are the result of a great musical and poetic instinct
that surpasses the bounds of the principium individuationis imposed by a state. The person, the
very subjecthood of Homer is an invention, as Orpheus is an invention, a name destined to
designate an eternal, musical instinct. In this address, Nietzsche puts forth a program for the
15

Giorgio Colli, Écrits sur Nietzsche, trans. Patricia Farazzi (Paris: Éditions de l’éclat, 1996), 15.
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Friedrich Nietzsche, Homer and Classical Philology, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol. 3, ed.
Oscar Levy, trans. J.M. Kennedy (London: J. N. Foulis, 1910). http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18188/18188-h/
18188-h.htm.
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advancement of the “science” (Wissenschaft: literally, making of knowledge) of philology, which
requires its unification both with science and with art. He writes: “Science has this in common
with art, that the most ordinary, everyday thing appears to it as something entirely new and
attractive, as if metamorphosed by witchcraft and now seen for the first time. Life is worth
living, says art, the beautiful temptress; life is worth knowing, says science.”17 Antiquity, to be
constantly revitalized and recreated, must be studied from both a scientific and an artistic
perspective, and the one must never obscure the other. At the juncture between living and
knowing stands philology, which, for its part, must unite with philosophy in order to treat the
Greeks properly. “We grant that philology is not the creator of this world, not the composer of
that immortal music; but is it not a merit, and a great merit, to be a mere virtuoso, and let the
world for the first time hear that music which lay so long in obscurity, despised and
undecipherable?”18 The philologist’s task is to cultivate the modern ear, that it might learn to hear
the ancient music of life; it must facilitate the reception of the enigmatic Greek life-rhythm for
the first time. To unveil that ancient force, to draw its infinitude into a twilit present, this is the
philologist’s task—and it is for this very reason that the ancients cannot appear in their purity,
but only through the mediation of the untimely thinker.
Nietzsche reverses a formula of Seneca’s to say: “Philosophia facta est quæ philologia
fuit.” (What was philology has now been made into philosophy.) His ambition is to overthrow
the barbarity of modernity and resuscitate the Greek instinct for life among the Germans with
this, “our” new philosophical philology. He explains his “philological creed” as follows: “By this
I wish to signify that all philological activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a
17

Nietzsche, Homer and Classical Philology.
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Nietzsche, Homer and Classical Philology.
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philosophical view of things [… .]”19 Against the highly academic philology of his day,
exemplified by Ulrich von Wilamowitz, whose central ambition was to make philology into a
pure positive science (Wissenschaft), divested of philosophical or artistic influences, Nietzsche
already, at the dawn of his ten-year career as a professor of philology, insists on the necessity to
reassess and revalue the study of the ancients through a philosophical perspective. The
transformation (which is to say, creation) of the world depends upon the exigency that philology
be philosophical, that philosophy be philological, and that this transfigured discipline ally itself
with art and with “the artistic friends of antiquity,”20 with science and with the great scientists.
By this means alone will philology succeed in breeding the geniuses of the future, a modern race
of demigods.
“There is an invisible bridge from genius to genius,” writes Nietzsche in a notebook of
1872, “—that is the truly real ‘history’ of a people” (KSA 7: 19 [1]).21 It is this bridge that must
continually be destroyed and rebuilt by the philosopher-philologist, each time anew, toward a
future and the genius it unwittingly conceals. Or rather, the whole semicircular series of bridges
must be demolished and re-erected once again each day, exposing ever greater dangers,
discontinuities and possible harmonies. This history is never mastered by one logic but exposes
the incommensurable difference between all self-necessitating logics, doctrines, philosophies,
cosmogonies. Thus, with the gap of difference and community that separates and connects
geniuses across a history comes also an immeasurable incomprehensibility. That wide chasm of

19
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Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings from the Period of Untimely Observations, trans. Richard T. Gray
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sameness and difference separates Heraclitus from Socrates, Schopenhauer from Nietzsche,
Nietzsche from us.
In the second of his Unzeitgemässe Batrachtungen—Untimely Meditations, entitled “The
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1873), Nietzsche writes: “Only insofar as history
serves life do we wish to serve history.”22 The life of which Nietzsche here speaks is threefold,
and requires a complex ἀγών between memory and forgetting: “the unhistorical and the
historical are equally necessary to the good health of a man [ein Mensch], a people [ein Volk],
and a culture [eine Kultur].”23 It is thus that the creator of histories, and particularly of
philosophical histories, must at once be able to “diagnose” his time from the perspective of the
past and to diagnose the past from the perspective of the present, in order to engender the
philosophical explosion proper to his time, the one that might push it beyond itself, onto
unforeseeable, fertile ground. The degrees of memory and forgetfulness, of the historical and
unhistorical forces necessary to a man, a people, a culture, is determined by the measure of
capacity for plasticity, which Nietzsche views as an essential life-force, because, precisely, it
determines the capacity for transformation.
To determine this degree and thereby the boundary beyond which the past must be
forgotten if it is not to bury the present, we would have to know precisely how great is
the plastic force24 [plastische Kraft] of a man, a people, or a culture. I mean the strength
to develop uniquely from within, to transform and assimilate the past and the alien, to
recover completely from wounds, to redeem losses, and to refashion broken forms. There
are men who possess so little of this strength that a single experience, a single pain, or,
often and a especially, a single subtle wrong, the tiniest scratch, makes them bleed
helplessly to death.25
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This force [Kraft] carries a primordial aspect—it is the Urkraft that makes possible the
reestablishment of health for the future. Hence, an emphasis is placed both on the depths of a
man, a people, a culture’s strength, its power to bring itself into existence, and on the surfacephenomenon of life that is the result of the exercise of this power. Here it becomes evident that
life has for Nietzsche both a scientific and a metaphysical signification. It is at once biological
and primordial—and these two aspects are inseparable, enchained together in a circular relation
at the heart of the world. And this is because the economy of the human creature is circular;
when appearance, the exterior manifestation of life in cultural creations, transforms itself,
therefore, the primordial and the underlying biological aspect of life must also be transformed. It
is the breaking-out of a vicious circle, where the disconnect between internal force and external
creation is so great that it merely subsists in a repetitive state of degeneracy, that enables a
transformation of life and of culture. What shall enable this cutting of the vicious circle for
Nietzsche shall be, precisely, the sacrifice—the abandonment of the metaphysical. With this
sacrifice comes, too, the sacrifice of the capacity for measuring the degree of plastic force
inherent in a man, a people, a culture. The question of the source from which such a capacity
might come to be is left open and unanswered by Nietzsche—it is perhaps only from within the
rhythm of one’s time that such a measure might become possible. Measure itself, therefore, is
ever relative—no universal law can be employed to undertake such a task. Indeed, there is a
paradox in the concept of measure—for the tragic itself is defined by the impossibility of
universal measure. It is only by approximation that the quantity of plastic force can be grasped.
The genius, or the tragic hero who is capable of this measure is therefore characterized by an
internal admixture of metaphysical and scientific life-forces that allow him at once to embody
21

the tragedy of his time, which reaches its apex in his excessive self-consciousness, and to
sacrifice the metaphysical portion of this tragedy. It is through this sacrifice that a culture
divested of metaphysics can arise.
The famous axiom of The Birth of Tragedy is that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon
that life is eternally justified”26—this proposition formed the basis of Nietzsche’s metaphysics of
art. Insofar as life is an artistic, aesthetic phenomenon, it surpasses and even transfigures the
biological, scientific force it manifests. Life as biological life, that is, as a surface-phenomenon,
on the other hand, leads necessarily to the deeper reality of life as the ground of all possibility, as
a metaphysical force. Philosophy reveals itself to be in a privileged position to serve and
cultivate life, precisely because it speaks the language of science but is primarily, primordially
artistic. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes:
Great quandary: whether philosophy is an art [Kunst] or a science [Wissenschaft].
In its aims and in its results it is an art. But its means, conceptual representation, it
shares with science. It is a form of poetic artistry.—It cannot be categorized:
consequently we must invent and characterize a species for it.
The physiography of the philosopher. He arrives at knowledge by poeticizing and
poeticizes by arriving at knowledge. […] Heraclitus can never be obsolete. [Philosophy]
is poetry beyond the limits of experience, continuation of the mythic impulse; also
essentially in images.
(KSA 7: 19 [62])27
It is in this respect that philosophy is capable of bringing about culture—as a poetic force, in the
sense of the Greek ποίησις, meaning creation. Philosophy’s power, which exceeds the measure
of human experience, creating into outer solar systems, lies in reviving the “free poetic manner in
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which the Greeks dealt with their gods!” (KSA 7: 19 [40]).28 Here, science is conceived as the
means to philosophy as art, insofar as philosophy, in its scientific capacity, entails the creation of
ordering concepts. Philosophy is a kind of monster, a hybrid creature, perhaps a species of
centaur which, exceeding all categorization, requires the creation of a new physiography to
contain it, to think it. The proper measure of the artistic, mythic impulse and the scientific
impulse is achievable thus only philosophically. And the individual, the philosopher who
emerges from the dynamic between these impulses, is himself the harbinger of the culture to
come. Nietzsche wrote to his friend and fellow-philologist, Erwin Rohde, in February, 1870,
while he was writing The Birth of Tragedy: “Scholarship, art, and philosophy are now growing
together in me so fully that some day I am sure to give birth to a centaur” (B 3, 95).29 This
centaur—the mythical, monstrous half-beast, half-man is the very emblem, the prophecy of the
new Kultur on the rise.
Of the philosopher’s relation to art, Nietzsche also writes: “How does the philosophical
genius relate to art? […] What remains when his system, as science, has been destroyed? But it is
precisely this remaining element that controls the drive for knowledge, that is hence the artistic
element. […] In this control [of knowledge], the value of philosophy does not lie in the sphere of
knowledge, but in the sphere of life: the will to existence uses philosophy for the purpose of a
higher form of existence” (KSA 7: 19 [45]).30 All of philosophy’s force (Kraft) thus originates
from its primordial artistic strength. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe defines this plastische Kraft as the
capacity to grow out of oneself, as the faculty to “croître par soi-même” and to “s’accomplir par

28

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 16.

29

Cited in Safranski, Nietzsche, 65.

30

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 18.
23

soi-même”—in the manner of nature. The self-creation of life as a work of art, this “autoorganic” capacity is the inner process that must be measured and cultivated by the philosopher.31
In an outline for the book, “Philosophers of the Tragic Age, in memory of Schopenhauer” (KSA
7: 23 [25]),32 Nietzsche writes: “Philosophy, marvelous double nature” (KSA 7: 23 [28]). 33 It is
double, precisely, in its capacity as both an artistic and scientific force.
Untimeliness is the way of life necessitated by Nietzsche’s grand ambition to give rise to
a new culture: “for I don’t know what sense classical philology could have today, if not that of
exercising an untimely influence, that is, of acting against the time, thus upon the time, and, let
us hope, to the aid of a time to come.”34 It is for this reason that the second Untimely Meditation
begins with this forceful quotation from Goethe: “I hate everything that merely instructs me
without increasing or directly conferring life on my activity.”35 History is fatal if it does not lead
to the construction of another invisible bridge whose destination promises a resurgence of genius
from its neglected tomb. As advice to the young philologist Nietzsche proclaims: “He must have
the courage to seek his path alone.”36 In other words: to leap into the doubly-unknown chasm of
future and antiquity across an unbuilt footbridge, penetrating through the present with equal
quantities of love and hatred. Likewise, Nietzsche says of “philosophers”: “following the road in
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solitude is part of their character.”37 The modern wayward genius, isolated by virtue of his
internal flame, must be both philologist and philosopher; in other words, the future of
philosophy, as united with science and art beyond metaphysics, depends upon its intimate study
of Greek antiquity. There alone will it find the source of a renewal of life for the future.
Untimeliness, the art of transforming antiquity (Alterthum) into novelty (Neuthum), is
therefore the task of the philosophical genius. Paolo D’Iorio explains that while the first of these
words is “of common usage,” the latter is highly “rare in the German language”—it appears in
Nietzsche’s writing only twice: first, in the second Untimely Meditation, and second in the
Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions, appended to Human, All too Human in 1879.38 In the
second Untimely, these terms are used in a reproach of the “antiquarian” historian, who,
endlessly accumulating the memories of history, finds that it is impossible “to set aside such a
past [Alterthum] for a new present [Neuthum].”39 The second occurrence is a reference to the
appearance of the dead in dreams—when the dead reappear in this manner, “the distant past
[Alterthum] becomes a new present [Neuthum].” These appearances are therefore “Signs of great
changes [W a n d l u n g e n].”40 In both cases, therefore, it is a matter of receiving ancient life
into the heart of modern life by a process of anamnesis rendered possible through forgetting,
which thereby creates this ancient life anew, in a manner unheard-of and unknown. This then is
why plastic force is needed—to call back the past, differently, and, scientifically, to create the
transformed present as a work of art. The collaboration of the scientific and the artistic and,
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indeed, their necessary, ceaseless struggle with one another, is at the heart of philosophy and
essential to the poetic work.
What separates our time from that of the pre-Platonic Greeks, what separates ancient
Greece from modern Germany, for Nietzsche, is predominantly the existence of culture. While
the sphere of common life for the Greeks was constituted by an indestructible unity of art, ethics,
philosophy and the state, such a cultural organism is no longer possible for the moderns. In 1872,
Nietzsche writes: “At the proper height everything comes together and harmonizes—the
philosopher’s thoughts, the artist’s works, and good deeds” (KSA 7: 19 [1]).41 The modern
philosopher must therefore lay the ground for a renewal of the culture of this Greek species, yet
in a manner that utterly transforms it. But what does “culture” mean? The word comes from the
Latin root colere, meaning “tend, guard, cultivate, till”—culture is a spontaneous outgrowing, an
organic upsurge from the depths of the earth, that must be defined and perfected by a people. It is
the abundant out-spring of that which is most natural, into the self-organizing forms of collective
life and government. In German, Kultur is used in the sense of “civilization” as opposed to
Bildung, which is closer to culture in the sense in which one speaks of high culture or being
cultured. Nietzsche uses the word Kultur to designate the externalization of the natural instinct of
a man, a people, a culture to create itself as a universal harmony by the harnessing of plastische
Kraft. It is, indeed, this life-force rendered absolute in the circumscribed historical context of a
nation. Nietzsche proclaims: “My task: to comprehend the inner coherence and the necessity of
every culture [K u l t u r]” (KSA 7: 19 [33]).42 These vital organizations correspond to one
another by an internal necessity that binds them into systemic harmony. For the Greeks, this is
41
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none other than the cosmic harmony that unites human and divine life in a perfect, dynamic
whole. In Attic tragedy, according to Nietzsche, this whole manifests as an artistic reflection of
the primordial, Dionysian One.

Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of Music
Schopenhauer revives this concept of universal harmony in his metaphysics of music,
wherein music appears as the absolute presentation of nature. He writes: “The four voices or
parts of all harmony, that is, bass, tenor, alto, and soprano, or fundamental note, third, fifth, and
octave, correspond to the four grades of the series of existences, hence to the mineral, plant, and
animal kingdoms, and to man.”43 The vital harmony of nature, therefore, corresponds precisely to
musical harmony; the latter is, it seems, an idealized copy of the former. Music, for
Schopenhauer, is the purest manifestation of “the will” as life-force, in all its various forms. It is
entirely “independent of the phenomenal world” and could to some degree exist in total absence
of the world itself, as sheer will. Therein, no alien mediation—no Idea or representation
(Vorstellung)—interferes with the will’s exhibition; music surpasses “the principium
individuationis (the form of the knowledge possible for the individual as such)” and, in excess of
the knowable, universally exposes the soul of the world.
Music is as direct an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself, nay,
even as the Ideas (Vorstellungen), whose multiplied manifestation constitutes the world of
individual things. Music is thus by no means like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but
the copy of the will itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are. This is why the effect of music
is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts, for they speak only
of shadows, but it speaks of the thing itself. Since, however, it is the same will which
objectifies itself both in the Ideas and in music, though in quite different ways, there must
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be, not indeed a direct likeness, but yet a parallel, an analogy, between music and the
Ideas whose manifestation in multiplicity and incompleteness is the visible world. 44
Objective representations thus seek to exemplify music by metaphor; all the other shadow-arts,
subordinated to the representative structure, strive toward music as their ideality, and collapse the
difference between Wille and Vorstellung by attempting an impossible equation of the two in
signs. This however, merely results in the endless and circular loss of the will itself, thus of
music itself.
To create music purely, for Schopenhauer, is therefore the highest possible human
achievement: “The composition of melody, the disclosure in it of all the deepest secrets of human
willing and feeling, is the work of genius [… .] The composer reveals the inner nature of the
world, and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which his reason does not understand; as
a person under the influence of mesmerism tells things of which he has no conception when he
awakes.”45 The composer-genius attains a lucidity of which men confined by reason alone are
incapable; his power is universal, for he opens to man his essence as will—this capacity is called
by Schopenhauer “inspiration.”46
Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, writes, in his notebook of Winter 1869-Spring 1870:
“Music is a language which is capable of infinite explanation” (KSA 7: 2 [10]). 47 The poverty of
words, which are “the most deficient signs” (KSA 7: 2 [11]),48 arises from their foundation by
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thought as “concepts” out of an origin in “shared sensation” (KSA 7: 2 [10]).49 A “word” is an
entirely physiological phenomenon—it is nothing but the “portrayal of a nerve stimulus in
sounds.”50 In another note, he writes: “Truth and lie physiological” (KSA 7: 19 [102]).51 Thus, as
language is strictly circumscribed by a set of possible sensations and ways of capturing them and
draining them of life, “[t]he largest amount of feeling does not express itself through words. And
the word itself barely hints: it is the surface of the choppy sea, while the storm rages in the
depths [in der Tiefe]” (KSA 7: 2 [10]).52

These depths however, do not house the

Schopenhauerean will; they are, rather, the epicenter of emotion, the impulsive and powerful
drive to life, conceived both biologically and metaphysically. The experience of this drive,
undergone in the music of the Dionysian dithyramb, does not, like the will of Schopenhauer,
recede infinitely into some noumenal nethersphere, but requires symbolic expression, and for this
purpose, a Dionysian language must be born, a language that speaks life anew from its
profoundest depths. Indeed, it is the simultaneous “coexistence” of “presence of mind and
intoxication” entailed by “Dionysian artistry” that “characterizes the high point of Hellenism
[… .]” This artistry is born, like tragedy itself, the absolute Hellenic art, from the unification of
Dionysus and Apollo, in a relation at once agonal and amorous, upon Dionysus’ arrival on Greek
soil from the East: “originally only Apollo was the Hellenic god of art and it was as a result of
his power, which so effectively restrained Dionysus as he advanced like a storm from Asia, that
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the most beautiful bond of brotherhood was able to arise.”53 This bond was forged, in fact, at the
Delphic oracle: “Because the Delphic priesthood saw through the new cult and took notice of its
deep effect upon the social processes of regeneration and furthered it according to their politicalreligious aim to a certain extent, because the Apollinian artist learned with careful moderation
from the revolutionary art of the Bacchus service, because finally, the dominion of the year in the
Delphic cult order was divided between Apollo and Dionysus, both gods emerged as victors out
of their contest: a reconciliation on the battleground.”54 The ἀγών between the two gods, the
ceaseless relation of strife and reconciliation, thus took place originally in the sphere of
divination. The Delphic cult thus incorporated Dionysus as a necessary counterpart to Apollinian
prophecy, which preached measure and self-knowledge—only through an ecstatic, Dionysian
experience of becoming divested of the self and plunging into oblivion was the individuation
required by the Greek state possible. Dionysian purification brought Apollinian illumination to
its highest power and, locked in their struggle, the struggle between two impulses to
symbolization, one destroying individuality and the other striving to reestablish it, not only
tragedy but first tragic prophecy was born.
Erwin Rohde, in his monumental philological work, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the
Belief in Immortality among the Greeks (1894), would make this assertion even more explicitly.
He writes that Apollo, after a “prolonged resistance” following Dionysus’ arrival in Greece from
Thracia, did indeed “enter into the closest alliance with this remarkable divine brother of his, the
Hellenized Dionysus. The covenant must have been made at Delphi. […] The festal year of
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Delphi was divided, though unequally it is true, between Apollo and Dionysus. To such an extent
had Dionysus taken root at Delphi, so closely were the two gods related, that while the front
pediment of the temple showed the form of Apollo, the back pediment represented Dionysus—
and the Dionysus of the nocturnal ecstatic revels. […] The two divinites have many of their titles
and attributes in common; in the end, the distinction between them seems to disappear
entirely.”55 This insight into the origin of the tragic ἀγών between Apollo and Dionysus reveals
prophecy as the nexus of this event—for Nietzsche, therefore, the philological resuscitation and
the philological reapprpopriation of the struggle between these two divine forces, alternating in
dissonance and consonance, allows for science and art to unite as a method of divination—thus,
of the prophetic unveiling of a future Kultur, arising as a necessity—as the destiny of cultural
dissolution.
The cathartic experience of Dionysian tragic music is at once the primordial desire for a
new system of representation (µίµησις): “In the Dionysian dithyramb the Dionysian reveler is
incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic possibilities: something never before
experienced struggles for utterance, the annihilation of the individual, the oneness as the soul of
the race and of nature itself. The essence of nature shall now express itself: a new world of
symbols is needed, the accompanying representations are symbolized in images of a heightened
humanness [… .]”56 The Dionysian impulse to symbolization lies beneath the Apollinian one;
from its great depths, it must disrupt and destroy this surface-regime of signs and create a new
one, which shall expose nature and the essence of humanity as a unity. This essence, however, is
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precisely that which is least human—the monstrous face of man that springs from music. Thus,
Nietzsche’s view of the self-representation of the Dionysian in music differs from
Schopenhauer’s view in that this instinct is nothing but the drive to symbolization. The
Dionysian hence achieves its goal precisely insofar as it is actualized as art: rather than being a
copy of that natural instinct, music is its very genesis. For the Dionysian is nothing but this
impulse to symbolization, which the dithyrambs ceaselessly awaken.
For Nietzsche, there is one form of life that overrides all others in the constellation of
culture. In a fragment, he writes: “Culture—the rule of art over life [Kultur—Herrschaft der
Kunst über das Leben]. The degrees of goodness of a culture depend firstly on the degree of this
rule and secondly on the value of art itself” (KSA 7: 19 [310]). 57 The creation of culture is the
task of the artist, who creates in natural purity, and whose pulsing music communicates through
the adequate externalization the essence of life—the esse, breath. For the ancients, Nietzsche
insists, there is no possible determination of a “concept of being” but rather “esse [to be]
basically means ‘to breathe.’”58 In the spirit of the ancients, and through this philological gesture,
Nietzsche rejects ontology as a central object of philosophy, just as he shall reject all idealist
separations of a thing-in-itself from experience, and insists, rather, on a metaphysics of the βίος,
natural life. He continues: “And if man uses it of all things other than himself as well, he projects
his conviction that he himself breathes and lives by means of metaphor […] upon all things. He
comprehends their existence as a ‘breathing’ by analogy with his own.” Therefore, though the
“original meaning of the word was soon blurred” we have the remnants of a proof that man
understands the existence of other creatures “anthropomorphically”—by an extension and
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projection of his breath onto them.59 Again, Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872: “Concepts
arise only from intuition. ‘Being’ is the transference of breath and life to all things: addition of
the human awareness of life” (KSA 7: 23 [13]). 60 Philosophy weaves its “webs of language”61 by
the self-projection of human life onto that which is without it, and the appropriation of these
things as concepts, through a metaphoric transmutation. All inanimate things become signs of
which the true meaning is simply man himself. Being, therefore, is ultimately illusory,
nonexistent for it presupposes the stagnancy, the eternity of all living things while Nietzsche,
following Heraclitus, asserts that such an eternity is impossible, as life itself is nothing but
becoming—we are transformed with every breath, and the only possible eternity therein is that of
the endlessness of becoming itself. It is for this reason that Nietzsche will reject Parmenides. In a
fragment, Nietzsche noted: “systems as anthropomorphisms” (KSA 7: 19 [245]). 62 From this
results the following “[c]urious problem: the self-consumption of philosophical systems!
Unheard of both in science [die Wissenschaft] and art [die Kunst]! The situation is similar in the
case of religions: that is remarkable and significant” (KSA 7: 19 [63]).63 Philosophical systems
are created in the same manner, and by the same anthropomorphic procedure, as religious
systems—by a projection of the human organism onto the cosmos. It is the task of philosophy to
determine the proper measure and proportion of science and art for the good of culture; this
requires that belief be transferred from the realm of “religion”—or philosophy as religion (as in
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the case of Kant, who valued belief above knowledge)—to that of a dissonant harmonic unity
between the arts and sciences.
Therefore, art is precisely that which for Nietzsche makes life possible, giving birth to it
continually as a primal and originary force—for the fundament human instinct is that toward
symbolization and the creation of illusion, and such illusions, in turn, engender life: “We live
only by means of […] artistic illusions [Illusionen der Kunst].” The task of “higher culture” is
the “[c]ontrol of knowledge as the drive of art.” Through the illumination of the fact that the
same “world” is “reveal[ed]” by the “philosophical systems of the early Greeks” and by their
“tragedy,” we are able to “grasp the unity of philosophy and art for the purpose of culture” (KSA
7: 19 [51]).64 This then is the vital coupling from which alone a culture is created.65 Nietzsche
also writes, as a central principle of the Greeks: “Identity between life and philosophy” (KSA 7:
16 [17]).66 It is this fluidity, this incessant interpenetration and thus transfiguration of life and
philosophy that Nietzsche wishes to bring about once more among the Germans. Only a
philosophy of life, established by a return to the ancient Greeks, can save modernity from
barbaric devolution. Every philosophical doctrine, like every artwork, is a manifestation of “[t]he
beautiful lie”—and this is how “the Greeks philosophized” (KSA 7: 19 [221]). 67 As art is the
medium of the beautiful lie, it has, in view of the failure of knowledge, also become the only
64
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means to the creation of truth: “The truthfulness of art: now it alone is honest. / Thus, by an
enormous detour, we return to natural behavior (among the Greeks). It has proved impossible to
build a culture on knowledge” (KSA 7: 19 [105]).68 Nietzsche speaks both of the life-serving
power of art and of the “barbarizing influence of knowledge” (KSA 7: 19 [51])69 whenever faith
is put into it alone. The very indistinguishability of truth and lie, and the loss of measure for
both, is what constitutes, for the moderns, the tragic experience—our tragedy is precisely the
loss of any possibility of a life-giving metaphysics. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes:
“impossibility of metaphysics” (KSA 7: 23 [7]).70 Yet for the Greeks there was the supreme
possibility of illusion, that is, art, as a force that created nature and transformed life, although its
superficial nature was recognized.
It is only with Plato that the sovereignty of the beautiful lie is dismantled: “Plato wants a
new state in which dialectics rule; he denies the culture of the beautiful lie” (KSA 7: 19 [221]).71
It is at this Platonic moment that philosophy and art are severed from one another—the one
subsumed under the category of knowledge and the other, that of illusion. Before this moment,
they combine and collaborate in a necessary manner: “Viewed from the standpoint of the present,
that entire period of Greek philosophy also belongs within the domain of their art” (KSA 7: 19
[36]).72 Nietzsche writes, in his notebook of 1870-1871: “My philosophy is an inverted
[umgedrehter] Platonism: the further something is from true being, the purer, the more beautiful,
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the better it is. Living in illusion as the goal [Das Leben im Schein als Ziel]” (KSA 7: 7 [156]).73
This life of illusion, therefore, defines itself against metaphysics and against the dialectic in all
its myriad forms, including any dialectic of history; to live in illusion requires that all
philosophical concepts be recognized as the manifestation of primal human drives—thus, no Idea
or ideal shall be posited as the ground of reality—merely the constantly-transforming life-breath
of becoming lies at the heart of nature as illusion. Such an inversion of the Platonic, hierarchical
regime of Ideas and their copies requires a resuscitation of those true Greeks, the philosophers of
life who lived in the tragic age, lives of the beautiful lie.
Nietzsche, in his course at Basel on the ancient Greek philosophers (1872), rejected the
term “pre-Socratic” to describe these philosophers whose thought brought about the very dawn
of philosophy, and replaced it with the term “pre-Platonic.” He justified this designation in the
following manner:
Plato is the first grand mixed character both in philosophy and in his philosophical
typology. Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements unite in his theory of the
Ideas: it should not, without further qualification, be called an original conception. Also,
as a human being he possesses the traits of a regally proud Heraclitus; of the melancholy,
secretive, and legislative Pythagoras; and of the reflective dialectician Socrates. All
subsequent philosophers are of this sort of mixed philosophical type. In contrast, this
series of pre-Platonics presents the pure and unmixed types, in terms of philosopheme as
well as of character. Socrates is the last in this series. […] [These pre-Platonics] are
genuine ‘discoverers.’ […] They had to find the path from myth to laws of nature, from
image to concept, from religion to science.74
The purity of the ancients was therefore destroyed at Plato’s hands—their singularity as
types was demolished, such that they became, rather, ingredients to be used and abused against
their own ends. The genealogy of the pre-Platonic philosophers tells of the liberation of σοφία
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from µύθος; their history is that of a striving toward the foundation of science, away from the life
of myth. At the end of this history, however, and before the goal of the pre-Platonics had been
achieved, Socrates rejected both art and myth in favor of rational morality. In a fragment of
1875, Nietzsche writes: “With Empedocles and Democritus, the Greeks were well on their way
to correctly assessing human existence, its irrationality, its suffering; but they never reached this,
thanks to Socrates.” It was by introducing “terrible abstractions, ‘the good, the just,’” which
diverted men from seeking the path of life and art, from understanding the cosmic workings
(KSA 7: 6 [25]).75 In the notes for his final lecture on the pre-Platonics, Nietzsche writes:
“[Socrates] was always hostile to the entire culture and the arts, along with the natural sciences.
[…] He dispenses entirely with physics [… .] Likewise, he thinks nothing of art; he grasped only
its practical and agreeable aspects, and he belongs among the despisers of tragedy. […] Thus
Socratic philosophy is absolutely practical: it is hostile to all knowledge unconnected to ethical
implications.”76 In a reversal of his characterization in The Birth of Tragedy of Socrates as the
champion of science who puts tragedy to death by means of making Euripides his mask and
having him employ the deus ex machina, Socrates is here envisioned as the murderer of both
science and art, paving the way for Plato’s metaphysics morality by turning against culture.
Socrates puts an end to the aesthetic world-view of Heraclitus, in whose mouth Nietzsche puts
the following phrase with reference to fire as the eternal cosmic Justice and of all else as
Injustice: “It is a game. Don’t take it so pathetically and—above all—don’t make a morality of
it!”77 For, before Socrates, morality is highly malleable, serving only the greatness of life and the
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health of art. For the future, Nietzsche calls for both, with Schiller, a recreation and
reenforcement of morals and, with Wagner, a subordination of morality to art. While, in
“Athens,” life was “constantly suffused in responsibility, commitments, initiative, and effort”
such that the people, for “cheer” knew how to “honor and crave art, the festival, and cultivation
in general,” the “Germans’ moral weakness is the primary cause for their lack of culture” (KSA
7: 31 [2]). 78 For without a moral structure to a culture, no art can be properly created for its
people. In accordance with his view of the pre-Platonic philosophers as pure, Nietzsche calls
these philosophers from Thales to Socrates “archetypal philosophers” and declares: “Each is the
first-born son of philosophy.”79
After Plato, thus, original philosophy is no longer possible; how the purity achieved by
the pre-Platonic philosophers had ever come about became a mystery—these early philosophers
were dismembered, obscured in their luminous wholeness and transformed into enigmatic, nearsacred figures. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes: “Later, people took from these
venerable-incomprehensible ones whatever they needed, they looted them; and hence we find,
sometimes here, sometimes there, in Plato’s academy as well as among the Stoics and in the
gardens of the Epicureans, one of Parmenides’ arms, a piece of Heraclitus’ shoulder, one of
Empedocles’ feet” (KSA 7: 23 [1]). 80 It became necessary, thereafter, that each philosophical
system possess its pieces of the creators of pure ancient wisdom, as every church requires its
saintly relic. Indeed, Nietzsche makes this very analogy in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the
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Greeks: “Other peoples have saints; the Greeks have sages.”81 Of the pre-Platonics in their overanalyzed, disfigured state, Nietzsche writes:
In order to understand them as wholes, one must recognize in them the first outline and
germ of the Greek reformer; their purpose was to pave the way for him, they were
supposed to precede him as the dawn precedes the rising sun. But the sun did not rise, the
reformer failed: hence the dawn remained nothing but a ghostly apparition. However, the
simultaneous emergence of tragedy demonstrates that something new was in the air; but
the philosopher and legislator who would have comprehended tragedy never appeared,
and hence his art died and the reformation became forever impossible. It is not possible to
think of Empedocles without a sense of profound sadness; he came the closest to filling
the role of the reformer. That he also failed and soon disappeared—following who knows
what horrible experiences and what hopelessness—was a pan-Hellenic catastrophe.
KSA 7: 23 [1]82
The tragic failure of the philosopher as cultural reformer, the failure to unite tragedy with
philosophy and hence the tragic fate of the Hellenic world itself, results instead in the dissolution
of philosophy into science and morality which, alone, and separated by a chasm, cannot suffice
to found a culture. This fate requires, indeed, a genealogical approach—one that apprehends the
abyss of difference between the ancients and us and that travels the hidden passages of history to
discover what it was that made their lives tragic. The figure of the philosopher as failed reformer,
although he seems to represent the tragic downfall of tragic culture and thus must be restored in
modernity as a successful reformer is in fact, as I shall later explicate, himself a necessary step in
the creation of culture in one of Nietzsche’s many perspectives.
In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche proposes the following: “The philosopher as the
physician of culture (Kultur)” (KSA 7: 23 [15]).83 On March 2, 1873, Nietzsche wrote to his
friend Carl von Gersdorff: “My book is growing and taking the form of a pendant to ‘Tragedy.’ I
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will call it, perhaps, ‘the philosopher as the physician of culture.’ I want, in fact, to make it a
surprise to Wagner for his next birthday.”84 This role for the philosopher—as physician—is
justified on the following grounds:
Philosophy can create no culture,
but it can prepare it;
or preserve it;
or moderate it.
Such a proposition, insofar as it is true for the Greeks, extends into the present as an exigency to
the nation that has no philosophy, and because of this, no culture. “For us: For these reasons, the
philosopher is the supreme tribunal of the schools. Preparation of the genius: since we have no
culture” (KSA 7: 23 [14]).85 The pre-Platonic philosophers, as pure types, must thus be used by
the modern philosopher in his practice as the physician of culture; this philosopher has the moral
responsibility of diagnosing the complex constellation of the individual, the people and the
civilization (Kultur) and treating them with the proper doses of each of these pure philosophies
to serve their maximal health. This requires the determination of the proper combination and
dynamic—the proper harmony, for a given time, between myth, art and science, these
components of culture. Knowledge and art are regarded by Nietzsche, respectively, as the
destructive and creative forces between which the conflict much ultimately result in the
formation of a culture. “Art is more powerful than knowledge, because it wants life, while
knowledge achieves as its ultimate goal nothing but—destruction.”86
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Hence, Nietzsche follows in the footsteps of Goethe, who, caught in the struggle between
science and art, had written in his Theory of Colors:
Neither in knowledge nor in reflection can anything whole be put together, since in the
former the internal is missing and in the latter the external; and so we must necessarily
think of science as art if we expect to derive any kind of wholeness from it. Nor should
we look for this in the general, the excessive, but, since art is always wholly represented
in every individual work of art, so science ought to reveal itself completely in every
individual object treated. 87
The possibility of a whole vision of the world to emerge hinges on this capacity to consider
science as art: herein lies the goal of Goethe’s poetic scientism. The Birth of Tragedy itself
begins with a declaration of Nietzsche’s ambition to create a new “science of aesthetics
[ästhetische Wissenschaft] [… .]”88 In a certain perspective, his is the continuation of Goethe’s
project to combine art with science, or rather, to subsume science under the title of art—to
transform science itself into an art which, as we know, also requires a transformation of the
meaning of art. That science, like art, requires representation, which is to say, the
presentification of nature, is the radical claim Nietzsche, with Goethe, is making. If philosophy
stands at the midpoint between art and science, this is because, for Nietzsche, it must work in the
service of life, springing from the changeable vital force in becoming, whose appearance men
are.

Imitation and the Approach to History
The Dionysian art instinct is the embodiment of Nietzsche’s epistemology, which views
the fundamental human drive as that toward artistic, instinctual creation. The medium of this
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creation, as I have said, is that of music. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche speaks of the
Schiller’s “poetic process,” wherein he began “the act of creation” faced not with any series of
images in a causal arrangement, but, rather, overcome with a musical mood. He quotes Schiller:
“With me the perception has at first no clear or definite object; that is formed later. A certain
musical mood comes first, and the poetical idea only follows later.”89 This primordial music, for
Nietzsche, the Dionysian, is thus the source of lyric poetry, while the Apollinian appearance is
that of epic poetry, though neither of these sources can create without the strife and struggle of
the natural-artistic forces: “Taking part in both worlds [the Dionysian and Apollinian], poetry,
too, reaches new spheres: simultaneously sensuality of image, as in epic, and the intoxication of
feeling of the tone, in lyric.”90 Poetry is defined by Schiller as “giving mankind its most complete
possible expression [… .]”91 And it is in the later surfacing of the poetic idea, which corresponds
as language to the Apollinian, that illusion manifests itself at once as the revitalized beautiful lie
and as the new establishment of truth. The art of which Nietzsche speaks is this double-weaving
of truth and lie that founds a culture, the collective life of a people. For art to rule life, it is thus
necessary that, out of an original, musical and willful instinct, something altogether monstrous,
absolutely different from its nature be created by human life, to re-appropriate this life as at once
infinitely other and infinitely similar to it, and so to preside over it in a world to come. Art must
simultaneously announce and bring about this world’s arrival. Nietzsche declares: “Our salvation
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does not lie in knowing, but in creating!” (KSA 7: 19 [125]).92 The first order of creation is,
indeed, cosmogony: world-creation.
It is the task of culture itself to engender instinct as the source of culture, which, for
Nietzsche, is also a second nature. In a fragment of 1873, he writes:
Imitation [Das Nachahmen] is the medium of all culture [Kultur]; it gradually produces
instinct. All comparison (primal thinking [Urdenken]) is an imitation. Species develop as
a result of the first specimens’ preference for imitating only similar specimens, i.e.
copying the largest and strongest specimen. The installation of a second nature by way of
imitation. In procreation the most remarkable thing is the unconscious imitation and at
the same time the education of a second nature.
KSA 7: 19 [226]93
Instinct, the original, spontaneous movement of life and its unmediated self-manifestation, lies
not, for Nietzsche, at a prehistoric original point, but must, on the contrary, be created through
imitation as the movement by which a culture, and thus a new nature, comes to be. This
imitation, however, is not a mere copy of an original. It is, rather, a self-originating, creative
process whereby the sphere of the primordial itself is brought about.
Conversely, in his notes toward his second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche warns against
imitation as mere copying (Nachmachen) for the health of a culture. He presents the portraits of
two sorts of historians, the monumental and the antiquarian. “Imitation (Nachmachen)—do not
imitate—result: assimilation. Point of view represented by the monumental.” As for the
antiquarian philosopher, he is characterized by “Veneration, gratitude: result: loyalty”—that is,
the desire to represent history exactly as “it once was,” as a “consolation.” Later in the same
fragment, on the subject of the “Deception of objectivity,” Nietzsche writes with foreboding:
“Now pure comprehension, without reference to life—takes over the degenerate form of the
92

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 42.

93

Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 153.
43

antiquarian (what is dead without veneration) and of the monumental (what is living without
imitation [Nachahmung])” (KSA 7: 29 [102]).94

The monumental, or exemplary

(monumentalitsche) view of history thus calls for continual spurts of originality. It is its
perspective that “the great moments in history form a chain; that in them a great mountain ridge
of mankind takes shape through the millennia; that the peaks of such long-lost moments might
still be alive, still luminous, still great, for me [… .] But this very demand—that greatness should
be immortal—kindles the most frightful battle.”95 For the need for the immortality of greatness
suffocates the great themselves. The antiquarian historian, on the other hand, is devoured by
infectious nostalgia, “a blind mania for collecting things, an incessant, restless accumulation of
everything that has ever existed” and his “craving for the new” is nothing but a craving “for the
old, for everything old.”96 He is incapable of forgetting and therefore antiquarian history
“understands merely how to preserve life, not how to create life [… .]”97 Life is therefore stifled
in the cobwebs of memory, and forgetfulness, which is absolutely necessary to the maximal
health of a man, a people, a culture, is ruthlessly eliminated from possibility.
There exists, for Nietzsche, a third type of history: critical history. Its principle is the
following: “In order to live, man must possess the strength, and occasionally employ it, to shatter
and disintegrate a past. He does this by haling the past before a tribunal, interrogating it
carefully, and in the end condemning it. But every past deserves to be condemned [… .]”98 To the
critical historical type belongs the impulse to destroy the past from which we issued, to “attack
94

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 243.

95

Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, 95.

96

Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, 101, 102.

97

Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, 102.

98

Nietzsche, Unmodern Observations, 102.
44

its roots with a knife” and “plant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that
the first nature withers.”99 Such an endeavor is “always dangerous, and dangerous even to life
itself,” since one’s history is inescapable, and “risky […] because second natures are generally
weaker than first natures.” Yet “for those who use critical history in the service of life, there is
significant consolation in knowing that every first nature was once a second nature, and that
every victorious second nature will become a first.”100 All three of these historical archetypes are
necessary; it is the task of the philosopher as comet and as cultural physician to determine which
dosage of each is appropriate: “Every man, every nation, requires, according to its goals,
strengths, and necessities, a certain knowledge of the past, a knowledge now in the form of
exemplary history, now of antiquarian history, and now of critical history.”101 Each of these
historical methods, accordingly, reflects an aspect of Nietzsche’s own approach to history, and
particularly to Greek antiquity, with respect to his modern Germany. While in his ambition to
create a second nature after the Greeks, to destroy their established, antiquarian history and to
erect a new, philological-philosophical one, his approach is primarily critical, yet it unites most
strongly with monumental, or exemplary history, in his treatment of the pre-Platonics as pure
types, as geniuses connected by an invisible series of bridges, which, nonetheless, are not
identical to a chain of dialectical necessity. A different species of necessity takes hold in
Nietzsche’s viewpoint; while he is strictly opposed to any kind of Hegelian διαδοχαί (succession)
of philosophers, he does believe in the need for genius and absolute novelty to form culture, by a
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kind of spiritual correspondence between the geniuses of all times. For this purpose, the old form
of imitation, inspired by Aristotle, as copying nature, must be demolished and a new one created.
Nietzsche thus avidly rejects all attempts to copy Greek antiquity in a barbaric manner—
he sees in opera a “warning example of the damage the direct aping of antiquity can do.” Here,
there is no “unconscious art growing out of the life of the people”—the “roots” of this art, rather,
are thereby “badly mutilated” (KSA 7: 1 [1]).102 In the notes for the unwritten Untimely
Meditation, Wir Philologen—“We philologists”—Nietzsche declares that “antiquity” is “not to
be imitated directly, but learned, in what way art achieved its highest perfection to date.” The
“few” who are destined to be philologists must equally be “critics of the present,” must “measure
our own times against antiquity” and therefore also “measure antiquity in terms of their own
ideals”—in this respect alone can they be “critics of antiquity.”103 The capacity to learn is
precisely what we lack, and what the Greeks were abundantly capable of: “The Greeks as
discoverers and voyagers and colonizers. They know how to learn: enormous power of
appropriation. Our age should not believe that it stands so much higher with regard to its drive
for knowledge: except that for the Greeks everything became life! For us it merely remains
knowledge!” (KSA 7: 19 [42]).104 The vital, artistic appropriation that Nietzsche calls for must
not be one that remains an “aping” in the perilous realm of “knowledge” but, rather, must fill
everything it imitates with life by creating it anew in the sphere of art.
The word Nachahmung in the German lies much closer to the Greek µίµησις than to the
English imitation or the German Imitation. µίµησις means artistic representation. Yet this
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definition is misleading; for art—τέχνη—does not represent nature but is its very manifestation.
For the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy, imitation for the Greeks is the act of the Dionysian
and Apollinian “art impulses of nature”105—the height of symbolic self-expression. Tragedy is
the “equally Dionysian and Apollinian form of art” created by the “coupling” of these two vital
impulses.106 Vitality, here, is itself, however, thought not as an original and extratemporal point
to which it would be necessary to return, but must be considered in concordance with the
inseparability of τέχνη and φύσις for the Greeks, in Nietzsche’s perspective. By the German
Idealists, tragedy had been conceived as “the absolute organon, or, to take up the expression that
Nietzsche applied to Tristan (a work in which Nietzsche found approximately the same thing),
‘of all art, the opus metaphysicum.’”107 The Organon is “the self-engendering, as Subject, of the
Work”108 —the paradox here, is that the genius, or tragic hero, does not spring out of some
oblivion; he is created by necessity. The very composition of tragedy, for Nietzsche, involves
tragic experience, which Schelling regarded as the conflict between necessity, another name for
destiny, and freedom, or our willful blindness in realizing our destinies. But the tragedy for the
moderns is precisely the lack of our divinities—our condemnation to the knowledge that we
create our own truth. Hence the organon is transfigured—it must be the work of mortals alone,
in the tumult of their own becoming.
The Aristotelian “imitation of nature,” for Nietzsche, does not mean a copying of reality
but, by an artistic creation of the Dionysian as the realm of the noumenal for the Greeks, a
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birthing of nature itself, of a first nature and then a second nature, of a new world where souls
exceed themselves and intermingle in the the dawn of a collective lucidity. For Dionysian
possession in tragedy, though it shatters individuality, does not, however, cloud consciousness.
On the contrary, it clarifies it; for “[t]ragedy” requires “reflection.” Krell writes that for
Nietzsche: “The chorus in tragedy motiviert die Besonenheit, ‘motivates lucidity.’” And this
word, lucidity, this Besonenheit, is equally used by Nietzsche in his description of “the
Dionysian dream of the Maenad troupes as described by the messenger in Euripides’ The
Bacchae. At the heart of Dionysus, the epitome of Apollo.”109 Nietzsche’s very creation of these
two art instincts of nature is exemplary of the creative imitation—µίµησις—of antiquity he calls
for. In the ecstatic (ἐκστατικός) experience of the Dionysian music of Greek tragedy, the dreamfabric of the Apollinian

image is torn away, the “veil of maya” abolished, and man “feels

himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking in
his dreams. He is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: in these paroxysms of
intoxication the artistic power of nature reveals itself to the highest gratification of the primordial
unity [Ur-Einen].”110 The “Dionysian world-artist”111 must expose the soul of the universe by its
creation—man becomes monstrous; in the experience of the Dionysian dithyramb, he is
transformed into the very divine Apollinian image he constructed in his dream. All that he had
brought to presence as appearance becomes for him reality—the measure of the real. Only by
self-dispossession through that fundamental human nature he has created can he cease to be the
artistic creator of the world and embody that harmonious cosmos. The self-engendering world of
109
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the Greeks is not some long-lost origin, but is still to be created. Lacoue-Labarthe affirms that for
Nietzsche, “life is indeed thought on the model of art, and not the reverse.”112 Nietzsche himself
writes, in a fragment of 1874: “Isn’t it nature that imitates art?” (KSA 7: 35 [12]).113 And this is
the function of tragedy, and, indeed, of art in the highest sense: to deliver us from the dream-life
of representation to a transfigured realm of experience. And this experience, as an artistic
creation by man of his own nature, his own φύσις, is also a birth of man himself, and hence a
primordial experience; or: the experience of the primordial, ever re-created by the agonal play
between artistic impulses.
Nietzsche writes in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks: “Everywhere, the way to
the beginnings leads to barbarism [Der Weg zu den Anfängen führt überall zu der Barbarei].
Whoever concerns himself with the Greeks should be ever mindful that an unrestrained thirst for
knowledge for its own sake barbarizes men just as much as å hatred for knowledge. […]
Whatever [the Greeks] learned, they wanted to live through, immediately.”114 The origins are
shrouded in barbarity, and to seek them simply with knowledge is barbarizing; rather, this
creation of this natural well-spring of all true experience is the task of science and art in their
necessary coupling, and thus the task of philosophy which unifies them. Nietzsche’s philological
project, which would develop into his genealogical project, thus works against the grain of
history and philosophy conceived in a metaphysical framework. The project of reuniting
knowledge with life, conceived on a biological ground, was thus for Nietzsche an overturning of
the metaphysical organization that posits an intelligible and unattainable substratum of the in-
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itself, the absolute or, indeed, the will behind the illusory phenomenal world, and projects a
necessity or, in the case of Hegel, a dialectic, onto the unfolding of history. Michel Foucault
writes: “Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the
philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects
the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself
to the search for ‘origins.’”115 The origin, rather, lies in the future of a transfigured physis.
Nietzsche ends the second Untimley Meditation in the critical perspective, by appealing
to the need for a revitalization of “the Greek concept of culture”—that is, “the concept of culture
as a new and improved physis.”116 The creation of culture is inseparably one with the recreation
of nature; the creation of nature as culture. Lacoue-Labarthe interprets Nietzsche’s definition of
culture as a living unity as follows: “A people, like a man or a culture, a civilization (Kultur),
only exists, only has its proper unity insofar as it is thinkable as a work of art.”117 The essential
task of the philosopher as comet is to recreate the Greeks as a model for the culture to come of
which, in his untimeliness, he is the only member, the sign and lone announcer. Such a task must
be completed anthropomorphically, in accordance with the man of his time. Just as the Greeks,
in Nietzsche’s creative view, formed their cosmogonies and philosophical systems by means of a
projection of themselves onto nature, so that an “imitation” (Nachahmung) of nature that was its
very genesis, modern man must create the nature he strives towards—that of antiquity—in order
to engender the monstrous novelty of genius in the form of a Kultur. Goethe had said: “I call the
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classic healthy, the romantic sickly.”118 It is indeed this health that Nietzsche seeks to bring about
in the mimetic creation of culture.

Knowledge, Wisdom, Belief
Nietzsche holds Kant responsible for a resurgence of anthropomorphism in the domain of
knowledge. In the place the Kantian idealist epistemology, Nietzsche will create a new
epistemology based upon sensation, strictly speaking, a physiological-materialistic ground. Yet
we shall see that this ground is also metaphysical. He writes in a fragment of 1872:
Human beings even immediately exploited Kantian epistemology for a glorification of
the human being: the world only has reality in them. […] Intellect’s forms emerge very
gradually out of matter. It is plausible in itself that they are strictly adequate to truth.
Where could such an apparatus that invents something new possibly have come from!
The primary faculty seems to me to be the perception of structure, that is, based
upon the mirror. Space and time are merely measured things, measured according to a
rhythm.
KSA 7: 19 [153]119
This rhythm is for the human that of breath. In every living thing, the measure upon which all
knowledge is based is relative to its powers of perception. Man sees himself reflected in the
world—he grasps external forms as relative to his own human form. “All knowledge is a process
of measuring according to a standard” (KSA 7: 19 [155]).120 Concepts, for Nietzsche, are formed
out of images, which are the synthetic results of sensations; truth and lie, which are
interpretations of these images, are separated only by degree. It is, indeed, a moral question as to
where the limit between the two must be drawn. Yet the morality to which Nietzsche appeals
118
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distinguishes itself from traditional morality in that it entails a tear in the veil of faith. His
criticism of Kant is precisely that the latter creates an opposition between faith and knowledge
and employs the former to destroy the latter:

Kant says (in the second preface to the Critique): “I must, therefore, abolish knowledge to
make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is
possible to advance in metaphysics without a critique of pure reason, is the true source of
all that unbelief—which is always very dogmatic—that opposes morality.” Very
important! he was driven by a cultural need.
Curious opposition, “knowledge and faith”! What would the Greeks have thought
of this? Kant knew of no other opposition! But we do!
KSA 7: 19 [34]121
Nietzsche will replace this destruction of knowledge by faith with a tempering of the drive to
knowledge by the artistic impulse. Both of these drives are present not only in the philosopher
but in every human being: “it is only a matter of degrees and quantities: all human beings are
artistic, philosophical, scientific, etc. […] However, humanity only grows only through the
veneration of what is rare and great” (KSA 7: 19 [80]).122 The epistemological structure of the
mind is such that it is primordially artistic—which is to say that it deals in illusions—and
secondarily scientific. It thus produces metaphors that are held to be absolute truths. This power
of illusion, for Nietzsche, rather than a moral exigency, is the force of philosophy, its
definitional, pulsionary and instinctual drive. The supremacy of philosophy over science and
over art is precisely due to the fact that is “deals with great things and concerns” (KSA 7: 19
[83]).123 It is for this reason that it is the philosopher must be central to the creation of culture:
only he can determine the dosage, i.e., the necessary combination of quantities of these
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fundamental impulses to contribute to a genesis of culture through greatness, by means of its
“legislation.”
Nietzsche writes: “It is not a matter of destroying science, but rather of controlling it. In
all its aims and methods it is wholly reliant on philosophical views, though it easily forgets this.
But the philosophy that is in control of science […] must determine its value!” (KSA 7: 19
[24]).124 The valuation of existence and its various constituent components—in the case of
culture, science, art and philosophy—is, in Nietzsche’s view, the philosopher’s grand task. He is
not meant to render social life possible—his purpose is not moral, but rather, by the coventriloquism of philosophy and philology, the values of science, of knowledge, of faith, of
morals must be disclosed. The “origins,” however, of these things, are mired in the confusion of
history, confusion of memory, such that they lose their character as absolute beginnings and do
not constitute a whole.
The limitation, thus, of Kantian morality, is that it remains in the realm of faith. Nietzsche
writes, in a fragment of 1872: “Practical morality will suffer greatly from the collapse of
religion. […] If we can only create mores, powerful mores! Then we would also have morality. /
But mores are formed following the example set by powerful individual personalities” (KSA 7:
19 [39]).125 The philosopher, to incarnate this individual power by bringing to the surface the
spherical tragedy of modern existence—that is, to become the tragic hero of his people. It is in
this same fragment that Nietzsche proposes the replacement of religion, hence of its metaphysics
and its morality, by art: “I can imagine a wholly new sort of philosopher-artist [neue Art des P h
i l o s o p h e n - K ü n s t l e r s] who fills the void with a work of art [ein K u n s t w e r k], with
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one that has aesthetic value” (KSA

7: 19 [39]).126 It is by a re-descent to the depths of

knowledge—to the primordial process by which this knowledge is formed—where the human
mind is revealed as the primary generator of illusions, that Nietzsche as philosopher-philologist,
as a sounder of the traces of knowledge’s origins in artistic, plastic force, reveals faith as a lie
and delivers us to the aesthetic as the ground of life. In place of religion, the primordial space of
the instinct to faith must be accessed; and this instinct finds itself, once again, embedded in the
fundamentally artistic life-force, as one of its originary perversions. For faith serves to veil, to
cover over and mystify, in short to stifle the “drive for truth (der Trieb zur Wahrheit)”127 such that
its origins go everywhere invisible, eradicated by an all-encompassing illusion—by a faith that
renders knowledge impossible, and thus eternally hides the rude and painful truth at which the
pursuit of knowledge must eventually arrive—a truth that shatters the reality of this drive.
If man were nothing but a “knowing animal,” says Nietzsche: “He would be driven to
despair and destruction by the truth, the truth that he is eternally condemned to untruth.”128 It is
for this reason that man, as the sheltering vessel of knowledge and the instinct toward truth, must
create ever new illusions in which to place his faith: “for man the only fitting belief is the belief
in the unattainable truth, in the illusion that approaches him trustfully.”129 The ultimate
incarnation of this truth, then, is the Kantian thing-in-itself, the unknowable that lurks beyond the
surfaces of things, that is a receptacle for belief. And this belief renders all thought, all
knowledge possible. Such an illusion differs from the artistic illusion which Nietzsche endorses

126

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 16.

127

Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 254.

128

Nietzsche, “On the Pathos of Truth (1872),” Early Notebooks, 248-252, 252.

129

Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 252.
54

precisely because it is by definition ungraspable, invisible, and because its very existence is
unprovable. Yet Nietzsche calls to another concealing power; that of consciousness itself, the
work of a cruel, abyssal Nature, which hides from man what is most intimate to him:
Does nature not conceal most things from [man], e.g. his own body, of which he has only
a deceptive “consciousness?” He is locked up in this consciousness, and nature has
thrown away the key. Oh, the disastrous curiosity of the philosopher who desires for once
to peer out and down through a crack in the chamber of consciousness: he might then
suspect that man, in the indifference of his ignorance, rests on the greedy, the insatiable,
the disgusting, the merciless, the murderous, as if he were hanging in his dreams from the
back of a tiger.
“Let him hang,” cries art. “Wake him,” cries the philosopher, in the pathos of
130
truth.
Yet to awake him would revive man from a world of imagination, where he comes to life as
something other than himself, outside himself, into a world of beautiful lies, a life of shadows in
which faith plays the central role of supplying an invisible inner truth to a truthless reality. The
philosophy of which Nietzsche dreams—the culture-engendering philosophy, comes out of a
unification of the philosophical drive to truth with the underlying artistic drive, which lives on
images, on the dream-surface of the mind, lights flickering from the outside, lifting the mind into
lucidity through illusion. Nietzsche writes: “It is [the human being’s] nature to be so immersed in
illusion (dream) and dependent upon surface (eye)” (KSA 7: 19 [183]).131 And again: “Due to
the superficiality of our intellect, we do indeed live in one ongoing illusion: that means that in
every moment we need art in order to live” (KSA 7: 19 [49]).132 Only by means of a control and
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limitation, indeed, a legislation of the drive to knowledge by the philosopher can culture come
about.133 This need defines the philosopher’s task:
The supreme dignity of the philosopher is revealed when he gives focus to the limitless
drive for knowledge, controls it by giving it unity.
This is how the earlier Greek philosophers are to be understood, they control the
drive for knowledge.
KSA 7: 19 [29]134
Nietzsche proffers a doctrine of art and world as illusion: “When closed, my eyes see
within themselves countless changing images—imagination produces them, and I know that they
do not correspond to reality. Thus, I believe in them only as images, not as realities. / Surfaces,
forms. / Art includes the joy of awakening belief by means of surfaces: but one isn’t really being
deceived? For if so, it would cease to be art! […] Art thus treats semblance as semblance,
precisely does not want to deceive, is true. […] The world as semblance” (KSA 7: 29 [17]).135
The philosopher speaks a double-tongue, both artistic and scientific, and wherein the artistic
drive [Trieb] always exceeds the scientific one, wherein Nature’s mad, organic movement toward
self-creation, its power to shroud the world in illusions, is ever stronger than the drive for
knowledge. He is, precisely for this reason, the truest creator of gods, the truest creator of worlds
in the absence of gods, the most capable of transfiguration.
A contradiction must be marked between the force of a Nature that precedes man, creates
him, precedes culture, and a cultural human force whose task is to create that Nature, again, and
again, newly at each turn. I would like to suggest a circularity between these two contradictory
strains of proposition. Yet this contradiction, like all contradictions in Nietzsche’s writing, is not
133

In a fragment of 1873, we read: “Control and limitation of knowledge for the benefit of life, of culture” (KSA 7:
29 [21]). (Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 199.)
134

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 10.

135

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 198-199.
56

dialectical; rather, it is born of an immense mobility between perspectives. Moreover, the
structure of the Nietzschean contradiction reveals it, in this movement between visions, to be
non-contradictory; the terms, that is, immediately lose the appearance of opposition, as soon as
the “opposite” exposes itself. In fact, these contraries move in a circular manner, yet this is not
the circle of Kant’s antinomies, nor is it the circle of Hegel’s dialectic. This circle is a
physiological, epistemological, philological proposition, which is to be broken through sacrifice.
Nietzsche makes a distinction between wisdom and knowledge (which he equates with
science), under the heading: “Wisdom and Science. / On Philosophers. / Dedicated to the
immortal Arthur Schopenhauer” (KSA 7: 19 [85]), which he had considered as a possible title
for his book on the Pre-Platonics.136 He draws the following line of distinction: “σοφία and
ἐπιοτήµη. Inherent in σοφία is discrimination, the possession of good taste: whereas science,
lacking such a refined sense of taste, gobbles up anything that is worth knowing” (KSA 7: 19
[86]).137 Philosophy, whose task is to control the drive to knowledge (KSA

7: 19 [83]:

“Philosophical thought is a controlling of the drive for knowledge”)138 must have exquisite taste
in order to choose that which is worth knowing—and this, of course, with respect to the
constellation of culture. Nietzsche traces σοφíα to sapio, “to taste”, sapiens, “one who tastes”,
and σαφήσ, “tastable.”139 Thus taste rather than skill is attributed to the sages: “According to
etymology, then, the word lacks the eccentric meaning: it contains nothing of quietude and
asceticism, only a sharp taste, a sharp knowledge, without any connotation of a ‘faculty.’”140
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Σοφία as taste is here defined as “active” and allied with those who are “of sharp taste,” as the
reduplication of the first syllable exhibits in Σíσυφος (Sisyphus), for in the Eolian dialect, σοφία
is σύφος. By an analogy to the transformation of the Greek λύχυς (wolf) into the Latin lupus
(where the χ becomes a p), Nietzsche traces the Latin sucus (taste, savor) to the Greek σοφóς, the
φ having been transformed into a c. The Latin sapio (to taste) and sapiens (he who tastes) would
thus come from σοφής and σοφóς, supposing the same equivalence of meaning as that between
lupus and λύχυς. Nietzsche opposes taste to τέχνη “(from τεκ, to generate), which always denotes
a ‘bringing forth’.”141 It is essential to mark this difference. For just as the philosopher cannot
produce a culture, nor can he create knowledge; his task, rather, is to control it. He is, further,
capable of performing such a task precisely because he embodies aspects of the artist, of the
religious leader, and of the scientist. In fact, σαφής comes from “σα” and “σάος”—“light.”
Originally, then σοφία and σαφής mean clarity, evidence, luminosity. Sharpness, thus, of
decision.142
The two cultural life-forces, art and philosophy, are called to bring about the coming birth
of culture, which the young Nietzsche felt to be imminent. In this sentiment, he felt himself to be
the herald of the coming culture. He believed Wagner to be the beginning of a great cultural
resurgence in Germany: “The problem: finding the culture to go with our music!” (KSA 7: 19
[30]).143 Nietzsche and Wagner, in their own eyes, came to personify the two poles of the culturecreating life-force of which Nietzsche speaks—that is, of art and philosophy (or, philology).
Wagner wrote to Nietzsche: “You could take over quite a lot for me, perhaps one entire half of
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my calling!” Musician and philosopher-philologist were thus to mutually guide and inspire one
another. Wagner wrote to Nietzsche on February 12, 1870: “Now you must demonstrate the
purpose of philology and help me usher in the ‘Renaissance’ in which Plato embraces Homer,
and Homer, filled with Plato’s ideas, really does become the greatest possible Homer” (N/W 1,
58).144 The two men were thus to push one another, by a sort of dialectical opposition, to become
more fully what each of them was. They exchanged lives and wills under the Pindaric
imperative:
Like precious goods from Tyre, my melody
comes to you over the gray sea.
Hear it gladly,
the Kastor-song on Aiolian strings, gladly
for the seven-toned lyre’s sake.
Listen, and become
what you are.
Pythian 2, lines 65-71145
On November 18, 1871, Nietzsche wrote to Carl von Gersdorff: “only as fighters have we
in our time a right to exist, as vanguard fighters for a coming saeculum, whose formation we can
roughly presage from our own selves—that is, from our best moments; for these best moments
do obviously estrange us from our own time, but they must have a home somewhere; therefore I
believe that we have in these moments a sort of obscure presentiment of what is to come.”146 In
this communication, at once major and minor, hyperbolic and obscure, Nietzsche expresses this
dispossession from his time precisely as the promise of greater time to come. He places himself
at the crux of this transition from one generation to another.
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To Erwin Rohde, on December 21, 1871, Nietzsche wrote the following, in reference to
his week in Mannheim with Wagner: “I felt like a man whose presentiments have at last come
true. For that precisely is music, and nothing else is. But I consider that if only a few hundred
people of the next generation will have from music what I have from it, I anticipate an entirely
new culture!”147 In the same letter, he declares: “I have had a number of fundamental insights
about Plato, and I think that we two might one day well and truly warm up and illuminate from
inside the hitherto so shabby and mummified history of Greek philosophers.”148 The coming
German culture and the revitalization of the history of Greek philosophy from within, as a
philological pursuit, are the two tasks of the young Nietzsche, and they are intimately connected.

Truth and Lie: The Need for Myth
The questions of foundational myths and the necessity of metaphysics in the service of
life occupy Nietzsche interminably. He writes, in a fragment of 1873, the enigmatic phrase:
“New mythology” (KSA 7: 29 [102]).149 We must regard this as both an exigency toward the
creation of a unifying mythology and the warning against a danger on this event’s horizon.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche insists on the “metaphysical comfort” we experience
in tragedy—a comfort inherited from the Greeks. Metaphysics here serves myth as an integral
cultural force. In his discussion of the Dionysian satyric chorus, in the presence of which the
“Greek man of culture felt himself nullified” and overcome by a “feeling of unity leading back to
the very heart of nature,” Nietzsche writes of the essential effect of the chorus as follows:
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The metaphysical comfort—with which, I am suggesting even now, every true tragedy
leaves us—that life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances,
indestructibly powerful and pleasurable—this comfort appears in incarnated clarity in the
chorus of the satyrs, a chorus of natural beings who live ineradicably, as it were, behind
all civilization and remain eternally the same, despite all the changes of generations and
of the history of nations.
With this chorus the profound Hellene, uniquely susceptible to the tenderest and
deepest suffering, comforts himself, having looked boldly right into the terrible
destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty of nature, and being in
danger of longing for a Buddhist negation of the will. Art saves him, and through art—
life.150
Tragedy provides the feeling of an ineffable, eternal, natural realm of primordial joy and
suffering—the Ureine—by which the fleeting world of appearances is constantly destroyed, and
of which this world is an inadequate manifestation. The pessimism of the Greeks was thus at
once their tremendous power of life-affirmation. Nietzsche’s intention, however, in this passage,
is not to create a new culture but to expose, in the manner necessary to the creation of a coming
culture, a metaphysics of Greek civilization.
Nietzsche thus considers myth, in this work, to be absolutely necessary to the health of a
culture: “without myth every culture loses the healthy power of its creativity: only a horizon
defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement. Myth alone saves all the
powers of the imagination and of the Apollinian dream from their aimless wanderings.”151 He
defines myth as “a concentrated image of the world that, as a condensation of phenomena,
cannot dispense with miracles.”152 It is for this reason that he calls for “the rebirth of German
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myth” out of “German music”—in this pursuit, he “we must hold fast to our luminous guides, the
Greeks.”153
As a criticism of Schiller’s opposition of the naïve and sentimental, Nietzsche writes: “the
present day has that frostily clear and sober atmosphere in which myth does not thrive, the air of
the historical—whereas the Greeks lived in the twilight air of the mythical and hence could make
clear contrasts and draw clean lines in their literature: whereas we seek twilight in art because
life is too bright. It is coherent with this that Goethe understood the position of the human being
in nature, and that of surrounding nature itself, to be more mysterious, enigmatic, and demonic
than his contemporaries; but for that sought all the more repose in the brightness and sharp
definition of the work of art” (KSA 7: 29 [116]).154 A darkened world like that of the Greeks
requires blinding luminosity in its art, purest clarity in its philosophy. While the modern world,
drenched in light, where knowledge has fatally mastered illusion and radical individuation rules
day and night, the only way back to a sentiment of originality is by a tenebrous simulation of that
Greek brightness in the absence of the myth that rendered this brightness possible. Goethe, the
greatest and most Grecian German poet in the eyes of Schiller and Nietzsche, moves within this
contradiction by drawing its tension out to plenitude: the dusky enigma must be sung in the
clearest tones possible.
Nietzsche wrote in 1872: “Philosophers appear during those times of great danger—when
the wheel keeps turning faster—they and art take the place of disappearing myth. But they are
thrown far ahead of their time, because they only gain the attention of their contemporaries very
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slowly. / A people that becomes conscious of its dangers produces genius” (KSA 7: 19 [17]).155
For the Greeks, the long process of absolution from myth was necessary to give birth to their
culture. Yet in Nietzsche’s modern Germany, the triumph of absolute knowledge over illusion
demands a resuscitation of myth and of illusion in art: “Illusion necessary for progress in
culture” (KSA 7: 19 [64]).156 Both art and knowledge, however, repose upon an economy of
meaning that pretends to universality. Both metaphor, the principle of illusion, and knowledge,
constitute themselves by an equalization of unequal things. Of metaphor, Nietzsche writes:
“Metaphor means treating as equal something that one has recognized to be similar in one
point” (KSA 7: 19 [249]).157 And of knowledge: “Knowledge, quite strictly speaking, has merely
the form of tautology and is empty. Any knowledge that advances us is an identification of the
non-identical, the similar, i.e. it is essentially illogical” (KSA

7: 19 [236]).158 Knowledge

reduces and sets an equal value to radically different things—thereby, it destroys. It is, however,
a natural occurrence. “The similar recalls the similar and compares itself with everything: that is
knowledge, the quick grouping of everything that is identical. Only the similar perceives the
similar: a physiological process.” (KSA 7: 19 [179]).159 The theory of like drawing to like is
Empedoclean and Democritean; it is the axiom of the physical theory of effluences. Here,
Nietzsche transforms it into a means for the critique of knowledge as reductive and destructive;
without the opposing force of art, which explodes the scientific metaphors with its own illusions,
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knowledge renders life impossible. Only in the time of the pre-Platonics were art and science
capable of harmonious and dissonant coexistence.
If a resurgence of myth is to serve as the soil of culture, it must be a profoundly
untruthful ground of truth: indeed, this myth, in an era of extreme self-consciousness, worlds
away from the naïveté of the Greeks, must be a myth that affirms itself as myth, and which,
therefore, in no way inspires universal belief. For the nature of the beautiful lie is such that every
cosmogony, every mythical foundation, reveals itself as anthropomorphic illusion: an economy
of truths, therefore, which unveil themselves in the moment of their utterance as lies must be
established. “The foundation of everything great and vital rests upon illusion. The pathos of truth
leads to decline. […] Above all to the decline of culture” (KSA 7: 19 [180]). 160 It is for this
reason that the art impulses must triumph over the pathos of truth in philosophy: for it is by
means of illusion alone that life comes about. Genius, the ultimate goal of culture, and that
around which it thrives, requires a renaissance of the beautiful lie for its superhuman spark to be
ignited. For the word genius means generative power for the root gen, produce, create. In the
1640s, it takes on the meaning it is destined to have for Nietzsche: a natural brilliance of man
that surges up and surpasses his finitude.
In his World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer defines genius by a monstrosity of
thought. “[W]here the brain’s power of forming representations has such a surplus that a pure,
distinct, objective picture of the external world exhibits itself without a purpose as something
useless for the intentions of the will, which is even disturbing in high degrees, and can even
become injurious to them—then there already exists at least the natural disposition to
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abnormality. This is denoted by the name of genius, which indicates that something foreign to the
will, i.e. to the I or ego proper, a genius added from the outside so to speak, seems to become
active here.” The “surplus of brain activity” at work in the genius is called by Schopenhauer
monstra per excessum.161 The difference, for him, between the genius and the normal man,
separated by a “gulf,”162

is that of the capacity for objectivity and the confinement to

subjectivity. The “genius has a double intellect, one for himself and the service of his will; the
other for the world, of which he becomes the mirror, in virtue of his purely objective attitude
toward it.”163 Thus is the genius, godlike, capable of representing not only his own will but also
the universal will of all men, so great is his mental strength. Consequently, the work of a genius
is the “quintessence” and manifestation of this fundamental “contemplative attitude[… .]” The
“normal man,” by contrast, “has only a single intellect,” which is “subjective” rather than
objective. The difference between a single and a double intellect is as unbridgeable as that
between “the open chest notes of the human voice” and “the falsetto notes”: high as the chest
voice may strain, it is “essentially different” from falsetto.164 Schopenhauer qualifies, however,
his definition of genius to say that it is contingent upon circumstance, and requires the proper
situation to be engendered: “By itself, genius can produce original thoughts just as little as a
woman by herself can bear children. Outward circumstances must fructify genius, and be, as it
were, a father of its progeny.”165 Genius thus requires a culture in order to be born. Nietzsche
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writes: “The Greeks as the only people of genius in world history. Even as learners they have
genius.”166 The powers of appropriation and creation among the Greeks are especially potent and
important; these, too, however, relied upon the culture in which the Greek soul was born.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes of Homer as the archetypal naïve genius, which
requires “the complete victory of the Apollinian illusion” used by “nature” to “achieve her own
ends.” He explains: “In the Greeks the ‘will’ wished to contemplate itself in the transfiguration of
genius and the world of art; in order to glorify themselves, its creatures had to feel themselves
worthy of glory; they had to behold themselves again in a higher sphere, without this perfect
world of contemplation acting as a command or a reproach. This is the sphere of beauty in which
they saw their mirror images, the Olympians.”167 The Greeks created their gods, their forces of
nature, in order both to reflect their will and to rule over them; the heroic genius could thus rise
upward, toward his towering mirror image and, becoming godlike, serve as a natural force for the
people himself. “It was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods from a
most profound need. [… O]ut of the original Titanic divine order of terror, the Olympian divine
order of joy gradually evolved through the Apollinian impulse toward beauty, just as roses burst
from a thorny bush. How else could this people, so sensitive, so vehement in its desires, so
singularly capable of suffering, have endured existence, if it had not been revealed to them in
their gods, surrounded with a higher glory?”168 To live under “the bright sunshine of [the] gods is
regarded as desirability in itself, and the real pain of Homeric men is caused by parting from it
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[… .]”169 Thus did every god render joy as well as suffering, light as well as obscurity absolutely
necessary to life. The task of the genius was to announce in immortal song “this oneness of man
and nature” called “naïve” by Schiller. 170
Of the birth of modern genius, Nietzsche writes, in Wir Philologen: “In transitional world
history the judgement will be most accurate, since it’s in such periods that the greatest genius
exists. / Production of the genius as the only one who can really value and deny life.”171 The task
of philology united with philosophy, therefore, is to produce the monstrous genius that his time
calls for, the only being capable of evaluating life for a culture.
In Wir Philologen, Nietzsche wrote: “Leopardi is the modern ideal of a classicist. The
German classicists can’t create anything.”172 At the heart of the task of philology thus lies artistic
creation. In his Pensieri, Giacomo Leopardi wrote: “the greatness connected with genius cannot
be achieved in our day without the soul wearing out the body, like the sword wears out its sheath.
It was different in antiquity where genius and greatness were much more natural and
spontaneous and could develop without so many obstacles to overcome; where the destructive
cognition of truth (which today goes hand in hand with great talent) was not as
powerful” (Pensieri I, 8/10/1820).173 On the Greek earth, body and spirit grew together naturally,
spontaneously—they engendered themselves in harmonious unity and took the form of the
genius. For Nietzsche as for Leopardi, with the separation of these elements comes the tyranny
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of knowledge over life, its constant effort to analyze and thus destroy it. According to Nietzsche,
the “[… dichotomy between] spirit (the faculty of abstraction) and bodies (lower sensory
apparatus),” which he also calls the “unnatural tearing apart of the intellect” is the “original
source first of dialectic […] and later of logic [… .]”174 His return to the Greeks is not a return to
origins but a return to the time before the empire of knowledge rendered the life of a Kultur
impossible. Such a time, because it never took place in a way our language could grasp, must be
created anthropomorphically.
In his essay On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873), Nietzsche exposes the
shattering truth of “truth,” which for him constitutes the very tissue of tragic experience:
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in
short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified,
transferred, decorated and which, after lengthy use, seem firm, canonical and binding to a
people: truths are illusions that are no longer remembered as being illusions, metaphors
that have become worn and stripped of their sensuous force, coins that have lost their
design and are now considered only as metal and no longer as coins.175
To build a culture on illusion in a world where knowledge reigns supreme, this requires first of
all the philological, genealogical destabilization of dogma—the truths in which knowledge deals
must be exposed in their infinite falsity, precisely to make room for an instinct toward illusion
qua art. On the heels of Nietzsche’s announcement of this fact follows a metaphor; that of
currency whose value has been lost, and which exists simply as worn metal, material exchanged
without a thought to its original meaning. This uncovering of value by metaphor constitutes a
first truth for the coming world. Its purpose is strictly pedagogical; it is a model for the myths on
which a culture must be built—metaphors which, in the same instant as they are pronounced,
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reveal their illusory nature, and the illusory nature of truth in general, so that truth is seen to rest,
by necessity, on the surface of life yet as the only means by which life comes to exist. A new
constellation of truths without blind belief is what Nietzsche is proposing. This requires that men
cease to copy language, i.e. merely to reproduce a set of lies in which they place their faith, and
transform the system of signs instead, through a mimetic process. For we sleep most the time:
“Men are deeply immersed in illusions and dreams; their eye glides along the surface of things
and sees ‘forms’; their feeling nowhere leads to the truth, but is content to receive stimuli and, as
it were, play blind games on the back of things.”176 Men cling to the metaphysical meaning of
the words they speak without ever plunging into the depths of that meaning—they glide safely
along the surface, in their eternal dream, never becoming conscious of their somnambulistic subexistence. It requires the rigor of philology, enforced by its intimate relation to philosophy, to
shatter this universal reverie.
The insight into the illusory, untruthful nature of truth and the consequent need for a
destabilizing unveiling of the old truths and a foundation of new ones are, for Nietzsche, at once
Heraclitean and Schopenhauerean. For Heraclitus says: “wisdom alone wants and does not want
to be called by the name of Zeus” (14 [A 84]).177 Giorgio Colli explains this fragment as follows:
“the name Zeus is acceptable as a symbol, as a human designation of the supreme god, but it is
not acceptable as an adequate designation, precisely because the supreme god is something
hidden, inaccessible.”178 This is why every utterance of the sage must be an enigma, a riddle:
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“the enigma (l’enigma, also the riddle), extended to a cosmic concept, is the expression of the
hidden, of the god. All the multiplicity of the world, its illusion-generating corporeality, is an
interlacing of enigmas, an appearance of the god, in the same way as the words of the sage are an
interlacing of enigmas, sensible manifestations which are the imprint of the hidden.”179 Colli
proposes this formula for the Hellenic wisdom uttered by Heraclitus: “There is a hidden world of
which our world is the appearance, this is the Greek intuition: there, the gods live.”180 Heraclitus
says, in continuity with the Delphic phrase, “Know thyself”: ἐδιζησάµην ἐµεωυτόν; “I have
searched myself out” (14 [A 37]).181 For the inner wisdom of man, all is unity, but in perception
and language it appears as separation and contradiction. Man must have the courage to search for
his inner λόγος, the eternal cosmic flame. Yet “nature loves to hide:” “ϕύσις [nature, birth]
κρύπτεσθαι ϕιλέει” (14 [A 92]).182 Therefore, this process of self-searching is itself the the
pursuit of the unknowable, that is, of our own birth and our own nature that recedes into oblivion
even as we approach it, and remains, indeed, to be created at every moment. “Aeon considers the
human being in itself as contrary to the Logos (ἄλόγος): only by his relationship to fire does he
participate in the common intelligence (ζυνὸν λόγος).”183 The wisdom of man is measured by his
proximity to fire. For the “con-tuitive god [… ,] all contradictions run into harmony, invisible to
the common human eye, yet understandable to one who, like Heraclitus, is related to the
contemplative god.”184 The realm of harmonious unity, which for men appears as warlike
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dissonance, is attainable only to the self-seeking sage, capable of transcending speech and
becoming godlike, in other words, for Nietzsche, a genius. Indeed, Nietzsche made this extension
himself, in a fragment of 1873: “Echoing Heraclitus: To the genius (god), even the most
intelligent philistine (human being) is an ape” (KSA 7: 27 [67]).185 This formula, then, offers us
another image, akin to metaphor of the philosopher as comet; the god of Heraclitus, which is
nothing but an anthropomorphic projection onto nature, must be profoundly reevaluated and
recreated as a genius, to surpass the commonality of the knowledge of humans themselves—
redefined as modern philistines—in his gesture of vital wisdom, achievable only through art.
Schopenhauer, for his part, considers all material reality to be the representation of that
which is eternally unknowable and unrepresentable: the universal will to life. Yet language is the
path of sufficient reason, the only means to civilization: “It is by the help of language alone that
reason accomplishes its most important achievements,—the united action of several individuals,
the planned co-operation of many thousands, civilization, the state; also science, the storing up of
experience, the uniting of common properties in one concept, the communication of truth, the
spread of error, thoughts and poems, dogmas and superstitions.”186
Nietzsche’s goal is thus to cultivate new truths upon which a culture can function without
believing in them—to replace the god behind language and the will behind representation with
experience, life itself, and to place the essence of this new ground of life, no longer equatable to
such a name because it is the stuff of infinitely changeable life itself, in the material of illusion
itself—of future illusions. Both art and nature deal in illusions, anthropomorphisms, metaphors,
metonymies, but while those of science, metaphysics, knowledge and religion symptomatically
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mask their metaphorical origin and birth dogmas, those of art reveal themselves in the same
instant as they present themselves as groundless, as illusory.
Yet belief is also, to a certain extent, necessary to life, and in this degree Nietzsche agrees
with Schopenhauer: “What the truth means to men! / The highest and purest life is possible in the
belief that one has the truth. The belief in truth is necessary for man. / Truth appears as a social
need: through a metastasis it is then applied to everything that does not need it. […] The
founding of states awakens truthfulness” (KSA 7: 19 [175]).187 It is precisely for this reason that
a culture cannot found itself on art alone, but requires at once the rigidity of organizational laws,
in the form of science and the state. Yet just as the long-suppressed Dionysian, “like a knight
sunk in slumber” must be reawakened “from this abyss” so that the birth of German culture out
of music and myth, the unseen “German knight,”188 may become possible, so art, led by
philological philosophy, must triumph over science and destroy its leaden truths before any
harmony between the two can be born. These laws, therefore, must be founded anew, and the old
ones destroyed; a new, Dionysian language must be born, a language which speaks the
unutterable; the depths. In a fragment of 1872, we read:
When it is a question, on the one hand, of the value of knowledge, whereas, on the other
hand, a beautiful illusion, as long as one believes in it, has the same value as an item of
knowledge, then one realizes that life requires illusions, that is, untruths that are held to
be truths. […] In the struggle between ‘truth’ and ‘truth’ both seek an alliance with
reflection. All true striving for truth came into the world through the struggle for a sacred
conviction, through the πάθος of struggle: otherwise human beings have no interest in its
logical origin [Ursprung].
KSA 7: 19 [43]189
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There is, then, a necessary reversibility between the lie that is held to be a truth and the truth that
reveals itself as lie—the philosopher as comet, who re-evaluates at every step the value of
knowledge and that of art, must, through the cultivation of illusions, reveal the chasmic depth
between these two functions of illusion. Only thereby can old illusions, old myths, be unveiled as
groundless lies even as new illusions are put in place on the very ground of that groundlessness;
in the ruins of the failure of religion. It is through this power that he shall put in place mores by
acting as an example for his people. The new nature that culture shall be thus necessitates, too, a
new species of belief, or Apollinian dream. In this fragment, it is the need for “sacred
conviction”—for religious belief—that gives birth, by means of the agonal instinct to which this
need gives rise, to truth. And if truths—common, binding myths, are necessary to a culture, so
too is the their tragic dissolution into lies.
Under the title “The Age,” Nietzsche declares: “Not directed toward happiness: the
‘truth’; not in comfortable repose, but heroic and hard.” Novel truth, in other words, must
destroy old, dogmatic truth. Nietzsche notes in the same fragment: “Against the overestimation
of the state, of national interests” (KSA

7: 32 [72]).190 The philosopher’s task is, then, to

cultivate the truths necessary to his time, and to attack at the roots the state’s truths, of religion’s
truths, of metaphysical truths. And this task offers no end, no absolute; the philosopher is mired
in the stuff of the tragic. He must eternally measure truths, create an ever new measure for them,
and bring them into harmony and conflict as necessary.
The task of history for Nietzsche is one that can in no way be bound to a metaphysics—it
relates solely and entirely to life, conceived as the force of becoming even underneath the
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human. In his notes toward the second Untimely, Nietzsche writes: “History requires the active
human being, history can be written only by the experienced person!” Yet his experience must
supply him with a capacity for imperious mantic clarity of the highest order: he must not only be
a student of the past but a prophet. In a fragment of 1873, he writes:
The voice of the past is always the voice of an oracle; only if you are seers into the future
and are familiar with the present will you be able to interpret the oracular voice of the
past. Today we tend to explain the effect of the Delphic oracle with the claim that those
priests had precise knowledge of the past; it is time we recognized that only those who
build the future have the right to sit on judgement of the past: he is only a historian by
virtue of being a seer.
KSA 7: 29 [96]191
The determination of truth and of myth is a matter of prophecy: the untimely historical method
reaches into the depths of the past—into primordial memory—in order to exercise the power of
prophecy. It is, therefore, not a matter of the present, but of the past and of the future, which
battle against one another in tumultuous soul of the philosopher as comet.

Agonal Hellenism
Nietzsche is firm in his affirmation that all every philosophical system for the Greeks is
anthropomorphism. Thus, he divides the doctrines of the Greek philosophers into “Ethical
anthropomorphisms: Anaximander : justice. / Heraclitus: law. / Empedocles: love and hate.” and
“Logical anthropomorphisms: Parmenides: nothing but being. / Anaxagoras: νοῦς. / Pythagoras:
everything is number.” (KSA 7: 19[116])192 From Thales to Socrates, these anthropomorphisms
slowly wane, to be replaced, with positive science, presented in its purest form by Democritus, in
his materialist doctrine of atomism. What first distinguished the philosopher from the Hellenic
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sage—his original “Freedom from myth,” brought about by “Thales” (KSA 7: 19[18])193 is
accomplished by degrees, until man finds himself nearly entirely purified from the world of myth
in science. The birth of philosophy, for Nietzsche, coinciding with the birth of tragedy, is at once
the birth of natural science and the beginning of the long, languishing death of myth. Nietzsche
writes: “Myth seeks to understand all transformation following an analogy to human behavior, to
human acts of will.” Stepping away from myth, Nietzsche claims, Thales presented “a hypothesis
of the natural sciences of great worth.”194 The first philosopher’s great “freedom and boldness”
was to “conceive the entirety of such a multifarious universe as the merely formal differentiation
of one fundamental material”195—that is, water. Nietzsche, in his constant project to connect the
pre-Platonics to the contemporary science of his time, relates this thesis, by analogy, to “the
Kant-Laplace hypothesis concerning a gaseous precondition of the universe.”196 Science does
not, however, eradicate anthropomorphism, but displaces it onto a different terrain—that of life
itself, of human experience. In other words, it avows itself of the fact that all truth is relative to
perception, to the human creature; it impales itself on the glittering lies that constitute truth.
Science requires a bold surrender to the tragic. As a consequence, our physical apparatus
remaining inescapable, no universalizing or absolute theory is possible. Nietzsche writes: “All
knowledge comes about by means of separation, delimitation, restriction; no absolute knowledge
of a whole!” (KSA 7: 19 [141]).197 In the absence of an anthropomorphic absolute, a philosophy
of “infinite approximation,” as Hölderlin put it, becomes necessary. It is in this sense that science
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is the purification—the κάθαρσις of myth. It liberates man into the groundlessness of experience
and of any philosophy to come.
Natural science, as the destiny of myth, is necessary both to culture and to philosophy
itself, insofar as it allows for a new, non-mythical thinking of experience. Such a new thinking
occasions, in its turn, a radical perspectivism. For Nietzsche, Heraclitus represents a major step
forward in the coming of science. Friedrich Albert Lange had already considered this philosopher
as a precursor to materialism, because of his physics of “persistent matter,” following and demythifying the model of Anaximander’s ἄπειρον (often equated, by Nietzsche, with the Kantian
thing in itself). According to this Heraclitean physics, it is “divine primitive fire […] into which
the changing world returns, to proceed from it anew [… .]”198 In Nietzsche’s notes toward his
lecture on Heraclitus, he speaks of the philosopher as a combatant of absolutism. For Heraclitus
says: πάντα ῥεῖ (“All things flow”). “Nowhere does an absolute persistence exist, because we
always come in the final analysis to forces, whose effects simultaneously include a desire for
power (Kraftverlust).”199 Convinced of the scientific validity of this argument, Nietzsche uses a
theory of the natural scientist, Karl Ernst von Bär, to explain the Heraclitean principle, πάντα ῥεῖ.
In von Bär’s lecture of 1860 called “Which Conception of Living Nature Is the Correct One?” he
posits the following hypothesis: “The rates of sensation and of voluntary movements, thus of
conscious life, appear among various animals to be approximately proportional to their heart
rates.”200 Experience, then, is absolutely conditioned upon the specificity of the physiological
and mental apparatus. There is, then, no possibility for a universal transcendental aesthetics such
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as Kant proposes, as the standard of perception differs immeasurably from one creature to the
next. “The inner life of various animal species (including humans) proceeds through the same
astronomical time-space at different specific rates, and it is according to these that they
subjectively and variously judge the fundamental standard of time. For this reason alone, only
because for us this fundamental standard is small, does an organic individual, a plant or an
animal, appear to us as something remaining at one size and shape, for we could observe it one
hundred times more in a minute without noticing any external alterations.”201 Nature and its laws
depend entirely, therefore, on one’s perception of phenomena. Such a realization does not,
however drive Nietzsche or his Heraclitus into Idealism, but rather into the experience of the
tragic, which requires a constant reevaluation, destruction, and recreation of truths. Truth itself,
then, has a homeotic character: homeosis is the process by which the cells of living creatures, by
means of plasticity, transform themselves in order to perform other functions—this is the process
that takes place when an animal (a spider, for example, or a lizard), having lost a limb, is capable
of growing it back, not identically but differently, through the instinctual transfiguration of its
cells. That Heraclitus was aware of this nature of truth is evident from what Nietzsche calls his
“aesthetic cosmodicy”—his Cosmodicee der Kunst.202
In On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, Nietzsche claims that the “[human]
intellect has no further mission beyond human life. It is human and only its owner and creator
treats it as solemnly as if the hinges of the world turned it. But if we could communicate with a
gnat we would hear that it swims through the air with the same solemnity and also feels as if the
flying center of the world were within it. There is nothing so reprehensible or low in nature that
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would not immediately be inflated like a balloon by a small breath of that power of knowledge;
and just as every porter wants to have his admirer, so the proudest of men, the philosopher,
believes that the eyes of the universe are trained on his actions and thoughts like a telescope from
all sides.”203 The idea of humans as the center of the universe, and of an absolute or universal
rule of life owing to this fact is entirely fictitious; rather, everything must be relative. The conceit
of knowledge is responsible for man’s irrepressible hybris. Nietzsche writes: “Science fathoms
the course of nature, but can never command man. Inclination, love, pleasure, displeasure,
elevation, exhaustion—science knows none of these. Man must interpret—and thereby assess—
his life and his experiences from a specific point of view” (KSA

7: 6 [41]).204 For this

perspectivism to become possible, science and knowledge must unite with art and illusion in a
relation of endless agonism. Nietzsche had considered as a title for his book on the pre-Platonics:
“The Philosopher. Observations on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge. [Betrachtungen
über den Kampf von Kunst und Erkenntniss]” (KSA 7: 19 [98]).205 This Kampf is Nietzsche’s
translation of the Greek ἀγών (strife, competition), regarded by both Nietzsche and Jacob
Burckhardt as the fundamental structure of Greek life and the genesis of its multiple worlds. It is
also the word used by Nietzsche to describe the relation between the Dionysian and the
Apollinian in Attic tragedy. When Nietzsche writes: “My goal is to bring about a state of
complete enmity between our present ‘culture’ and antiquity. Whoever wishes to serve the former
must hate the latter,”206 he recasts this agonal formula as the necessary historical method through
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which the Greeks must be created and destroyed, constantly working to the service of a modern
culture, just as the aion creates and destroys the world at its whim, subordinated to the unknown
laws of a cosmic game.

Cosmogony: Heraclitus and Democritus
Concealed in the metaphor of the philosopher as comet is the double-impulse in the
young Nietzsche: first, toward a metaphysics of art, whose task it is to annihilate and replace
metaphysics as such, that is, the metaphysics put in place by German Idealism, and, second, the
impulse toward a new positivist materialism—a materialism free of all idealism. One might call
these two impulses the Heraclitean impulse and the Democritean impulse. These two sages
constitute the two acmes of pre-Platonic philosophy, for Nietzsche, with Empedocles occupying
the agonal point of transition between them. Of Heraclitus Nietzsche wrote: “he is like a star
without an atmosphere.”207 Heraclitus’ greatest attribute was his terrible hybris and solitude; he is
exemplary of those philosophers who “reject the people from the start” (KSA 7: 23 [14]).208 He
created a metaphysical cosmodicy describing the eternal flux of the universe. Democritus, for his
part, was the first atheist, and the founder of atomism. He originated a theory of the birth of
worlds in the absence of divinity. Nietzsche considers Heraclitus (along with Empedocles and
Anaximander) to be among those philosophers who achieved “Mastery of the knowledge drive:
or the strengthening of that which is mythical, mystical, and artistic. […] Legislation by
greatness.” Democritus he enumerates among those (along with Thales and Parmenides) who
affected the “Mastery of the mythical: strengthening the sense of truth over against free fiction.
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Vis veritatis, or the strengthening of pure knowing” (KSA 7: 23 [14]).209 These two masteries
necessarily oppose one another: it is a constant battle between the supremacy of the art-instinct,
this eternal source of life, creation of nature, and the drive to knowledge, which searches for
truth and eliminates myth. These are, indeed the two perspectives between which the young
Nietzsche travels—the first is that of The Birth of Tragedy and the second that of the lectures on
the pre-Platonic philosophers. To a culture, they are biologically necessary, and the ἀγών
between them is, indeed, what makes it flourish. Thus illusion as illusion must master illusion as
truth in the perspective of the myth- and art-drive while, from the perspective of the drive to
knowledge, myth—false origins and metaphysical comforts—must be overcome by the urge
toward the truth at the heart of the world. It is clear, moreover, that these perspectives constantly
reverse into one another and yet remain in separation.
Every pre-Platonic Greek philosophy has its cosmogony (κοσµογονία), each pure and
original in its kind. Wisdom itself (σοφία), and thus philosophy, has two sources for Nietzsche—
two “preliminary stages.” The first is “a mythic preliminary stage” and the second is a “sporadicproverbial one.”210 The first of these is nothing other than theogony and cosmogony, inseparable
for the Greeks from poetry. Nietzsche devotes his third lecture on the pre-Platonic philosophers
to an enumeration of these cosmogonies, out of which the philosophical instinct will be born. He
begins: “The power to systematize—very strong in the Greek’s ranking and genesis of their gods
—presents us with a drive never coming to rest.”211 What separates us from the Greeks is thus
their immense power of organization of nature which is at once an artistic creation of nature;
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both that nature from which all human power springs and the nature of man as such. Cosmogony
and theogony for them had a strictly cultural function: “It was the grand task to establish the
rights and ranks of this colorful divine realm. The Greeks met it with their political and religious
genius. The continual blending of the gods (θεῶν κρᾶσις) was faced with a crisis of the gods
(θεῶν κρίσις). It was especially difficult to bring the ancient ranks of the Titans into a
relationship with the Olympians [… .] Bizarre contrasts allowed the possibility of fantastic
innovations. Finally, a peace among the gods was established; Delphi was involved, probably
above all; there, in any case, we find an epicenter of philosophical theology.”212 All ancient
Greek theogonies, in Nietzsche’s eyes, begin in agonal dissonance; thus the αγών between the
Titans and the Olympians was necessary to the birth of theology, and to its centralization at
Delphi, where the oracle was.
In keeping with the structure of Greek civilization, both Olympian and mystery gods
were required in order for religion to thrive in harmony with the state. The contradiction between
these two species of god is “resolved with extraordinary wisdom. First of all, [there were] gods
who clarify everything at hand, as continual guardians and observers of all Greek existence, and
likewise gods of mundane existence: next, for especially earnest religious elevation, as an
individuation to all ascetic and pessimistic affects, [there were] the mysteries, with their hope of
immortality. That these two currents did not harm or dishonor one another must be deemed
especially wise.”213 Nietzsche goes on to explain the Orphic theogonies. The most ancient of
these are created by poets, toward which Aristotle alludes in listing the original elements in these
theogonies: “Night and Heaven or Chaos and Ocean”; Nietzsche identifies these with their
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authors: “Hesiod refers to Chaos [(χάος) Theogony, 116-7], Homer to Ocean (Ὀκεανός) [Iliad,
bk. 14. 1.201; bk. 15, 1.240], and a theogony attributed to Eudemus (from which the
Neoplatonist Damascius narrates [De princ., 382]) refers to Night and Heaven (Νὺξ καὶ
Οὐρανός).”214 The theogony of Apollonius (Argonaut. 1.494ff.) “depicts Orpheus singing as, in
the beginning, the earth, sky and sea separated themselves from the admixture of all things; as
the sun, moon, and stars took up their orbits; [as] mountains, rivers, and animals came to be; as
the Oceanids ruled over Ophion and Eurynome for the first time in Olympus; as they were hurled
into the oceans by Chronos and Rhea, who were in their turn ousted by Zeus.”215 According to a
third Orphic theogony (Damascius, De Princ. 381), the world is born of “water and primeval
mud,” which “thicken into earth” and engender “a dragon with wings on its shoulders and the
appearance of a god; on both sides [it has] the head of a lion and that of a steer named Heracles
or Chronos.” This monster then unites with necessity, Adrestea—“this then extended itself
incorporeally across the entire universe. Chronos-Heracles produced a gigantic egg that broke
open around the middle, with the upper half forming the sky and the lower half forming the
earth.”216 Yet another, more ancient Orphic theogony “places Chronos at the pinnacle.” The god
creates “aether and chaos, from which he fashions a silver egg: from this is brought forth the allilluminating, first-born god, Phanes, who is also called Metis, Eros, and Erikpaios …
Androgynous, since he contains the seeds of all the gods in himself. Phanes generates out of
himself Echidna, or night, who, along with Uranus and Gaia, the step-parents of the middle
generation of gods, is portrayed by Hesiod in her essence. Zeus, having successfully taken
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power, devours Phanes, and precisely because of this, he is the epitome of all things.” Nietzsche
then quotes Plato, who relates as an “old saying (παλαιòς λóγος)”: “Zeus is the beginning and the
middle, from Zeus everything is made” (Laws IV, 715e). Zeus then births the last generation of
gods. Nietzsche emphasizes: “Most important is the story of Dionysus Zagreus, the son of Zeus
and Persephone who, torn limb from limb by the Titans, lives once again as the younger
Dionysus, after Zeus has eaten his still intact heart.”217 In this cosmogony, Zeus acts as the
mythical incarnation of the primordial element of which all matter is constituted. This
metaphysical determination will later give way to a series of original physical determinations for
the all-embracing One of life for the Greek philosophers, beginning with Thales’ designation of
water as the primal element.
That philosophy develops out of anthropomorphic cosmogonies conceived as poetry
(ποίηση) is of the highest significance; for the Greeks created their worlds in richest multiplicity.
They did not regard nature as an unknowable and prehistoric origin of man but firstly as the
ground of life that must be fashioned, made (ποιεῖσθαι) by him in song. Man must transcend
himself, be outside himself, near-godly, in order to bring a universe into being. “The course of
philosophy: at first human beings are conceived as the authors of all things—gradually things are
explained according to analogies with individual human qualities—ultimately one arrives at
sensation.” Sensation, then, would be the ultimate purification from myth. Nietzsche then, in the
same fragment, poses this “Important question: Is sensation a primordial fact of all matter? /
Attraction and repulsion?” (KSA 7: 19 [149]). 218 The paradox between metaphysics and science
here comes to its apex: the importance of this question lies in the possibility that science, in its
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purest form, might once again revert to the realm of the metaphysical. The primordial nature of
sensation would have as its effect that science, or materialism—would have to be constantly
recreated as art. The only way in which it might become possible to imitate the Greek
philosophers is by an anthropomorphic leap that characterizes them according to our social
necessities and that creates them as cosmogonists. To experience our difference with the Greeks
is to measure them against us by anthropomorphically attributing to them this method of life and
thought.
Both Heraclitus and Democritus, on Nietzsche’s account, possess, as an essential
component of their cosmogonies, a theory of the infinite succession of worlds. However, while
that of Heraclitus inscribes itself in an artistic metaphysics, that of Democritus is purely
scientific. Although Heraclitus is scientific insofar as he considers fire as the primal element,
which “[transforms] itself into water and earth”219 to create the material of the world, his theory
is ultimately mythical and hence anthropomorphic, assigning godly agency to cosmic forces.
“Since everything is fire, then whatever is not fire, which would be the opposite of fire, cannot
exist at all.”220 All vapors are either pure or impure, depending on the direction of their
evolution, toward or away from fire: “From the sea arise only pure vapors, which serve as
nourishment; from the earth, only dark mists, on which the moist draws for nourishment. Pure
vapors constitute the bridge from sea to fire; impure [vapors], the transition from earth to water. /
Thus [there is] a double process, ‘the way up and the way down (ὁδóς κάτω and ἄνω),’ both [of
which are] one thing eternally returning next to the other.”221 This then is a theory of the unity
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and indestructibility of all matter in its gradation of warmth, and this matter is constantly
becoming.
Everlastingly, a given quality contends against itself and separates into opposites;
everlastingly these opposites seek to reunite. Ordinary people fancy they see something
rigid, complete and permanent; in truth, however, light and dark, bitter and sweet are
attached to each other like wrestlers of whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is
on top. […] It is a wonderful idea, welling up from the purest strings of Hellenism, the
idea that strife embodies the everlasting sovereignty of strict justice, bound to everlasting
laws. Only a Greek was capable of finding such an idea to be the fundament of a
cosmology; it is Hesiod’s good Eris transformed into the cosmic principle; it is the
contest-idea of the Greek individual and the Greek state, taken from the gymnasium and
the palaestra, from the artist’s agon, from the contest between political parties and
between cities—all transformed into universal application so that now the wheels of the
cosmos turn on it.222
The perception of stability is nothing but a myth—in reality, there is only constant change and
flux, organized by a cosmic game of chance, where every origin is split, such that there is no
identity that is not first of all traversed by difference. For Heraclitus says, in a phrase dear to both
Nietzsche and Hölderlin: ἒν διαφέρον ἑαυτῷ—the one differentiating in itself. And, in another
marvelous paradox, that the one is at the same time the many. The play of this competitive forces
requires a time of becoming in which a creative-destructive movement rigorously prohibits any
continuity of subject. In this Heraclitean becoming, then, every instant in the sacrifice of the
instant that came before—every world is the sacrifice of the previous world, which, as soon as it
comes into being, plunges the whole string of worlds that came before it into forgetfulness. The
paradoxical logic of this agonal movement is such that the more strongly identity and
reconciliation between opposing forces is approached, the more these forces differ from one
another. Thus in Nietzsche’s appropriation of Heraclitus’ becoming, he reveals that the Dionysian
art-state of nature, the Ureine, is simultaneously and in its deepest truth the tearing-apart of all
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uniformity, all identity, all individuation. The matrix of Heraclitus’ ἀγών is fire itself, the divine
force of life that creates and destroys worlds by turn, time and again to all eternity.
Nietzsche affirms that Heraclitus “believes, like Anaximander, in a periodically repeated
end of the world out of the all-destroying cosmic fire. The period in which the world hurries
toward the conflagration and dissolves into pure fire Heraclitus characterizes, with notable
emphasis, as a desire, a want, or lack; the full consumption in fire he calls satiety.”223 Heraclitus
says that the αἰών (aeon; life, time, century) is a child playing dice, or, in one of Nietzsche’s
interpretations: “‘The world is the game Zeus plays, […] of the fire itself. The is the only sense
in which the one is at the same time the many.’”224 Nietzsche writes of this “game of the great
world-child Zeus”:225 “the ever self-renewing impulse to play calls new worlds into being.” For
the αἰών, also called fire, “builds towers of sand like a child at the seashore, piles them up and
tramples them down. From time to time it starts the game anew. An instant of satiety—and again
it is seized by its need, as the artist is seized by his need to create.”226 Hence this creative
instinct, at once an instinct toward destruction, ignites itself anew each day, sending the last
world into oblivion.
Stars, in his theory, are “barks in which pure vaporizations [are] gathered. Whenever
these barks turn about, solar and lunar eclipses occur. The sun itself is thus a vaporous burning
mass: daytime depletes the vapors, and in the morning they produce themselves anew; the sun is
new every day.”227 Heraclitus thus devises a mythological, cosmological physics; Nietzsche calls
223

Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 6, 60.

224

Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 6, 58.

225

Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 8, 67.

226

Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, § 7, 62.

227

Nietzsche, Pre-Platonics, 67.
86

his system a cosmodicy, already many bounds beyond all theodicies. This word, cosmodicy,
Cosmodicee a combination of the Greek words, κόσµος and δίκη, meaning, therefore, cosmic
justice, was coined by Erwin Rohde in respect to Heraclitus, as an alternative to theodicy. He
arrived at this formulation through a rejection of Bernays’ theory of Heraclitus as being
indifferent to justice and injustice alike.228 Thus he rendered possible the interpretation of
Heraclitus that Nietzsche takes up when, for example, he puts in the Ephesian’s mouth the
following words: “The struggle of the many is pure justice itself! In fact, the one is the many.”229
Moreover, Rohde used this very expression, “aesthetic cosmodicy,” to describe The Birth of
Tragedy.230
The Heraclitean solar system is formed of the purest, highest, and most vital beings: stars
of primordial fire. For the wisdom of the Heraclitean man is determined by his proximity to fire,
by the dryness of his soul: “the soul parched with thirst is the wisest” (14 [A 52]).231 And:
“eternally living fire, which ignites with measure and is extinguished with measure” (14 [A
30]).232 The solar system, reborn daily, is made of numerous constellations of pure wisdom,
which reflect, in their harmonious and dissonant relation, the agonal brilliance of Greek
civilization. In a fragment contemporary to his lectures on the pre-Platonics, Nietzsche writes:
Heraclitus
The creative power of the artist primordial [die bildende Kraft des
Künstlers uranfänglich].
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The philosopher is the extension of that drive by which we, by means of anthropological
illusions, continually relate with nature. The eye. Time. [Das Auge. Zeit.]
KSA 7: 19 [134]233
Here, the anthropomorphic-artistic, plastic power of man enigmatically clarifies itself in the role
it shall come to play for Nietzsche. It is by a spherical projection of the human eye onto the
cosmos that the world is created ever anew, and this projection is a temporal phenomenon—
therefore, subject to fluctuation, to the constant birth, death and rebirth that time entails. The
human animal, in its incessant creation of the world, creates its own nature, its own internal
physis over and over again, ever sacrificing old natures in the fiery need to create and recreate
the cosmos in its image. This is the only rule of the game—the only justice.
Democritus and Heraclitus share the position that movement (i.e., becoming) is incessant,
and that “every motion presupposes an opposite” so that, consequently, for both of them: “war is
the father of all things [… .]” War (πόλεµος) is here another name for the Hellenic ἀγών, the
overarching principle of Greek life in Nietzsche’s view. Another consonance between the two
philosophers, inseparable from that of strife, is the indestructibility of matter. In his section of
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks on Heraclitus, Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer on this
matter: “Forever and ever, persistent matter must change its form. Grasping the due of causality,
mechanical, physical, chemical and organic phenomena greedily push to the fore, snatching
matter from one another, for each would reveal its own inherent idea. We can follow this strife
throughout the whole of nature. In fact we might say that nature exists by virtue of it.”234 Yet the
Democritean system is “of the greatest consequence” because, with it, “for the first time the
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collective, anthropomorphic, mythic view of the world has been overcome.”235 Democritus’
theory of infinite worlds bases itself on the proposition that “[e]ach self-isolating entity from the
mass of primal bodies: countless worlds exist. They are generated and yet also cast into
destruction.”236
Nietzsche had doubtless learned of this from Lange, who relates as Democritus’ fourth
fundamental principle:
The atoms are infinite in number, and of endless variety and form. In the eternal fall
through infinite space, the greater, which fall more quickly, strike against the lesser, and
lateral movements and vortices that thus arise are the commencement of the formation of
worlds. Innumerable worlds are formed and perish successively and simultaneously.237
Lange defends this theory, often accused, according to him, of being “monstrous” in antiquity, by
insisting that it “stands much nearer to our modern ideas than that of Aristotle, who proved a
priori that besides his self-contained world there could be no second.”238 Although Democritus’
view that large bodies fall faster than smaller ones is “erroneous,” the theory of lateral motion
and revolution between atoms founded on the variousness of their shapes and the fact that
collision never takes place in their center, but along the axes of individual atoms, is followed by
“the principles of modern mechanical science.” These lateral motions gain in complexity, and “as
the collision of constant new atoms with a layer of atoms already in lateral motion constantly
imparts new forces, so we may suppose that the motion will continually increase.”239 Aristotle
objected to the Democritean physics because he taught that “if there could be void space, which
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he thought impossible, then all bodies must necessarily fall with equal speed, since the difference
in the rapidity of the descent is determined by the various densities of the medium—as, for
example, water and air.” Lange concedes that here, as in his “doctrine of gravitation towards the
center of the universe,” Aristotle “was at one with our modern science,” although his deduction
is not consistently “rational.” Epicurus, for his part, came to the following conclusion with
regard to Democritus’ physics: “because in empty space there is no resistance, all bodies must
fall equally fast”—this view, according to Lange, is only “apparently in agreement with modern
physics” since the “true theory of gravitation” would not come about until Galileo.240 Lange also
relates Democritus’ theory of the permanent subsistence of matter and the consequent doctrine
that: “All change is only a combination and separation of atoms” to Kant’s “first analogy of
experience,” according to which: “In all changes of phenomena matter is permanent, and the
quality thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished.”241 Lange’s purpose is thus to prove
the currency of the Democritean system, and its proximity to “our” modern materialism,
indissociable for him from Kantian metaphysics.
Nietzsche explains the manner in which worlds are atomically created for Democritus as
follows:
A single world arises thus: impact between different sorts of atoms produces the excretion
of a mass in which the lighter particles are driven upward. By the same effects of
collision, the mass is caused to turn—the bodies forced outward settle themselves down
from the outside, like a sort of skin. This shell becomes increasingly thin, since its
particles are driven more and more into the middle. Out of the atoms in the middle, earth
is formed; out of those that climb upward, sky, fire, and air. Here and there thicker masses
ball together. Air, which forces itself about, is a stormy vortex motion; they gradually dry
out in this and are ignited by rapid motion as stars. Thus, smaller particles are squeezed
out of the earthly corpus by winds and stars and flow together into the depths as water.
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The earth became increasingly more firm. Gradually it takes its place at the center of the
world; in the beginning, since it was still small and light, it moved here and there. The
sun and moon, being at an earlier stage of their formation, were stirred by those masses
orbiting around the earth’s core and so were brought into line in our world system. 242
The stars which, for Heraclitus, were sparks of primordial fire, become for Democritus light, dry,
quickly-moving clusters of air atoms, rising upward from the earth to form a mass of
constellations, purified of myth.
In this sense, the aesthetic intuitions of Heraclitus which, for him, remain in the realm of
anthropomorphic myth, find their scientific actualization and justification in Democritus, just as
they find their incarnation in the tragic hero, Empedocles. Democritus defines thought as
physical; Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872, under the heading “Democritus”: “Thought as
movement” (KSA 7: 23 [39]).243 And in the notes to his lectures: “Democritus proceeds only
from the reality of motion, because, to be precise, thought is motion. […] ‘There exists a motion,
since I think and thought has reality.’ But if motion exists, then empty space must also exist,
unless ‘Not-Being is as real as Being,’ [(Democritus, frag. 156)] or Not-Being (οὐδέν) is in no
way less than Being (δέν). With absolutely filled space, motion is impossible.”244 Therefore, as
Lange says: “Nothing exists by atoms and empty space: all else is only opinion.”245 This, then, is
the materialist incarnation of the Heraclitean πάντα ῥεῖ—all things now take on their scientific
aspect—they are moving atoms, hastened along the temporal path.
At the midpoint between Heraclitus and Democritus, between mythical becoming and
materialist positivism, Empedocles stands, the comet incarnate, the transitional figure between
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Myth and Science, in whom this tension is strong enough to require a self-sacrifice of the highest
order. He is, moreover, the tragic harbinger of culture. Nietzsche writes of this hero, alive in
celestial flame, who is a mirror, indeed, for Nietzsche himself:
Empedocles continually stands on this boundary line, […]; he demarcates the age of
myth, tragedy, and orgiasticism yet at the same time there appears in him the new Greek,
as democratic statesman, orator, enlightened figure, allegorist, and scientific human
being. In him the two periods wrestle with each other; he is a man of competition [an
agonal man, a man of the ἀγών] through and through. 246

The German Romantic Mimesis of Antiquity and Nietzsche
Nietzsche was not the first to connect the Greeks with the possibility of a German culture
to come. This question, rather, had hung thickly in the air of German philosophy since
Winckelmann’s famous and fateful utterance: “The only way we can become great, and, if this is
possible, inimitable, is by imitating the Ancients.”247 Which is to say, following the Aristotelian
determination, for art, τέχνη to imitate nature, φύσις. The Greeks represent our lost nature which
we must recover by an artificial, technical, artistic imitation of them—in order to attain to a
culture that is properly our own.
Schiller, in his essay On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, speaks of the love of “antiquity,”
as well as that of “flowers,” of “animals,”248 etc., as the love of that which is both “natural” and
“naïve”—he declares: “nature must contrast with art and put it to shame.” In these natural, naïve
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things, “we cherish that inner necessity, that eternal oneness with themselves.”249 Schiller goes
on:
They are what we were; they are what we should become once more. We were nature like
them, and our culture should lead us along the path of reason and freedom back to nature.
Thus they depict at once out lost childhood, something that remains ever dearest to us,
and for this reason they fill us with a certain melancholy. Because at the same time they
portray our supreme perfection in an ideal sense, they transport us into a state of sublime
emotion.250
Nature is called naïve because of its “superior force of the passion and a lack of reflection.”251
However, he who lives in nostalgia, striving hopelessly after his originary naïveté falls into
modern sentimentality, which is barbaric. The sentimental age, the condemnation to an eternal
striving back to a lost nature, thus begins with self-reflection and self-consciousness, which
brings with it both the idealization of a lost nature and the tragic impossibility of its recuperation
—this comes about with modern philosophy.
The Greeks existed with nature in a perfectly harmonious manner: “Consider how
confidently this people was able, under its serendipitous sky, to live with nature in the wild;
consider how very much nearer to the simplicity of nature lay its manner of thinking, its way of
feeling, its mores, and what a faithful copy of this is provided by the works of its poets.”252 The
Greek “does not cling to nature with fervor, sensitivity, and sweet melancholy that we moderns
do. Indeed, by personifying and deifying it in its individual appearances, and by presenting its
effects as actions of beings endowed with freedom, the Greek overcomes serene necessity in it,
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precisely what makes it so attractive to us.”253 Now: “Our feeling for nature is like the sick
person’s feeling for health.”254 Yet it is still possible for genius to spring forth organically; indeed
“[e]very true genius must be naïve or he is no genius.”255 Poets, says Schiller, are “everywhere
the guardians of nature”; in his relation to nature, the poet “will either be nature or seek the lost
nature.” The former is the character of the naïve poet, the latter of the sentimental poet.256 “As
long as the human being is still part of nature that is pure […], he operates as an undivided
sensuous unity and as a harmonizing whole.”257 For Schiller, the purity of this cosmic harmony,
both human and divine, in which the poet has a necessary existence, is broken by the mastery of
man by “culture and art,” following which “he can only express himself as a moral unity, that is
to say, as someone striving for unity.” Thereafter, the poet, rather than naïvely imitating the
“actuality” of the nature of which he constitutes an essential component, must sentimentally
imitate the ideal of this lost unity. 258 Schiller calls Goethe a naïve poet in an age of
sentimentalism—in other words, a comet—pure among the impure.
Nietzsche wrote, in the summer of 1876: “The artist needs the infidelity of memory in
order not to copy (abzuschreiben) nature but to transform (umzubilden) nature” (KSA 7: 17
[32]).259 This transformation entails, indeed, a maximal exercise of the homeotic plastic force—
we are separated from original nature—from the Greeks—by an ocean of oblivion: and this is
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highly necessary to our approach to them—for that origin, rather, lies in the future of a cultural
resurgence. Nietzsche tirelessly emphasizes the importance of forgetting for life: “life in any true
sense is impossible without forgetfulness.”260 For the “man who totally lacks the power to forget,
who is doomed to see becoming everywhere” loses himself in “this flux of becoming” and “no
longer believes in his own being” or in “himself [… .]”261 He is overcome by a Heraclitean
paralysis of ceaseless transformation, and is yet incapable of transforming himself, because he
refuses to let go of his past selves. The reflective man, subject to knowledge and the “great and
ever-growing burden of the past” envies innocent creatures who live unhistorically—his
immediate reaction to seeing animals grazing in a field is one of intense pain and sentimentality:
And so it hurts him, like the thought of a lost Paradise, to see the herd grazing, or, nearer
still, a child, that has nothing yet of the past to disown, and plays in happy blindness
between the walls of the past and the future. And yet its play must be disturbed, and only
too soon will it be summoned from its little kingdom of oblivion.262
Nietzsche’s modern man, like that of Schiller, thus also strives after the unity and innocence of
childlike nature—of the Heraclitean cosmic child, who plays his game of chance instinctively,
and yet in accordance with the laws of divine necessity. Nietzsche echoes Schiller: “The
humanity of the Greeks lies in a certain childlike naïveté in which, among them, man is revealed
—his art, government, society, military and civil law, sexual relations education, politics. It’s
precisely the human element that appears among the Greeks in a state of nakedness and
inhumanity that makes it indispensable for education.”263 The cultural constellation of the
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Greeks, for Nietzsche, grows out of their inhumanity, the pure organic impulse of that people.
This inhumanity, however, is precisely what makes the Greeks human; indeed, it is by means of
their creative fervor that they constantly rebirth nature, first as myth, and gradually, in a series of
cosmogonies, arrive at the creation of a physical world. This is the major difference between
these two philosophers: for Schiller, modern life must first be sentimental and idealist in order to
imitate antiquity and thus to give way to a coming world, while for Nietzsche, the Greeks
themselves are originally the creators of nature, and it is our task, within the breadth of our
perspective, to create the Greeks themselves, not as our lost, irretrievable nature, but as that
model of a unified birth of culture as nature that our time requires: to create the Greeks as they
created their world is, in the same breath, to create our own nature.
Schiller’s “decisive gesture” with his On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, according to
Lacoue-Labarthe, was to historicize Aristotle’s definition of τέχνη in a particular manner.
Schiller divides the ancient as the lost life of nature, the time of purity and naïveté, from the
modern, the artificiality of culture, the perverse sentimentality for a never-experienced
childhood.
“Generally speaking,” a canonical text of the Physics says, “on the one hand τέχνη
accomplishes what φύσις is incapable of effecting; on the other hand, τέχνη imitates
φύσις.”264 Interpreting historically, this double postulation can yield this result: art, so far
as it imitates nature, is specifically—following Winckelmann—Greek art: mimesis is
Greek. On the other hand, it is up to the Moderns to accomplish […] what nature cannot
carry out. Consequently, it is up to the Moderns to go a step beyond the Greeks—to
“accomplish” them.
That is to say, also, to surpass and surmount them.”265
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The ideal function of art is thus to create nature by µίµησις, that is, to engender, complete and
dialectically overreach the world of the Greeks in the foundation of novelty.
The explicit ambition of the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy was a German “rebirth of
tragedy,”266 which he meant to accomplish by a revival of that “time” and of those “men” in
whom “the German spirit has so far striven most resolutely to learn from the ancient Greeks”—
he names “Goethe, Schiller, and Winckelmann,” since whom, however, “the endeavor to attain to
culture and to the Greeks on the same path has grown incomprehensibly feebler and feebler.”267
In his prophetic voice, Nietzsche proclaims the source from which this miraculous resurgence,
reconnecting the ancient Greeks to the modern Germans, must come: “Let no one try to blight
our faith in a yet-impending rebirth of Hellenic antiquity; for this alone gives us hope for a
renovation and purification of the German spirit through the fire magic of music.”268
The opposition of Nature and Culture, of φύσις and τέχνη, of the Greek and the German,
before Nietzsche found itself all too often superimposed on a metaphysical opposition, attributed
also, yet in a premature stage of non-self-consciousness, to the Greeks, namely that of noumena
and the phenomena. Nietzsche transforms the questions surrounding the relation of the Germans
to the Greeks by shifting the terrain away from such metaphysical preoccupations and toward a
concern for life with respect to a people; thus, of a philological typology of truths and a method
for their cultivation and destruction. This very opposition becomes immediately untenable for
Nietzsche, since he defines nature itself as the creation of culture.
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The Young Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer and Lange
Nietzsche called Schopenhauer a champion of culture, a hero of the conquest of
knowledge by art, both despite and by virtue of his asceticism. The young Nietzsche writes of his
philosophical master, in 1873, in the following reverent manner: “[Schopenhauer] is the
destroyer of forces hostile to culture; he reopens the depths of existence. Thanks to him the
serenity of art becomes possible once more” (KSA 7: 28 [6]).269 Schopenhauer lifted the veil of
language and morals, revealing the eternal suffering life in the will: “A chief source of that
suffering which we found above all to be essential and inevitable to all life is, when it really
appears in a definite form, that Eris, the conflict of all individuals, the expression of the
contradiction, with which the will to live is affected in its inner self, and which attains a visible
form through the principium individuationis. Wild-beast fights are the most cruel means of
showing this directly and vividly. In this original discord lies an unquenchable source of
suffering [… .]”270 Nietzsche’s vocation is to transform this pessimism into an affirmation of life.
“As Nietzsche wrote to Rohde in October 1868, the ‘ethical air, the Faustian odor, cross, death,
and grave’ (B 2, 322) were what fascinated him about Schopenhauer. ‘Cross, death, and grave’
did not depress him; on the contrary, they seemed to be an elixir of life. […] [I]n his view,
Schopenhauer’s negation of the will was not denial but extreme affirmation. It signaled the
victory of the mental will over the natural will.”271 Nietzsche detected in Schopenhauer, as well
as among the Greeks, the force of this life-affirming, active pessimism.
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An early critique of Schopenhauer, titled “On Schopenhauer,” and written between
October 1867 and April 1868, exposes the extent to which the young Nietzsche had already
performed his essential work upon Schopenhauer’s opposition of the will as thing-in-itself and
representation. Several years later, in 1870-1871, he would write: “In man the primal One looks
back at itself through the appearance: the appearance reveals the essence. I. e.[,] the primal One
looks at man, more precisely, at man looking at the appearance, at man looking through the
appearance. There is no road to the primal One for man. He is all appearance” (KSA 7: 7
[170]).272

In other words, man’s essence, far from existing behind phenomena as a

transhistorical, eternal truth, is inseparable from his phenomenality, which is in constant flux and
transformation, and thus requires a constant reevaluation of life and its needs for science, art,
philosophy.
For Schopenhauer, according to Nietzsche, the problem of Kant, in seeking to “explain
the world under an assumed factor,” namely, the thing-in-itself, and the reason why he did not
perceive his answer as a “failure” is that “he did not want to sense the dark and contradictory
elements in the region where indiv[iduality] ends.” Thus, for Schopenhauer: “The dark drive,
brought under an apparatus of representation, manifests itself as world. This drive has not found
a place under the princip[ium] indiv[iduationis].”273 The immense, destructive strife of the will
is forever in excess of individuating representation, raging behind it in a noumenal realm and
exposing the illusionary nature of the individual—of the subject, by presenting the eternity of the
oneness of all living things—all creatures capable of affirming the universal will, and thereby
affirming life.
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Nietzsche writes: “[Schopenhauer’s] answer to the yearning question of all
metaphysicians—expressed in Goethe’s ‘whether the spirit would not reveal many a secret’—is a
bold Yes; and to ensure that the new insight was seen far and wide, like an inscription on a
temple, her wrote the redeeming formula for the old and most important riddle of the world
across the face of his book as the title The World as Will and Representation.” Nietzsche
translates Schopenhauer solution in the following “semi-figurative form”: “The will, which has
neither cause [grundlos] nor knowledge, manifests itself, when subjected to an apparatus of
representation, as world.”274 This groundless will, then, surging forth at every instant like lava
from its subterranean abyss, yet only finds incarnation as reality to the extent that some medium
of representation, in its thin and veiling surface-existence, is used to express it. Representation,
whose law is the principium individuationis, separating all things out into discrete and
disconnected forms, is the falsifying manifestation of the will, whose breadth exceeds all
individuation. For this reason, the Schopenhauerean Wille, the force of life, goes far beyond the
Kantian Ding an sich which, for its part, remains separated from man, and eternally unknowable,
existing merely as reality’s a priori condition of possibility. Schopenhauer’s Wille, declares
Nietzsche, “went so far beyond Kant that its discoverer could say that he considered it as ‘that
which has very long been sought under the name of philosophy, and which is therefore
considered by those who are familiar with history as the philosopher’s stone.’”275 This is the
“quintessence of Sch[openhauer]’s system [… .]”276
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Despite the fact that Schopenhauer followed Kant down his “dangerous path” toward the
thing-in-itself in the creation of his philosophical system and, as Friedrich Überweg argued,
viewed this as “only a hidden category,” a major difference emerges between the two
philosophers. For that which Schopenhauer “puts in the place of the Kantian X, the will, is
created only with the help of poetic intuition, while his attempted logical proofs can satisfy
neither Schopenhauer nor us.”277 It is thus an intuition, an organic and artistic movement, that
founds the will, and not a logical progression constituting a proof. It is, further, necessary to
“protest against the predicates attributed by Schopenhauer to his will, which sound far too
definite for something absolutely unthinkable and which are gained throughout from their
opposition to the world of representation; while between the thing-in-itself and the appearance
even the concept of opposition is meaningless.”278 No opposition can take hold between the
ungraspable and the graspable.
This critique of Schopenhauer’s attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself is executed in
accordance with a specific neo-Kantian materialism. Nietzsche had read Lange’s History of
Materialism (Geschichte des Materialismus, 1860) during the summer of 1866, and been greatly
inspired by it. He brought this materialism to bear upon Schopenhauer’s determination of the
thing-in-itself as will. This critique based itself on the postulate that the unknowable must not be
regarded as a negation of the knowable or as its dialectical opposite. For if one does this, one
immediately anthropomorphizes that which is beyond determination by projecting aspects of the
known world onto one that exceeds all epistemological faculties. Thus, to reinterpret the Kantian
“thing-in-itself” as universal will is to assign it characteristics that are proper to the phenomenal
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—to the realm of experience. Lange accepts Schopenhauer’s designation of the will as a
universal life-force, yet objects to its assignation to the position of the thing-in-itself. , otherwise
one runs the risk of using the logic of the antipode to project determinations of the knowable
world onto what is indeterminable. 279 From Schopenhauer’s perspective, Nietzsche condemns
the Kantian division between an atemporal, primordial cause of all things and the flux of
becoming in a fallen, illusory world and advocates for the inclusion of the will in becoming as
the interior life-force of man. From Lange’s perspective, however, he criticizes the
Schopenhauerean will qua thing-in-itself as a name for the unnamable, unknowable essence
behind all things. These two critiques, arising from opposing metaphysical and scientific
impulses, compete in his reading of Schopenhauer.
Nietzsche transforms, from the very start, the concept of the thing-in-itself, in the
championing of his perspectivism. He writes: “there may be a thing-in-itself, albeit in no other
sense than that in the realm of transcendence anything is possible that is every hatched out in the
mind of a philosopher.”280 That which the philosopher calls the universal condition of objective
reality is thus revealed by Nietzsche to be radically subjective and perspectival; the language of
universality is nothing but an anthropomorphic and metaphorical disguise for the philosopher’s
own urges and beliefs. Within the philosopher, two “possibilities” meet, properly, that of
possibility and that of impossibility, and their combination engenders the unthinkable thought of
the thing-in-itself, airing on the side of the impossible—the “negative power of the first
possibility [… .]”281 Kant and Schopenhauer are thus like Parmenides, who “tested the existent
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and the non-existent, the positive and the negative properties—and suddenly he found that he
could not get past the concept of a negative quality, the concept of non-existence.”282 Parmenides
thus discovers reality as “eternal unity”283 — the “key to the cosmic secret, remote from all
human illusion.”284 Having grasped this, he could thus “climb down, into the abyss of all things.
[…] By wrenching apart the senses and the capacity for abstraction, in other words by splitting
up the mind as though it were composed of two quite separate capacities, he demolished the
intellect itself, encouraging man to indulge in that wholly erroneous distinction between ‘spirit’
and ‘body’ which, especially since Plato, lies upon philosophy like a curse.”285
Since any opposition between the thing-in-itself and appearance is strictly unprovable,
though it can be thought, “this concept of a continually decreasing possibility” must be
reinforced. Were the moralist to object to this “knot of possibilities,” he would be countered by
the declaration that “the thinker, faced with the mystery of the world, has no other means than
guessing, i.e. hoping that a moment of genius will place upon his lips the word that provides the
key to the writing that lies before everyone’s eyes and yet has never been read, which we call the
world. But is that word the will?”286 The question which Schopenhauer believed, at the end of his
life, had been left unanswered by his philosophy was, according to Nietzsche, “the question of
the limits of individ[uation].”287 Nietzsche will accordingly, in his own philosophy, stretch those
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limits, placing his emphasis on the supreme malleability of individuality, no longer as a
metaphysical principle, but as one that is highly subject to time and to history.
For Schopenhauer, all forms of “appearance” of “the will as a thing-in-itself” are “alien to
itself” insofar as they concern “only its nature as an object.”288 Space and time, thus, as
appearances, are thus called by Schopenhauer the principium individuationis. Schopenhauer
writes, quoted by Nietzsche: “This thing-in-itself, as such, is never an object, because every
object is its mere appearance and no longer itself. If it was nevertheless to be thought of
objectively, it had to borrow a name and a concept from an object, i.e.[,] from something in
some way objectively given, and therefore from one of its appearances.”289 This objective
thought, however, as Nietzsche points out, following Lange’s criticism of Schopenhauer,
possesses merely “an apparent objectivity”—for in its process, we must adorn the “obscure and
incomprehensible x” with “ brightly colored garments” and, thereafter, regard these garments as
the thing-in-itself. That is, by attributing human characteristics to the thing-in-itself through its
determination as will, this very thing is banished into invisibility: through this process, the
“concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is secretly eliminated because it is ‘meant to be’ and we are
handed another concept in exchange.”290 The dazzling cloak of language which encloses the will
thus serves both to corrupt and to bury deeper this concept of the thing-in-itself. It pretends to
objectivity and confers on the true, unified, ineffable concept of reality a false existence.
This “borrowed name and concept is precisely the will, ‘because it is the clearest, most
developed appearance of the thing-in-itself, directly illuminated by knowledge.’” But what
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fascinates Nietzsche most powerfully is that “all the predicates of the will too are borrowed from
the world of appearances.”291 In other words, the will itself, unlike the Kantian thing-in-itself,
has no reality outside experience. “Admittedly, Sch[openhauer] makes an attempt here and there
to present the meaning of these predicates as totally incomprehensible and transcendent, e.g. W
as W II, p. 368: ‘The unity of that will in which we have recognized the essential nature of the
nature-in-itself of the world of appearances is a metaphysical one. Consequently our knowledge
of it is transcendent, i.e.[,] it is not based on the functions of our intellect and therefore cannot
really be grasped by them.’”292 Nietzsche explains that both “will” and “unity” are “predicates
for the thing-in-itself, taken from the world of appearances, under which the real heart of the
matter, the transcendental, evaporates.”293 The predicates “unity, eternity (i.e timelessness),
liberty (i.e. lacking in any reason [Grundlosigkeit]” are bound, like the thing-in-itself, to “our
organization” and therefore “it is extremely doubtful that they have any meaning at all outside
the sphere of human knowledge.” Yet the fact that they exist unknowably, while “their opposites
rule the world of appearances” is unprovable by both Kant and Schopenhauer; they immediately
clothe themselves in concepts of “multiplicity, temporality and causality” when exposed to the
homogenizing light of the human gaze.294 This is why Schopenhauer says, and Nietzsche affirms
he is “entirely right”: “it will never be possible to reach the nature of things from without:
however much we may investigate, we gain nothing but images and names.”295 Thus,
unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself, he had created the possibility, through the failure of his
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definition of the will as thing-in-itself, to philosophize this will as experience itself, in the evershifting movements of history.
“The will appears:” writes Nietzsche, “how could it appear?”296 By means of intellect, the
µηχανή of the will, which serves to represent the will, to conjure it to the surface from its depths.
“But this enhancement of brain development is brought about by the constantly increasing and
ever more complicated need of the corresponding appearances of the will.”297 The will and the
intellect thus grow together, contiguously, out of a mutual necessity: the more powerful the
intellect, which is to say, the more inhuman—the more godlike—the stronger is the will. The
“conscious self” is “tertiary” for Schopenhauer: as consciousness it “presupposes the organism,
and the organism presupposes the will.”298 The will appears in “a step-by-step sequence of
phenomena” which bring on their wings “continually increasing existential needs:” these in turn
are satisfied by nature’s “corresponding a step-by-step sequence of aids” of which the intellect is
one.299 In this manner, a “world of appearances” is placed “in front of the world of appearances”:
“Before the appearance of the intellect we already see the principium indiv[iduationis], the law
of causality, in full effectiveness.” Therefore, the intellect is in no way strictly inchoate but,
annihilating the possibility of any transcendence strictly speaking by the immediacy of its
emergence, it appears within the principle of individuation from the instant of its first
appearance: “The will seizes life post-haste, seeking to manifest itself in every way; it begins at
the lowest levels and as it were works its way up from the bottom. In this region of
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Schopenhauer’s system everything is already dissolved into words and images: the initial
definition of the thing-in-itself—almost even the memory of it—has been lost.”300 There where
this memory is once again evoked, the contradictory nature of Schopenhauer’s thought comes to
full lucidity. The will must be both that which subtracts itself from all appearance and the very
soul of this appearance. The “regressus of appearances” shows us that “it lay in the nature of the
thing-in-itself to manifest itself in such events.” Yet these events are merely “translations into the
language of our intuiting intellect.”301
The question of the intellect’s origin exposes, according to Nietzsche, the antinomy of
Schopenhauer’s system—this is why Schopenhauer so carefully avoids this question. The
intellect, in an identical manner to the thing-in-itself, must have “burst forth suddenly and
abruptly from a non-existent world” as a “flower of knowledge” from within “a sphere of
timelessness and spacelessness, without intervention of causality.” At this juncture, the intellect
must either remain “eternally joined together with the thing-in-itself as a new predicate” or the
intellect must prove itself to be impossible—that is, without origin. 302
This loophole in the Schopenhauerean system reveals that he had already taken the fatal
step away from metaphysics, in a manner that he himself avoided. He presents, in fact, the will
and the representation by which it manifests itself all as the world itself. “Schopenhauer’s thingin-itself would therefore be at one and the same time princip[ium] indiv[iduationis] and the
ground of necessitation: in other words, the existing world. Sch[openhauer] tried to find the x of
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an equation: and the result of his calculation is that it equals x, i.e.[,] that he has not found it.”303
Anaximander’s ἄπειρον, the indefinite totality of being, which places itself outside all
experience, and of which Nietzsche claims: “We may look upon it as the equal of the Kantian
Ding an sich”304 proves to remain untouched by Schopenhauer, who covers it in attributes and
unites it inseparably with the manifest world. Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872:
As soon as one wishes to gain knowledge of the thing-in-itself, then it is precisely this
world—knowledge is only possible as a reflection and by measuring oneself according to
one standard (sensation).
We know what the world is. Absolute and unconditional knowledge is the desire
to know without knowledge.
KSA 7: 19 [146]305
Schopenhauer made the leap, against his own will, that Parmenides never could make—
from an eternal, stagnant being into the ever-moving flux of experience. Thereafter, the depths
and the surface are no longer opposed, on two incommunicable registers of noumena and
phenomena—they are an ever-changing, ever-moving unity—there is no will independent of
time. There is, Nietzsche can thus affirm, a genealogy of the will, as there is a genealogy of
every concept.
Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1872: “There is no form in nature, because there is no
distinction between inner and outer. / All art is based upon the mirror of the eyes.” (KSA 7: 19
[144])306 All art, like all metaphysical philosophy, is anthropomorphic; through our doublymirrored eyes we see nature as our reflection, and nature creates us through our projection of
human aspects onto it—the Greeks were utterly aware of this secret paradox—this circularity by
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which plastic force is employed to create one world after another, interminably—yet we
moderns, in our seriousness, have forgotten it. The primordial is nothing but sensation—a
rhythmic force from which concepts arise by an artistic process: the senses create artistically that
which they sense.
Nietzsche’s tendency toward metaphysics founds nothing less than a metaphysics whose
basis is utterly physical, which is to say, contained within the sphere of experience—it is highly
questionable whether this can still be called a metaphysics. Two consequences follow from his
interpretation of Schopenhauer, which includes the will in the realm of appearance, as its
absolute and deepest sense. Firstly, the valuation of art above all else for Kultur, which is true
both for antiquity and modernity—“for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that life is eternally
justified”307 as Nietzsche declares in The Birth of Tragedy. His use of the term “aesthetic” must
here be taken as a modification of its original Kantian meaning, as the science of the
metaphysical conditions of sense perception, as well as of that meaning, popularized by
Alexander Baumgarten in the 1750s, as the criticism of taste. We mustn’t forget, here,
Nietzsche’s philological tracing of wisdom to taste: this assures the fact that, for him, the task of
the philosopher is doubly aesthetic—for just as he must replace all a priori values and
determinations of the thing-in-itself with sensation and the constantly sacrificial experience of
becoming, he must also combine this transformation of the philosophical scope with a valuation
of art and the plasticity of life above all else. Indeed, the significance of the aesthetic is artistic,
yet in such a way that it surpasses the idealist, metaphysical definition by displacing it onto the
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sphere of artistic creation. Life, therefore, is only justified insofar as it creates itself organically,
through the ἀγών of the Dionysian and Apollinian art instincts of nature, as a tragic work of art.
Secondly, Nietzsche’s understanding of Schopenhauer leads him to the realm of the
material—that is, away from metaphysics, toward science and positivism. Nietzsche had read, in
1872, since its very appearance, Friedrich Zöllner’s book, On the Nature of Comets:
Contribution to the History and the Theory of Knowledge (Über die Natur der Kometen.
Beiträge zur Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntniss, Leipzig, 1872) and considered it an
example of “scientific Schopenhauerism.” Zöllner exposes, in his chapter “On the general
properties of matter,” a “dynamic theory of movement based on the attribution of physical facts
to matter.”308 And these facts are, according to Zöllner, the fundamental materials used by the
subject to create an external world of representation for himself. The result of this is that “the
phenomenon of sensation is a fundamental fact of the observation just as well as the movement
of matter, and we are even obliged to connect it to movement, since it serves as the general
property and the condition of the comprehension of sensible movements.”309 Zöllner thus
inscribes the Democritean concept of thought as movement in the Schopenhauerean framework.
In November 1872, Nietzsche wrote to Rohde of his excitement with regard to Zöllner’s
book: “Have you heard of the Zöllner scandal at Leipzig? Look, then, at his book on the nature
of comets someday; there are many astonishing things in it for us. Since this act, here is an
honest man who, in the most contemptuous manner, has been excommunicated from the republic
of scholars, his closest friends have broken with him and everyone is slandering him as ‘crazy!’
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Yes, quite seriously as ‘mentally ill’ because he doesn’t play the same fanfare on his trumpet as
his compatriots! Such is the spiritual state that rules in the ochlocracy 310 of Leipzig scholars!”311
It was not only by a gesture of solidarity that Nietzsche wished to draw attention to this
work, having just undergone the experience of being ostracized by the academic community of
philologists as a result of the scandal caused by The Birth of Tragedy. The book was also “for us”
as he said, meaning, perhaps, that it contained within it the profound comprehension of the
significance of the comet as at once a scientific, an artistic, and a philosophical figure of
transition—the prototype of the tragic hero.

The Ground of the Tragic
At the time of Nietzsche’s professorship at Basel, the conflict between Hegelian Idealism
and neo-Kantianism was in full flower, constituting a dominating presence both for philosophy
and for science. Lange’s History of Materialism heavily influenced both Nietzsche’s reading of
Schopenhauer and his view of metaphysics. Lange, a natural scientist and a founder of the
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, had attempted to reconcile materialism with idealism,
which, as had been recognized, refer back to one another in a self-perpetuating double-bind. He
considered himself to be returning to pre-Hegelian philosophy (which he regarded as a misstep in
the history of philosophy, toward Scholasticism) in order to “complete what Kant had only half
done: the annihilation of metaphysics.”312 The paradox of materialism, that it constantly falls
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back into idealism by the need to traverse physiology, which renders it impossible to prove the
physical experience of things-in-themselves, had resolved itself for Lange, however, in an
idealist position, following Hermann von Helmholtz and rejecting the anti-speculative theory of
Heinrich Czolbe, according to which “the sensible qualities of sensation are already completely
present in the external stimuli [… ;] from a red-radiating object a ready-made redness, from a
sound source a melody, detaches itself in order to penetrate into us through the portals of the
sense organs.”313 Lange, on the basis of the lack of empirical evidence available to prove
Czolbe’s position on the direct transmission of eternal objects to perception, concluded that this
theory, too, ended by resorting to idealism.
Helmholtz had sought to prove Kant’s transcendental idealism by means of empirical
physiology. In his 1853 address “On Goethe’s Scientific Researches,” he had written:
The result of [scientific] examination, as at present understood, is that the organs of sense
do indeed give us information about external effects produced on them, but convey those
effects to our consciousness in a totally different form, so that the character of a sensuous
perception depends not so much on the properties of the object perceived as on those of
the organ by which we receive the information.314
Moreover, since our “nerve excitations” must have a cause, as “there can be no effect without
cause, Helmholtz concludes that “the investigation of sensory perception also leads us to what
Kant had already recognized, namely that the principle, ‘No effect without cause,’ is a law of our
thought given before all experience.”315 Conceding to this idealist-physiological position, Lange
wrote:
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The senses give us, as Helmholtz says, effects of things, not faithful copies, let alone the
things themselves. To these mere effects, however, belong also the senses themselves,
together with the brain and the supposed molecular movements in it. We must therefore
recognize the existence of a transcendent world order, whether this depends on ‘things-inthemselves,’ or whether—since even the ‘thing-in-itself’ is but a last application of our
intuitive thought—it depends on mere relations, which exhibit themselves in various
minds as various kinds and stages of the sensible, without its being at all conceivable
what an adequate appearance of the absolute in a cognizing mind would be.316
Metaphysics therefore triumphs, even in materialism, over science; belief takes hold where the
limits of perception end. It is here, therefore, that Nietzsche departs from both Schopenhauer and
Lange, and embarks on the creation of his own philosophy. For he writes: “You should not flee
into some metaphysics, rather, you should actively sacrifice yourself for the emerging culture
[euch der w e r d e n d e n K u l t u r thätig opfern]! That is why I am strictly against dreamy
idealism [Traumidealism]” (KSA 7: 19 [154]).317
Indeed, Nietzsche, the young philologist was deeply convinced of, as he put it in a
fragment of 1872: “The impossibility of metaphysics” (KSA 7: 23 [7]) 318 in his time. This is,
moreover, the fault of Kant in his eyes: “The consequences of Kantian doctrine. End of
metaphysics as a scientific discipline” (KSA

7: 19 [51]).319 By installing the inescapable

transcendental world of the thing-in-itself behind experience as its condition of possibility, and
by creating a categorical hierarchy constitutive of man’s newly inescapable and radically
individualized consciousness, Kant had rendered impossible both metaphysics and any science
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worthy of it. The absence of the ground of metaphysics constitutes, for Nietzsche, the ground of
the tragic.
In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes of the “philosopher of tragic knowledge” as he
who “controls the unleashed drive for knowledge, not by means of metaphysics. He does not
establish a new faith. He senses it to be tragic that the ground of metaphysics has been cut away
and can never be satisfied by the colorful kaleidoscope of the sciences.” It is thus his task to
“[work] toward the construction of a new life; he returns art to its rights.” For this tragic
philosopher, “the image of existence is made complete by the insight that the metaphysical only
appears in anthropomorphic form.” This is why he finds it “necessary to create a concept: for
skepticism is not the aim. Once it reaches its limitations, the drive for knowledge turns against in
order to proceed to the critique of knowledge. Knowledge in the service of the best life. / One
must even desire illusion—that is what makes it tragic” (KSA 7: 19 [35]).320 It is for this reason
that metaphysics must be replaced by art, and knowledge overcome. The Heraclitean impulse
thus is the most urgent of all.
The philosopher as comet is also the tragic philosopher; he must be willing to sacrifice
himself for the sake of a culture and its truths, thought his nature semi-divine nature be so
superior to those he yearns to save. Schopenhauer had written a letter to Goethe on such heroism,
in which he expressed the following: “The courage not to keep any question just in one’s mind is
what makes a philosopher. Philosophers must be like Sophocles’ Oedipus, who tirelessly
searches for enlightenment about his own terrible fate, even if he already suspects that he will be
horror-struck by the answers.”321 In such a way does the philosopher move through the world: as
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a tragic hero, ever searching for himself, after the fashion of Heraclitus, until his consciousness
becomes monstrous with self-knowledge so that he tumbles reflectively, by will, into the arms of
fate. For tragic knowledge demands a sacrifice in the service of a distant horizon of community.
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2
Hölderlin’s Passage: Divine Infidelity and Downgoing
Nietzsche’s early thought is traversed by an ever-urgent need for the hyperbolic
affirmation and overcoming of the circularity between Nature and Man, wherein they must
constantly create one another as their origin. The apotheosis of this circularity takes place in the
semi-divine tragic hero, who transforms it into the excentricity of the comet’s path, through its
tragic and, indeed, sacrificial affirmation. This schema is inherited from the modern tragic poet
Friedrich Hölderlin. Nietzsche writes that “nature” has locked man up in his “consciousness”—
in a world of illusions—and “thrown away the key.”322 Yet it is man himself who creates this
nature from which he comes, and which has condemned him to blindness; he creates this
primeval sphere for himself by means of an artistic, anthropomorphic procedure, just as the
Greeks created their divinities in order that they may be eternally hidden from sight, appearing
only through the falsifying mediation of incarnation.
Nietzsche writes, in a fragment toward his Untimely Meditations: “Doesn’t every true
work of art give the lie to Aristotle’s claim? Isn’t it nature that imitates art? Doesn’t it, with the
restiveness of its becoming, merely haltingly repeat, in an inadequate language and in ever new
attempts, what the artist expresses in all its purity? Doesn’t nature long for the artist so that he
can redeem it from its imperfection?” (KSA 7: 35 [12]).323 The mimetic circle between nature
and art is thus established—art creates nature as its imitator and at once forms the ideal of
nature’s originality. But this imitative φύσις, as we know, this second nature bears the mark, the
remembrance of an artistically created nature before it which, too, was once a second nature. The
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truth of the “true work of art” lies in its capacity both to recreate nature and to bring to life the
chimera of a first nature—an origin. The life of man, the constellation of values by which he
measures his experience, depends on his capacity to perfect nature, to shape his absent origin
through artistic creation. There where the circle between art and nature ought to close, where the
repetition of its rhythmic movement should begin again, which is to say—where time is destined
to return to itself in the instant of what would otherwise be its death, there stands the figure of the
tragic hero, a herald, announcing the coming culture of which he is himself the exemplar, and
marking the difference between old and new through an act of sacrifice. It is the sacrifice,
precisely, that is necessary for self-transcendence and the new creation of the lost ground of
nature.
Nietzsche is not himself that tragic hero—he does not consider himself to be that
transitional figure transforming twilight into dawn. Rather, he conjures the hero, brings him into
being in writing, where writing takes on the role of tragedy, as the active deliverance from
reflection, from image or representation, from the Apollonian language of art as the beautiful, to
the primordial, the space of the Ur where life is created as unity, as the changing, turbulent
temporality of experience. Thus, from out of himself and in an untimely fashion, by plunging
into the depths of a past both contained in his memory and called into being across history, which
is to say, anew, Nietzsche brings to the surface of his time a multiplicity of tragic heroes. He
divides himself in writing to unearth and to create his self-sacrificing heroes. It is not he, the
philologist-philosopher who shall bring about the passage from modernity into culture, but these
figures who are destined to accomplish this grand reformation are his own reflections, according
to the anthropomorphic movement of creative conjuring. Thus these heroes come about both in
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unity with him and as absolutely strange, different, monstrous creatures whose destiny is that of
a humanity’s force unleashed upon nature. By the circular movement between the nature that
creates man and the man who creates his nature, which courses through and animates all life,
Nietzsche transforms his predecessors into his successors by creating them, and among these
figures, these tragic heroes, through whom the spirit of Heraclitus runs like a vital force, are
Oedipus, Empedocles and Hölderlin. A figure of myth, a figure of philosophy and a figure of
poetry. All of these figures bear the burden of being, singularly and in their various sacred
solitudes, the last human being. Nietzsche first uses this turn of phrase not to describe the
nihilistic man of the present age who can only blink, as in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but in an
enigmatic fragment of 1873 entitled “Oedipus / Soliloquies of the Last Philosopher” to which I
shall return in the next chapter.
Hölderlin takes on for Nietzsche a multiple role. If he is one of Nietzsche’s tragic heroes,
he is first the thinker of the tragic hero to whom Nietzsche is most indebted, the first to poetize
the transformation of predecessors—heroes—into successors. It is through Hölderlin that
Oedipus and Empedocles emerge, and it is Hölderlin’s mode of creating figures from out of his
own depths yet through a most profound intimacy with the culture of his ancient Greece—his
Hyperion, Empedocles, Oedipus, Antigone—that prefigures Nietzsche’s own hyperbolic practice
of figuration.

Human Measure: Nietzsche and Hölderlin
In 1861, at the age of sixteen, Nietzsche wrote a letter in praise of Hölderlin, defending
the poet against an imagined critic and “friend.” It is entitled: “Letter to my friend in which I
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recommend that he read my favorite poet”324 and was written as a secondary school assignment
at the Schulpforta. Nietzsche’s teacher, Herr Koberstein, gave him a B-grade for the composition,
instructing him to focus on a “healthier,” and “more German” poet. 325 In this letter, Nietzsche
attacks his interlocutor for accusing Hölderlin of espousing “the ideas of a lunatic, violent
outbreaks against Germany, deification of the pagan world, now naturalism, now pantheism, now
polytheism, all confused” and for praising the poet solely for his “accomplished Greek meters.”
Passionately, Nietzsche insists that Hölderlin’s “poems (to consider their form alone) spring from
the purest, most susceptible sensibility” and that their “naturalness and originality eclipse the art
and formal skill of Platen.”326 It is precisely the organic character of Hölderlin’s poetry that is
dear to Nietzsche, its effulgent and excessive exercise of the “plastische Kraft”—the plastic
force, which, in the second Untimely Meditation, defines the necessary limit between forgetting
and remembrance for every man, people, and culture.327 Hölderlin, then, accomplishes the
perfection of this power’s synthesis between the natural in the absolute and the original; his
attitude toward antiquity is in the proper measure, standing midway between the human and the
divine, between the ancient and the modern.
Nietzsche calls to his “friend’s” attention, then, the fact that Hölderlin was not only poet
but tragedian: “you do not know his Empedocles then, this most important dramatic fragment, in
whose melancholy tones reverberates the future of the unhappy poet, his grave of long madness,
and not as you say in unclear talk but in the purest Sophoclean language and with an
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inexhaustible fullness of profound ideas.”328 Already, then, the figures of Hölderlin and
Empedocles (of Hölderlin’s Empedocles immediately, yet through this, also the Empedocles of
Nietzsche) come to mirror one another in Nietzsche’s vision. The suicide of the ancient
philosopher reflects itself in the madness of the poet, so that Hölderlin’s modern re-creation of
Empedocles becomes a prophetic gesture connecting these two comet-like geniuses to one
another. Indeed, Nietzsche says in his letter: “In the unfinished tragedy Empedocles, the poet
unfolds his own nature to us. Empedocles’ death is a death from divine pride, from scorn of man,
from being sated with the earth, and from pantheism. Whenever I have read it, the whole work
has always moved me profoundly; there is a divine loftiness in this Empedocles.”329 Nietzsche
thus casts a ray of light into the tragic fate of his favorite poet. Hölderlin’s striving for divinity,
like that of his Empedocles, was too strong—it overstepped the bounds of the human, filling the
mortal world immeasurably with shards of the sacred. It was the excess of his knowledge,
brimming on godliness to such a degree that his superiority led him to scorn men in their
barbarity, their common mediocrity, that rendered Hölderlin, and Empedocles through him, as his
mirror image, tragic in the extreme. It was this that made the self-sacrifice both of the ancient
and of the modern poet necessary—to communicate to those “contemporaries” whose ears were
deaf and whose eyes were blind the tragedy of their time.
Yet Nietzsche holds testimony to the failure—itself tragic—of Hölderlin’s sacrifice,
which itself mirrors the failure he perceived in the self-sacrifice of Empedocles. He ends his
letter: “I only hope—and do regard this as the purpose of my letter—that it will move you to an
understanding and to an unprejudiced evaluation of this poet, whose very name is hardly known
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to most of his countrymen.”330 Hence the excentric path of Hölderlin as a tragic hero, like that of
Empedocles, is illuminated—his necessary failure, even in view of his divinity. For the hero’s
universality is beyond his time, and thus at his most universal and his most divine, he becomes,
in turn, most particular, most mortal, and his death-song does not reach the ears of the people it is
destined for.
Hölderlin, too, at the limit between sanity and madness, had dreamed himself a comet. In
the famous late fragmentary poem, “In lieblecher Bläue” (“In Lovely Blue”) dating from the
early days of Hölderlin’s madness, and preserved (perhaps transformed) by Wilhelm Waiblinger
in his novel Phaeton (1823), he writes:
Would I like to be a comet? I think so.
They are swift as birds, they flower
With fire, childlike in purity. To desire
More than this is beyond human measure.331
The comet, common figure to Nietzsche and to Hölderlin, is that lonely celestial flame, whose
motion transcends its time in a burst that sacrifices itself as it shoots across the sky—its path is
necessarily excentric (i.e., non-circular). Hölderlin’s Hyperion, too, cries out to his barbaric
“contemporaries”: “You have lost your faith in all that is great; thus you must depart, you must,
if this faith does not return like a comet from foreign skies [wie ein Komet aus fremden
Himmeln].”332 That flash of foreignness alone could give rise to the return of the gods; only the
monstrous could reverse the tragic dissolution of culture. That which is proper is only to be
achieved across a purificatory (cathartic) travel through that which is foreign.
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The human measure of which Hölderlin speaks has thus, as its limit, the desire to be a
comet. The very force of the comet is its striving toward incalculability—its divergence from the
circular path. This measure is never possible in an absolute sense, but only through what
Hölderlin calls infinite approximation [unendliche Annäherung]. In a letter to Schiller of
September 4, 1795, Hölderlin wrote:
I am trying to develop for myself the idea of an infinite progression in philosophy. I am
trying to show that the relentless demand that must be made on every system, namely the
unification of subject and object in the absolute—in an ego or in whatever one wants to
call it—is possible, albeit aesthetically, in intellectual intuition. It is possible theoretically
only through an infinite approximation [eine unendliche Annäherung], as in the squaring
of the circle. I am thus trying to show that in order to realize a system of thought an
immortality is necessary—every bit as necessary as it is for a system of action.333
The aesthetic is thus the only realm in which intellectual intuition, the immediate, sensuous
attainment of the absolute, can be established; this is precisely because of its temporal character,
its capacity to render the unification and separation of the mortal and the immortal in their
primordial rhythm—it is for this reason, too, that Empedocles was a poet, and that he was
capable of the purification of his people. This notion of “infinite approximation,” which is the
epicenter of the tragic, as the loss of absolute measure, thus requires an immortal counterpart to
the mortal, in order for intellectual intuition to come about in a work of art. Hölderlin proposes
tragedy, in fact, as the metaphor for intellectual intuition.334 This notion reappears in Hölderlin’s
preface to the second edition of his novel Hyperion, which unites the poetic instinct of the
ancients with the modern world. Here, it is a question of the possibility of a reunification of man
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with nature in primordial oneness, after having fallen out of that originary natural state. He
writes:
Neither our knowledge nor our action […] in any period of existence, attains that point at
which all conflict ceases and all is one: the determinate line unites with the indeterminate
one only in infinite approximation [unendliche Annäherung]. […]
[But that infinite reunion of man and nature] is actually at hand—in the form of
Beauty; to speak as Hyperion does, a new Kingdom awaits us, where Beauty is queen.—
I believe we shall all say in the end: Holy Plato, forgive us! grievously have we
sinned against you.335
The word Annäherung also means “reconciliation” or “rapprochement.” The movement of the
tragic, for Hölderlin, always consists in the striving to reconcile, to bring into a lucid equality the
human and the boundless. From this project of infinite reconciliation, infinite approximation, a
“calculable law” is formed, as is necessary in the writing of tragedies. Hyperion gives voice to
this tragic knowledge in the following cry:
Why are we excepted from the beautiful cycle of nature? Or does it also hold sway for
us?
I would have had it, were one thing not in us: the monstrous striving to be all,
which, like [E]tna’s Titan, rages up from the depths of our being [ungeheure Streben Alles
zu seyn, das, wie der Titan des Aetna, heraufzürnt aus den Tiefen unsers Wesens].336
The Titan Typhon was defeated by Zeus in the subterranean region beneath Mount Etna—the
very volcano into which Empedocles would throw himself. Here, it is the “monstrous striving to
be all”—the constant impulse by which men move toward divinity, toward the infinite and
toward ever-greater consciousness that prevents his return to the harmonious, circular movement
of nature. The self-reflective man, beyond the boundless innocence of nature, is condemned to
the excentric path of the comet—the path that does not lead back into the heart of his natural
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origin but which, rather, casts him ever farther from that nature. Thus, incapable of measuring
himself against the divine, and yet continually striving toward it, man lives a tragic existence,
banished from the circular sphere and sent to wander without the promise of a return to guide
him back to nature. It is only by infinite approximation that human measure can be divined;
excentricity sets the limit of this measure.
Nietzsche, for his part, pronounces, in a fragment of 1873, the following, unfulfillable
exigency: “To be completely truthful—glorious, heroic joy of man, in a mendacious nature. But
possible only in a very relative sense! That is tragic. That is the tragic problem of Kant! Now art
acquires an entirely new dignity. The sciences, on the other hand, are degraded by one
degree” (KSA 7: 19 [104]).337 The definition of the tragic in the modern world is thus of the same
nature for Hölderlin and Nietzsche: it is the condemnation to infinite approximation—the loss of
the absolute, the disappearance of the god, the unity of man and nature that has turned the
experience of men into an excentric movement, ever departing from Nature and speeding toward
the unknown like a comet. Yet while for Hölderlin it is thus necessary to strive toward being
“all”—to achieve the reunification of man with nature through the endless mourning of their
separation, the measure is, for Nietzsche, bodily.
In his letter, Nietzsche speaks, too, of Hölderlin’s abhorrence for Germany. He writes:
In other poems, especially in ‘Remembrance’ [‘Andenken’] and ‘The Journey’ [‘Die
Wanderung’], the poet raises us up to the purest ideal spheres, and we feel with him that
this was the element where he was at home. And last, a whole series of poems is
noteworthy, in which he tells the Germans bitter truths which are, unfortunately, only too
firmly grounded. In Hyperion too, he flings sharp and cutting words at German
‘barbarism.’ Yet this abhorrence of reality is compatible with the greatest love of his
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country, and this love Hölderlin did have in high degree. But he hated in Germans the
mere specialist, the philistine.338
In his first Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche writes of Hölderlin as a victim of his barbaric,
philistine age—thus as an obscure version of Empedocles as failed reformer. He writes of “the
noble Hölderlin” as “a tried-and-true non-philistine” who “perished by philistines [… .]” He
attacks Friedrich Vischer, a Hegelian “esthete” and “culture-philistine” according to Nietzsche’s
terminology, for appropriating the memory of Hölderlin and claiming that the poet would never
have been able to “‘endure the harshness of war’”—that he went mad because “‘his spirit lacked
hardness and the weapon of wit’” and ultimately that “‘He found it unendurable that one could
be a philistine and still not be a barbarian.’”339 Vischer’s attack is based on the championing of
philistinism, against which Hölderlin was ceaselessly critical, equating it with barbarism, and an
accusation of Hölderlin’s lack of philistine “wit.” Viciously, Nietzsche remarks that Vischer
“would certainly maintain that a man can be a philistine and still be a man of culture—such wit
was lacking in poor Hölderlin, and this lack was his undoing.”340 Nietzsche affirms thus his
affinity with Hölderlin, for he, too, identifies barbarity with philistinism, and the heroes of
culture who are able to do this—to diagnose their age and to will its surpassing—find themselves
by this very fact in the situation of tragic heroes. Hölderlin’s madness, for Nietzsche, is then
parallel to the death of Empedocles—a going-under—Untergang—a self-sacrificial response to
modern barbarism.
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Hölderlin writes to his brother on June 4, 1799, of the “paradox, […] that the instinct for
art and cultivation, with all of its modifications and varieties, is a proper service that men
perform for nature.”341 By this paradox, then, an art, or a culture is performed that is the very
presentation of the nature that it serves, or whose goal it accomplishes. The circle is thus formed
between man and nature as economically, aesthetically, and tragically dependent upon one
another. As Szondi puts it, Hölderlin wishes to “grant man a position vis-à-vis nature that
simultaneously shows man as nature’s servant and nature as dependent on man”342 —dependent,
indeed, for its very existence. Therefore, the paradox that Nietzsche will later formulate is here
expressed. This notion is again revealed in a fragment of Hölderlin’s on tragedy:
The significance of tragedies can be understood most easily by way of paradox. Since all
potential [Vermögen; ability] is divided justly and equally, everything that is original
[alles Ursprüngliche] appears not in its original strength [ursprünglicher Stärke], but
rather, properly [eigentlich; actually], in its weakness [in seiner Schwäche]. Hence,
appearance and the light of life quite properly belong to the weakness of every whole.
Now in the tragic, the sign itself is insignificant, without effect, but the original is openly
revealed. Properly speaking, the original can appear only in its weakness; but insofar as
the sign itself is posited as insignificant = 0, the original, the hidden ground of every
nature, can also present itself. If nature properly presents itself in its weakest talent, then,
when it shows itself in its strongest talent, the sign = 0.343
Hölderlin speaks again of the essential equality of force in its original division, in a letter to Isaac
von Sinclair of December 24, 1798, where this becomes a cosmological principle—here, tragedy
begins to reveal itself, for Hölderlin, as a model or allegory for life itself, and most profoundly
for modern life in the god’s absence. He writes: “indeed, it is the first condition of all life and all
organization—that in heaven and on earth no force rules monarchically. Absolute monarchy
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cancels itself out everywhere, for it is without object [… .] Everything that is interpenetrates as
soon as it becomes active. … Of course, from every finite point of view some one of the
autonomous forces must be the ruling force, yet it must be observed to prevail only temporarily
and only to a certain degree.”344 The absolute as such, the kingly, is never pure—it only rules
from one perspective at a time—it is only appearance. Hence every king is a false king, and is
never the sole sovereign endowed with divinity—even Oedipus, whose first error was to interpret
the oracle “too infinitely,” by assuming the crime responsible for the affliction of Thebes with
plague on a religious basis, considering the crime to be the fault of a single, particular man, and
himself to the absolute exception from guilt as a monarch. The signification of the king—
translated by Hölderlin not as König but as Tyrann—is just this, that in Oedipus the transparency
of the king unveils itself; the king becomes the most mortal of mortals—hence he can no longer
remain a possessor of absolute power, absolute knowledge. In Oedipus, a transgression of the
idea of the sovereign takes place, as he is defeated by the blind servitude to the myth of his
kingship—herein lies, indeed, his tyranny. For he is unable to embrace the original equality of all
things.
Hence Empedocles, the wandering god, in the first draft of Hölderlin’s Trauerspiel,
refuses to accept the crown offered to him by the Agrigent people, declaring the age of kings to
be over. Rather, he commands them to return to the divine equality nature, saying:
The narratives of your father’s voices teaching you,
All law and custom, names of all the ancient gods,
Forget these things courageously; like newborn babes
Your eyes will open to the godliness of nature [Die Augen auf zur gottlichen Natur!] 345
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This revolutionary spirit leads from monarchy back to the divine present in nature, where all
things possess equal potential for self-actualization, equal, organic plastische Kraft. The
abolition of the monarchic order must result in a return to the unity of nature.
The interpenetration of all living things, which results in activity—in other words, the
coming-into-conflict of things, which alone ignites their movement, is a concept inherited from
Empedocles, whose opposition between love, φιλία and strife, νεῖκος formed his cosmic
principle. The battle between these two life-forces is the universal movement. In his explication
of his cosmogony, Empedocles speaks of the double genesis of all things:
For at one time [τοτὲ; once] [they] grew to be one alone
from many, and at another [τοτὲ], again, [they] grew apart to be many from one. […]
And these things never cease from constantly alternating,
at one time all coming together by love into one [φιλóτητι συνερχóµεν εἰς]
and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility of strife
[νεῖκος].346
Hölderlin takes the model of this cosmic double-movement in ceaseless transformation from
extreme unity in love to extreme separation in strife as the matrix of his philosophical and
poetological thinking. According to Rohde, Empedocles, like the other Eleatics, denied
“becoming and passing away” and “all qualitative change,”347 but rather than endorsing Being as
an indivisible unity, he posited four “roots”—elements, whose “mixture and separation […]
cause the appearance of becoming and perishing; and those two processes are caused by the two
forces […] of attraction and repulsion, Love and Hate, which in the creative process struggle and
in turn overmaster each other until at last, in the final victory of one of the two forces, all things
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are either united or divided: in either case the organic world ceases to exist.”348 The attainment of
either absolute, thus, absolute separation or absolute unity, results in the annihilation of the
world. The only force of life that preserves the activity of the universe is the mixture of elements
that conjures the appearance of becoming, which, however, never corresponds to the actual pure
dynamic of nature. For Empedocles, as for Hölderlin and Nietzsche, his successor, it is only
through art, the aesthetic rendering, the aesthetic creation of nature that life is possible.
There is, thus, according to Hölderlin’s fragment quoted above, no simultaneity of origin
and appearance in tragedy. The primordial force of nature is perfectly divided among all agents,
and cannot coincide with its appearance, but rather, that underlying strength can only appear as
weakness. Strength itself is merely recalled by weakness, whose task it is to present that natural
strength—this strength is merely traced, signified on the back of weakness. Yet this strength is
brought about through weakness; the figure of the tragic hero is the clearest, the most transparent
sign—through him alone, through the curse of his mortality, in its essential weakness, can the
natural absolute strength of the divine in nature show itself. With the movement of the scenes in
any tragedy, with the shift in their rhythms and tones, the relation between weakness and the
strength that is its true sense shifts radically.
Of this fragment, Lacoue-Labarthe writes, “we find, under the name of the tragic sign, the
figure (in the strong sense, the Gestalt—Hölderlin also speaks of the symbol) of the suffering
hero who is the site of the revelation and the epiphany of what is.”349 The hero, in other words, is
the ultimate tragic sign—the incarnation of the primordial under the sway of destiny. Szondi
writes:
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In art, nature no longer appears “properly,” but through the mediation of a sign. In
tragedy, this sign is the tragic hero. Insofar as he can do nothing against the power of
nature and is destroyed by it, he is “insignificant” and “without effect.” But in the tragic
hero’s demise, when the sign = 0, nature presents itself as a conquerer “in its strongest
talent,” and “the original is openly revealed.” Hölderlin thus interprets tragedy as a
sacrifice that man offers to nature in order to help it achieve an adequate appearance.350
The proper, or what Nietzsche would call the quantity of plastic force in measure with a man is
thus only possible by means of a dis-appropriation of the self—i.e., a sacrifice—that is at once
the re-creation of nature, its strength transformed with every medium of weakness in which it
necessarily appears. Because voluntary death is the ultimate form of weakness and of absence,
the tragic hero, having attained to an excessive self-consciousness, must then resolve himself to
sacrifice, precisely so that divine nature might once again achieve its unity in appearance.
Another way of saying this is, as Hölderlin writes in the “Notes” to his translation of
Oedipus: “the tragic transport [Der tragische T r a n s p o r t] is actually empty and the least
restrained.”351 This transport necessitates the intervention of “the pure word, the counterrhythmic rupture” which takes place, in both Oedipus Tyrannos and Antigone, when Tiresias
enters into the drama; the portent gives the hero his tragic significance and determines his
destiny of sacrifice and, thus condemning him, liberates him.352 The “pure word” is thus,
precisely, prophecy delivered as enigma—the most lucid coincidence of the calculable and the
incalculable, and hence the moment where the approximation of god and man to one another is
most accurate, when their reconciliation is most present. The tragic hero must become
insignificant (must = 0) in that moment, in order for the prophecy, the sign of Zeus, to reveal
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itself in him. And yet, because prophecy remains linguistic, and remains enigmatic, that is,
because it comes into play through the mouth of Tiresias, the blind seer, who is, nonetheless,
human, it remains veiled; rather than presenting in its purity the union of god and man, it
represents, by the silence it speaks (by the caesura it constitutes—the pause in tragic rhythm),
their simultaneous separation. The paradoxical nature of the very term “pure word” reveals itself
here—for language is, by its very nature, impure, serving to mystify and conceal even as it sheds
the light of divine flame on the future, is infinitely mirrored and reproduced by the paradoxical
form of its deliverance, in the likewise paradoxical person of Tiresias, and its reception by the
human it condemns, who necessarily misunderstands it. Through the interruption, thus, of the
pure word in tragic transport, “manifestation [Vorstellung] itself” comes about; the manifestation
of the hero’s fate of downgoing as the silent prophetic word. 353
The rhythm meets a “counter-rhythmic interruption”—a “caesura”—at the midpoint of
the tragedy’s fated unfolding, there where the tragic transport is at its most empty—where the
voice of the divine comes through in its purest clarity.354 If “in the rapidity of the inspiration” the
rhythm of the first scenes is “carried away” by the following scenes, then the caesura “must lie
towards the front” to protect the earlier rhythm from the weight and speed of the later one—
because of the “counter-working of the caesura,” the balance must then “incline more from the
back […] towards the beginning” in a diagonal that leans downward, halfway between the
beginning and the end. On the other hand, if in the rhythm the later scenes “are more under
pressure from those at the beginning,” the caesura lies towards the end, since the final scenes
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require protection from the the initials ones, “and the balance will as a consequence incline more
towards the end […] since the first half […] extends itself further but the balance comes later.” In
this case, the opposite diagonal takes place.355 Hölderlin writes that the “rule,” the “calculable
law of ‘Antigone’ compares to that of ‘Oedipus’ like __/____ to ____\__.”356 The reason for this
is that: “In both plays the speeches of Tiresias form the caesura.”357 Hence, in Oedipus Tyrannos,
the caesura lies toward the beginning of the play because “in excentric rapidity,” the earlier
scenes “are more rended forward by the following ones”—the caesura is necessary precisely in
order to establish an “equilibrium” between the two halves of the drama, divided by the counterrhythmic rupture. Hence, because in Oedipus the rhythm of the later scenes tends violently
toward excess, because the second half “is originally more rapid and seems to weigh more,” the
first half must be “as it were protected against the second one.”358 Hence the “balance
inclines”359 from the end toward the beginning in Oedipus. In the case of Antigone, the
succession is opposite.
The art of tragedy, as Hölderlin conceives it, depends upon the drawing-together of the
calculable, “sensuous” medium of poetry and the incalculable content of the play, which he also
calls “reason.” Hence, in order for the boundless content to be “Something,” i.e., that it be
“recognizable in the medium (moyen) of its appearance”—in order that it be intelligible, a poetic
“lawful calculation” is called for. This calculation, says Hölderlin, relates to the infinite, “living
meaning which cannot be calculated” expressed in the drama in various ways throughout the
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unfolding of the scenes, yet remains ever “distinct” from it. The movement of this
correspondence of the calculable and the incalculable, which is changeable in the unfolding of
the tragedy, is measured by the rhythm of poetic meter, both in the minutiae of its lines and in the
succession of the scenes of the drama.360 Hölderlin says that this calculation “exists in tragedy
more as a state of balance than as mere succession.”361 The caesura in the drama determines the
point at which this balance is established; it approximates the measure of the two halves of the
tragedy against one another, such that their weight may be equal, and it thus takes place at the
turning-point of the action, where the tragic hero, as the sign through which the strength of
divine nature manifests, = 0. This, then, is the moment at which the infinite time of the gods, the
time without present, the αἰών, manifests itself through the medium of mortal, successive time,
the χρόνος. It causes, therefore, a disturbance in the “onrushing time [reißenden Zeit]”362 —an
originary moment in the flux of becoming, when divine and mortal time are most united, and
thus must separate most boundlessly—this, as we shall see, is the event of intellectual intuition
for Hölderlin.
In Oedipus der Tyrann, it is from the moment of the hero’s tragic reception of the oracle,
of his excessive interpretation of it, that his fate of striving willfully toward a monstrous selfconsciousness, which shall necessitate his destruction, is determined. The excentric temporal
movement of the drama begins at this moment. The time of tragedy, for Hölderlin, is excentric
precisely because it offers no continuity, and the rhythmic motion of the scenes will not allow
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Oedipus to return to his original naïveté. Therefore, the further he proceeds toward selfknowledge, the more firmly is the fate of his self-sacrifice determined. Hölderlin writes: “The
intelligibility of the whole rests primarily on one’s [ability to] focus on the scene where Oedipus
interprets the saying of the oracle too infinitely [zu unendlich], and is tempted into nefas.”363 This
infinitude of interpretation refers to Oedipus’ immediate drawing-together of the curse of the
plague on Thebes and the murder of Laius, and thereafter the assumption of an infinite,
inexpiable crime and a particular criminal guilty for it. After hearing the oracle, Oedipus initially
“speaks in a priestly fashion. ‘What is the rite / of purification [Reinigung]? etc.’ And moves into
the particular, ‘Who is the man whose fate the God pronounces?’”364 By means of this
interrogation—by the request that a man be designated as infinitely culpable for the infinite
crime, Oedipus “leads [C]reon’s thoughts to the terrible pronouncement: ‘Our master, O Lord,
was Laius / In this country, before you piloted the state.’” Having thus brought “the saying of the
oracles and the story of Laius’ death, not necessarily related to it” together, “Oedipus’ spirit states
in furious presentiment [and] knowing all, the nefas quite properly by resentfully interpreting the
general injunction in particular terms and applying it to the murder of Laius, and then by taking
the sin [Sünde] as infinite [unendlich].”365 It is at this moment that Oedipus accurses the culprit
of Laius’ murder and ordains that he be shunned from Thebes.
This act gives rise to Oedipus’ “wonderful furious curiosity” in the exchange with
Tiresias, his mad longing for and resistance to self-knowledge, “because knowledge [das Wissen]
—after it has broken through its barriers—as if intoxicated in its great harmonious form [wie
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trunken in seiner herrlichen harmonischen Form], which can remain, is spurred to know itself
more than it can bear or contain.”366 It is from the monstrosity of this drive to knowledge, this
monstrous seeking of himself to uncover the ground of his nature that the succession of the
tragedy’s scenes unfolds, and that the hero falls ever further into the depth of his excentric path,
into the excess of self-consciousness that will require him to sacrifice himself. This movement
toward self-knowledge, thus, requires Oedipus to succumb to the tragic rhythm of the drama,
from the later scene with Creon to the scene with Jacosta to the confrontation of the Corinthian
messenger, as his “loyal and certain spirit suffers in furious excess which, rejoicing in
destruction, merely follows the onrushing time [reißenden Zeit].”367
This tragic temporality, precipitated by fate, thus comes gradually, through his “desperate
struggle to find himself,”368 to take the form of Oedipus’ ever-quickening, excentric, “madly wild
seeking for a consciousness.”369 It is the attainment of this consciousness, the reception of the
murderous response to the question of his provenance and of his crime as infinite—and, thereby,
too, of the need for infinite punishment—that Oedipus unites with the divine precisely by
separating from it, becoming empty so that mortality is turned in upon itself as the god
withdraws. For Hölderlin writes that the “presentation of the tragic” rests upon “the boundless
union” of god and man “purifying itself through boundless separation.”370 Hence, Oedipus
himself, upon attaining the self-knowledge he had sought so furiously, becomes equal to zero, in
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order to present the tragic absence of the god by taking responsibility for the crime that he had
claimed to be infinite, and sacrificing himself as a result.
Hölderlin and Nietzsche meet in the thinking of rhythm as the cosmological,
epistemological movement and measure. In accordance with his theory of the illusionary nature
of space and of time, Nietzsche writes: “Space and time are merely measured things, measured
according to a rhythm” (KSA 7: 19 [153]).371 This rhythm, we have seen, is for the human that of
breath. In every living thing, the measure upon which all knowledge is based is relative to its
powers of perception. Bettina von Arnim relates two quotations of Hölderlin’s, reported to her by
Isaac von Sinclair, probably dating from the time of Hölderlin’s madness. The first runs as
follows: “All is rhythm [Rhythmus], the entire destiny of man is a single celestial rhythm, just as
the work of art is one unique rhythm.”372 And again: “Only the spirit is poetry, the one that bears
in itself the mystery of an innate rhythm; and it is by this rhythm alone that it can become visible
and living, for rhythm is its soul.”373 This rhythm then, excludes all absolute beginning, for that
which awakes as rhythm is already separated from itself by a distance of becoming as soon as it
comes to consciousness—it is the pulse of life, and thus of poetry that courses through the
universal soul. This is also why Hölderlin says that the critical moment of tragedy—that of the
caesura in its rhythmic progression, where a “categorical reversal” takes place between god and
man—no longer fits “beginning and end [… .]”374 For in that rhythmed moment, the continuity,
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the successive nature of time shows its very failure as it fragments itself, distancing self from
self.
For Hölderlin, tragedy follows a “poetic logic,” different from philosophical logic in that
the latter is the name of “the mere hanging together of the parts” that make up the whole of
philosophy’s presentation of the only capacity of the soul with which it is concerned: the logical
capacity. Poetry, on the other hand, presents the myriad, “various capacities of the human being”
as a composed whole, and the “hanging together of the—more autonomous—parts of these
different capacities may be called the rhythm (in a higher sense) or the calculable law.”375 Thus
the supremacy of poetry over philosophy lies in its capacity to conjure a presentation of every
human capacity, each with its own proper autonomy and singularity, not in the sphere of an ideal
extra-spatiotemporal unity, but in the rhythmic time of the artistic. This rhythm, moreover, is one
both appropriated from antiquity (in the form of Pindaric meter for the odes and Sophoclean
meter for tragedy) and recreated by the artist in whom it is presented. For the purity of the truth
unveiled and brought forth by the tragic drama depends upon its propriety, its properness, to the
poet himself.
Through this expression of the divine and the proper in the tragic drama, the subject and
object are equally abolished in the tragic whole, which is to say that man and god unite, or
rhythmically coincide infinitely; this is, for Hölderlin, the purest mode of tragedy. For he writes:
Tragedy […] resides in this: that the immediate God, wholly one with man, […] that an
infinite enthusiasm infinitely, which is to say in antitheses, in consciousness that cancels
out consciousness, and sacramentally departing from itself, apprehends itself, and the
god, in the shape of death, is present.376
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The sacrifice that tragedy entails is this entrance of man into the god of death through the
reversal by which, holding himself responsible for an immeasurable, inexpiable transgression
committed through necessity, he resolves himself to separate infinitely from the god, descending
into the “the excentric sphere of the dead [in die exzentrische Sphäre der Todten].”377 This god,
the invisible face of mortality, is the eternal reflection of man himself. Catharsis, for Hölderlin, is
the separation of god and man out of this infinite unification.

The Perspective of the Moderns toward the Ancients
In a letter to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff of December 4, 1801, Hölderlin lays out his
theory of the necessary relation between the ancients and the moderns. The theory is organized
around the postulate that: “the free use of that which is our own is hardest of all.”378 The proper is
that impasse at which we must recognize the limit of our speech to say the god. The impossibility
of philosophy is also the impossibility of the proper. It is the impossibility of the absolute in our
own sphere—the absolute is, rather, something that has flown irretrievably, and the tragic poem,
which temporally reveals this absence of the natural sphere of originality, incites then the
necessity of its mourning, the necessity of its recurrence, differently.
Hölderlin writes: “And it is my belief that clarity of exposition is originally as natural to
us as heavenly fire is to the Greeks. For precisely that reason the Greeks are more likely to be
surpassed in fine passion, which is what you have managed to keep [in your Fernando], than in
the presence of spirit and faculty for exposition we find in Homer.”379 What is proper to the
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Greeks is precisely the lack of anything proper, that is to say, the force of appropriation, and the
perfection of the formal exposition of this appropriated material—in other words, their capacity
to, like the tragic hero, = 0 in order to let the strength of nature appear, and indeed, manifest itself
through them. The rhythm of Greek drama expresses lucidly the infinite content of tragedy, the
coming-together and separating of the divine and the human which is, in its essence, monstrous.
Yet the moderns can repeat this poetic movement in a manner that, being proper, undoes the
possibility of such propriety, precisely because the sole common element between the Germans
and the Greeks is “living craft and proportion [… .]”380 The life-force of art, the capacity for the
aesthetic rendering of the rhythm of life, is what the ancients and the moderns share. Hölderlin
writes, in a fragment called “The Standpoint from which we should consider Antiquity” that the
“universal reason for the demise of all peoples” is “that their originality, their own living nature,
succumbed beneath the positive forms, the luxury that their fathers produced, and also appears to
be our own fate, only to a greater degree, inasmuch as an almost infinite antiquity, which we
know either through education or through experience, influences and oppresses us.”381 This
battle anticipates the conflicting views of Nietzsche’s antiquarian and critical historians.
Hölderlin says in his letter to Böhlendorff that “sacred pathos” was “native” to the
Greeks, such that they did not have to master it. Rather, the Greeks “are exceptional in their
faculty for exposition, from Homer onwards, because this extraordinary man had the feeling
necessary to capture the Junonian sobriety of the occident for his Apollonian realm, and so truly
to appropriate the foreign.”382 He then says: “With us it is the other way around.” Hölderlin
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defines the foreign doubly: for the Greeks, it is the divine, while for the modern poet, it is the
medium of representation—the words of the ode, the characters of the drama. The Greek power
of appropriation, their contact with the god, is lost for us. We must, rather, learn to use what is
proper to us, which is nothing other than the absence of the god, the national abandoned by the
divine: “Only is it precisely in what is proper to us, in the national, that we shall never match
them.”383 Indeed, a deliverance of the national into the natural, which, among the Greeks, were
harmonious, is Hölderlin’s ambition for his age.

Hölderlin’s Greece is purely monstrous to

itself by birth—it cannot appropriate itself, and does not seek to. Lacoue-Labarthe writes that for
Hölderlin: “The Greeks’ proper is inimitable because it never took place. At the very most it is
possible to catch a glimpse of it, or even perhaps deduce it from its opposite—art. And then
introduce it, après coup, into this art. Hence the work of translation, which consists in making
the Greek text say what it said endlessly without ever saying it. Which consists, then, in
repeating the unuttered of this text’s very utterance.”384 The task of translation is then to express,
in the mode of the living, the Greek appropriation of the foreign as their own in our language, the
exteriorization of the rhythm of our lives, our nation. This is then to say, through the cadence of
the tragic drama, a multiple lack of the proper. Hyperion cries: “We find pleasure in flinging
ourselves into the night of the unknown, into the cold foreign realm of some other world, and if it
were possible, we would leave the domain of the sun, and plunge beyond the bounds of the
comet. O! for man’s wild breast, no home is possible [… .]”385 Such is the homelessness, the full
lack of the proper to which man is condemned. Here, then, is his proximity and his distance from
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Nietzsche: while for Hölderlin, it is precisely the emptiness, the dis-apppropriation of the proper
that must be achieved by the moderns in order to imitate that same empty properness of the
ancients, the power of appropriation and reception of the foreign, it is always, for Nietzsche, a
question of expressing the void between the ancients and the moderns by a recreation of their
φύσις as a model for culture.
For Hölderlin, is only through poetry—and tragic poetry specifically—that the unity that
is at once a separation between god and man, between ancient and modern, and its necessary
mourning can be put into voice, the living human force that breath supports. He speaks the
following of Sophocles:
Many sought in vain to say joyfully the most joyful.
Here, finally, here in mourning [in der Trauer], it pronounces itself to me.386
It is thus that mourning is the absolute and joyful affirmation of life for Hölderlin;
mourning is the rhythm of life’s supremacy—the victory over the crushing power of the old. That
he found this mourning to be the movement present in Sophocles’ tragedies and hence translated
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them as Trauerspiele rather than Tragödien is his triumph in translation over the Greeks—his
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manner of surpassing them in transmitting their wisdom into the light of his day.387
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tragedies speak fluently the languages of both the ancients and the moderns—of both Trauerspiel and Tragödie, in
order properly and actually to transform the mythic into the historical—the function of the mourning-play is a
purificatory one just as much as the Greek tragedy is, yet the the latter is sublated into the former in this baroque
dialectic between the ancient and the modern, such that Trauerspiel takes on the role that is suited to the historical
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Benjamin recalls Hellingrath’s appellation of Hölderlin’s late period, from which his translations of
Sophocles date, as “the poet’s ‘baroque’ period” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 189). As such, his work is emblematic of
the event of the German Trauerspiel by which the theory of tragedy and the “rules of ancient tragedy” were
separated and at the same time combined with one another “around an allegorical figure representing the tragic
muse” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 188). Thus the operation of ancient tragedy became binding to the development of
the Trauerspiel, so that the tragic hero takes on an allegorical significance, and this power of allegory serves to
shatter the symbol and the ideal relation of resemblance inherent to it. “In such a context of allegorical decay and
destruction the image of Greek tragedy seemed to be the only possible, the natural sign of ‘tragic poetry.’ Its rules
became significant anticipations of the Trauerspiel; its texts are read as Trauerspiel-texts” (Benjamin, Trauerspiel,
189).
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Hölderlin’s Hyperion speaks of the originary nature of poetry, out of which philosophy is
born. He writes to Diotima as follows: “Like Minerva from Jupiter’s head, philosophy springs
from the poetry of an infinite, divine Being. And thus, in philosophy, too, the irreconcilable
ultimately converges again in the mysterious wellspring of poetry.”388 Poetry, the primordial, is
also the divine, then. In the tragic, man is both united with and separated from the god—he lives
in the god’s service, and the god speaks through him. By Hyperion’s word, a dialectic between
philosophy and poetry emerges in which heterogenous, the contradiction with which the
philosopher deals constantly, is transformed into the unified origin of poetry. Yet, for Hölderlin,
neither the separation nor the unification are isolable; they relate to one another by a rhythm
which is the life-force, and thus there is nothing but a rhythmic passage from the one into the
other, never whole or silent, never still.
Hyperion, in the same passage, calls Heraclitus the father of philosophy: “The great word
of Heraclitus, ἒν διαφέρον ἑαυτῷ (the one differentiating in itself), this only a Greek could find,
for it is the essence of beauty, and before that was found, there was no philosophy.”389
Differentiation takes place at the heart of union, uniformity. This is the divine moment, the
coupling and separation of man and god—of the oneness that lies behind words and the
heterogeneity they speak. The tragic, for Hölderlin, is the absolute metaphor for intellectual
intuition, where metaphor is conceived in the sense of tragic transport, “Der tragische T r a n s p
o r t”390—tragic travel. Indeed, tragic transport, for Hölderlin, is itself metaphor, taken in the
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Greek sense as µεταφορά, transfer or transport.391 To call tragedy the metaphor for intellectual
intuition is thus to say that tragedy itself is the very movement, the very transport that effects the
event and the failure of this intuition, which are inseparable. Hölderlin writes: “The tragic, in its
outer appearance heroic poem is in its basic tone idealistic, and all works of this kind must be
founded on an intellectual intuition which cannot be any other than that unity with everything
living [… .]”392 Yet this universal, living unity of intellectual intuition, which is not “felt by the
limited soul” but rather “anticipated,”393 “transcends itself” and becomes separation because of
its intensity and in “the excess of spirit within unity, in its striving for materiality, in the striving
of the divisible, more infinite aorgic which must contain all that is more organic, […] in this
striving for the divisible infinite, […] in this necessary arbitrariness of Zeus there actually lies
the ideal beginning of the real separation.”394
The passage from the ideal to the real is that transport from the unity present in
intellectual intuition to the event of the real wherein the god, limitless freedom and
deathlessness, and man, whose essence is to die, and who is thus bound by necessity undergo
their primordial separation, boundlessly separate from one another. Indeed, this separation ends
in the voluntary death of tragic hero, his attempt to attain, in spite of separation, the absolute
unity within himself of the immortal and the mortal, which is to say: of divine necessity and
human freedom. According to Hölderlin, there are different degrees of intellectual intuition: “If
the intellectual intuition is more subjective, and if the separation proceeds mainly from the
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concentrating parts, as in Antigone, then the style is lyrical [… .]” Oedipus, on the other hand, is
“tragic,” writes Hölderlin, because “it proceeds from the highest separable, from Zeus [… .]”395
Zeus is the “highest separable” because he is the highest god, the one with the most potent
potential for separation from man, out of the unification of intellectual intuition. From the point
at which his force as arbitrary destiny becomes, for Oedipus, an act of his own freedom through
the hyperbolic attainment of self-consciousness, the god withdraws from the world of man,
leaving behind only the curse of man’s fate to become free self-inflicted punishment
accomplished in a radically human manner, in a world condemned to immanence. It is by means
of this “divine infidelity [götliche Untreue]”396 —this departure of the godhead, presented in the
emptiness of the hero’s tragic transport—that the tragedy proper to the mortal, the tragedy of a
discontinuous, excentric temporality, comes into being for the tragic hero, as that which is proper
to him.

Tragic Ode, Tragic Drama
We have established that, for Hölderlin, the constant demand for poetry—for ποίησις, the
creation of realities bathed in tragic light is “the free use of that which is our own,” and that this
is precisely what is both most necessary and “hardest of all.”397 Yet this use of the proper entails
an experience of the different, the foreign, through which alone the proper, in its emptiness,
comes to light, at two different levels. For the poet himself, the proper must be expressed
through a dialectic between his own experience and intensity and the medium through which this
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is expressed. Within the tragic poem itself, it is a tragic dialectic between what is proper to the
poem itself—to its musical spirit in the case of the ode or to its characters in the case of the
drama and the supersensuous or divinity. Hölderlin, in an essay contemporary to the writing of
his unfinished Trauerspiel, Der Tod des Empedokles (1798), which was to be a modern Greek
tragedy, writes:
every poem, including the tragic, must indeed have proceeded from poetic life and poetic
actuality, that is, from the poet’s own world and soul, because otherwise the proper truth
everywhere goes missing; nothing at all can be understood and brought to life if we are
unable to transpose our own innermost heart and our own experience to the foreign
analogical material. 398
The foreignness of the material measures, by its distance from the proper, the capacity for the
drama to engender a new world and to bring into rhythmic actuality, by extension, the dialectic
of unity and separation between internal “intensity” and external “divinity” both within the
drama itself and within the poet’s own experience. The tragic dramatic poem, therefore, like all
true poetry, brings to life “the divinity that poets sense and experience in their own world”—
hence, divinity, which is, in fact, the recalling of the divine in its absence, must be grasped at
every moment of its metamorphosis through time, through history, and rediscovered in the
artistic, the poetic and aesthetic synthesis.
In the tragic ode, which is the initial, more naïve stage of the tragic dramatic poem,
“intensity” is also presented “in actual opposites” yet only “in the form and unmediated language
of sensibility.”399 The tragic ode, for Hölderlin, is the origin—the beginning of a dialectic out of
which tragedy issues. It refers precisely to the choral ode, such that Hölderlin’s theory of tragedy
is, indeed, quite similar to the one that Nietzsche will develop after him: namely that tragedy is
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born “out of the spirit of music.”400 Nietzsche declares this thesis in bold tones as follows:
“tragedy arose from the tragic chorus, and was originally only chorus and nothing but
chorus.”401 The movement of Hölderlin’s tragic ode, which contains within it the excentric
movement that extends across all of his thought, runs thus: it begins, first of all, in “supernal
fire,” that is, in the highest intensity of the primordial element.402 He thus follows in the poetic
cosmogony of Heraclitus, who speaks the following:
This world, the same of all worlds, was neither created by gods nor men, but always has
been and is and shall be eternally living fire, which ignites [ἁπτόµενον] with measure
[µέτρα] and is extinguished [ἀποσβεννύµενον] with measure [µέτρα].
14 [A 30]403
This measure is internal to the cosmic rhythm of chance and necessity, expressed in selfgenerating movements of primordial fire—for Hölderlin, the measure shall be expressed in the
rhythmic dialectic of tragic poetry.
The tragic ode ignites a “conflict” by an excess of “pure spirit pure intensity [sic]” having
“overstepped its boundaries”—having erred, in other words, beyond its proper measure. This
conflict, however, is necessary to the tragic ode in order to “depict what is pure”—Hölderlin
defines this purity as “the supersensuous.”404 It then moves dialectically between the extremes of
“differentiation” and of “not differentiating at all with respect to what is pure.” Differentiation
refers to the mode in which the difference between the sensuous and the supersensuous is
apprehended, such that the latter is inadequately mediated through the former, while
400
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nondifferentiation names the state in which the sensuous does not distinguish itself from the
supersensuous and hence strives to unite with it in pure lucidity—perfect coincidence, which
would be the attainment, indeed, of intellectual intuition. From the height, then, of this
nondifferentiation, “the ode falls into a pure sensuality and a more modest intensity, because the
original more lofty more godlike bolder intensity appears to it to be extreme.” The ode comes to
a point of self-consciousness and self-reflexivity in its mode of nondifferentiation, of furious
excess, which renders necessary an Untergang, a downgoing from unity with the supersensuous
to separation from it, back into mere, modest sensuality—the mortal element.
From its fallen state, the ode comes to understand that it must transcend this opposition of
“differentiation and nondifferentiation” so that it may “come to appreciate the necessity of
struggle, that is, struggle for a lucidity that itself requires a more enhanced striving” and grasp
the necessity of passing over into its original, maximally extreme and fiery intensity, “if it is not
to end tragically in this modest state” of self-reflection and sentimentality, in Schiller’s sense. Yet
because of the ode’s appreciation of its opposite, “the idea that unifies both opposites now
emerges more purely, the primal tone is found once again, and with lucidity.” A liberation
coincides with this return to the primal tone, as the ode has “attained the basis of an experience
of, and an insight into, the heterogenous,”405 that is, into its inner agonal nature, wherein it is
constantly divided between its unity with and separation from the supersensuous. It is through
the grasping of the ever-changing measure of that division and unification, and the necessity of
ceaseless conflict, that the ode becomes capable of returning to its original nature. The tragic
ode, thus, in the sensuous experience of the differentiation between the sensuous and
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supersensuous, returns anew to its ground, to the space of its primordial intensity, to the sphere
of nature rediscovered through self-consciousness, transfigured by the experience of
heterogeneity; it is by this dialectic, in effect, that nature qua origin is continually transformed in
the poetic movement. Its return, moreover, is not a return to the same nature, which pretends to
harmonious homogeneity, but is, rather, a re-ignition of the supernal fire that had been
extinguished in the experience of separation from the supersensuous. It is a return to a nature
whose movement is that of becoming, and its measure, after the moment of self-reflection, has
become a sensuous, human measure, that is, a proper measure, infinitely approximated to the
realm of the supersensuous. The ode sacrifices itself, out of a state that strives toward eternity,
into the sphere of becoming. Thus, while the journey of the tragic ode appears to be circular,
beginning and ending in primordial flame, it is actually excentric, which is to say: non-circular,
and its final state is differentiated from its initial state precisely by the change in measure, the
experience of the heterogenous, which introduces a reflective, temporal rhythm into the space of
origin. It is, moreover, this excentricity that characterizes the ode’s musical movement—its
musical dialectic, as tragic.
The tragic drama differs from the tragic ode in that it is more immersed in the
foreignness of its mode of expression, precisely because it moves into the realm of the
representation of actuality, while the ode remains within ideality. Hence its movement between
the sensuous and the supersensuous unfolds in a way that is not merely abstract and formal, but
effects a passage from the ideal to the real. The tragic poem “veils the intensity in the
presentation to a greater extent, expressing it in distinctions that are more stark, inasmuch as it
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expresses a more profound intensity, a more infinite divinity.”406 The more powerful the divinity,
the more whole is the unity of the true whose fire must be presented in the tragic poem, the
thicker must its veiling be, and the more foreign (fremd) the linguistic fabric of the veil, just as
Heraclitus must announce eternal truths through the medium of enigmas, whose decipherability
varies according to the vitality of the truth and the force of its tragic character. Thus in the tragic
poem, “[the] image of intensity everywhere denies its ultimate basis, and has to do so, to the
extent and to the degree that it everywhere approximates to the symbolic realm [… .]” In the
tragic poem, “the material has to be a bolder more foreign likeness and exemplar of [the poet’s]
sensibility [arrested within its boundaries], while the form has to withstand something more like
a counter-posing and separating.”407 The symbolic material must be in profound heterogeneity
with the intensity it presents; a “foreign” and “different world” must be created for the
expression of the “characteristic intensity that lies at the basis of the image” which itself must
also be in strong affinity with the medium that reveals and veils it.408 “The more alien these
foreign forms are, the livelier they have to be [… .]” The intense, that is, the poet’s inner world,
and the divine, that is, the “spirit” that takes possession of the poet must be expressed in the
foreign medium solely “through a correspondingly greater degree of differentiation.”409 Hence
the inner world of the poet—that which is proper to him, must unite with and separate from the
foreign, which in its absolute sense is the divine, in order for the tragic poem to serve the purpose
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of transforming and engendering life and liveliness. The joy that is the true sense of mourning,
thus, depends upon the potency of this differentiation.
The mourning-play (Trauerspiel) is thus dramatic in both material and form, precisely
because “it contains a third element, namely, the different, more foreign material that the poets
have chosen, material quite distinct from their inmost heart and their world, because they have
found that foreign material to be sufficiently analogous for their investment of their total
sensibility into it, thus preserving the poets’ sensibility within it as in a vessel, indeed all the
more assuredly as the analogous material becomes increasingly foreign; for the most intense
sensibility is exposed to what is transitory to the degree that has not denied truly temporal and
sensuous relationships [… .]”410 Because, therefore, the tragic poets express “the most profound
intensity,” they are obligated to “renounce altogether their own person, their subjectivity” and
also renounce “the object that is present to them, conveying it to a foreign personality, a foreign
objectivity,” even and most potently where “the drama’s object, namely, destiny, expresses its
mystery most tellingly, and […] there where homogeneity grips the hero most strongly, even
there [… .]” 411 The essence of the tragic drama is the poet’s dispossession of himself and his
subjective propriety by the expression of that propriety in the medium of absolute foreignness.
Destiny intersects the tragic movement precisely by means of this dispossession, by a return to
the poetic wellspring, where god and man, from their eternal intermingling, must separate.
Hölderlin writes:
The presentation of the tragic [Die Darstellung des Tragischen] rests principally upon
this: that the monstrous [das Ungeheure], the fact that God and man couple, and the fact
that without limit the power of nature [Naturmacht] and the innermost of man become
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one in fury, is conceived in that the limitless becoming-one [gränzenloses Eineswerden]
is purified through limitless separation [gränzenloses Scheiden].412
Hence the role of destiny is to bring about this purifying rupture, this reversal of the rhythmic
movement in the very primordial union of god and man, from that of unification to that of
separation, and it is in this moment that the hero’s need to sacrifice himself becomes clear in a
poetic flash—a voice carried from the oceans of the future to which he was previously blind, into
the rush of becoming on the instant’s opening. The caesura is this moment of reversal—this
silence that admits of no presence, drawing mortal and immortal toward each other and purifying
each of them through their boundless, mutual withdrawal. Hence does man discover in a single
instant the time of his tragedy and the tragedy of his time. For without the god to guide the
human, he has no measure for himself, and merely strives forward, toward transcendence, in the
monstrosity of his self-consciousness. The only means of measure after this withdrawal is
infinite approximation, which requires that the god who has flown be constantly called back,
through a process of anamnesis. Yet Hölderlin reveals to us this secret, that the ideal union
between man and god never, in fact, took place as presence or eternity—rather, in its very origin,
which the modern tragedian seeks in Sophocles, this union was, in the same instant, purified
through separation. And in order for this purification—this κάθαρσις—to be delivered to the
tragic hero’s people as the revelation of this temporal tragedy, the hero shall have to go down in
self-sacrifice.
In his “Notes to Antigone,” Hölderlin writes of tragedy as the very expression of the time
of life:
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The boldest moment in the course of a day or a work of art comes when the spirit of the
times and of nature, the divine that is seizing hold of a human being and the object in
which he is interested are at their most wildly opposed because the sensuous object of his
interest only reaches half way but the spirit wakes to its greatest power beyond the half.
At that moment the human being must keep the firmest hold on himself, for which reason
he stands most open in his character. 413
For Hölderlin, the tragic is a kind of universal and eternal movement. It courses through the
temporal unfolding of days across and under history, in time’s most secret crevices, between its
pillars and under its openings. It is a night-lit, sunlit drift—a fateful intimacy between heaven
and earth. In the καιρóς of tragedy, then, divinity and the object of human love cast themselves in
radical opposition, and the godly portion of man, his spirit, extends beyond the earthliness of the
relation between man and what he loves. In this miraculous moment, man is more than man—he
is heroic—halfway divine in his entirety. But what kind of opposition is this? None other than the
one between the godly, the unutterable, and the spoken, which buries the god deeper in man,
outside the reach of all phenomena. This spirit, then says Hölderlin, is “wild”—a kind of mania
that grips and transcends time and that the human half of man conceals in strife and weariness.

Hölderlin and Intellectual Intuition
Hölderlin’s theory of the intellectual intuition (intellectuale Anschauung) and of
primordial separation, transforms across the history of his thought, moving from philosophical to
poetological ground. His early thinking on this subject is heavily influenced by his submersion in
the development of speculative philosophy, that is, in the German Romanticist and Idealist
transition from Kant’s critical philosophy to the foundation of the dialectic. His earliest
philosophical fragments were written contemporaneous to Fichte’s lectures, which he attended,
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at Jena in 1794-1795. Fichte was among the first of the German philosophers of the post-Kantian
generation to theorize intellectual intuition as a decisive step forward in the history of
philosophy.
The “essential incompatibility of the the sensuous and the intelligible” in Kant is given
exception only in the Critique of Judgement. Yet there, intuition oscillates between “reception
and production” for the aesthetic judgement, and its relation to the ratio “always” occurs solely
“according to analogical laws.”414 Therefore, no concept corresponds to the aesthetic reflective
judgement; this judgement, rather, remains irrevocably subjective. In the late eighteenth century,
it became the project of German philosophers to restore this scission, to reignite the union of
intuition and the supersensuous, the immediate experience of divinity. 415 A primordial ground of
union between these two had to be reestablished in an actual sense, that is, in a sense that entered
into experience—not merely as analogy.
Hölderlin, in his early philosophical writings, seeks this primordial unity from which the
“division between a natural and a rational causality must have originated.”416 From out of a
theory of the excentric movement of time, Hölderlin grasps intellectual intuition as an analeptic
and “quasi Platonic anamnesis,”417 which shatters the possibility of an absolutely continuous
subject. From his very first theoretical writings, Hölderlin regards the philosophical with a high
degree of skepticism. In a fragment of 1794 entitled On the Law of Freedom, Hölderlin writes of
a “natural state of the imagination” which dwells in “lawlessness”—in an “anarchy of
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representations,” and which is organized by the “intellect” and the “law of freedom.” This
natural state is “a moral one” over which the intellect exercises its law; hence a state of
boundless disorder—the imagination—is accompanied by and opposed to an ordering and
limiting force—the intellect.418

“There,” that is, in the anarchy of representations, the

imagination is considered “in and of itself,” i.e., “theoretically,” while “here,” i.e., in its natural
state, it is considered “in conjunction with the faculty of desire,” that is, of striving for freedom.
In that anarchy, “where the imagination is considered theoretically, a unity of the manifold, an
ordering of perceptions was indeed possible yet accidental.”419 Here, in opposition to Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason, which determines the necessary conditions of possibility for synthetic
judgements, Hölderlin reduces the theoretical, insofar as its object is epistemology, to
contingency. The imagination’s synthesis into a complete unity, visible only from the point of
view of the theoretical, is for Hölderlin purely accidental—thus the standpoint of the theoretical
stands on no solid ground, but is highly aleatory with respect to its object. Likewise, in the
imagination’s “natural state of fantasy,” where it is seen in relation with desire, “moral
lawfulness is indeed possible yet accidental.”420

Here, Hölderlin rejects the Kantian

“transcendental imagination,” which, as primordial Being, must precede the epistemological
organization it grounds as well as the imagination in its reproductive function where it effects the
application of synthetic judgements to intuitions.
In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant defines Reason, the faculty by grace of which
morality is possible, as “pure spontaneity,” elevated above the sphere of understanding, which is
418
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circumscribed to the phenomenal world, while Reason, in its pure productivity, applies to the
intelligible realm.421 It is this faculty, this passport to the unknowable world of things-inthemselves, that defines man as a “rational being” and, consequently, also as a moral being, i.e.,
as subjected to the laws of the intelligible realm. Freedom itself is fundamentally defined as
freedom from the “determinate” causality of the sensible world; from this follows the supremacy
of the spontaneous freedom of the will. There is, for him, a supersensous causality that
transcends and renders possible all other causalities—its existence assures “the idea of freedom”
which, in turn, is inseparable from “autonomy” and the “universal principle of morality.”422
Hence all moral “judgement [Urteil]” must base itself upon this superior causality and take place
“according to the absolute spontaneity of freedom” in order to attain universal validity.423 The
absolute spontaneity, however, is based on the “spontaneity of the subject as thing in itself,”
which would be knowable only by means of an impossible “intellectual intuition.”424 This
noumenal existence of the subject is nonetheless posited necessarily in the idea of freedom,
which is set in motion by every moral judgement, whose function is to appeal to the intelligible
causality of the will.
Hölderlin’s moral theory rests on the primordial transgression of this impossibility of
intellectual intuition. For him, there is “an aspect of the empirical faculty of desire, the analogue
of what is called nature, which is most prominent where necessity and freedom, the restricted
and the unrestricted, the sensuous and the sacred seem to unite [… .]” This aspect is called
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variously “a natural innocence” and “a morality of the instinct”—it is a primordial union of
Kant’s sensible and intelligible realms, and—as Hölderlin writes, “the fantasy in tune with it is
heavenly.”425 This harmony of the earthly and the divine, of human freedom and supersensuous
necessity inherent in the subject thus characterizes the essential and originary morality of nature.
Pfau writes: “Hölderlin recasts the convergence of ‘freedom and necessity’ as the most
primordial synthesis of intellect and intuition itself, a synthesis that takes place within the subject
itself.”426 Thus Hölderlin’s intuition overcomes the theoretical realm of the symbolic analogon to
which Kant had relegated it. The presupposed ground of Being present in Kant’s theory, as the
domain of freedom, is overcome by Hölderlin, for whom that primordial unity can only come
about by means of an action that limits it. It is, moreover, because of the contingent quality of
that action that any effort to organize it systematically necessarily fails. Hence, critical
philosophy falls short of its moral task precisely insofar as it falls short of experience in its
aleatory nature. For Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition, the simultaneity of freedom and necessity,
has its manifestation only through the act of punishment, which, by its violent force, effects at
once a separation between the elements of the synthesis, in such rapidity that the καιρός of that
simultaneity never even takes place—for the conflict between them is eternal and cannot be
stopped. Where freedom and necessity are in their closest proximity, there they are also farthest
from one another.
Hölderlin posits the thesis (articulated by Pfau) “that a primordial order and unity can
only be grasped a posteriori, when instigated by punishment.”427 Hölderlin writes: “The first time
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that the law of freedom discloses itself to us, it appears as punishing.”428 The very affirmation of
freedom depends upon a circular paradox, formulated in a footnote to the fragment, “On the
Concept of Punishment,” as follows: “ideal [:] without punishment no law / real [:] without law
no punishment”429 where the law in question is, precisely, moral law. Freedom is thus defined
only negatively, as the act by which “the transgression of the law within oneself” becomes
transparent through a foundation of punishment. 430 Hence the convergence of the “sensuous and
the sacred” occurs only as anamnesis, as it is drawn into time through the memory of a
primordial existence that, perhaps, never took place, by an analeptic action. Hölderlin’s theory of
punishment and freedom, of punishment as both the manifestation and annihilation of freedom,
and of this event as irreducible to any pretension to systematicity or perfect wholeness is thus
primarily a thinking of the tragic. The free creative force by which life defines itself is only
illuminated, set in motion and manifested through punishment. That punishing that was once,
among the Greeks, divine, has become for us, however, immanent. Inspiration itself is tragic for
us—in it, the voice of a disappeared god intones in us with freeing force. Hence the god must be
met with, parted with, and mourned in the space of the caesura. The task of the poet is to bring
about the presentation of this process and the tragic morality of punishment that it founds.
Hölderlin tells his brother in a letter that the “tragic with us” is this: “to go away from the
kingdom of the living in total silence packed up in some kind of container, not to pay for the
flames we have been unable to control by being consumed in fire.”431 To leave this debt, then,
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which is properly a debt to the Greeks, behind, to search out a new living kingdom beyond that
ancient one whose fire, exceeding its measure, has consumed us, requires, then both mourning
and a joyfulness born out of it. This paradoxical experience is precisely that of our tragedy, the
tragedy of a fall from the primordial kingdom we never could have lived in, as we are
condemned already to onrush of time that carries us unwittingly, from the moment of our selfconscious birth, away from the harmony of nature.
This mourning (Trauer) and the play (spiel) that accompanies and overcomes it through
affirmation of life beyond the whole must then take place within the empty travel, the empty
exchange between the propriety of the moderns and the foreignness of the Greeks. That the
central point of the tragic drama for Hölderlin is the caesura in its onrushing rhythm—the
moment of the silent withdrawal of the god and and the turning of man toward his mortality—
this is the sign, in tragedy, the metaphor for intellectual intuition, and hence the very transport of
this intuition, of the poet-philosopher’s radical displacement of the speculative discourse of his
contemporaries.
For Fichte, the ground of Being is provided a priori by a primordial judgement (Urteil),
which posits the identity of the subjective and the objective. He writes: “The proposition ‘A = A’
constitutes a judgement. […] The self’s positing of itself is thus its own pure activity.” From this
he construes a definition of “the self as absolute subject” in the following terms: “That whose
being or essence consists simply in the fact that it posits itself as existing, is the self as absolute
subject.”432 Intellectual intuition is hence defined as the supreme Act (Tathandlung, also, fact) of
this absolute subject, by means of which it brings itself into being. This definition is born both of
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the rigorous impossibility of the Kantian thing in itself, on his own critical ground, and of the
irreconcilability that Fichte perceived between Kant’s denial of the possibility of intellectual
intuition and his axiom of the subject’s intuitive immediacy to himself as a conscious being and a
moral agent. Hence, for Fichte, the subject becomes, from his very genesis by means of
reflective self-consciousness, the absolute itself. The judgement by which this comes about does
not assure an attainment of the thing-in-itself, but the becoming all-encompassing of the subject
which identifies with itself as its own object.
Pfau specifies that Fichte’s proposition indicates neither a tautological identity of “I” and
“I” nor a reified consciousness, but that the originary Act lays the primordial foundation from
which the Fichtean “reflection of the absolute subject” can evolve as a systematic Science of
Knowledge. The Act thus provides the subject as reified consciousness merely with its formal
condition of possibility, by inaugurating an “ontological unity [… .]”433 As Cassirer explains, the
self-identity of the “A” or the “I” is necessary insofar as it “implies the self-certainty of the
grounding relation” by which the subject can determine all of its “possible moments and
applications [… .]” This self-identity signifies, moreover, recognizability, and this recognition
cannot be achieved by “mere ‘perception’” but, rather, requires “an intuition which encompasses
the infinity and totality of all possible perceptions.”434 The difference between “I” and “non-I” is
preserved in the progressive reciprocal determination of subject and object in consciousness,
which issues forth from Being, defined as “the predicate of coherence and systematicity” so that
this determination is constantly view from the perspective of its τέλος, which is “absolute
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unity.”435 Fichtean intellectual intuition is simultaneously the Act’s condition of possibility and
the guarantee of its teleological determination, its end in the absolute.
Hölderlin, as a reader of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge and as his student at Jena, found
the practical lacking in this formal postulate of the “I” identical with itself. Following Fichte’s
notion of a “‘reciprocal determination’ (Wechselbestimmung)” of the “I” and the “non-I,” the
“formal matrix” wherein consciousness comes to knowledge,436 Hölderlin posits an “archeseparation,” and a “reciprocity” between subject and object. In a text of 1795 entitled
“Judgement and Being,” Hölderlin thinks intellectual intuition as the absolute healing and
reconciliation of “the original separation between subject and object, that separation through
which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation [Urtheil].”437 Krell
explains that Hölderlin thinks Urtheil—judgement—as Ur-theilung, “the primordial sundering or
dividing of consciousness and its object [… .]”438 The foundation of this fragment, written in
Fichte’s terminology and rigorously opposed to him, is a challenging of the “possibility of ever
determining the primordial and systematic ground of Being.”439 Rather, following Fichte, for
whom judgement (Urteil) is the primordial Act that founds consciousness, Hölderlin also refutes
him, by defining this judgement, in accordance with its name, as Ur-teil—that is, primordial
separation. The “reciprocity” between subject and object that Hölderlin posits results in a
dialectical structure of thinking (to all judgement) insofar as, for example, the theoretical
proposition “I am I” divides itself from the beginning by introducing the necessity of difference
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into identity, just as “in the practical arche-separation it [the ‘I’] opposes the not I, not itself.”440
This primordial separation is a return to Heraclitus’ cosmological principle of division, of
duplicity, as inherent and prior to all unity. And, as for Heraclitus, this original split, for
Hölderlin, results in the temporal movement of becoming—for Hölderlin, this is an excentric
temporality, where the subject can never coincide with itself as object except in the saving power
of intellectual intuition, envisioned as an event that heals the originary subjective scission.
Hölderlin also posits, in “Judgement and Being,” a dialectic between “reality and
potentiality,” which are respectively analogous and directly related to “mediate and immediate
consciousness.” The object expressed as potentiality is merely the repetition of the subject for
whom it exists as such. The “concept of potentiality” applies only to the “objects of the
intellect” (not to those of “reason” to which “necessity” applies), while the concept of “reality”
applies to “perception and intuition”—hence does the combination of these concepts in a given
subject bring about the unification of the potential and the real, the intellectual object and the
intuiting subject. In “intellectual intuition” alone are “subject and object united altogether”—that
is to say, inseparably, to such an extreme extent that “no separation can be performed without
violating the essence of what is to be separated [… .]”441 Yet this unity of Being in intellectual
intuition is by no means a principle of identity. Being, for Hölderlin, as a “connection between
subject and object,” forms the condition of all reflexive separation, as anterior to all “synthetic
unity.”442 Rather, “the I is only possible by means of [the] separation of the I from the I.”
Hölderlin exposes the paradoxical nature of self-consciousness concealed in the utterance of “I,”
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the rupture concealed in the “I” itself. For “I” cannot be said without self-consciousness, and yet
this self-consciousness is only possible through an affirmation of the “I” that is at once its
subversion, or: “In opposing myself to myself, separating myself from myself, yet in recognizing
myself as the same in the opposed regardless of this separation.”443 The problem is altogether
circular, that the subject is destabilized within itself from it very genesis—that the “I” is
primordially split in two within the very Urteil by which it brings itself about.
Hence, because Fichte’s Act, which posits the “I = I” as a totality, does not account for
the separation of the “I” within itself, it is, for Hölderlin, already derivative, presupposing the
possibility of a cohesive and consistent systematicity—a uniformity of Being. Thus, Hölderlin
claims that “identity is not = to absolute Being.”444 On the grounds of the misunderstanding of
Fichte which prematurely anthropomorphizes and absolutizes his subject as a consciousness, of
which Pfau also accuses Hölderlin,445 the latter demonstrates how “Being can neither be
conceived of as an identity nor as a synthesis” nor, indeed, as consistent with the “absolute ‘I,’”
since all transcendental categories imply a difference from that which is transcended.446 I’d like
to gesture toward, however, the objection, against this accusation, that Hölderlin’s concern is
with the presupposition of initial subjective continuity—a continuity of Being—contained in the
Fichtean proposition that the subject in possession of “self-consciounsess” who can say “I” is
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capable of ultimately uniting with himself qua object in an impenetrable absolute without a
temporal separation ensuing.
Hölderlin’s fragment thus dismantles the possibility of any transcendental philosophy
consistent with Being. For the “I” is never purely present, but is infinitely separated from itself as
object, such that it is “grounded by a [primordial] unity [of Being] it can only presuppose, and
which becomes the ‘boundary concept’ of the intellectual intuition.”447 It is for this reason that
self-consciousness qua self-identity is radically impossible—as soon as we begin to
conceptualize Being through consciousness, we must equally grasp the futility of this project;
consciousness of Being is hence the consciousness of this futility, of the failure of an enduring
intellectual intuition. Being is undermined by every attempt to grasp it, running ahead of and
behind the self-divided subject, who is, indeed, more than anything, subject to his own excentric
time. In accordance with this, intellectual intuition as the definition of Being wherein subject and
object unite can never found a totalizing transcendental system for Hölderlin, but rather opens
itself out onto a rhythmic dissonance and discontinuity within the subject itself, and hence the
failure of all philosophical systems.
Hölderlin will thus also refuse Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition as “the
organ of all transcendental thinking” in 1800. Schelling’s thesis, based on Fichte as well,
understood intellectual intuition as that “universally and freely productive” intuition wherein
“producing and produced are one and the same”—in other words, that procedure whereby the
“ego […] first originates” through “knowing” itself as both subject and object, thence creating
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itself as such.448 Whereas Schelling proposes intellectual intuition as a “grounding function,” for
Hölderlin it constitutes, in the words of Pfau, “an intuition of the very impossibility of ever
grounding a totality.”449 Hölderlin views intellectual intuition as the movement by which
philosophy reveals the very absence of its ground, by which absolute unity fails to be achieved
from the first moment of consciousness, and passes over into absolute discontinuity, absolute
separation from itself.
However, Schelling also regarded intellectual intuition as an aesthetic act. He writes:
“Aesthetic intuition is intellectual intuition become objective.”450 This aesthetic intuition is the
rendering-sensuous of intellectual intuition, in the sense of the Greek αἴσθησις, perception; it is
the becoming-perceptible of intellectual intuition, the subject’s unification with the god. As a
visible movement, intellectual intuition, for Schelling, is only present in ancient Greek
tragedy. Thus for Hölderlin, who, in his later poetological works, would come to view tragedy as
the metaphor of intellectual intuition, Schelling is of particular importance. One might almost
say that, refusing the ontological ground of intellectual intuition, i.e., refusing it as a positive and
coherent philosophical postulate, Hölderlin rather embraced it as an aesthetic phenomenon, as
the map of tragic transport in the rhythmic unfolding of tragedy, and, even there, as the
movement of a ceaseless conflict between god and man. Yet tragedy, for him, far from being an
abstract philosophical paradigm, tragedy becomes a template for tragic experience itself.
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Schelling’s Tragic Philosophy
Schelling was the first philosopher of the tragic. 451 His theory of the tragic came about
through a meditation on the problematic dissonance, the apparent irreconcilability, between
critical and dogmatic philosophy in regard to freedom, which is for Schelling “the essence of the
I,” and even “the alpha and omega of all philosophy.”452 Critical philosophy, of which Kant is the
paradigmatic thinker, proceeds from a positing of the “absolute I,”453 where the subject is given
supreme reign, and is thus “a striving for immutable selfhood, unconditional freedom, and
unbounded activity.”454 In dogmatic philosophy, on the other hand, whose exemplary philosopher
is Spinoza, the absolute becomes the object of all subjective knowledge, which leads to a
situation of “absolute passivity” and subservience of the subject to the objective force of
necessity.455 Both of these doctrines, for Schelling, do not take into account, however, the power
of the objective. For, in the first, the object is always mastered by the subject and in the second
as well, the subject’s position of passivity neglects the fact that the objective “owes its victory to
the subject itself.”456 Hence, Schelling, in his Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795),
construes a combination of these theories, or rather, an integrating (sublating) alternative to
them, which will constitute the paradoxical paradigm of the tragic. He attributes its insight to his
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imaginary interlocutor and writes, in the tenth letter: “You are right, one thing still remains—to
know that there is an objective power which threatens to destroy our freedom and, with this firm
and certain conviction in our hearts, to fight against it, to summon up all our freedom and thus to
perish.”457 Thus the speculative philosophy of the tragic has self-sacrifice at its center and it
hinges upon this as the dialectical consequence of the contradiction between human freedom and
divine necessity. Schelling accordingly views self-sacrifice as the only response to the threat of
objective necessity to freedom that guarantees their coincidence in the absolute.
This theory, however, remains for Schelling strictly aesthetic, applying only to Greek
tragic art and being insufficient to furnish a “system of action” in the absence of a “race of
Titans,” without whom such a systematization of the struggle between freedom and necessity
could only have “the most ruinous consequences for humanity.”458 The essential meaning of the
tragic has its truth only in the ancient world, because it is only there that the power of necessity
qua divine destiny has an actual existence and value. For modernity, the tragic conflict between
freedom and necessity does not have the same force—our task is not to assert our freedom in the
face of divine necessity, in the manner of the tragic hero, but rather to reflect upon this conflict as
an aesthetic principle. The “tragic process” that plays itself out in Oedipus Tyrannos is
significant, thus, “only in view of its telos.”459 Schelling’s interpretation of the tragic hero
regards him as victim to the power not only of objective necessity but of a punishment for his
succumbing to this necessity; thus his (positive) will to freedom turns against him. The dialectic
between destruction and salvation thus surfaces here, for Oedipus is both saved and destroyed by

457

Schelling, Briefe, 85; Marti, 192. Cited in Szondi, The Tragic, 8.

458

Schelling, Briefe, 88; Marti, 194. Cited in Szondi, The Tragic, 8.

459

Szondi, The Tragic, 8.
168

his ultimate assertion of his freedom, “destroyed precisely by what should have saved” him,460
that is, in his decision “to willingly endure punishment even for an unavoidable crime, so that he
might prove his freedom through the loss of that freedom itself, and so as to be defeated even as
he declared the rights of free will.”461
Nearly a decade after the Letters, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art (1802-1803),
Schelling speaks again of the “essence of tragedy” as “a real conflict between freedom in the
subject and objective necessity” in which neither force wins over the other, but rather, in the end,
“both of them simultaneously [appear] as conquerors and conquered in perfect indifference.”462
The point of departure in this passage is that of Schelling’s identity philosophy, developed in
1801, where the self-conscious subject is regarded as a result rather than a self-generating cause,
as in Fichte’s philosophy. His aesthetics thus rests on philosophical ground; Schelling views God
as “infinite ideality grasping all reality within itself”463 and the beautiful as the “forming-intoone [Ineinsbildung] of the real and the ideal”—thus, the common indifference of freedom and
necessity come to rest in a “real entity.”464 The poetic genres each constitute a progressively
higher manifestation of this identity and struggle between freedom and necessity. Their
progression coincides with the development of culture (Bildung). The epic contains “a state of
innocence” and “unity”—a perfect identity whose wholeness will later recur, after the experience
of “dispersion.” The “lyrical poem,” then, is the event of “identity [flaring] up into […] conflict”
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in culture’s process of maturing. Schelling writes, then, of the genesis of tragedy: “It was only
with the ripest fruit of later culture that unity itself was reconciled with conflict on a higher level
and that the two became one again in a more perfect formation [Bildung]. This higher identity is
drama.”465 Tragedy is thus thought as the final stage in an ascending dialectic and “the tragic
process” is viewed as “the restoration of […] indifference in conflict.” And this conflict, taking
place at the heart of freedom, causes freedom itself to “become its own adversary.”466
Lacoue-Labarthe writes of Schelling’s theory, which bases itself primarily on Sophocles’
Oedipus: “Here we have the scheme and the matrix of dialectical logic itself: the negative
(privation of freedom) converts itself into a positive (accomplishment of liberty) by virtue of the
accentuation, or of the redoubling, of the negative itself (the provocation of punishment, the very
will to lose freedom). The dialectic treats of the paradox of contradiction, that is, of identity.”
Identity presupposes identity with itself, and must refer endlessly back to itself; thus “identity is
always self-identity with itself and identity with its other. Which means also that alterity—
including the most extreme contradiction—is potentially identity.”467

Through the self-

condemnation to fate—through the self-sacrifice and punishment for a sin of which he knows
himself to be innocent—the absolute tragic hero establishes also a mechanism of selfappropriation, such that all that is strange, monstrous, horrifying in himself as a result of his
destiny (where destiny is transposed onto, or perhaps sublated into, nature) can be infinitely
identified with the Same, which is to say, with the freedom that characterizes him.
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If Oedipus maintains, in Schelling’s view, a curative function as the relic of the κάθαρσις
he provoked in Aristotle’s Poetics, it is because he is at once the originary event and the symbol
of the speculative dialectic, that is, the dialectic whose completion is the subject’s selfconsciousness and his attainment of an absolute perspective—his τέλος in the god, and hence his
absolute liberation from mortality. κάθαρσις, performed by tragedy in the figure of Oedipus,
coincides with what shall become the Aufhebung (sublation, or relève) of the dialectic, present in
Schelling’s text, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, in his discussion of the constraints and demands
of art, that is, “under the name of the conditions proper to (re)presentation, Darstellung, or
mimesis.” κάθαρσις is therefore the function of the aesthetic proper, where this representation or
recreation of nature in art plays itself out on the ground of tragedy, the ancient ground wherein
alone the gods are present in such a way that intellectual intuition becomes primordially possible.
It is for the sake of the tragedy as a complete work of art that the tragic hero must present
—i.e., bring into being—the conciliation, in the form of self-consciousness, of the dissonance or
opposition embedded in himself, that is, namely, the opposition between his self-identity (his
innocence) and the difference that undercuts it through destiny (his guilt), so as to purify the
opposition through a synthesis that at once carries innocence and guilt with it in their isolation
and leaves them behind it, abolishing them into the irretrievable past. This then is the operation
of the Aufhebung—the simultaneous preservation and abolition of internal contradiction, which,
in the case of Oedipus, results in voluntary punishment—in self-sacrifice. “And it is, of course,”
writes Lacoue-Labarthe, “because identity is thought as Self, ipseity or Selbstheit, that only a
metaphysics of the subject can pretend to the resolution of the paradox of the Same. Inversely,
there where this paradox is left in the state of paradox, there where the extreme difference
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maintains itself, the circumscription of such a metaphysics is, in one way or another,
exceeded.”468 Lacoue-Labarthe names Hölderlin as one who rigorously maintained the paradox.
He did this, we can affirm, by replacing the unity of selfhood with its constant, agonal separation
and fragmentation.

Hölderlin: Poetology, Tragedy, Excentricity
For Hölderlin, as for Schelling, the intellectual intuition “of a unity that antedates any
structure of synthesis” is necessarily aesthetic. For Hölderlin, this intuition as origin and absolute
can only occur a posteriori, and, accordingly, the meaning of the aesthetic is transformed along
with the meaning of the tragic. “Thus the aesthetic does not serve as the ‘objective’ manifestation
of the union between the subjective and the objective (Schelling), but only affords man an
‘accidental’ glimpse into a past that was never quite present.”469 Intellectual intuition, thus,
represents for Hölderlin the very limit of the philosophical, the point at which it comes up
against its impossibility by postulating the ground of Being in an absolute and eternal unity that
cannot endure in time without dividing itself. Thus the philosophical, coming to its Ursprung in
the contingency of the future, requires its purification in the poetological. Hence Hölderlin posits
temporal self-separation as the pre-history of the Subject, and the purification of the unity
achieved in intellectual intuition through “boundless separation.” It is through the actualization
of his original instinct against Fichte, that the identity of the subject with itself as object is
impossible without an original scission in the subject itself, that he comes to think separation,
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rather than union, as the absolute and therefrom discovers poetology as the only means by which
this separation is demonstrable in its essential tragic temporality.
Primordial separation precedes Being and the primordial unity that succeeds it reveals
itself, too, to be a separation; hence it proves, in the moment of its arrival, the impossibility of
any attainment of the absolute. The failure of the philosophical, its self-fragmentation resulting
from its pretension to absolute selfhood, gives way to the tragic for us, the need to mourn this
impossibility of a return to the unity of nature, or rather, the impossibility of that unity ever
having taken place; the very arrival of the Ursprung is at once its infinite loss. The revelation of
this impossibility, however, is the very event that renders life possible; the unification of nature
and art, of god and man, which, as intellectual intuition, brings the absolute into being, can only
come about by means of their initial boundless separation. It is thus that mourning is, for
Hölderlin, the very movement of living, the affirmation of mortality calling out to itself as the
god disappears. And this process is undergone in the painful, mournful movement of its
temporality, only in the art of tragedy, which is no longer thought as a medium isolated in a
primal past and only proper to the ancient Greeks, but as a movement that extends into our own
experience. For Hölderlin, indeed, as for Nietzsche after him, life is conceived on the basis of
tragic art—it is not art that imitates nature, but nature that imitates art.
The attainment of the absolute in a temporal present, as the coincidence of subject and
object, of necessity and freedom that was sought after by the speculative philosophers of the
German Idealist movement, that is, namely, by Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, is subverted by
Hölderlin through the determination of the caesura as the occurrence, in tragedy, of intellectual
intuition. Any presence of such an event as an affirmation of the wholeness, the oneness of the
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subject is rendered impossible by this determination of the very attainment of the absolute as
separation between freedom and necessity, between god and man. Rather, the continuity of
subjectivity within the tragic hero is, from the point of this caesura, split apart and the splinters
of the subject sent flying into the atoms of a non-unifiable and tragic becoming.
Lacoue-Labarthe suggests such a subversion of in his essay “The Caesura of the
Speculative”: “Why would we not conclude, then, that in (dis)organizing tragedy in this way,
Hölderlin caesuraed the speculative (which is not to go beyond it, or to maintain it, or to sublate
it) and, in doing so, rediscovered something of the Trauerspiel?”470 This role for Hölderlin is
based, moreover, on the idea that Lacoue-Labarthe advances of tragedy, for Hölderlin, as the
“catharsis of the speculative” insofar as the “speculative desire for the infinite and the divine,”
insofar as it is associated with tragedy, is purified precisely through tragedy’s presentation of this
desire as “a casting into separation, differentiation, finitude.”471 Although it is not my intention to
schematize Hölderlin’s philosophical project in this way, I believe that the indication is just—in
general, Lacoue-Labarthe avoids a recognition of the negative connotations Hölderlin perceives
in the failure of the speculative and hence does not bring across the weight of the tragedy that
separation entails. He tends, rather, quite often, toward an appropriation of the Hölderlinian
configuration as a means of affirming and advancing the deconstructionist project. For, indeed, it
is, for Hölderlin, a painful excentricity to which we are condemned, which exposes the failure of
the speculative project of intellectual intuition as a present unification—hence the endless need
for mourning.
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The ἒν διαφέρον ἑαυτῷ of Heraclitus is, for Hölderlin, the tragic opening of life; it is the
very event of the caesura, a prophetic revelation that determines the hero’s fate. For it is precisely
the impossibility of overcoming that supreme separation, the unattainability of harmony, that
condemns the hero to his self-sacrifice, and which defines his tragedy. This sacrifice is a final
attempt at entering the absolute, of bringing about the coincidence of freedom and necessity. And
yet, it shall bring to the man, the people, the culture it leaves behind merely a greater separation,
and the tragic revelation of becoming. It is in this respect that his sacrifice fails and, through its
failure alone, succeeds.
A un-traversable distance between god and man awakes in Hölderlin’s writing of the
tragic. Boundless separation replaces Schelling’s indifference—the battleground of the tragic
ἀγών shifts; no longer are both sides at once conqueror and conquered, but, rather, they are
separated by immeasurable stretches of time, beaches of distance. Szondi points out that, for
Hölderlin, the reconciliation between nature and art is “recognizable only when what has been
bound together in an inner unity is divided through conflict” while “the physical union can only
be merely apparent and temporary and must be sublated,” so that the universal does not lose
itself in the particular “‘life of a world’”—so that it does not expire in an individual. This death is
the destiny of Empedocles, exemplary of all “‘tragic figures’”—his passing gives birth to a
“‘becoming.’”472 Szondi thus discloses the meaning of the counter-rhythmic caesura as a passage
from a world ruled by divinity and fate into a fallen ground of immanence. Hölderlin devoted
himself to understanding “the poet’s task in an age when the gods can be near only through their
distance.”473 He writes: “Hölderlin is determined both to hold out in this night of divine distance
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[…] and to prepare the future coming of the gods.”474 But who are these gods to come? Perhaps,
no gods at all but something entirely other—for example, a new sort of mortal love. For
Hölderlin’s tragic hero is always announcing the flight of the gods by his self-sacrifice.
In a letter of June 1799 to Suzette Gontard, Hölderlin’s muse and the model for
Hyperion’s great love, Diotima, Hölderlin writes: “Every day I have to invoke the absent god
again.” Thus the tragic movement that plays out between man and the disappearing god must be
ceaselessly repeated; the mourning must daily recommence, in cosmological magnitude, as
Heraclitus’ sun is new each day. Hölderlin continues:
When I think of great men at the great moments of history, how they caught at the things
around them like holy fire and transformed everything dead and wooden, the world’s
straw, into flame which flew up with them to the heavens; and then of myself, how I
often go about like a poor glimmering lamp that would dearly beg a drop of oil to shine
into the night a bit longer—then, I tell you, a curious shudder runs through my whole
body, and softly I call out to myself the terrible words: more dead than alive.475
This desire that Hölderlin speaks is precisely that of transforming the dead, the forgotten refuse
of past glory, into the future—the fire reigniting ancient heroes. Tragedy as Trauerspiel is the
only means to this power of transformation, this deliverance of the past into the future. In
accordance with this, Hölderlin’s shift toward the poetological, the function of tragedy as the
passage, the transport from the ideal to the real, is also a shift toward the embrace of tragic
excentricity. Hölderlin ends his letter to Suzette Gontard thus:
a nature like yours, where everything is joined in intimate, indelible, living union, this is
the pearl of time, and whoever has recognized it and seen how its heavenly innate unique
happiness is also its deep unhappiness, he is likewise forever happy and forever
unhappy. 476
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Such a “pearl of time” is that nature which transforms the dead into the living, which calls the
god back by its beauty, in the manner of Platonic anamnesis, and in which life in the tragic Greek
sense, as this constant union and separation with divinity, revives itself once again. Within this
pearl of time, therefore, a measure of timelessness is attained—an instant of eternity, that defies
the rhythmic onrush of tragedy. If there is human love to be attained, it lies, perhaps, within this
temporary, counter-rhythmic experience of the eternal, which makes the descent back into the
tragic rhythm of becoming bearable. It offers up the dream of the absolute, of the possibility of
retaining something of the divine, before the self is once again split and must undergo the
constant sacrifice of itself in the movement of time, even as it gains in self-knowledge.
Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition takes place within a conception of time as excentric,
discontinuous, and thus of selfhood as discontinuous, where the distance between men and the
divinity, between the moderns and the ancients, is measured by a tragic, living rhythm. The
whole is not given beforehand—it comes later, as a mere instant before the boundless withdrawal
of the god. The primordial ground of Being, likewise, comes about through the action of
punishment; it is not the origin but the interstice between a circular and an excentric movement.
There, at the point of the failure of the philosophical to attain the absolute, there lies the
downgoing—the Untergang—of the tragic hero. Untergang equally signifies setting, as in the
downgoing motion of the sun. It thus contains within itself the promise of a dawn to follow.
Hölderlin’s turn to the poetological is based on the idea, expressed in his essay, “The
Ground of Empedocles,” that “the image of intensity”477 which, as Pfau affirms, “is tragedy
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itself,”478 must deny and “everywhere denies its ultimate basis”479 or foundation. Self-sacrifice,
or going under, is always the infinite, immeasurable attainment of freedom brought about
through the infinite loss of freedom. It is the re-unification of art with nature, of man with god
wherein both withdraw immeasurably—the god into his absence and the mortal into an
“excentric sphere of the dead.” The sacrificial moment of the tragedy is determined at the
midpoint, when the human and the divine come into closest contact, thus, the boundless, tragic
content of the play and the calculable law, the rhythm that measures it at a distance. There the
downgoing begins; there, at the the moment of the god’s most potent presence, he vanishes. Man
descends and god withdraws, and there an infinite work of mourning—Trauerarbeit—finds its
origin. This mourning signifies for humanity the loss of the divine—man is condemned to
becoming, and to his own body as the source of his freedom and punishment. Szondi writes:
A spark leaps over the fire that it kindles, night is changed into scorching day. By
“interpreting the words of the oracle too infinitely,” that is, as a religious demand, and by
fulfilling this demand, Oedipus forces a union with God. Yet this “boundless union” […]
must pass over into a “boundless separation,” so that the monstrosity it presents becomes
knowable. The forced day tragically turns into an intensified night: into the darkness of
the blinded Oedpius.480
The idea of separation as the absolute, rather than unification in an intellectual intuition
comes as an Empedoclean inspiration concerning love, during the Homburg period of Hölderlin’s
Empedocles and translations of Sophocles’ Trauerspiele. In tragedy, this absolute separation
becomes necessary in the counter-rhythmic rupture, and unity always results in a higher form of
conflict—of ἀγών. There is indeed, for Hölderlin, an ascending dialectic—born, however, before
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that of Hegel—of the tragic movement of union and conflict. Separation is so primordially
inscribed at the heart of unification that it continually re-erupts like an eternally active volcano,
indeed like Empedocles’ Etna itself.
For Schelling, self-sacrifice is the fundamental movement by which man achieves
divinity and freedom. He writes: “It is not likely that any enthusiast [Schwärmer] would ever
have taken delight in the the thought of being engulfed in the abyss of the deity, had he not
always put his own ego in the place of the deity.”481 Thus, the only way in which a tragic hero
could desire to abolish himself is by a pretension to an attainment of divinity, of the absolute—of
a self-transcendence that makes the ego itself the divine. The experience of intellectual intuition
is, indeed, characterized by a death, for Schelling—the only way that infinite freedom can be
attained is by a limitless descent into the night of the ego qua god. Schelling writes:
Where all resistance ceases, there is infinite expansion. […] The supreme moment of
being is, for us, transition to not-being, the moment of annihilation. Here is the moment
of absolute being, supreme passivity is one with the most unlimited activity. […] We
awaken from intellectual intuition as from a state of death. 482
The seeker of absolute freedom plunges himself into an annihilating night, and the only manner
in which it would be possible to unite with the god would be by suicide—the absolute itself, the
unification of the passive or meaningless sign of the hero with the pure activity of divine nature
is itself a death. Thus the philosophical finds its end in death. This is so because “with absolute
freedom no consciousness of self is compatible. An activity without any object, an activity which
encounters no resistance, never returns to itself. Only a restricted reality [Realität] is an actuality
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[Wirlichkeit] for us.”483 Like Hölderlin’s monarchy, Schelling’s freedom is impossible in an
absolute sense precisely because it lacks an object, and hence, a limiting power. In inspiration,
Schelling claims, that is, in the aesthetic exteriorization of the internal harmony of freedom and
necessity, the “self-intuition of the absolute” comes about. 484 Inspiration is thus a self-sacrificial
drive, the drive toward the absolute, which resists death by uniting subject and object in a work
of art: the absolute is attainable aesthetically. For Hölderlin, on the other hand, the aesthetic, art,
and tragedy in particular, must be capable of actually bringing about the real, and of
transforming it. Thus the function of his Empedocles is precisely to deliver a people to freedom,
returning them to a transfigured nature, through a self-sacrifice that is at once an attainment of
true unity with the divine in death. And this is because “in Empedocles his time individualizes
itself” to such a degree of intensity that his sacrifice becomes absolutely necessary to the
salvation of the Agrigentian people. 485
The crime of Empedocles was to consider himself a wandering god—to affirm his unity
with the divine. Hermocrates, in Hölderlin’s first draft of The Death of Empedocles, says, upon
banishing Empedocles:
And to his banishment in a barren wasteland,
That there, never to return again,
He’ll pay, and dearly, for that evil hour he
Made himself a god.486
This crime, unforgivable, and for which his people desired to punish him, resulted in his decision
of suicide. In Hölderlin’s “Frankfurt Plan” for the Empedocles tragedy, he writes in the sketch of
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act two, scene four, that it is after the Agrigent people topple the statue of him that they
themselves have built that Empedocles resolves “to unite with infinite nature by means of a
voluntary death.”487
In his letter to his brother of June 4, 1799, Hölderlin writes of the path of man out of
nature, returning back into it: “all the meandering rivers of human activity flow into the ocean of
nature, just as they begin from it.” The task of “philosophy, art and religion” is to teach men how
to travel this dangerous “path [Bahn],” not “blindly” but “with eyes wide open, joyfully and
nobly” and these forces owe their power to the fact that they “proceed from this creative
impulse” which gives life its value. Philosophy does this by bringing “this impulse into
consciousness”—the tragic impulse, and unveiling to it “its infinite object in the ideal”—thereby
it “strengthens and clarifies it.” Yet because it remains in the realm of the ideal, philosophy
circumvents and escapes life by a pretension to universality, to circularity—to non-excentricity.
Hölderlin continues:
Art presents the impulse with its infinite object in a living image, in a higher world of
representation. And religion teaches it to sense and believe this higher world precisely
where it looks for and wishes to create it, i.e. in nature, both in its own human nature and
in the surrounding world, as a latent disposition, as a spirit to be unfolded.488
The realm of the aesthetic, of art, proves itself to be the one in which life unveils itself most
purely, precisely because it transforms it into a medium of representation; therein, intellectual
intuition is exemplified in its highest degree of purity. The ideal is no longer the mode of
explicitation for the creative impulse—no grand synthesis is attempted—rather, the tragic
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convergence and divergence of life force and the infinite are displayed according to the
momentary flowering of their occurrence.
Hölderlin speaks to his brother of the tremendous courage it requires to be a great man.
For the weakest, blindest men, rush through life seeking safety and shelter. But for great men,
“the present is not satisfactory, […] they want things different, and so they fling themselves
sooner into nature’s grave, and accelerate the march of the world.”489 Man is at a precipice,
where he must have the courage and eyefulness to plunge himself into the abyss of nature, to
sacrifice himself to her perfection. The path of the man Hölderlin describes is an excentric one,
departing out of unity, undergoing dissonance, and returning to its source transformed.
The concept of excentricity, Exzentrizität, rose in ubiquity during the last five years of the
18th century among the German Romantics. The word was used originally strictly in astronomy,
to describe the inscrutable and non-circular orbit of comets. In his Universal Natural History and
Theory of the Heavens (1755), inspired by Newton, Kant explains that excentricity is “the
deviation from circular motion”490 of heavenly bodies in orbit. This deviation, he claims, is
coincident with the increase of the distance of a body from the sun. Such deviation is caused by
the interference of contingent causes and “materials” that have different degrees of “orbital
velocity,” with the circular path of heavenly bodies. While planets remain primarily in a circular
orbit around the sun, comets are distinguished from them precisely by the excentricity of their
path:
Eccentricity is the most notable characteristic differentiating the comets. Their
atmosphere and tail, which expand through the heat of their close approach to the sun, are
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only consequences of the eccentricity, although they have always served in times of
ignorance as uncommon images of horror, announcing to the common folk imaginary
destinies.491
Among the German Romantics, excentricity took on the meaning of the turn away from
philosophical systems and toward a fragmentary form of thinking, verging on poetics, as in the
case of Novalis and Schlegel. For Hölderlin, thus, in form, a turn away from “Dame
philosophy”—the “tyrant”492 and toward tragic poetry. But to be blinded to necessity, no longer
to possess any sure circularity, and hence to be abandoned to chance at every juncture, this is
tragic. The figure of the comet was considered to be a prophetic omen perhaps until the
demystification of Pierre Bayle’s Pensées Diverses sur la Comète of 1680. Once it ceases to be
such, once all absolute measure of necessity is lost, man is condemned to become his own
Tiresias. It is indeed the task of the tragic hero to divert from the path that repeats itself ad
infinitum, i.e., the dream of a circular path leading back into the naïve heart of nature, which has
become impossible, or the path that progresses toward a goal; in the distance between the
circular path and the excentric one lies the counter-rhythmic rupture—the encounter of tragic
transport with the double-withdrawal of god and man. That is the point of the Untergang—the
point when the tragic hero, becoming himself, discovers that he must go down.
The Chorus in Antigone addresses the heroine: “living the life of your own among /
Mortals unique / You go down into the world of the dead [Gehst du hinab, in die Welt der Todten,
Ἅιδην καταβήσει].”493 This downgoing is an act of love—a love impossible in the monarchy of
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Thebes, impossible in the world above ground. Hence Antigone’s excentric movement into death
is, like that of Empedocles, one destined to revive love, nature, and which, by its very
excentricity, fails to do so. Creon speaks to Antigone, in a punishing tone: “Go down below then
if you want to love / And love down there. [So geh’ hinunter, wenn du lieben willst, / Und liebe
dort!]”494 Antigone’s punishment, the necessity of her Untergang, ensues from a mourning of the
death that must not be mourned. The love that inspires forbidden mourning, that seeks to reunite
divine nature with man by insisting on their boundless, irresolvable separation must be banished
to underworld. In Hyperion, Hölderlin writes: “We die so as to live.”495 For it is only in death
that true reconciliation, the attainment of the harmony of nature through excentricity, can come
to pass. The one who goes down must do so precisely because he endures the contradiction
between man and nature most harshly—because he bears that opposition in his breast, and stands
between them like a god, for, as Hölderlin writes in “The Ground of Empedocles,” when the
tragedy reaches its “perfection,” the “divine stands at the midpoint” between art and nature.496
Hölderlin refers to the cadence of the scenes in the Trauerspiel as an “excentric rapidity
[exzentrischer Rapidität]”497—the time of the tragic drama, thus, its transport, is excentric.
Deviating from the path of the circular orbit, pushed off its course by the force of contingency,
the movement of the Trauerspiel leads its tragic hero to his downgoing—to absolute separation
from the god. Tiresias “enters the course of fate as a custodian of the natural power [Naturmacht]
which, in a tragic manner, removes man from his own life-sphere [Lebensphäre], the center of
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his inner life into another world and into the excentric sphere of the dead [in die exzentrische
Sphäre der Todten].”498 The natural power of prophecy, of the future, is that which pushes man
farther and farther into monstrosity, until he has reached the realm of the dead, and embodied the
tragedy he is born into being.
Hölderlin writes, in an introduction to the second draft of Hyperion:
We all pass through an eccentric path [eine exzentrische Bahn], and there is no other way
possible from childhood to consummation [Vollendung].
The blesses unity, Being (in the only sense of that word) is lost to us, and we had
to lose it if we were to gain it again by striving and struggle. We tear ourselves loose from
the peaceful [h]en kai pan of the world, in order to restore it through ourselves. We have
fallen out with nature, and what was once one, as we can believe, is now in conflict with
itself, and each side alternates between mastery and servitude. … Hyperion too was
divided between these two extremes.499
Hölderlin defines this excentric path as the path that leads from Einfalt—simplicity, naïveté in
Schiller’s sense, as the absolute, spontaneous organic, to Bildung—modern culture, which
undergoes the infinite separation, analogous to Schiller’s sentimentality, as the nostalgic
backward gazing onto an irretrievable, ideal past. We are condemned to a life of conflict—a
ceaseless, agonal struggle, where Being—the myth that Fichte had conjured—is no longer
possible in any degree. Rather than the original universal equality, we have nothing proper to us
but the constant reversal between the “extremes” of “mastery and servitude.”500 Thus, Paul de
Man writes: “controlled consciousness (Bildung) is the beginning of dissonance (Trennung)
between man and nature.”501 The path of life leads out of simple, innocent harmony, into
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dissonance, disparity, separation—Hyperion laments: “the blessing of every year becomes a
curse, and all the gods flee”502 —, and back into harmony, a higher harmony of love which bears
the traces of dissonance, of suffering, of murderous self-consciousness, through downgoing. Yet
life in the true sense comes about only through pain and the mourning of lost love. Hyperion
writes, in his last letter to Bellarmin: “a new bliss rises in the heart when it endures and suffers
through the midnight of grief, and […] like the nightingale’s song in the darkness, the world’s
song of life first divinely sounds for us in deep suffering.”503 The restoration of an original
harmonious nature that never truly took place can only come about a posteriori, from out of
dissonance, through excentricity, which is to say, by undergoing the tragic course of life—a selfinflicted punishment, indeed, must play the central role in its arrival. It must come to be through
an overcoming of Bildung, by means of a transformation of the sphere of origin and unity itself
—a reestablishment of the meaning of harmonious love.
The excentric path is thus the one that must be followed for the transformation of
predecessors into successors; it guarantees the restoration of nature to man by its tragic creation.
But the idea of excentricity, for Hölderlin, is an incarnation of the tragic—that we do not end in a
perfect state of unity and innocence, but must follow a series of experiences, of loves and pains,
that strip us of our purity and dare us to become the self-sacrificing tragic hero, flinging himself
into the flames of death in order to liberate the people of his age and to unite with divine nature,
paradoxically, in the excentric sphere of the dead. It is a chthonic divinity of fragmentation that
the hero shall meet in the underworld. This liberation, however, shall be the purification of the
hero’s people from the myth of an enduring intellectual intuition--it is into becoming, rather, that
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he shall deliver his people, and this, indeed, constitutes the hero’s failure—the triumph of his
failure. This failure reveals the difference of self-sacrifice for Hölderlin from the sacrifice of
which Schelling had spoken: for the sacrifice of Hölderlin’s Empedocles, although it strives
toward unity with the god, serves, in fact, the function of allowing for an embrace of the tragic
itself in the rhythm of life outside the perfection of nature—of joyful affirmation out of
mourning.
Hyperion writes to Bellarmin, after the Diotima’s death:
And now tell me, where is there still a refuge?—Yesterday I was on top of [E]tna. There
the great Sicilian sprang to my mind who, weary of counting the hours, intimate with the
soul of the world, in his bold love of life flung himself down into the glorious flames—
for the cold poet had to warm himself by the fire, a mocker said later.
O how gladly would I have taken such mockery upon myself! but one must regard
oneself more highly than I do to fly so unbidden to the heart of nature, or whatever else
you may call it, for truly! as I am now, I have no name for things and all is uncertain to
me.504
Hyperion, the failed emulator of Empedocles, the absolute tragic hero, must fail to match his
predecessor, to accomplish the justice of the tragic, he must fall short of the courage for suicide
precisely in order to sing his forebear’s mourning-song, and to measure the distance in its rhythm
and alternations of tones between the flown Greek philosopher, in whose soul the future speaks,
and the modern man, whose spirit is excentric in its movement, and uncertain. Hyperion also
sings, in verse, accompanied by his lyre, that man falls “from cliff to cliff / downward for years
into uncertainty.”505 This downgoing, from the shelter of the gods to the immanence of the
uncertain is one of mourning, and must arrive in the musical and rhythmic tones of the tragic in
order to effect their Trauerarbeit, and thus be faithful to life. This song, moreover, is sung before
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Diotima’s death, takes place as a Tiresian prophecy of the downgoing and mourning that her
death will induce. It is a philosophic-poetic singing that brings about the counter-rhythmic
interruption in the unfolding of Hyperion’s tragedy. For it is poetry, indeed, that achieves the
rhythmic separation and absolution of the tragic. This is what Hölderlin calls the tonal
“Katastrophe,” taken in its etymological sense to mean “down-turning” or “overturning”—the
point of the excentric inversion of tones, where the “idealic catastrophe” resolves itself “into the
natural.”506
The excentric path in Hyperion is a path of love, ascending the ladder of Plato’s Diotima
toward the ideal form of beauty and then falling boundlessly from that transcendent height back
into immanence, where the tragic hero is defeated. This view of love, however, is combined with
that of Empedocles, as the drawing together of all things that are alike in being one with nature,
which necessarily and ceaselessly results in their separation again, which is, nonetheless, the
promise of an end in unity to come. Empedocles says that between love and strife, all things
“have no constant life [αἰών]; / but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging
[διαλλάσσοντα] / in this respect they are always an unchanged cycle [κύκλον].”507 Like
Heraclitus’ becoming, which is eternal insofar as it is in constant flux (in Nietzsche’s view), the
Empedoclean cosmic unification and separation achieves its universality, constancy and
absoluteness only insofar as the αἰών (time, life, eternity) is constituted by a constant, tragic
conflict between φιλία and νεῖκος—only the dream of a salvation from this constant struggle
occasionally interrupts, and changes the course of its movement.
Hyperion ends thus:
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The dissonances of the world are like lovers’ strife. In the midst of the quarrel is
reconciliation, and all that is separate comes together again.
The arteries part and return in the heart and all is one eternal, glowing life.
So I thought. More soon.508
That dream of unity, perhaps, conjured as the end of the excentric path, is always destined to be
shattered once again by another death, another irreparable separation. Excentricity defines the
very experience of the tragic, both for us and in its original manifestation.
To translate the central tragedy of the Greeks, that is, the betrayal of the gods against
men, the event of “divine infidelity,” is first of all the task of speaking, in a monstrous language,
the essence of our tragedy, that is, the creation, the destruction and the mourning of the Greeks,
of their tragedy—thereby alone does Tragödie, united with Trauerspiel, come to produce joy and
the highest affirmation of the suffering, the sundering of self that is our αἰών. In an untimely
fashion, it is first of all necessary, in announcing a dawn at the end of our twilit life, to speak the
loss of their loss. For it is through the mouth of Oedipus that our tragedy articulates itself.
Let us not forget the cryptic prophecy of Hölderlin on the verge of madness, from “In
lieblecher Bläue:”
King Oedipus may have an eye too many. 509
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The Ground of Empedocles
Hölderlin claims that Empedocles’ fate as a tragic hero was determined by the fact that
his “times demanded a sacrifice in which the whole human being becomes actual and visible, a
sacrifice in which the destiny of his times appears to dissolve and the extremes appear to unite
actually and visibly in one [… .]”510 This demand is proper to declining times, which prophesize
in their very nature the coming of a newly sunlit world through dissolution, and the embodiment
of this destiny by an actual (as opposed to ideal) individual.
The destiny of a nation and its time, for Hölderlin, creates itself by means of a play
between two sides of an Empedoclean opposition:
When life is pure, art and nature oppose one another merely harmoniously. Art is the
blossom, the perfection of nature; nature first becomes divine when it is allied with art,
which differs from it in kind but is in harmony with it, first when each is everything it can
be and when each allies itself with the other, supplying what the other lacks, and lacks
necessarily if it is to be everything it can be as particular; at that point perfection is
achieved and the divine stands at the midpoint between the two.511
Nature and art must enter into a harmonious and dissonant relation of duplicity, wherein the one
completes the other and renders it possible, so that the divine can manifest itself. Harmony, that
is, must not preserve itself simply but, in the tragic, must give rise to dissonance, becoming
monstrous to itself by means of conflict. Just as Empedocles’ world births itself as divinity,
between Love and Strife, Hölderlin’s tragic divinity springs up at the “midpoint” between nature
and art. Tragedy for Hölderlin, that is to say, poetry in its highest form, as a metaphor for
intellectual intuition—the purest expression of life—is nothing other than cosmogony itself.
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Nietzsche’s duplicity of the Dionysian and Apollonian, too, requires not only a
harmonious relation but essentially a conflictual and agonal one—the perfection of this incessant
conflict is tragedy itself. Hölderlin has names for this natural drive and artistic drive: the
Organischere and the Aorgische. “The more organizational, more artistic human being is nature’s
flowering; the more aorgic nature, when it is felt in its purity by human beings who are organized
purely in their mode of being, grants them their feeling of perfection. Yet such a life is at hand
only in feeling, and is not a matter of cognition.” For this life to become knowable, it must
“[separate] itself off from itself in the excess of intensity in which opposites mistake themselves
for one another [… .]”512 Thus the organizational passes over into the “extremes of autonomous
activity,” into artistic creation and self-reflection, recovering its forgotten “essence” and
“consciousness” while nature passes over to the aorgic extreme, “the unbounded, until both
sides, advancing in their reciprocal way, as though encountering one another at the
commencement, except that nature has become more organized through the shaping and
cultivating human being, through the cultural drives and formative forces in general, whereas, by
contrast, the human being has become more aorgic, more universal, more infinite.”513
Let us notice that the organizational is already monstrous—is already no longer nature,
but nature’s result in man’s rational capacities. In the unification of the organic and the aorgic,
“the universalized spiritually vital artistically pure aorgic human being and the magnificent
configuration of nature” in an alliance of pure harmony, resembling the initial one, but now
rendered “more infinite”514 through reflection.
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Here, in this meeting-between, there arrives the καιρóς of the tragedy. “At the midpoint
lies the death of the individual, namely, the moment when the organizational dispenses with its
ego, its particularized existence, which went to the extreme; the aorgic dispenses with its
universality, not in ideal mixture, at it was at the commencement, but in its real supreme struggle
[… .]”515 The particular (organizational) and the aorgic thus enter into an agonal conflict,
wherein the former, confusing itself with the aorgic, strives to become universal and the aorgic
strives to become particular—at this point, each appears to revert to its original existence, but in
truth the aorgic takes on individuality at the moment when the organizational becomes fully
aorgic, so that “in the birth of supreme enmity, supreme reconciliation appears to be actual.” The
individuality and universality of this moment, in their radical contradiction, are both a product of
“supreme strife.”516 A “unifying moment” then takes place, upon which the organizational as
particular and the aorgic as universal have both made their creative “impressions” which, in their
turn, also pass into their opposites as the twilight of the unification. That is to say, this moment
must dissolve “like a mirage” as the aorgic becomes particular and the organizational, universal.
And yet, the result of this “death of the moment”517 is that “the warring extremes from
which the moment came to be are more beautifully reconciled and united than they ever were in
the life of the moment [… .]” For since individuality, whose inner forces are divinity and
intensity, has been surpassed along with “the felicitous fraud of unification” the organizational
rises, past the “transitory moment” which repels it, to “a more pure universality” while the aorgic
“passes over to the moment” and becomes an “object of tranquil observation” for the
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organizational, such that “the intensity of the past moment now comes to the fore with greater
clarity, universality, steadfastness, and capacity for differentiation.”518
Through this interior dialectic of the organizational and the aorgic, which renders
universal the individual, “Empedocles is a son of his heavens and of his period, a son of his
fatherland and of the massive oppositions of nature and art in which the world appeared to his
eyes.”519 These opposites unite and overcome each other in him, “divesting themselves of their
original distinguishing form and thus reversing themselves” in such a way that what is in
principle most subjective becomes within him more entirely objective. Thus “he is more capable
of making distinctions, comparing, shaping, organizing and being organized when he is less at
home in himself; and to the extent that he is less consciously himself the ineffable comes to speak
in and for him, and for and in him the universal, the less conscious, attains the form of
consciousness and particularity [… .]”520 Conversely, that which for others is most objective—
aorgic—“disorganized”—becomes in Empedocles most subjective: he is “more aorgic and more
disorganizational when he is more at home in himself” that is, when he attains consciousness “of
the fact that in him and for him speaking attains the unspoken or the ineffable, and that in him
and for him the more particular and the more conscious aspects assume the form of the
unconscious and universal, so that these two opposites become one in him” precisely because of
their mutual reversal in his being. Hölderlin remarks: “such a human being can have reached
maturity only on the basis of the supreme opposition between nature and art, and as (ideally) the
excess of intensity comes to the fore on the basis of intensity, so also does this real excess of

518

Hölderlin, Empedocles, 146.

519

Hölderlin, Empedocles, 146.

520

Hölderlin, Empedocles, 146.
193

intensity come to the fore on the basis of enmity and supreme conflict [… .]”521 That is to say
that on an ideal level, the excess of intensity has inner poetical fire or passion as its ground,
while on the level of reality, the same excess roots itself in struggle—αγών.
In their innermost being, the aorgic and the organizational are outside themselves within
one another in the being of Empedocles, they “interpenetrate” and “touch one another in their
uttermost extremes” as the aorgic fills the form of the particular and “thus appears to be
reconciled with the hyperorganizational” while the organizational takes on the figure of the
universal, “thus appearing to be reconciled with the hyperaorgic and the hypervital [… .]” In this
way, the two forces are opposed merely in their outer form, in semblance. Of Empedocles,
Hölderlin says: “His destiny exhibits itself in him as in a momentary unification, one that has to
dissolve in order to become something more.”522 This, then, follows the plan of Hölderlin’s
Notes to the Sophoclean tragedies—this is the moment of unification, the arrival of the caesura,
the moment in which the hero unites with the god in order to separate infinitely into dissolution,
which, like downgoing, contains the promise “something more”—in effect, of love among
mortals.
Because Empedocles “appears to have been born to be a poet,” he has, even in his most
radically subjective and active nature, a “tendency to universality”—that inspiration that leads to
the “tranquil observation […] by means of which the poet espies a totality [… .]” And,
symmetrically, one might say, his passive and “objective nature” allows him to strive, even
without inherent organization, toward order, thought, form, and toward “that malleability of the
senses and of the innermost heart that is able to absorb all things easily and quickly in their
521
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totality and in a vital way [… .]”523 The discordant accord within Empedocles was thus destined
to become, through “its own free expression,” “the most universal accord” which would
“simultaneously be the determination of his nation [… .]” Empedocles was created to answer the
call of his time—to be its destiny. And this time required neither merely “song” nor an “authentic
deed,” which are both one-sided, but rather “a sacrifice”—the sacrifice of a whole human life, in
which it becomes for the first time “actual and visible” and a sacrifice in which “the destiny of
his times appears to dissolve and the extremes appear to unite actually and visibly in one [… ,]”
while in reality “the individual goes down in an idealized deed” of necessity since “in him the
sensuous unification shows itself to be the proleptic product of calamity and conflict [… .]”524
In this unification, destiny is dissolved, either in an individual, in which case the “life of a
world would be [impossibly] expunged in a singularity” or, conversely, this singularity itself “as
a proleptic result of destiny” dissolves because of its excessive intensity, actuality, and visibility.
In the first case, destiny is dissolved “formaliter” while in the second it is dissolved
“materialiter,” since the original intensity, produced by “good fortune” and become actual in
supreme conflict, “cancels itself out” in correspondence with the self-canceling of “the original
excess of intensity” and all its “levels forces and implements [… .]” In this way, “the force of the
intense excess actually evanesces, and a more mature, true, and purely universal intensity
remains.”525 Ideally, therefore, the universal does not expire in the waning of the individual but
the individual, as a sacrifice that murders destiny precisely because it is a free act, in its suicidal
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and divinatory gesture for the new birth of culture, leaves behind it a universal life-force out of
which such a culture, absolved of destiny and returned to nature, can grow.
“Thus Empedocles was to become a sacrifice of his time, the problems of destiny in
which he grew up were to be apparently solved” yet this solution was to be merely “a temporary
solution, as is the case more or less with all tragic personages [… .]”526 For the life and goal of
all these figures is precisely to solve the problem of destiny, and yet, in a divine reversal, these
attempts “all cancel themselves to the degree that they are not universally valid” which is to say
that they revert from one dissolution of destiny—the material one, in which the particular kills
itself to leave only the purest universal, to the formal one, wherein the dying man attempts and
fails to absorb a universal world-perspective into his particularity, and ends by dying as a
singularity alone. In this way, “the ones who apparently dissolve destiny most completely exhibit
themselves most conspicuously in their transitoriness and in the implacable progress of their
efforts to be a sacrificial victim.”527 The universal and timeless value of the sacrifice reverses
itself and falls back into particularity precisely through the self-manifestation of these heroes as
self-sacrificing individualities.
Thus, by a paradoxical turn, that gesture which is meant to bring an end to the tragic
becomes, through this very act of sacrifice, the individual exemplification of tragedy itself—the
absolute incarnation of tragic destiny, insofar as the attempt dooms itself to failure in its
accomplishment. It is thus in the very nature of the tragic hero to fail—for just as an eternal
intellectual intuition is impossible, an enduring union of god and man, so the coincidence of
universality and particularity in a single man are impossible. The universal value of the hero, by
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virtue of which he is capable of saving his people, must revert to singularity out of the ideality of
its identity with the god, thus exposing, rather, the fragmentary nature of the subject and its
condemnation to perpetual self-sacrifice in the temporal movement of our tragedy.
The tragic individual is the explicitation of the destiny of his time, “constituted by the
opposites of art and nature” and created by the complex interpenetration of the organizational
and the aorgic in harmony and strife particular to it. “Thus in Empedocles his time individualizes
itself; the more it does so, and the more scintillating and actual and visible the riddle that appears
to be dissolved in him grows, all the more necessary does his downgoing [Untergang]
become.”528 It is because the tragic dialectic of his time finds its objectification in the individual
figure of the tragic hero Empedocles that his self-sacrifice becomes necessary—that he must
descend to the hearth of the Titans beneath Etna to join their excentric world. It is hence for this
reason also that his sacrifice constitutes a liberation and a purification of the Agrigentian people.
The philosopher, as the unsurpassable brilliance of the brightest star in the heavens he embodies,
must set upon the earth and the time of which he is the absolute manifestation, so that this earth
and this time may liberate themselves in a universal dawn, from the highest plane of divinity:
µοῖρα, housed beyond the reach of the gods. At the point of this downgoing, the tragic hero
reaches the apex of his loneliness, the absence of his gods, and so must sacrifice himself in the
mad hope of reuniting with them.
Empedocles’ individualization of his time takes place in three different respects. Firstly,
by a double determination, the Agrigentian people’s “spirit of art [Kunstgeist],” in its vigorous
vitality, “had to repeat itself in him more aorgically”529 while simultaneously, “the glowing
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stretch of sky and the luxuriant Sicilian landscape had to exhibit themselves for him and in him
more tellingly and in a way that was more powerfully felt [… .]” Empedocles thus found himself
“seized by both sides”—the “active force of his essential self” and its “countereffect [… .]” In
this way, the spirit of art and “his inmost heart” reciprocally “nurtured” one another, each
pushing the other toward the extreme. 530 The interpenetration and exchange of the proper and the
foreign, of intensity and divinity, of art and nature thus rent the heart of the hero apart just as
they unified together, pushing his particularity into the sphere of universality.
Secondly, in the political realm, and among the “hyperpolitical” Agrigentians,
Empedocles’ “character” also united “two sides”: on the one hand, “a spirit of reform” in his
natural yearning toward the whole, and on the other hand “anarchical self-reliance in which each
citizen pursued a cause unique to him [… .]” These two natures of Empedocles, that of a
restoration of the unity and equality of the people and that of a radical individualism, thus also
“reciprocally enhanced and magnified each other.”531
Thirdly: “The boldness of a free spirit sets itself in ever-waxing opposition to the
unknown”—thus Empedocles “had to master the unknown [dem Unbekannten]”—that is to say,
to master nature, and, in the process, to “struggle against sheer serviceability [… .]”532 In his
grand effort to “comprehend the nature that overwhelms us,” Empedocles “felt compelled to
struggle toward a sense of identity with nature”—it is for this reason that “his spirit had to
assume an aorgic configuration in the highest sense of the word; he had to tear himself away
from himself and from his point of equilibrium, always penetrating his object so excessively that
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he lost himself in it as in an abyss, while, viewed from the opposite side, the entire life of the
object had to seize his abandoned inmost heart, which had become more and more infinitely
receptive because of the boundless activity of his spirit; with him the object had to become
individuality”533 in such a way that, while he strove to master nature, nature simultaneously had
to invade him and, as his “object [, …] appear in a subjective configuration, just as he had taken
on the objective configuration of the object.”534 Empedocles thereafter, because he had changed
forms with nature in his duplicitous dialectic with it, “was the universal, the unknown, the object
[… ,] the particular.”
Therefore, the contest (Widerstreit) between, on one side, “art, thought, and the human
character’s compulsion to order” and, on the other side, the “less conscious nature [Natur]” had
the appearance of being “united in their uttermost extremes” to such an extent that the very form
by which they were distinguishable was “exchanged” by these extremes. “This was the magic
[der Zober] with which Empedocles entered on the stage of his world.” The same nature by
which the free spirits were dominated, “with all her melodies, came to appear in the spirit and the
mouth of this man […] as though his heart were her own [… .]” “This is what lent him his
special grace, his grandeur, his divinity; every heart was moved by the storm of destiny and
every specter that was flitting here and there, restless and without guidance in the enigmatic
night of those times, flew to him [… .]”535 These worshipful hearts thus clustered around that
“extraordinary soul” and the fervor of their love for him increased and sharpened to the degree
that they each appropriated his “divinely configured being” into their own particularity. “Thus he
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lived in supreme independence, in that relation which prescribed to him his own path [… .]” This
relation “resulted in an encounter with his own freest determination and his very own soul,” this
determination itself being “the most intrinsic spirit of the circumstances” as their extremes
departed and returned to that spirit. “The destiny of his time, in its initial and ultimate problem, is
dissolved in his utterly independent relation to it,” and yet this “apparent solution” afterward
would cancel itself and “come to an end.”536 Empedocles, thus, within this independent relation
to his nation’s destiny and in his “supreme intensity” had to live “with the elements” while the
surrounding, free-spirited world opposed itself to them, refusing “to think about or acknowledge
in any way that which lives” while, on the other hand, their relation to nature’s “encroachments”
was ruled by “sheer serviceability.”537 In the face of this nihilism of the free spirits, 538 this denial
of primordial, divine and natural life and the valuation of nature according to its use-value alone,
Empedocles had to fling himself into the elements, into the heart of nature, indeed, to become it
and to let it become him so that, thus attaining a universal value, he would be able to return his
people to nature through self-sacrifice—through a voluntary death as that universality, and
furthermore, paradoxically, as the particular form of that universality.
This independent relation encapsulated three capacities in which Empedocles lived: first,
as a “human being” with a generally refined sensibility, second, as a poet and philosopher, and
third, “as a solitary who cultivates his gardens.” Because Empedocles “stands in an intense
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relation” not only with the elements but also with people, he must not merely join in their
struggle to “cultivate” nature and “anarchic life,” but, further, “he had to strive to grasp [the
living] in its inmost core with his own essence” and to become “equal to the human element” and
to its “soul, to all that is ungraspable and involuntary in it [… .]” In this way, his “will,” his
“consciousness” and his “spirit, which transcended the usual human boundaries of knowledge
and action, had to lose themselves and become objective [… .]” The “objective reverberated in
him all the more purely and profoundly the more open his inmost heart remained” which itself
was open simply because he had “surrendered himself to the particular as well as to the
universal.”539
Empedocles thus acted both as a political figure and as a “religious reformer” and, in his
“exchanging the positions of object and subject, he solved for himself all that is destined.” In this
relation, that which satisfies the incredulous portion of the population, and which therefore
creates the situation in which “that which unites must go down” is the “single unifying factor
between themselves and this man”—that is, in the “unification of extremes [… .]” Yet because
these extremes themselves “arise in the conflict between art and nature,” Empedocles must
“reconcile nature with art precisely in that respect which is most out of reach for art.”540 He
accomplished this “with love, and against his own will”541 since he knew that the greater his
expression of intensity was, the more sure the need for his downgoing would become.542 The
“deception” of his oneness with them” then “comes to an end” in the same moment that “he
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comes to realize what they are.” As a result: “He pulls back, and they grow cold toward him. His
opponent uses this, brings about his banishment.”543 His opponent, whose “natural disposition” is
great, is “[b]orn to be a hero” and so, rather than uniting extremes, he is inclined to “rein them in
and tie their reciprocal relation” to something firm at their “midpoint” such that only one
extreme may act at a time. “His virtue is the intellect, his goddess, Necessity.” This opponent is
“destiny itself, with the difference that in him contending forces are firmly tied to a
consciousness,” which solidifies the extremes in “a (negative) ideality” and allows them a single
direction alone. 544
In Empedocles, “art and nature unite in an extreme antagonism, the active in excess
becomes objective, and the [lost] subjectivity […] is replaced by the profound encroachment of
the object.” In his opponent, on the other hand, art and nature unite “through an excess of
objectivity, of being-outside-itself and of reality ([…] in such a dominant fear in the face of the
unknown), in a courageous open heart” which substitutes itself for the active, formative force as
the subjective becomes merely passive. If, in this unification, the extremes take on the figure of
the “organizational,” then the “subjectively active” is forced to become “the organizing factor,
the element”—it is thus that, even for Empedocles’ opponent, “the subjective and objective have
to exchange their configurations and become united in one.”545 The necessity of the tragic
dialectic of which Empedocles is the absolute manifestation must, insofar as it creates itself from
the initially harmonious and then dissonant and conflictual opposition of art and nature, always
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produce itself when destiny is the rule of the day, and end in one of various unifications of object
and subject which are at once their separation.

Hölderlin’s Injunction
On the dawn of the Austro-Prussian war, on May 7, 1866, Nietzsche wrote to Wilhelm
Pinder from Leipzig of his hopes for the victory of the German Fatherland (Vaterlande). He
speaks of the immense “mental” and “physical” performance (Leistungen) that will be required
of the military forces. He writes, then: “But let each give his best. For loving, as Hölderlin says,
the mortal gives of his best [denn liebend giebt der Sterbliche vom Besten].”546 Hölderin is thus
invoked as a voice calling the nation of Germany to its future unification—this love is the love of
a Fatherland that is still to come. The poet’s eternal exigency to every man, that he might
incarnate the genius of a properly German world in the same spirit as that of the Greeks. The love
in question is a national love, which, by its power, demands that every creature under the
German sun fulfill his role as citizen of a harmonious culture worthy of his people. Though
Prussia would defeat Germany in this war, Nietzsche’s prophetic desire would find its
accomplishment in the victory of the Franco-Prussian war that would unify Germany as a nationstate for the first time. Yet the great hope would be answered by great danger, as a fascistic
nationalism triumphed over the ideal of a harmoniously unified culture. Hölderlin, in a letter to
his brother of 1793, wrote: “I love the race of men who are coming in the next centuries.”547 It is
this love, then, that Nietzsche invokes in his letter to Pinder.
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Three years later, on September 3, 1869, the first year of his professorship at Basel,
Nietzsche wrote the same line to Rohde, who was in Florence at the time. The letter begins with
a romantic complaint about the veiling, insufficient nature of epistolary communication: “It is a
terrible problem with letters: one wants to give one’s best, and in the end one gives only the very
ephemeral, the chord and not the eternal melody. Whenever I write letters to you I am befallen by
the line of Hölderlin’s (my favorite from high school): for loving, the mortal gives of his best.”
He then effusively apologizes for his shadowy past letters and promises the fullness and force of
his current letter to attain the highest perfection possible to it: “And know that Zeus and
autumnal pure heaven so strongly move me just at this time in positivity, so many a lush hour
with rich insight and real illustration enfold me—but whenever such times and swelling
sentiments come, I’ll take a whole letter, rich in good thoughts and wishes for you […] in the
hope that the electric wire between our souls (or, according to Reichenbach, the odic force) will
transmit this shorthand to you.” This love, then, is of a different sort; it is intimate and literary in
the highest degree. The love of which Nietzsche speaks through Hölderlin’s voice and with great
devotion expressed toward the poet himself, is a love between the closest of friends, twin souls,
which double one another, connected by Zeus’s lightning, an electric current, deathless and
eternally unbroken. Odic force was a concept developed by Karl von Reichenbach in 1845 to
designate a universal vital force which animated beings and connected like to like.
Nietzsche must thus, after Hölderlin’s injunction, give of his best—try ever harder to
translate the inexpressible force of this friendship, and of the solitary experiences that kindle its
sentiment in him, into the untruthful medium of language, in its most amorous and indirect form:
the letter. A love between mortals, a love between geniuses, a love between philologists; and the
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letter as the very material of the bridge that binds them together. The form that must fulfill this
task can never be philosophy; it must be literature, speech in its purest transmission, and not any
literature but the letter; those words that overcome every distance, that defy the far reaches of
geography to connect souls destined to communicate, that they may inhabit one another. It is in
this same letter that Nietzsche pines for Italy, saying: “I too have my Italy, like you, except that I
can only ever go on Saturdays and Sundays. Recently, I have been there four times, in swift
succession, and a letter almost every week flies along the same path. Dearest friend, what I learn
and see, hear and understand is indescribable. Schopenhauer and Goethe, Aeschylus and Pindar
are still alive—only believe.”548 The mortal, he thus proclaims, is the fertile dwelling-place in
which the immortality of past geniuses arises and comes to rest. By writing the vitality of these
geniuses, Nietzsche in fact brings them to life, within himself, as for Rohde. It is no longer the
gods who are immortal, who give birth to mortals, but the geniuses of a past Germany, of an
ancient Greece, who are immortal—only brought into being through the obscure channels of an
untimely mortality.
The quotation appears again in Human, All too Human (1878), when Nietzsche writes of
the “male culture” of the Greeks. As an explanation of the “erotic relationship of men to youths”
and its necessity to education, he writes: “the whole idealism of strength of the Greek character
was thrown into that relationship, and the treatment of young people has probably never been so
aware, loving, so thoroughly geared toward excellence (virtus), as it was in the sixth and fifth
centuries—in accordance with Hölderlin’s beautiful line, ‘denn liebend giebt der Sterbliche vom
Besten’ (for loving the mortal gives of his best).” The “love” present between Greek men and
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their youths was not only romantic, not only carnal, but spiritual—a love inaccessible to women,
with whom “there was no spiritual intercourse”—no “real romance.” For this reason, women
were excluded from “all kinds of competitions and spectacles,” so that “the sole higher
entertainment remaining to her was religious worship.” In “art,” the tragic heroines Elektra and
Antigone were merely “tolerated,” though abhorred in “life.” The only task of women in Greek
culture, then, was “to produce beautiful, powerful bodies”—to assure the continual survival,
voracity and youthfulness of that “highly developed culture [… .] For in Greek mothers, the
Greek genius returned again and again to nature.”549 The invocation of Hölderlin’s words here
speaks of a cosmic, multilayered love, binding the whole of Greek culture into a superior
perfection. For this is the very principle of education; that it create genius by pushing mortals to
the very limit of their amorous capacities. In the organon of the Greeks, men spontaneously give
forth what they can, simply because they love—their love thus rises to approach that mysterious,
unknown love of the gods, and they are thus creative of a coming world.
The Hölderlin line, which Nietzsche never cites, but rather, seems to call forth from
memory, comes from the first draft of Der Tod des Empedokles. It is the fourth scene of the
second act, in which Empedocles, refusing an invitation from Critias from Etna back into the
city, delivers an oration to the Agrigentian people to announce his decision of suicide and calls to
them to found a new Fatherland, a republic uniting it with nature. It is not Hölderlin himself who
speaks, but his Empedocles, one of his doubles, and Nietzsche’s failed reformer. Empedocles
begins his speech by making a distinction between animal life and human life: animals, which he
calls the “children of the earth / Will always shrink away from all that’s new and strange” and
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thus desire to “stay at home” in eternal peace and “care only for / Survival” so that in death, each
of them shall “Return to its own element, that it may find / Rejuvination [… .]” On the other
hand, “On human life the grand desire is / Bestowed that it rejuvinate itself.” Men of the greatest
courage choose their own deaths: “And from the purifying death that they / Themselves will
choose, upon a time propitious, / Will rise, Achilles from the Styx, the nations.” An imperative
follows, to overcome nature: “Oh, give yourselves to nature, before she takes you!— / For you
have thirsted long for things unfamiliar, and / As though imprisoned in a sickly body the spirit /
of Agrigent is yearning to slough off the old ways. / So, dare it!” The main distinguishing factor
between men and animals (as well as naïve children) is thus that men seek the unknown, while
animals remain isolated in the cycle of nature; men are a dissonance in the great harmonious
necessity of nature. It is thus necessary for men to chase after the novel and the monstrous, and
they must “Forget” old customs, laws, the “names of all the ancient gods” and do this
“courageously”—they must be incessantly active, while innocent animals are passive. It is the
highest distinction of man from beast that he possesses the self-consciousness and power to go
willingly to death. In this way: “like newborn babes / Your eyes will open to the godliness of
nature, / And then your spirit will flame from / The light of heaven, sweet breath of life / Will
then suffuse your breast anew [… .]”550 Empedocles demands therefore a new birth, a resurgence
of nature and the gods in man from which will flower a new system of laws:
and you
will dwell within your own grand world,
shake hands with one another, give the word and share the good.
Oh then dear friends—partake of deeds and fame,
Like faithful Dioscuri; each will be the equal of
The others—like slender statues in repose your
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New life will come to rest on well-conceived
Arrangements, letting law tie confederate bonds.
You tutelary spirits of our all-transforming nature! […]
You will invite from all the far-flung corners of the world
The liberated peoples to the celebrated festival,
Hospitable! pious! for mortals then will donate lovingly
Their very best; no form of servitude
Will cramp and crush the breast—551
It is the return to nature, to the primordial, that requires this sacrifice of our best in love.
This is the call of the tragic hero to his people, a cry into the mortal abyss abandoned by the
godhead, that his people may unify again in everlasting love. For after the god has disappeared, it
is only by means of a giving forth of our best that he may be called back, that the cosmic
phenomenon of strife may be transformed into that of love and thus that a new culture may be
founded, a deliverance from dissonance back into harmony. And yet the excentric path of the
philosopher-poet who sings his own downgoing has already been determined, and it is the very
futility of this un-accomplishable goal, the doom to failure of this mirage of a final promise of
redemption that is the secret sense of this injunction, its tragic potency. For the voice of the god
who calls Empedocles to death is a silent one and tragic destiny has already gripped the hero. It
shall, rather, be his task to disappear from the mortal sphere into the excentric sphere of the dead.
And yet this double withdrawal of Empedocles and his voiceless god is the very purification of
the Agrigentian people from the myth of the circular path; it is, in fact, the precipitation of this
lost people into what Nietzsche calls the torrent of becoming.
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3
The Time of Tragedy
The tragic temporal movement, which falls outside the reach of divinity as it withdraws,
constitutes, for both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, a purificatory rhythmics. While for Hölderlin, this
rhythm results in the necessity of a poetology of tragedy, for Nietzsche, it comes about as a
philosophical and physiological poetics of life, a life that for the ancients was
anthropomorphically transposed onto the cosmos as a physics and metaphysics of breath, and
which for us moderns arises in a manner entirely foreign to the Greek sensibility and profoundly
rooted in the body. Nietzsche’s early thoughts on epistemology take sensation as the ground of
knowledge and of art, out of which rhythm arises as the measure of a chimerical time and space.
Human beings, for Nietzsche, are endowed with an infinite plasticity of forces, whose
externalization forms the illusory concepts by which they live. It is the transformation of these
forces and their harnessing toward the creation of a culture to come that constitutes the
movement of history. The task of the tragic hero, in a world tragically condemned to absolute
becoming, is to become what Hölderlin had called a “pearl of time”—an instant of eternity
beyond the tragic movement of life with no inherent teleology, and, from that height, to go down,
to sacrifice himself so as to bring about the embrace of this temporality as the essential
phenomenon of our time. It is in this sense that the tragic hero must be the last man; his selfsacrifice must also be the self-sacrifice of metaphysics. His downgoing must announce the
downgoing of man defined as a creature subordinated to the divine sphere.
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Loneliness of the Tragic Hero
It is profound solitude, depthless loneliness, for both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, that
characterizes the tragic hero, that determines his fate as such. This loneliness is a result of a
double event: on the one hand, his monstrous consciousness, both of the tragedy of his people
and of his own tragedy and, on the other, the loss of love—of the Empedoclean originary sphere
of harmony between godly men in an eternal oneness.
In the second draft of Hölderlin’s Tod des Empedokles, the hero, in a soliloquy spoken
alone on the slopes of Etna, cries out, enunciating the depth of his tragedy, and mourning the loss
of the unity of divine nature from which he issued, thus performing his own prophecy:

Woe! lonely! lonely! lonely!
And never will I find
You, my gods,
and never more will I return
To your life, nature!552

Weh! einsam! einsam! einsam!
Und nimmer find ich
Euch, meine Götter,
Und nimmer kehr ich
Zu deinem Leben, Natur!

The tragic for Empedocles, the source of his profound loneliness, of his lack of unity with even
another human creature, is the loss of his gods, who depart in their greatest moment of intimacy
with man, banishing the possibility of divine love: “For love expires as soon as gods have
flown”553 —it is for this reason, in the absence of this supreme love between mortals, that that
they must give of their best, in order to transfigure nature back into the whole—to redirect the
mortal, excentric path back to a circular one. In this same speech, Empedocles inquires—not to
the earless, far-off gods but to himself, or to his shadow:

[…] why now is all

[…] wie ists denn nun?
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in mourning? am I alone?
And is it night outside, the daylight
notwithstanding?
An eye that saw more lofty things than
mortal eye
Is now struck blind, I grope about me—
Where are you, O my gods?
Woe!554

Vertrauert? bin ich ganz allein?
Und ist es Nacht hier außen auch am
Tage?
Der höhers, denn ein sterblich Auge, sah
Der Blindgeschlagene tastet nun umher—
Wo seid ihr, meine Götter?
Weh!

This song of Empedocles, the last man endowed with divinity, is one of mourning; a mourning of
eternal, binding love. In the madness of self-reflection, where language is no longer a bridge to
the divine, beyond the mortal word, these questions cast themselves into the abyss of solitude.
Empedocles speaks, thus, but to whom? It is in this mourning, in the cry of “Woe” that, at one
and the same moment, the disappearance of the god and the affirmation of life in spite of, and
because of this disappearance, take place. It is the nearly-silent, the pure word, the caesura that
splits the hero in two, into divinity and mortality, awakening in him the need to go down for the
salvation of his people, and at once, the impossibility of such a salvation. Hence in the word
“Woe,” the dream of a world outside time vanishes, and the hero announces the coming failure of
his own self-sacrifice. Like the blind Oedipus, Empedocles gropes for the light of his gods, of his
nature, but finds himself condemned to an endless night, a world veiled in mourning. Such
unending Woe! is the outcry of the one who must go under to revive the day, to free all mortals
from their curse, the silence of their gods, their wayward path. And so the idea of Oedipus as
philosopher, not merely as the central figure of philosophy but its tragic speaker, takes form.
In Nietzsche’s “Fragment / from the History of Posterity” called “Oedipus / Soliloquies /
of the Last Philosopher,” the hero cries his “soliloquy”:
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I call myself the last philosopher because I am the last human being. I myself am the only
one who speaks with me, and my voice comes to me as the voice of someone who is
dying. Let me communicate with you for just one hour, beloved voice, with you, the last
trace of memory of all human happiness; with your help I will deceive myself about my
loneliness and lie my way into community and love; for my heart refuses to believe that
love is dead; it cannot bear the shudder of the loneliest loneliness [einsamsten
Einsamkeit] and it forces me to speak as if I were two persons.
Do I still hear you, my voice? You whisper when you curse? And yet your curse
should cause the bowels of this world to burst! But it continues to live and merely stares
at me all the more brilliantly and coldly with its pitiless stars [Sternen]; it continues to
live, dumb and blind as ever, and the only thing that dies is—the human being. —And
yet! I still hear you, beloved voice! Someone other than I, the last human being, is dying
in this universe: the last sigh, your sigh, dies with me, the drawn out Woe! Woe! [das
hingezogene Wehe! Wehe!] sighing around me, Oedipus, the last of the woeful human
beings [der Wehemenschen letzten, Oedipus].
KSA 7: 19 [131]555

Oedipus, in Nietzsche’s rewriting of him, stands as a double or a mask of the writer
himself, the tragic hero speaking through the philosopher to come, the hero of the Greeks
speaking German, in the philosopher’s voice, is considered as the absolute mortal—the last to
preserve the tragic flame of man’s essence, to die—the last mortal, and because of this, as the last
philosopher. His death, in essence, is self-sacrifice. Nietzsche writes of Oedipus: “The world is
an enigma. Sophocles is not the poet of perfect harmony between the divine and the human;
unconditional submission and resignation, that is his doctrine.”556 Thus Oedipus, whose
knowledge is monstrous precisely because it is his fate to untie the enigmatic knot of the human
as such and therefrom, blindly, to proceed to what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the “madness of selfconsciousness”557 and the profound knowledge of his crime against nature accomplished,
nonetheless, in accordance with Μοίρα, must freely submit himself, in terrible lucidity, to his
555

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 43-44.

556

Nietzsche, L’Œdipe-Roi de Sophocle, 58.

557

Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, 234.
212

own punishment—his own sacrifice. This sacrifice must bring also about the death—the
downgoing—of the human, the mortal as such. To invoke Oedipus again, in an untimely fashion,
as a hero both ancient and modern, is to recreate him, precisely, as the tragic hero who must
bring death to the metaphysical human beings, steeped in nihilism, of Nietzsche’s time. He
stands above the abyss that separates life from death, and, like Hölderlin’s Empedocles,
announces his descent. Yet he announces it to no one but himself, his double born of loneliness—
the ghost of a love, a voice outside of voice.
Indeed, it is onto the motion of mortal becoming that Nietzsche transfers the paradigm of
the tragic hero. His tragedy is, like that of Hölderlin’s hero, the loss of love, of community. Yet
he calls out not to the absent god but to himself, the only possible receiver of his love in the
absence of a binding force drawing men together. This loneliness, then, is different from that of
Höderlin’s Empedocles; Oedipus suffers the loneliness of self-knowledge without another to
share in it, to impart it to. Nietzsche writes in a fragment: “Oedipus the ‘suffering human being’
solves the riddle of the human being.” (KSA 7: 26 [2])558 Suffering is, indeed, for Nietzsche, the
ground of mortality in tragedy. This Oedipus contains within himself the secret of man, yet
because he has become monstrous by that knowledge, he must divide himself and become his
own interlocutor; in this loneliness, he has no one to whom to whisper his knowledge but his
own voice. And this voice of the tragic hero, his other self born out of self, is indeed the most
dangerous of his selves, whose tragedy is just that his curse does not “cause the bowels of this
world to burst” but languishes as the last human being. That violent, dying voice, and not a god,
is the withdrawing force that Nietzsche’s Oedipus calls to. And its loss is not, indeed, an
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occasion for mourning but, in the surpassing of the human that it brings, it must evoke the most
supremely powerful admixture of joy and suffering; of affirmation out of pain, and from there, of
boundless transformation. The secret of the human being, indeed, is just that he is dying, that he
must be surpassed—self-consciousness, when it is too extreme, turns against itself and must, in
the absence of a legislating voice, undergo the greatest sacrifice. Is it merely by chance that the
tragic hero should speak the pure word, “Woe” at the very moment when he is outside himself?
Nietzsche writes of ἔκστασις not only as the καιρóς of tragedy, but also as the
precondition of art in general. In a fragment of 1869, he writes: “Every art [Alle Kunst] demands
a ‘being outside of oneself’ [außer-sich-sein], an ἔκστασις; the step to drama occurs from here,
since here [in drama] we do not return to ourselves but, in our ἔκστασις, remain lodged in a
foreign being” (KSA 7: 2 [25]).559 If we take into consideration Nietzsche’s contemporaneous
metaphysics of art, and his thinking of the aesthetic as indissolubly a definition of life and of art,
indeed of art as the only means by which life is made manifest, ἔκστασις, the primordial split of
self in the ocean of becoming, is that by which the human being becomes what he is. This
shattering of the illusory principle of individuation is the very manifestation, the very event of
the tragic. It is the disruption of harmony by dissonance, of love by strife; thus it takes place as
the unveiling of the ἀγών that traverses the tragic hero. In the double prophetic word of Oedipus,
Woe, which travels between himself and his voice, the Hölderlinian caesura comes to disrupt the
ideal rhythm of life, to open the depth of its temporality. Again, Nietzsche writes, in The Greek
Music Drama (1870):
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For drama […] begins when a human being steps outside himself and believes himself to
be transformed and enchanted. In this condition of “being-outside-of-oneself” [Außersich-seins], or ecstasy [Ecstase], only one further step is necessary: we do not return back
into ourselves, but turn into another being, so that we ourselves behave like enchanted
beings. This is the fundamental reason for our deep astonishment at the sight of the
drama: the ground shakes, the belief in the indissolubility of and permanence of the
individual.560
The rhythmic rupture in the drama for Nietzsche takes place on a biological level; it is the exit of
life from its body, its entrance into another, enchanted form. It is thus at one and the same time a
shattering of individuality and of subjectivity to the point that their sense languishes in finitude
and a joyful affirmation in the face of this suffering, born out of it, which constitutes itself as a
unification of beings-outside-of-themselves. The shattering of sense, conceived, after
Schopenhauer, as the principium individuationis, against that which exceeds it beyond measure,
the non-sense, the supra-sense of ἔκστασις, is the very cathartic experience of Tragödie for
Nietzsche. In his lectures on Sophocles of 1870, Nietzsche sketches the Apollinian-Dionysian
duplicity (Duplicität) as follows: In the Apollinian state, “the individual accedes to an exalted
disposition: an andante full of a sacerdotal majesty.”561 In the Dionysian revel, on the other hand,
“the mass accedes to an ecstatic excitation: the instinctive externalizes itself in an immediate
way. Unbounded violence of the springtime instinct; forgetting of individuality; allied with the
ascetic exteriorization of self in pain and terror. Nature in its supreme force thus reunites the
separated beings and makes them feel as one: so that the principle of individuation appears, so to
speak, as a persistent state of weakness of nature.”562 With the “forgetting of self”563 that tragedy
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entailed, a more primordial level of memory was unleashed, bringing with it a transformation of
individuals into the recreation of a new oneness, a new nature, which the division of beings,
pushing them outside themselves, gave rise to. The opening of these more profound and
originary chasms of rhythm shaped thus the tragic rhythm of the drama through this confluence
of shattering and unification—this simultaneity which took place throughout and in spite of the
time of tragedy. Nietzsche also writes:
The drama ran without spectators because all participated in it. The principle of
individuation was broken, the god, ὁ λύσιος (‘the liberator’). had delivered all the beings
from themselves, each one was metamorphosed. The affects are converted into the state
of ecstasy, the pains arouse pleasure, the terrors arouse joy. The song and communicative
gestures of these fierily excited masses was completely new and unheard-of in the
Homeric Greek world, it was an asiatic and oriental thing that he Greeks, with their
prodigious rhythmic and plastic force, in a word with their sense of beauty, had mastered
to the point of pulling tragedy from it [… .] 564
ἔκστασις is thus profoundly, rhythmically linked to plastic force, here even called rhythmic. The
experience of being outside of oneself as the universal binding force of tragedy was possible
only because of the height of the Greek power of homeotic transformation and appropriation.
For Nietzsche, Sophocles is a threshold figure, standing midway between ancient tragedy
and its modernization—between Aeschylus and Euripides. He writes: “Sophocles is the figure of
transition; thought still moves along the path of instinct [… .]”565 It is because of his role as a
boundary figure, and because in him the primordial, organic instinct of self-creation remains
even as the organization of the new tragedy, the separation of chorus and drama begins to take
place—at the daybreak, thus, of tragedy’s self-consciousness—that Sophocles is a figure of the
tragic. Nietzsche writes:
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The worldview is tragic only in Sophocles. The undeserved character [U n v e r d i e n t
h e i t] of destiny seemed to him tragic: the enigmatic nature of human life, truly
terrifying, was his tragic muse. The κάθαρσις comes on the scene as a necessary feeling
of consonance in a world of dissonances [als nothwendiges Consonanzgefühl in der Welt
der Dissonanzen]. Suffering, the origin of tragedy, [Das L e i d e n, der Ursprung der
Tragödie] achieves with Sophocles its transfiguration: it is grasped as something that
makes one holy [Heiligendes]. […] The distance between the human and the divine is
beyond measure: the most profound obeisance and resignation are called for. […] Heroic
humanity is the noblest humanity, devoid of virtue; its destiny demonstrates the infinite
chasm [die unendliche Kluft] [vis-à-vis the divine]. There is scarcely guilt; only a lack of
knowledge concerning the worth of human life.566
In the word of the tragic hero thus correspond this consonance and this dissonance, in a
simultaneity akin to that between the Apollinian and the Dionysian—individuation and its
rupture. Thus just as in Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition, where the unification is purified through
separation, a consonance occurs, for Nietzsche, as the purification of the tragic discontinuity
between the hero and his nation. The word, then—is precisely caesura.567 Excentricity spells the
necessary failure of the tragic hero, of the philosopher-poet who sacrifices himself for the
creation of a new culture. Rather, he eternally delivers the others into the flood of becoming from
which it was his destiny to escape and to save his nation.
Nietzsche attacks the “modern” and “esthetico-moral” interpretation of tragedy that
would claim κάθαρσις to be “the triumph of the just, moderate man, deprived of passion [… .]”
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Tragedy, claims Nietzsche here, was born “precisely there where the tragic instinct manifests
itself in a creative way, while nature is so sure in her instinctive reign [… .]”568 Thus κάθαρσις,
for Nietzsche, takes place rhythmically, in accordance with the life-breath of the world brought
into its highest possible idealization.
Schopenhauer had interpreted tragedy as the process by which the will objectifies itself
into external visibility, and thus as the playing-out of its own intrinsic tragic nature. “It is the
antagonism of the will with itself which is here [in tragedy] most completely unfolded at the
highest grade of its objectivity, and which comes into fearful prominence. […] It is one and the
same will, living and appearing in […] all [individuals], whose phenomena fight with one
another and tear one another to pieces.”569 Hence tragedy is merely the phenomenology of the
will’s objectification and the ἀγών of its manifestations with one another. Because Schopenhauer
determined the will as the thing-in-itself, he called the “self-knowledge [of the will] the sole
event in-itself” and, in turn, defined the tragic process as precisely this attainment of selfknowledge.570 It is through the tragic process of the will’s objectification that it ascends from the
empty state of being “only a blind, irresistible urge” to the point at which it “obtains knowledge
of its own willing and what it wills through the addition of the world of representation,
developed for its service.”571 For Schopenhauer, thus, as for Hölderlin and later Nietzsche, it is
through monstrous reflective consciousness and self-knowledge that tragedy comes to necessitate
a sacrifice. In the case of the Schopenhauerean will, the “tragic […] receives its characteristic
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tendency toward the sublime from the dawning that the world of knowledge that the world and
life can afford us no true satisfaction, and are therefore not worth our attachment to them.” In the
perspective of this pessimism, the “tragic spirit,” having brought about the attainment of this
extreme knowledge, “leads to resignation.”572 Szondi writes that for Schopenhauer, the “sole
goal of art is the communication of this [the will’s] knowledge.573 The process of objectification
and self-knowledge thus culminates in man and art.”574 The tragic hence becomes “the selfdestruction and self-negation of the will” as the movement of a tragedy unfolds as “the battle of
the will against itself” in the form of its various representations. In tragedy, moreover, art
becomes “a clear mirror of the world” precisely because there, knowledge, which “proceeds
originally from the will itself,” and is therefore subordinated to it, finds the power to “withdraw
itself” from “this servitude” and become “freed from all the aims of the will”575 thus revolting
against its sphere of origin and pushing the will to self-destruction in resignation. The task of
tragedy, then, for Schopenhauer, is to reveal to its spectators the will’s tragic nature—to lift them
into the greatest proportions of the will’s self-knowledge and to lead them, too, into resignation.
Simultaneously, in the darkness of this very resignation, “the will, whose manifestation is man,
sublates itself in a dual dialectic.”576
Nietzsche, in turn, wrote in The Birth of Tragedy of the monstrous knowledge of the
tragic hero. In reference to Oedipus he claims that the message delivered in that drama is that of
the necessary downgoing of he who exceeds the limits of human measure, this being a peculiarly
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Apollinian value: “the myth seems to whisper to us that wisdom, and particularly Dionysian
wisdom, is an unnatural abomination; that he who by means of his knowledge plunges nature
into the abyss of destruction must also suffer the dissolution of nature in his own person. ‘The
edge of wisdom turns against the wise: wisdom is a crime against nature.’”577 Nietzsche goes on
to form the hypothesis that every tragic hero in Greek tragedy until the time of Euripides was a
manifestation of Dionysus; he asserts that “all the celebrated heroes of the Greek stage—
Prometheus, Oedipus, etc.—are mere masks of this original hero, Dionysus.”578 Hence, Szondi
postulates a parallel between Nietzsche’s Dionysus and Schopenhauer’s will as the universal
ground of all life that takes on the form in its manifestation of different tragic heroes as, for
Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer’s metaphysical concepts […] become aesthetic concepts.”579 Thus,
just as the Schopenhauerean will in tragedy is driven to self-destruction through excessive
knowledge, for Nietzsche, “Dionysus’s mythical fate of being torn to pieces is celebrated anew in
every tragedy.” Szondi writes that this fate is understood by Nietzsche as “the symbol of
individuation: in the tragic hero one can see ‘the god experiencing in himself the agonies of
individuation.’”580
Szondi further draws together the Nietzschean Apollinian and the Schpenhauerean
concept of representation, which are both positioned in opposition to “an original oneness”—yet
the difference between their conceptions arises in the comparison, for while Schopenhauer’s will
undergoes an auto-sublation into resignation, Nietzsche’s “Dionysus emerges from his
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dismemberment in the process of individuation as one who is powerful and indestructible, which
is precisely the ‘metaphysical consolation’ that tragedy offers.” Thus, Szondi concludes that
“Nietzsche confronts Schopenhauer’s negative dialectic with a positive dialectic [… .]581
According to Szondi, while in Schopenhauer’s “dialectic” the “will negates itself in its
objectification as appearance,” Nietzsche’s “dialectic” consists of the self-affirmation of the
Dionysian through the very negation of the Apollinian pleasure of appearance, so that it plunges
itself into “a still greater pleasure in the destruction of the visible world of mere appearance.”582
Hence, rather than acting as a mirror of the world of individuation, art, for Nietzsche, unveils
individuation as “the prime cause of evil”—“the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may
be broken—the augury of a restored oneness.”583
The essence of tragedy, then, is the dismemberment of individuals through a loss, a
forgetting of self that allows men to participate in the being of the god Dionysus and through this
very violence and fragmentation to find a unification in joy—an affirmation of life as this
capacity for transfiguration within the temporal movement of the drama and its music. The
primordial unity the conjuring of which is the task of tragedy is therefore not a prehistorical state
of perfection but, rather, arising from the dissonant flood of becoming, it is an instant in which
consonance is born, precisely, through a community of discontinuous selves, of selves pushed
outside of themselves by the exaltation of Dionysus. It is at once a sacrifice and a forgetting of
individuality which serves a purificatory function for the whole of the chorus and the spectators
insofar as it attains a state of timelessness and therefrom, with the god, is voluntarily torn to
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shreds. The primordial is thus not an absolute; it is an aesthetic reserve of force that changes
constantly, with every breath—of the force that makes both art and science—both illusion and
knowledge—possible.
In order to describe the process by which the Dionysian appears to the chorus and the
audience in an ecstatic state, Nietzsche borrows the idea of the Urphänomen—the primordial
phenomenon—from Goethe. In Eckermann’s Conversations of Goethe, the “naïve” poetphilosopher speaks of this pantheistic proto-phenomenon as follows: “The Understanding will
not reach her [Nature]; man must be capable of elevating himself to the highest Reason, to come
into contact with the Divinity, which manifests itself in primitive phenomena (Urphänomenen),
which dwells behind them, and from which they proceed.”584 This view of the Urphänomen
places it on a Kantian plan of consciousness, understanding Reason, the highest of the faculties,
as the means by which this phenomenon must be grasped.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche distinguishes between the tragic, Dionysian “truth of
nature” and the “lie of culture,” as a “contrast” comparable to that “between the eternal core of
things, the thing-in-itself, and the whole world of appearances [Erscheinungen].”585 This leads to
a discussion of the “artistic proto-phenomenon [Urphänomen]”wherein the poet “sees himself
surrounded by figures who live and act before him and whose inmost nature he can see.”586
Nietzsche speaks of the chorus as the “primal ground of tragedy [Ur-grund der Tragödie]” which
represents (darstellt) the “shattering of the individual [Zerbrechen des Individuums] and his
fusion with primal being [Ursein]” such that the drama is the “Dionysian embodiment of
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Dionysian insights and effects [… .]” The Dionysian is here defined as the “expression of
nature” wherein the chorus “[shares] in [Dionysus’s] suffering” and thereby also “shares
something of his wisdom and proclaims the truth from the heart of the world.”587 This ground of
reality, suffering, is thus brought about through the illumination of the symbolic faculty that the
Dionysian excites. Through the communal ἔκστασις of the chorus, which, indeed, was originally
the sole element of tragedy, all of the participants, in a religious exaltation, in dance and song,
communally sacrificed themselves as part of the god himself, and it was this sacrifice that
allowed the κάθαρσις of consonance to be experienced.
Nietzsche writes, against the modern interpretation of tragedy:
Thus we use the experiences of the truly aesthetic listened to bring to mind the tragic
artist himself as he creates his figures like a fecund divinity of individuation (so his work
can hardly be called an “imitation of nature” [Nachahmung der Natur]) and as his vast
Dionysian impulse then devours his entire world of phenomena, in order to let us sense
beyond it, and through its destruction, the highest artistic primal joy [Urfreude], in the
bosom of the primordially One [Ur-Einen]. Of course, our aestheticians have nothing to
say about this return to the primordial home [Urheimat], or the fraternal union of the two
art-deities, nor of the excitement of the hearer which is Apollinian as well as Dionysian,
but they never tire of characterizing the struggle of the hero with fate, the triumph of the
moral world order, or the purgation of the emotions through tragedy, as the essence of the
tragic. And their indefatigability makes me think that perhaps they are not aesthetically
sensitive at all, but react merely as moral beings when listening to a tragedy.588
This passage contains Nietzsche’s rejection of the dialectic and of moralization as a way of
thinking tragedy and his embrace, or replacement thereof, by the idea of a return to a primordial
state by means of the unification of Apollo and Dionysus insofar as they are considered as vital
forces. Their combination, then, far from achieving an absolute “imitation” of Nature as origin
[Ursprung], requires instead a creation of a new Ur-dimension, one that extends to the depths of
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memory, though not to the beginning of time, which, indeed, never took place. He follows, in
this respect, in Goethe’s footsteps. The bard had said: “That a work of art should be perfect and
complete in itself is the eternal and essential requirement! Aristotle, who had before him the
height of perfection, was thinking of the effect? How absurd!”589 This is, of course, equally an
attack on Kant, who, in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, claims that there is no such thing as
a work of art in itself, and that, indeed, no judgement of the beautiful or sublime is ever made of
an object but that, rather, it is merely the effect such an artwork or object has on the judging
subject that is deemed “beautiful”—“sublime,” etc.
Against this idealist subjectivism, Goethe and Nietzsche after him, combat with force,
toward nothing other than a new metaphysics that shall destroy metaphysics proper—of the
aesthetic phenomenon as Urphänomen, in which, again, the distinction between subject and
object is obliterated along with, in tragedy, that between spectators and chorus. Yet over against a
German Idealist conception of the unification of subject and object in an absolute, a universal I
or eye, this musical destruction of the boundaries between collective subject and collective object
leads both chorus and spectators into a realm beyond both—a primordial Ur-sphere of melody
and rhythm—dance and song, where all perspective is plunged into oblivion. There is, further, an
agonal relation at work in this artistic Urphänomen, between the Dionysian and Apollinian forces
[Kräften], which carries a circular aspect, so that Dionysus and Apollo continually double and
redouble themselves, unite and disperse into an infinite competition—infinite ἀγών. Nietzsche
writes: “the public at an Attic tragedy found itself in the chorus of the orchestra, and there was at
bottom no opposition between the public and the chorus: everything is merely a great sublime
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chorus of dancing and singing satyrs or of those who permit themselves to be represented by
such satyrs.”590 The chorus of satyrs, in its “symbolism,” plays the role of “proclaim[ing] this
primordial relationship between the thing-in-itself and appearance [Urverhältniss zwischen Ding
an sich und Erscheinung],”591 in other words, between the primordial One and and its
appearances. The root that connects these two, however, that both unifies and separates them,
holds them in luminous identity, in tenebrous difference, and it is in this choral experience that
the circle of all life and movement comes back to itself as a transfigured space of origin. The
κάθαρσις that takes place in tragedy is not an effect, but rather a shared musical experience that
undergoes the collective sacrifice of individualities, of identity and homogeneity, and gives itself
over to the absolute heterogeneity of liberated souls, liberated beings, out of language, back to
the Ur.
As a result of his position against the German Idealist interpretation of tragedy, which
moralizes and follows in Aristotle’s footsteps, Nietzsche must account for the “aesthetic
pleasure” provided by the tragic myth “without transgressing into the region of pity, fear, or the
morally sublime.” Without a moral interpretation of the unbeautiful and monstrous in tragedy,
necessarily heavily marked by Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. In answer to the question:
“How can the ugly and the disharmonic, the content of the tragic myth, stimulate artistic
pleasure?” Nietzsche revives his “metaphysics of art” whose axiom is that “existence and the
world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.” Nietzsche continues: “In this sense, it is
precisely the tragic myth that must convince us that even the ugly and disharmonic are part of an
artistic game that the will in the eternal amplitude of its pleasure plays with itself. But this
590
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primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen] of Dionysian art is difficult to grasp, and there is only
one direct way to make it intelligible and grasp it immediately: through the wonderful
significance of musical dissonance. Quite generally, only music, placed beside the world, can
give us an idea of what is meant by the justification of the world as an aesthetic phenomenon.”592
Nietzsche’s metaphysics of art and of the artist entails the destruction of metaphysics. In a
fragment of 1872, he writes, here taking recourse to the scientific strain in Heraclitus,
Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus, all of whom affirmed the indestructibility of matter:
“How can anyone dare to speak of the objective of the earth! / In infinite time and space there are
no aims: what exists, exists eternally in one form or another. It is impossible to foresee what kind
of metaphysical world there ought to be. / Humanity must be able to stand without anything of
this sort to lean on—enormous task of the artist!” (KSA 7: 19 [139]).593 It is therefore the artists
task to serve this aesthetic, anti-moral metaphysics whose very task is to destroy the possibility
of metaphysics by proclaiming even the primordial to be a work of illusion. He must therefore
harness the rhythmic plastic force of life in order to bring about a new sphere of origin which
affirms itself as illusion—which proclaims the thing-in-itself to be nothing other than its own
auto-representation. And this must take place on the wide temporal plane of immanence which
has, in truth, neither an absolute beginning nor a goal—a tragic time, therefore, divested of all
teleology.
In Nietzsche’s genealogical study of rhythm, he writes of two modes of rhythmic life;
Zeitleben and Tonleben to which correspond quantitative rhythmics, which operate according to
time and qualitative rhythmics, which work by force and depend on stress. Accordingly, while
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the former is proper to lyric poetry, the latter finds its expression in speech and prose. After
making the claim that Zeitleben precedes Tonleben historically,594 Nietzsche reconsiders this
thesis and, complicating its supposition of linearity, posits a primordial agonal relationship
between these two lives of rhythm: “At the very earliest stage, struggle [Kampf] between Zeitand Tonleben (side by side [Nebeneinander.]) / Victory of Zeitleben over Tonleben / Decline of
Zeitleben and victory of Tonleben.”595 Originally, therefore, poetry and speech are inseparable, in
constant battle with one another, while at the other extreme the lyric dissolves again into vocality
through “its sheer profusion of polyrhythms [… .]”596 In their struggle, force serves as power that
shapes and organizes time into various rhythms. Nietzsche thus conceives that originally,
Tonleben is also temporal, such that rhythm itself can be viewed as “the shaping force of
temporal proportions.”597 In the proper measure, then, and in the proper dynamical agon, these
two temporal functions—that of time and that of force—constitute the rhythm of life, in a
manner analogous to that in which the Dionysian and the Apollinian must constantly combat in a
state of “perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations.”598
Whenever either Zeitleben or Tonleben is overvalued, and the other element of rhythm
denied or suppressed, as occurs in the wake of the primordial Kampf between them, idealism
ensues. And yet this idealism is strictly unavoidable for Nietzsche, and, indeed, structures his
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very study of rhythm. Porter writes: “Rhythm is an idealization of time, and what is equally
important […] the perception of rhythm is itself an idealization of what is perceived: rhythms
never obtain except ideally, because ‘two beats are never equivalent in a mathematically exact
way.’599”600 In the same instant at which a perception or a sensation is received, it is idealized
into rhythm—rhythm is formed, that is, in the same manner as which concepts are formed,
through an equalization of that which is fundamentally unequal. Hence idealization occurs, and
this is itself the rhythmic Urphänomen, the process by which the rhythm by which we live is
determined. It is therefore a matter of treating the genealogy of idealisms, the development of
one idealism out of another. Nietzsche writes: “the idealism of tonality and feeling [that is, of the
moderns], as against the idealism of space and light (appearance) of the Greeks.”601 In both of
these idealism, sensation, which, for Nietzsche, constitutes the sphere of the in-itself,
primordially enters into representation. Porter confirms that therefore: “There is no way of
avoiding ideality”—for Nietzsche writes explicitly that throughout history, in the case of both the
ancients and the moderns, “representation [Vorstellung] is already underway and at work.”602
Dissonance and consonance are two levels of rhythmic ideality, the former being closer to
the real, that is, to the immediate idealization of sensation, and the latter being more ideal,
because of its suppression of the supreme irrationality of rhythm. In a fragment of 1870,
Nietzsche writes: “One might think of the reality of dissonance [Realität der Dissonanz], as
opposed to the ideality of consonance [Idealität der Konsonanz]” (KSA 7:7 [116]).603 This
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fragment is a meditation on tragedy and accordingly views the real as suffering or pain—der
Schmerz. Denying the existence of “natural beauty,” Nietzsche asserts that, rather “there is the
disruptively ugly and a point of indifference [indifferenter Punkt].” He continues: “What is
productive, then, is the pain, which creates the beautiful as a related counter-color—out of that
point of indifference” (KSA 7:7 [116]). 604 The pain of which Nietzsche speaks is accordingly
that Dionysian dissonant suffering that underlies appearance, which springs forth in the
Apollinian ideality of consonance.
Dissonances were conceived by the ancient rhythmicists to be “irrational” rhythms,
falling into what Aristoxenus called the space “intermediate between two ratios that the senses
can recognize.”605 Dissonance thus defines the limits of sensation—it is the irrational substratum
of rhythm that renders possible the sensible or rational aspects of rhythm possible. Hence, the
experience of dissonance is the experience of the very boundaries of sensation—the “effect” of
such experiences is “often described as ‘ecstatic.’”606 In the rhythmic sense, then, ἔκστασις is the
experience of dissonance rising up to collide with sensation. Because, for Nietzsche, after
Aristoxenus, language and music are “discrepant mediums” insofar as they “represent the
intersection of time and a body,”607 the irrationality, the senselessness of rhythm, in song, speech
and dance, are necessary to the rationalization of rhythm, i.e., its idealization through the
representative faculty of sensation. There is a primal need for dissonance in every man, every
people, every culture, precisely so that sense can be rhythmically, biologically created. The
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contradictory impulses toward dissonance and consonance, constantly in conflict with one
another, constitute the rhythmic problem, the knot of the tragic in every human being.
Greek rhythm, thus, is kept alive precisely by a plenitude of dissonance. Thus consonant
metrons (metrical units) are interspersed with dissonant ones. Nietzsche defines the dactyl ( ̄ ̆ ̆ )
as precisely a dissonant metron, or alogia, of which he gives the following definition: “alogia is a
light dissonance in a beat that in other respects is regular.”608 The ratio between the long and the
two shorts is irrational, according to Nietzsche, but has been rationalized by rhythmic
conventions into the ratio 1:2. However, this ratio has “nothing to do with the mathematical
description of the way the dactyl comes out when spoken.”609 Nietzsche claims, moreover that:
“In itself, language can develop only the felt contrast of syllables that are long and short, not that
of 1 long = 2 shorts. A foot with three syllables will always be slightly different from one with
two. ̄ ̄ and ̄ ̆ ̆ will have been approximately equivalent in time, but their division was slightly
different.” This, then, shows the “[c]ontrast between mathematical facts and those of feeling.”610
Nietzsche associates quantitative rhythmics, which takes place temporally with the
Apollinian and qualitative rhythmics, brought about through vocality and dissonance, with the
Dionysian. He writes: “Originally (in citharodic music), the note functions as a measure of
time.”611 Hence prior to the arrival of Dionysus in Greece, Zeitleben is stronger than Tonleben in
musical rhythms—musical notes measure time, and are therefore consistent, symmetrical, and
occur at regular intervals.

After Dionysus arrived in Greece, irrationality—the force of
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Tonleben, along with ἔκστασις in dance and song, was introduced into Greek rhythm precisely as
a dissonant disruption of its temporally measured music. Once the “treaty of peace” between the
two warring gods had been formed, the “reconciliation” of the “two antagonists” Dionysus with
Apollo, brought about, 612 this primordial conflict between Zeitleben and Tonleben would have, in
this perspective, commenced, operating in a manner continuous with the ἀγών between the two
artistic gods. Nietzsche writes: “Establishment of the ancient [viz., classical (antiken)] symbolic.
The Dionysian innovations in tonality [or “key” (Tonart)], in rhythm [alogia?].”613 Since
harmony, according to this history, “was not drawn into the realm of the symbolic” for the the
Greeks,614 the Dionysian senselessness of force, colliding with the temporal measure of
Apollinian music was necessary precisely in order to lift rhythm into the realm of the symbolic—
it is thus that dissonance was lifted into ideality, as, precisely, the most basic level of
symbolization—hence, as a primordial phenomenon. Indeed, Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of
1870-1871: “The projection of illusion [S c h e i n s] is the artistic primal process [d e r k ü n s t
l e r i s c h e U r p r o z e ß]. / All that lives, lives on illusion” (KSA 7:7 [167]).615
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche elucidates this insight into the development of music
from the Apollinian to the Dionysian as the shift from the time-beat of quantitative rhythmics to
the dissonant and melodic Tonleben: “If music, as it would seem, had been known previously as
an Apollinian art, it was so, strictly speaking, only as the wave beat of rhythm, whose formative
power was developed for the representation of Apollinian states. The music of Apollo was Doric
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architectonics in tones, but in tones that were merely suggestive, such as those of the cithara. The
very element which forms the essence of Dionysian music (and hence of music in general) is
carefully excluded as un-Apollinian—namely, the emotional power of the tone, the uniform flow
of melody, and the utterly incomparable flow of harmony. In the Dionysian dithyramb man is
incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties [… .]”616 Thus, by the combination
of force and tone in rhythm, accomplished through the musical unification of Dionysus with
Apollo, rhythm was enriched by the dissonance and harmony of tonality, which, in turn, by
means of the ecstatic “annihilation of the veil of maya,” which delivered men back to nature,
brought symbolization into its highest form by extending rhythm to the body itself in dance: “the
entire symbolism of the body is here brought into play […] the whole pantomime of dancing,
forcing every member into rhythmic movement.”617 It is the arrival of Dionysus in tragedy,
therefore, that at once renders sense possible and reveals irrationality and dissonance as the
fundament, the primordial being of that sense. For, introducing qualitative rhythmics into Greek
culture, the Dionysian also presented, necessarily, the seed of the stress accent—the ictus—and
this, connected to the meaning of words, is called by Nietzsche a “logical accent”618 —therefore,
Porter writes: “stress and meaning go hand in hand.”619
The experience of consonance in tragedy, therefore, which, for Nietzsche, is cathartic is
an upsurge of timelessness and of the continuity of meaning and music in the movement of
becoming that characterizes the time of tragedy, which movement is indeed the embodiment of
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its tragic nature. Nietzsche writes the for the Greeks, through the power of their myths, “even the
immediate present had to appear to them right away sub specie aeterni [under the aspect of the
eternal] and in a certain sense as timeless.”620 This timelessness, this lifting up out of the terrors
of becoming, took place precisely as the unity experienced in division of self, the
dismemberment of individuality, as artistic ideality. It was by a profound experience of
Dionysian dissonance that this consonant Urphänomen could take place, and this, indeed, was
brought about by means of the tragic hero. For if the tragic hero is, at bottom, Dionysus himself,
and if his fate must replicate that of his primordial predecessor—the “dismembered god”—thus
undergoing, through resignation to Μοίρα the experience of “Dionysian suffering” by which the
god, “torn to pieces by the Titans” is transformed in what Hölderlin had called the excentric
sphere of the dead to be “worshipped in this state as Zagreus,”621 it is equally the case that the
Dionysian, at its extreme, passes over into the Apollinian, such that the hero is at once
individuated and idealized in the highest degree and lifted out of time. It is the function of the
tragic hero to bring about such timelessness, delivering itself and its world continually back in to
the stream of becoming, the stream of pain. In this perspective, Empedocles too becomes a figure
for Dionysus, the self-sacrificing hero who descends into the realm of the dead—the realm of the
Titans beneath Etna, where he is torn apart as a chthonic god, god of earth and underworld.
Nietzsche had struggled with the necessity of art to obtain this timeless quality, to serve
as a refuge from dissonant, tragic becoming in consonance. In a fragment of 1870, he writes:
“The tendency of art is to overcome dissonance”—it is by this power of overcoming that,
through “representation” a salvation from pain must take place: “A condition of painlessness
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must be created somewhere—but how?” (KSA 7:7 [117]).622 The response to the question that
Nietzsche poses to himself shall be, precisely, through the consonance achieved by art, out of the
pain of dissonance. Through the rhythmic transfiguration into the god Dionysus, the participants
of tragedy achieve this state of ideality born, precisely of suffering, and by which suffering is
presented as the ground of the world, as the Heraclitean one differing in itself that is originary.
For what is most primordial is precisely to suffer the “agonies of individuation” that Dionysus,
voluntarily submitting to his annihilation, undergoes. In another fragment, Nietzsche writes:
“Dissonance and consonance in music—we may say that a chord suffers through a false note.
The secret of pain must also rest in becoming. If every world of the moment is a new world,
where do sensation and pain come from?” (KSA 7:7 [165]).623 This fragment ends as follows:
“Pain, contradiction is the true being. Joy, harmony is illusion” (KSA 7:7 [165]).624 This
illusion, this highest ideality, however, is only possible as an upsurge out of the fundamental
dissonance of suffering and becoming—for it is precisely the purificatory function of suffering to
give birth to joy, which, in turn, presentification of suffering.
Nietzsche writes: “Tragedy with a chorus is born from a transfigured reality in which
men sing and move in a rhythmic manner; the tragedy without a chorus, from an empirical
reality where they speak and walk.”625 Tragic time is thus highly rhythmic—it is essentially the
excentric, temporal deployment of the power of self-transformation. Nietzsche’s rhythmics is
thus homeotic—rooting itself deeply in the body, it opens wide the possibility of biological
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transformation by means of the artistic presentation of the physiological primordial phenomena
of rhythm. It is precisely because the Dionysian impulse only appears through its selfsymbolization that it can be transformed by that symbolic expression—it is utterly historical,
subjected to the movements of becoming insofar as they externalize—idealize themselves
rhythmically. Therefore, consonance as the highest form of ideality is capable of transforming,
radically reversing the physiological Urphänomenen of the participants (spectators, players and
chorus members) of tragedy. Originally, indeed, the Dionysian was closest to life—it was a vital
impulse that exteriorized itself, mediated by the Apollinian, in the communally conjured image
of the god. Hence, as the entire throng took part in the suffering of Dionysus—became Dionysus,
driven outside of themselves in exaltation, they also shared in the joy—the affirmation of life
born of that suffering and, indeed, shared in the self-sacrifice of the god, going down into Hades
as a chthonic deity beyond individuation, embracing the terrors of being torn to shreds.
As the Apollinian gained in power in the historical development of drama—as the
principium individuationis took over more and more in the dramatic process, the Dionysian
instinct was progressively distanced and estranged from the Apollinian instinct toward plastic
ideality. The appearance of Dionysus himself on the stage marks the moment of rupture in
tragedy between “chorus,” wherein Dionysus was merely “imagined as present” and “drama,”
wherein he appeared as “the real stage hero”—it was at this point that the tragic hero, the saving
individual was conceived, as a mask for the god himself. Yet when the Apollinian comes into
play, which veils the reality of day in illusion such that a new dream-world arises, both more
lucid and more shadowy, which “presents itself to our eyes in continual rebirths” so that we are
no longer in that monstrous, profound, natural world of Dionysus. “The Apollinian appearances
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in which Dionysus objectified himself are no longer ‘an eternal sea, changeful strife, a glowing
life,’626 like the music of the chorus, no longer those forces [Kräften], merely felt and not
condensed into images, in which the enraptured servant senses the nearness of the god”—the
epic aspect overtakes the lyric, and we are lifted out of drunkenness, into dream. In accordance
with this change in tragic drama, the hero took on the function of embodying Dionysus and the
Dionysian, so that it became his task to bring about the tragic transformation, the deliverance,
from the point of ideal consonance, into a transfigured dissonance of becoming—a new world,
differently rhtyhmed, by means of his self-sacrifice. The Dionysian instinct to self-sacrifice was
thus individuated, no longer belonging to the multitude, to the entire community of choral
tragedy which in divine ekstasis created itself as the work of art rising into consonance out of
dissonance, saving itself by the liberation of the world that the image of Dionysus brought about,
but rather limited, in the epic fashion, to the singular and lonely tragic hero.
In his letter on Hölderlin of 1861, Nietzsche had also written of the poignant dissonance
peculiar to the poet’s Hyperion. Accusing his “friend” of his ignorance of the genius of
Hölderlin’s work apart from his “accomplished Greek meters,”—to which Nietzsche responds:
“Accomplished Greek meters! My God! Is that all the praise you can offer?”627 —he expounds
the supreme musicality of the poet’s novel: “Also you do not know Hyperion, in which the
harmonious movement of his prose, the sublimity and beauty of the characters, made upon me an
impression like that of the wave beat of a troubled sea. Indeed, this prose is music, soft melting
sounds interrupted by painful dissonances, finally expiring in dark mysterious funeral songs.”628
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Here, Nietzsche calls attention to the very excentric tragic path that Hyperion describes, yet on a
minute scale—the very rhythm of Hölderlin’s poetic prose, he suggests, is excentric, beginning in
ideal, sublime harmonies (as the universal harmony with nature of which Hyperion dreams) and,
descending through interruptive “painful dissonances,” ending tragically far outside the
primordial sphere of originary love, in drawn-out mourning-songs—funerary hymns.

Nietzsche’s Tragic Philosophers
The connection between the flight of the gods and the tragic hero was made by Nietzsche
as well as Hölderlin. A fragment from 1870 contains the following lines:
Der große Pan ist todt. Untergang der Götter.
Der tragische Mensch—Empedocles.
The great Pan is dead. Downgoing of the gods.
The tragic man—Empedocles (KSA 7:7 [15]).
For Nietzsche, Empedocles is indeed the tragic man par excellence. He is, moreover, an analog,
a figure of the philosopher himself, caught between a metaphysics inherited from Heraclitus and
Schopenhauer and a materialism determined through Democritus and Lange. He characterizes
Empedocles, this singular pre-Platonic philosopher as the supreme agonal man, in whom the
transition from myth to science takes place in the history of this early development of
philosophy. Empedocles is thus the man in whom the mythic and scientific impulses, which are
constantly battling in Nietzsche’s own thought, are most potently alive, coming together through
φιλία and and dividing through νεῖκος in an eternal movement of becoming that, eventually,
necessitates this hero’s Untergang—his boundless unification and separation with the
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disappearing god. Indeed, for Nietzsche, Empedocles is the personification of the ἀγών in a
multitude of ways. In the notes toward his courses on the Pre-Platonic philosophers, he writes:
Empedocles continually stands on this boundary line, […] and in almost all matters
Empedocles is such a boundary-line figure. He hovers between poet and rhetorician,
between god and man, between scientific man and artist, between statesman and priest,
between Pythagoras and Democritus. He is the motliest figure of older philosophy; he
demarcates the age of myth, tragedy, and orgiasticism yet at the same time there appears
in him the new Greek, as democratic statesman, orator, enlightened figure, allegorist, and
scientific human being. In him the two periods wrestle with each other; he is a man of
competition [an agonal man, a man of the ἀγών] through and through. 629
This is, indeed, the more profound reason for which Empedocles becomes a figure of Nietzsche
as a tragic philosopher, a “philosopher of tragic knowledge” who experiences the tragedy of his
time, who “senses it to be tragic that the ground of metaphysics has been cut away and can never
be satisfied by the colorful kaleidoscope of the sciences” (KSA 7: 19 [35]).630 As this tragic
philosopher sought after the proper measure of the revival of myth to the importance of science,
trying ceaselessly to reconcile, or infinitely approximate these elements to one another, it was the
fact that the gods had gone down that brought about the necessity of a new religion, a new
science for the revitalization of his nation and his time. He is the first philosopher to experience
tragedy in the sense considered to be modern by both Nietzsche and Hölderlin: in the wake of the
god’s disappearance. In the section of Ecce Homo on The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche would call
himself “the first tragic philosopher”—the strongest warrior against the “pessimistic
philosopher,” precisely because of his ability to affirm life in the absence of any metaphysical
ground. “Before me,” he writes, “this transposition of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos
did not exist: tragic wisdom was lacking [… .]” He claims to have found a possible predecessor
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in this regard only “in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and
better than anywhere else.” He continues by enumerating the aspects of the Heraclitean
philosophy that inspired his own tragic philosophy: “The affirmation of passing away and
destroying, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and
war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of being—all this is clearly
more closely related to me than anything else to date.”631 In a fragment of 1870, we find the
following: “The ancient philosophers, the Eleatics Heraclitus Empedocles as tragic philosophers
[als die t r a g i s c h e n Philosophen]” (KSA 7:5 [94]).
Yet it was precisely by the pessimism of Empedocles that the young Nietzsche defined
him as a tragic philosopher—as one whose pessimism did not become a nihilism, but was, rather,
capable of strongly affirming life and which, rather than leading to asceticism, resulted in action:
“[Empedocles] is the tragic philosopher, the contemporary of Aeschylus. The most unique thing
about him is his extraordinary pessimism, which works on him actively, however, not
quietistically.” The “fundamental idea” of Empedocles’ political view was “to lead humanity
across to the universal friendship (κοινὰ τῶν φíλων) of the Pythagoreans and thus to social
reform with a dissolution of private property; he moves about as a wandering prophet after he
failed to found the rule by all (Allherrschaft) from love in Agrigentum.”632 Nietzsche also writes
that Empedocles was a great champion of “‘equality in politics’ [ἰσότητα πολιτικὴν ἀσκεῖν]”633
and, with the use of his tremendous resources, attempted a redistribution of wealth in
Agrigentum by providing dowries for poverty-stricken young women. Empedocles’ success was
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so great that he was “offered a kingdom (βασιλεíα), which he declined.”634 Instead, he left
Agrigentum to wander as a self-proclaimed god, healer, prophet, and magician. Thus the political
failure of Empedocles to put kingship to death and effect the deliverance from monarchy to
communism, thus restoring the original, eternal love between all living things, and his
consequent exile from his fatherland for the blasphemy of declaring himself to be a god
determined his fate as a wanderer and, eventually, would necessitate his self-sacrifice in the hope
of thereby bringing about again that lost unity. Indeed, in Nietzsche’s view, by claiming to be a
god, Empedocles understood himself to be announcing a return to the equality and friendship
between all men.
According to Nietzsche, following the siege of Himera, Agrigentum became extremely
wealthy in riches and slaves, and Empedocles declared of it: “The Agrigentines live delicately as
if tomorrow they would die, but they build their houses well as if they thought they would live
forever.”635 The House of Gelon, king of Syracuse, then fell in Sicily, and Hieron became
Syracuse’s new ruler. Theron, the ruler of Agrigentum then died in 472 B.C.E. and his son
Thrasydaeus, already king of Himera, inherited the throne at Agrigentum from his father as well.
He quickly became a tyrant with “bloodthirsty and violent instincts,” built an army of twenty
thousand and besieged Sicily, after provoking its ruler, Hieron. From this act, “a monstrous
bloodbath [ensued, with] 2,000 slain on the side of the Syracusans and 4,000 on the side of the
Agrigentines—most of them Hellenes, according to Diodorus [11.53].” Thrasydaeus then fled to
Megara, in Greece, where he was sentenced to death, and Hieron banished many of his subjects.
The result of this great tumult was the establishment of a democratic government by the
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people of Agrigentum.636 Empedocles, for his part, was a passionate advocate of democracy.
Once the Senate of One Thousand had installed itself in Agrigentum, Empedocles made his “first
incursion into politics [and …] oratory” by “suppressing an attempt at tyranny.”637 Having been
invited to a dinner party of the magistrates (ἄρχοντες) of the thousand, he was driven to rage by
the absence of wine and demanded that it be supplied. “When he [the actual host, the senator]
arrived, he was made the ‘master of the revels’ (συµποσíαρχος) [and …] because resistance had
been fomented, this man commanded the ‘guests’ either to drink or to have it poured over their
heads.” Empedocles, understanding this order to be a manifestation of tyrannical intent, “remains
silent” at the time, but later “brings both of them before the court, and it sentences them to
death.”638 With his great oratorical skill and political power, Empedocles even succeeded in
dissolving the assembly of the thousand altogether. Nietzsche writes that with Empedocles
“arose rhetoric,” and indeed, “Aristotle […] describes him in the [lost] dialogue Sophist as the
‘inventor of rhetoric’ [πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινηκέναι].”639
The origin or mortals, Empedocles believes, is the punishment of “primal criminals: the
anger of the aether drives them into the sea, the sea spits them out onto the land, land tosses them
up into the flames of the sun, and there [push them] once more into the aether: thus one gathers
them from the other, yet each hates them. Eventually they appear to become mortal”—thus are
humans born of strife (νεῖκος).640 Nietzsche writes: “Mortals appear to him, accordingly, to be
fallen and punished gods! The earth is a dark cave, the unholy meadow (λειµὼν ἄτης)” ruled
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over by wicked fates. “He plunges into a pile of opposing daimons: Deris and Harmonia
[Discord and Harmony], Callisto and Aischre [Beauty and Ugliness], Thoosa and Denaie [Haste
and Tarrying], Nemertes and Asapheia [Truth and Obscurity], Physo and Phthimene (Nature and
Downfall), and so on.”641
Eduard Zeller, one of Nietzsche’s main sources for his work on the pre-Platonics,
pronounces this same paradox within Empedocles as follows: “With [his] system of natural
philosophy Empedocles made no attempt to reconcile scientifically his mystic doctrine (allied to
that of the Orphics and Pythagoreans) of the sinking down of souls into terrestrial existence, of
their transmigration into the bodies of plants, animals, and men, and of the subsequent return of
purified souls to the gods; nor his prohibition of animal sacrifices and of animal food.642 He did
not even try to explain away the contradiction between them, though it is evident that these
doctrines involve the conception that strife and opposition are the cause of all evil, and that unity
and harmony are supremely blessed.”643
Erwin Rohde, whose great Psyche would not appear until 1894, when Nietzsche had
already descended into madness, writes of Empedocles, too, as a man divided between
metaphysics and science: “Empedokles united in his own person to an astonishing degree the
most sober attempts at a study of nature that was scientific according to its lights, and quite
irrational beliefs and theological speculations. Occasionally the scientific impulse passes over to
influence even the world of his beliefs; but as a rule theology and natural science exist side by
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side in his mind quite independently.”644 Unlike Zeller, who insists on the irreconcilability of the
myth and science instincts in Empedocles, Rohde speaks of them as a dissonant unity, which
worked at the heart of his organism, now fighting with one another, now harmonizing together,
now passing over into one another, now separating into two individual forces. And perhaps
Rohde wrote of this tragic philosopher himself as, precisely, a mirror image of his long-loved
and lost friend Nietzsche. Perhaps the Odic force that bound them was not broken by Nietzsche’s
disappearance into madness but was strengthened through this tragic figure left behind by the
philosopher, which bound his fate inseparably to that of Hölderlin, through their common hero,
Emepedocles. One can hardly doubt the surety of Rohde’s homage to Nietzsche when one reads,
in his allusion to the miraculous death of Empedocles: “He must have made a profound
impression on the men among whom he lived, though he disappeared from their midst like a
comet.”645 Indeed, it was in Rohde’s company that Nietzsche first read the text of his book,
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, aloud to Richard and Cosima Wagner on the Easter
of 1873 at Bayreuth, the first section of which contains the figure of the philosopher as comet.
In a letter dated February 2, 1873, Friedrich Ritschl, the common mentor of the young
Nietzsche and the young Rohde, who was responsible for the former philologist’s position at the
university of Basel at the age of 24, wrote of Nietzsche in a manner nearly identical to that in
which Zeller, whom Nietzsche read, and Rohde, whose Psyche would come after him, wrote of
Empedocles: “It is strange how two souls can live right next to each other in the man
[Nietzsche]. On the one hand the strictest method of scientific research … on the other hand this
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fantastic excessive overly spiritual verging-on-incomprehensible Wagnerian-Schopenhauerian
artistic-mysterious-religious gushing!” (KSA 7: 15:46-47). 646
This complex combination of metaphysics and physics was, indeed, Nietzsche’s primary
interest in his lecture on Empedocles. He carefully delineates their limits and the points at which
they pass over into one another in the philosopher’s work. According to Nietzsche, the
“greatness” of Empedocles lay in the fact that he “prepared the conditions for rigorous atomism
[… .]” Thus he “[reduced] this power [Macht] of love and strife to a force [Kraft] lying inside
things” after which “Democritus found weight and shape sufficient.” Democritus could affirm,
after Empedocles’ doctrine of effluences, the existence of empty space, denied by Anaxagoras.
Empedocles rejects Anaxagoras in his “doctrine of effluences (ἀπρροαί) [which] presupposes an
empty space [… .]”647 In his theory of “chance forms,” according to Nietzsche, Empedocles is of
a “purely atomistic-materialistic viewpoint.”648 Yet love and strife exceed all measure, and thus
cannot be quantified; it is precisely because of this excessiveness and eternity of these universal
laws that Empedocles passes over into myth. Thus, at his most scientific, his doctrine reaches its
extreme metaphysical point. In a fragment of 1870-1871, Nietzsche writes of this phenomenon
as “the abrupt transformation of science into art every time its limits are reached” (KSA 7:7
[125]).649
The Empedoclean theory of effluences was based upon a view of love that was at once
quasi-mythical, universal, and profoundly rooted in the bodies of all living creatures. It was
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Empedocles’ belief that he lived in a fallen world and that earthly life was a punishment for a
primordial sin against eternal life. Empedocles is deeply “related to Pythagorean-Orphic
mysticism,” which is the main source of his metaphysical beliefs, “just as Anaxagoras is related
to Hellenic mythology. He [Empedocles] joins the religious instinct to scientific explanation and
broadens it in this scientific form. He is the one who enlightens and consequently remains
unloved among the faithful.”650 The great lucidity and power of the philosopher thus turned the
people of Agrigentum against him: “As a result he still takes over the entire collective world of
gods and demons, in whose reality he believes no less than in that of human beings. He even
feels himself to be an outcast god; he sighs about the pinnacle of honor from which he has fallen:
‘I wept and mourned when I discovered myself in this unfamiliar land’ [frag. 118]”—this foreign
land refers, precisely, to the human world.651
Nietzsche writes: “In the world of sorrow, of oppositions, [Empedocles] finds only one
principle that guarantees an entirely different order: he finds Aphrodite, known to all, but never
as a cosmic principle. [Empedocles, frag. 17, 20 ff.] The life of sexuality is the best, the noblest,
the greatest opposition against the drive toward divisions.”652 This allegorization of the sexual
“drive to sameness”653, referred to by Nietzsche as a Treib, extends both to the political realm,
where it represents “the cooperation of conflicting social classes for the sake of production”654
and to the domain of physics, in which the “mixture [of primal materials] becomes possible only
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when the part[icles] of one body enter the spatial intervals between the part[icles] of the other”
while “with complete mixing, there exists fundamentally only a mass of particles [Teilchen].”
Under this universal law of penetration, “[t]he more thoroughly the pores of one body
correspond to the effluences and particles of the other, the more capacity it will have for mixture
therewith; thus […] like seeks out like; whatever does not allow mixing is alien.”655
“The conclusion is this: love alone is thought to be active, such that, after absolute separation,
everything rests once more. Thus both must struggle with each other.”656 This struggle between
Love and Strife is absolutely necessary to life itself. “Here he touches on Heraclitus’s
glorification of war as the father of all things. Yet if we conceive their forces as equal and
instantaneously effective, then once again motion does not arise. Periodic cycles must alternate
[in] predominance.”657
In general, Nietzsche affirms that Empedocles surpassed Anaxagoras and “discovered all
the foundational conceptions of atomism—that is, the fundamental hypothesis of the scientific
view of nature of the ancients [… .]”658 However, on one point, he does not “overcome” his
predecessor: namely, “his principles of love and strife in order to eliminate the dualism
concerning motion. […] If all motion is reduced to the workings of incomprehensible forces,
then science basically dissolves into magic.”659
Nietzsche follows Hölderlin’s definition of the tragic as the monstrous transgression of
divinity by the human—Empedocles is, then, the embodiment of tragedy. Nietzsche writes of
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him: “What he says in general is true of himself: ‘In the course of time there come to earth
certain men who are prophets, bards, physicians, and princes; such men rise up as gods, extolled
in honor.’ This was his belief: he has already crossed over to divinity. […] He is a seer, poet,
doctor, and prince (a general term, not τύραννος); now, since his wandering, he is also ‘god, no
more a mortal.’ [θεóςµ οὐκέτι θνητóς (Empedocles, frag. 112, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives, bk. 8,
sect.

62).] Well now, how does he cross over to ‘sharing hearth and table with the other

immortals, freed from human woes and human trials?’ [v. 387-388, Empedocles, fragment 147]
He plunges into [Mt.] [E]tna because he wants to confirm himself as a god; the immediately
preceding event was either the worship of the Selinuntines or the healing of Panthea, a woman of
Agrigentum.”660 Nietzsche also gives other accounts of Empedocles’ death: that of Timaeus,
according to which he “never returned from the Peloponese”661 and that of Neanthes, according
to which, he broke his thigh at a festival in Messana and died from it. Nietzsche then conjectures:
“The legend of the faithful portrays him disappearing; that of the ironic portrays him plunging
into [E]tna; that of the pragmatists portrays him breaking a thigh and being buried in Megara.”662
Nietzsche’s notion of breath as the universal element that binds us together, as the
rhythmic and inconstant measure of all life is a very ancient one: it is an idea common to
Heraclitus and Empedocles. In Nietzsche’s discussion of the transition from Anaximander to
Heraclitus with regard to physics, he writes that Heraclitus, replaced Thales’ and Anaximander’s
primal element of water with that of fire precisely because because of the warmth of universal
breath. Anaximander had defined heat and cold as the “preliminary stages of water,” which
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Thales had declared to be first element, which afterwards transforms into the other elements,
while Heraclitus, in turn, “re-interprets the Anaximandrian warm as warm breath, dry vapor, in
other words, as fire. Of this fire he now says what Thales and Anaximander had said of water;
that it coursed in countless transformations through the orbits of becoming; above all, in its three
major occurrences as warmth, moisture and solidity.”663
Nietzsche writes: “Empedocles’ entire pathos comes back to this one point, that all living
things are one; in this respect the gods, human beings, and animals are all one.”664 To this
declaration, Nietzsche appends, in a footnote, a quotation of Goethe: “And so every creature is
only a tone, a shading of a grand harmony, which must be studied in large and whole, otherwise
every individual is a lost character.”665 Nietzsche continues: “Sextus Empiricus”—through whom
Empedocles’ poems survive—“is quite explicit that breath (ἓν πνεῦµα) is the soul of the entire
world, which relates us to the animals as well. […] [Empedocles’] life’s mission is presented as
being to make good once more what had been worsened by strife (νεῖκος), to proclaim and even
to aid the ides of oneness in love inside the world of strife wherever he finds sorrow, the result of
strife. Heavily he plods through this world of agony, of oppositions: the fact that he is within it
may be explained only as a transgression: in some time or another, a crime, a murder, a perjury,
must have transpired. Existence in such a world punishes a guilt.”666 The world of Empedocles is
thus a fallen one precisely because the eternal breath that binds together nature and man in love
has been shattered and rendered discontinuous by strife. Becoming is the punishment for this
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transgression against love. Thus the path of man is indeed an excentric one: exiled from the
universal, equal harmony of nature, which is timeless in its unity, he is condemned to suffer the
dissonance of time itself, and of a time that offers no promise of salvation, no exit from the curse
of strife but temporary sojourns in human love.
In a fragment of 1870, we find the following: “The ancient philosophers, the Eleatics
Heraclitus Empedocles as tragic philosophers [als die t r a g i s c h e n Philosophen]” (KSA 7:5
[94]). Heraclitus and Empedocles are tragic philosophers precisely because they are the thinkers
of becoming, of time as the dimension to which men are condemned. In Philosophy in the Tragic
Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche speaks through Heraclitus as follows: “‘“Becoming [Das Werden]’”
is what I contemplate,’ he exclaims, ‘and no one else has watched so attentively this everlasting
wavebeat and rhythm [ewigen Wellenschlage und Rhythmus] of things.’”667 And this is because
Heraclitus denied the eternal ἄπειρον of Anaximander, the metaphysical substratum of existence,
which Nietzsche aligns with the Kantian thing-in-itself. Heraclitus, rather “no longer
distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an
undefinable ‘indefinite!’And after this first step, nothing could hold him back from a second, far
bolder negation: he altogether denied being. For this one world which he retained—supported by
eternal unwritten laws, flowing upward and downward in brazen rhythmic beat [Schlage des
Rhythmus]—nowhere shows a tarrying, an indestructibility, a bulwark in the stream.’”668 Thus
the indefinite, the eternal realm of Being is replaced, in Nietzsche’s vision of Heraclitus, by an
ever-changing musical rhythm, the laws of which remain concealed from men through language.
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In this work, destined to be read by Wagner, Nietzsche thus aligns Heraclitus with
Schopenhauer, and the cosmic rhythm with the will to live. He calls Heraclitus an intuitive
philosopher who “embraces” two things: “one, the present many-colored and changing world
that crowds in upon us in all our experiences, and two, the conditions which alone make any
experience of this world possible: time and space.”669 He thus presents time and space for
Heraclitus as the structures of intuition. The category of causality, as well as the forms of time
and space had been retained from Kant by Schopenhauer as the necessary preconditions and
structures of all experience, yet Schopenhauer, unlike Kant, characterized this causal and
spatiotemporal intuition as the principle of sufficient reason, also called the principium
individuationis, which, in turn, he aligned with space and time. Nietzsche thus defines
Heraclitean becoming by a parallel with Schopenhauer: “As Heraclitus sees time, so does
Schopenhauer. He repeatedly said of it that every moment in it exists only insofar as it has just
consumed the preceding one, its father, and is then immediately consumed likewise. And that
past and future are as perishable as any dream, but that the presence is but the dimensionless and
durationless borderline between the two.”670 This Heraclitean-Schophenhauerean conception of
time and space, however, differs from that of Kant in that it views them as absolutely relative,
existing only by means of actions: “everything which coexists in space and time has but a
relative existence […] whoever finds himself directly looking at it must at once move on to the
Heraclitan conclusion and say that the whole nature of reality [Wirklichkeit] lies simply in its acts
[Wirken] and that for it there exists no other sort of being.”671 Nietzsche then quotes
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Schopehnauer as saying: “Only by way of its acts does [reality] fill space and time. […] Cause
and effect [Wirkung] in other words make out the whole nature of materiality: its being is its
activity. Actuality [Wirklichkeit] therefore is completely relative, in accordance with a
relationship that is valid only within its bounds, exactly as is time, exactly as is space.”672 Space
and time are thus viewed, by Schopenhauer, as being on the same plane; as being equal
phenomena whose “union,” in Nietzsche’s words, is effected “by means of causality [… .]”673
Nietzsche speaks of the life-affirming pessimism of Heraclitus, for it is the eternal
“strife” between opposites that gives rise to becoming itself, “and it is just in the strife that
eternal justice is revealed.”674 The thought of pure becoming, however, as the eternal movement
of the world, without an origin or goal, is a tragic, and hence terrifying one: “The everlasting and
exclusive coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly acts and
comes-to-be but never is, as Heraclitus teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought.”675 Nietzsche,
aligning himself with this philosopher, with this “wonderful idea”676 proposes the profound
embrace of this tragic temporality; an affirmation of its supreme untimeliness; for him, life
requires the profound acceptance of the excentric path of man in this inconstant temporality.
Moreover, it is thus against Hölderlin that he opens the possibility for this embrace of the tragic
in time. For, in Hölderlin’s view, it is the striving for eternity, for a salvation from this time that
renders it bearable. The promise of intellectual intuition as a state that is more than temporary
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remains a myth on the horizon of our lives for him, and in its absence, that unity with the god
must be mourned. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, as for Heraclitus, life itself is nothing but this
temporal movement, and it is this that we must affirm with the birth of each new moment and the
sacrifice of the last.
History, like time, for Nietzsche, as for Hölderlin and Heraclitus, is in its deepest reaches
discontinuous. Hence is the self, too, discontinuous; it is not a solid body persisting in space, but
an entity that is not, that, rather, becomes, a manifestation of forces in eternal strife and
competition with one another. The greatest advances from Anaximander to Heraclitus, according
to Nietzsche, were the absolute denial of the ἄπειρον (which he equates, at turns, with both the
Kantian thing-in-itself and the Schopenhauerian will) and the determination of becoming as
justice, rather than as injustice. For according to Anaximander, in Nietzsche’s words: “Becoming
is an injustice and is to be atoned for with Passing Away (φθορά).” Thus all time was at once a
result and a punishment for the disunity with the qualityless one, eternal Being.677 Yet this eternal
transformation, this flux of strife in all that becomes, was conceived by Schopenhauer, as for
Anaximander, not as a movement to be affirmed, but as a frightening truth, an occasion for
pessimism. Nietzsche verifies that “strife for Schopenhauer is a proof of the internal selfdissociation of the Will to Live, which is seen as a self-consuming, menacing and gloomy drive,
a thoroughly frightful and by no means blessed phenomenon.” Moreover, the sphere of becoming
is for Schopenhauer that of “persistent matter,” which “must change its form” constantly,
“[f]orever and ever” by means of “causality [… .]”678 This then, is precisely that spatial domain
of persistence of which Heraclitus utterly denies the existence. With Heraclitus, then, against
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Anaximander and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche embraces this becoming on the temporal plane
against a spatial model of becoming as that which must be affirmed in the service of life; it is an
overturning of the pessimism of this fear of history, an embrace of the ἀγών which, like history
itself, defies all causality: “[Heraclitus’] idea of war-justice (Πóλεµος-δíκη) is the first
specifically Hellenic idea in philosophy [… .]”679
Heraclitus’ central, paradoxical idea, is that: “The one is the many.” Nietzsche carefully
explains that this is not a separation of the world onto a phenomenal and noumenal plan, but that,
rather, it is a cosmic game, a movement ruled by chance. “‘The world is the game Zeus plays,’
or, expressed more concretely, ‘of the fire with itself. This is the only sense in which the one is at
the same time the many.’”680 Referring to Heraclitus’ fragment: “Time (αἰών) is a child playing
dice: royalty of a child,” Nietzsche writes: “as children and artists play, so plays the ever-living
fire. It constructs and destroys, all in innocence. Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself.
Transforming itself into water and earth, it builds towers of sand like a child at the seashore, piles
them up and tramples them down. From time to time it starts the game anew. An instant of satiety
—and again it is seized by its need, as the artist is seized by his need to create.”681 The
connection of the Heraclitean metaphor of the child for the αἰών with the artist, is Nietzsche’s
doing, both for the benefit of Wagner and in accordance with his own epistemology, which is
based on the human as fundamentally artistic, such that, in the creation of concepts, there is a
“twofold artistic power [künstlerische Kraft], the power that generates images and the power that
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selects among them” (KSA 7: 19 [79]). 682 The homogenizing force [Kraft] of the intellect, that
one which “allows us to perceive the major features of a mirror image with greater intensity” and
the other force that “stresses similarity in rhythm despite actual imprecision” is, of necessity, a
“K u n s tkraft” (KSA 7: 19 [67]).683 Science, from this perspective, is a mystification, a
systematic concealment of this primordial artistic force.
Hence Nietzsche writes of Heraclitus: “Only aesthetic man can look thus at the world, a
man who has experienced in artists and in the birth of art objects how the struggle of the many
can yet carry rules and laws inherent in itself, how the artist stands contemplatively above and at
the same time actively within his work, how necessity and random play, oppositional tension and
harmony, must pair to create a work of art.”684 It is on the grounds of this interpretation that
Nietzsche determines Heraclitus as an immoralist; herein lies the affirmative power of this prePlatonic philosopher: “But if we press upon Heraclitus the question why fire is not always fire,
why it is sometimes water and sometimes earth, he could only say, ‘It is a game. Don't take it so
pathetically and—above all—don't make morality of it!’”685
Time, then, is a game of chance—the cosmic child ruling over the universe, who plays the
song of destiny governed by unknowable rules. The rhythm which makes us live is thus multiple,
transforming at every moment, brought about through the caprices of a destroying and creating
child. Following Heraclitus, whose view of the cosmos was, according to Nietzsche, entirely
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aesthetic in the sense that the world was for him a great work of art, he writes in a fragment:
“Return to the Hellenic conception: art as physis” (KSA 7: 19 [290]).686
Yet in his lectures on the pre-Platonic philosophers, Nietzsche speaks neither of
Schopenhauer nor of the laws of time and of space as equal. He conceives becoming, rather, in
temporal terms: “[Heraclitus] knows only Becoming, the flowing. He considers belief in
something persistent as error and foolishness. To this he adds this thought: that which becomes is
one thing in eternal transformation, and the law of this eternal transformation, the Logos in all
things, is precisely this One, fire (τò πῦρ). Thus, the one overall Becoming is itself law [… .]”687
Thus, because πάντα ῥεῖ, space in the absolute is utterly impossible, as, indeed, is time.
Nietzsche writes of Heraclitus’ doctrine of becoming: “Nature is just as infinite inwardly as it is
outwardly: we have succeeded up to the cell and the the parts of the cell, yet there are no limits
where we could say here is the last divisible point. Becoming never ceases at the indefinitely
small. Yet at the greatest [level] nothing absolutely inalterable exists. Our earthly world must
eventually perish for inexorable reasons. The heat of the sun cannot last eternally.”688 He then
quotes Hermann von Helmholtz’s essay “On the Interaction of the Natural Forces,” in his
explanation of the ever-decreasing speed of “rotation of the planets” resulting from that “every
tide, although with infinite slowness still with certainty diminishes the stores of mechanical force
of the system [… .]” Hence, Helmholtz concludes that “we must not speak of our astronomical
time in an absolute sense.”689 Nietzsche attributes to Heraclitus an “intuitive perception” of such
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a cosmological theory, based on his denial of Being and his embrace of the ever-changing, of
Becoming.
Nietzsche develops, moreover, against Kant and Schopenhauer, and by a return to
Hume’s empiricism—indeed, by forging an invisible bridge to that genius against whom critical
and idealist philosophy had defined themselves—his own theory of causality and its
epistemological genesis. He writes, in a fragment of 1872: “Space and time are dependent upon
the sensation of causality” (KSA 7: 19 [161]).690 Causality, however, like all words and concepts,
is a surface-phenomenon, a metaphor, existing only in the mind of the subject, and based on the
interpretation of sensations that links forces to results, or to external events. For Nietzsche
describes the process by which concepts are formed as follows: “every word immediately
becomes a concept precisely because it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique,
entirely individualized primal experience [Urerlebniss] to which it owes its existence, but
because it has to fit at one and the same time countless more or less similar cases which, strictly
speaking, are never equal, or, in other words, are always unequal. Every concept comes into
being through the equation of non-equal things.”691 And again, in his championing of sensation
as the ground of experience, he writes: “The eye provides structures. We cling to the surface.
[…] Lack of logic, but metaphors” (KSA 7: 19 [225]).692 The principle of causality is the
inference of an agent from an action, as its originary cause, and hence the deduction of
succession. This movement comes to play in the formation of knowledge, that is, in the buildingup of metaphors out of actions that take place in the sphere of external experience. Nietzsche
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writes: “A sensed stimulus and a glance at a movement, linked together, initially produce
causality as an empirical principle: two things—namely, a specific sensation and a specific visual
image—always appear together: the belief that the one is the cause of the other is a metaphor,
adopted from will and act: an analogical inference” (KSA 7: 19 [209]).693 Causality is thus of the
order of faith—it is a spatiotemporal metaphysical concept that obscures the reality of actions
and, moreover, of the forces of which they are the manifestation. By means of an inference of
causality and the exercise of this law on the world, an action is performed and attributed to the
will such that the “animal” is established as “a creature that wills” and this is called “its essence.”
Thus nouns, or agents, are deduced from verbs, or actions, as be their sources. This, then, is how
knowledge proceeds:
From quality to act: one of our characteristics leads to action: whereas in reality
what happens is that we infer characteristics because we observe actions of a particular
sort.
Thus: the action comes first; we connect it with a characteristic.
First the word for an action arises, from it is derived the word for the quality. This
relationship transferred onto all things is causality.
First “seeing,” then “sight.” The one who “sees” is taken to be the cause of
“seeing.” Between the sense and its function we experience a regulated relationship:
causality is the transfer of this relationship (of sense to sensory function) onto all things.
It is a primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen]: to associate with the eye the
stimulus sensed by the eye, that is, to associate a sensory impression with the sensory
organ. Of course, only the stimulus is given in itself: to sense this to be an action on the
part of the eye and call it “seeing” is to draw a causal inference. […] The inner
connection of stimulus and activity transferred onto all things. […] The eye acts upon a
stimulus: that is, it sees. We explain the world on the basis of our sensory functions:
which means, we presuppose a causality everywhere because we ourselves are constantly
experiencing changes of this sort.
KSA 7: 19 [209]694
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There are thus only actions. The force behind them, which brings them into being, is merely
inferred, in a metaphorical veiling gesture, and is thus a matter of illusion, always to be
recreated. All thought depends on the sensory Urphänomen that consist of conceptually claiming
the will as the origin [Ursprung] of a stimulus. Yet this Urphänomen is itself an action: the eye
must act upon action (stimulus) and assert itself to be its author in order for sensation to form
itself as the ground of all experience, of all action. It is for this reason that living creatures
artistically create their primordial aesthetic existence—it is thus that life creates life causally as
an illusory phenomenon. The intellect depends for its scientific, analytic and synthetic being on
its own power [Kraft] to create life as an aesthetic phenomenon. In another fragment, Nietzsche
says that: “Misapprehension is the primordial phenomenon [Urphänomen]” because it is the
exigency of language to collapse the differences between things. The intellect works by
“[i]dentifying similar thing with similar thing—discovering some similarity or other in one thing
and another thing is the primordial procedure. Memory thrives on this activity and constantly
practices it” (KSA 7: 19 [217]).695 This misapprehension, for its part, “presupposes the
perception of structures. The image in our eye is decisive for knowledge, them the rhythm in our
ear. We would never arrive at a conception of time based solely on the eye; never arrive at a
conception of space based solely on the ear. The sensation of causality corresponds to the sense
of touch.” Sounds and images arise in an interior manner, from which an external world is
deduced by an illogical “leap.” In accordance with this anthropological theory of causality,
Nietzsche writes: “The human being is acquainted with the world to the extent that he is
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acquainted with himself: that is, its profundity is disclosed to him to the extent that he is amazed
at himself and his own complexity” (KSA 7: 19 [118]).696
In this proposition, thus, Nietzsche returns to Hume’s theory of causality, according to
which all necessary connections between phenomena are purely constructed, inferred from
observation and projected onto the world as laws. Hume asserts that “[t]here are no ideas, which
occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy, or
necessary connexion [… .]”697 On empiricist grounds, he establishes a theoretical structure for
these concepts, so mysterious precisely because of the obscure relationship between inherent
force, or will and appearance or action. Hume thus proposes that “all our ideas are nothing but
copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing,
which we have not antecedently felt, either by out external or internal senses.”698 Necessity is
hence an entirely subjective concept, deduced from the only true realm of reality—sensation—
and employed to explain the mysteries of external phenomena in their connection to internal or
otherwise hidden forces: “The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object
follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force, which actuates the whole
machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities
of the body.”699 The repetition of the experience construed as that of causality insures its
apparent validity as an external process. The homogenizing power of such a concept thus permits
it a pretension to universality in the consensus of its regulative use: “Our idea […] of necessity
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and causation arises entirely from the uniformity, observable in operations of nature; where
similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer
the one from the appearance of the other. There two circumstances form the whole of that
necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and
their consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity, or
connexion.”700 It is as a physiologist that Nietzsche returns to Hume, the philosopher whose
thought famously awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber and inspired him to surpass his
empiricist predecessor by the foundation of a universal and infallible metaphysics, by
“abolishing knowledge to make room for faith.” It is in his inversion, his overturning of this
metaphysics that Nietzsche’s consideration of causality, as well as of time and space, returns to
Hume, perhaps a genius whose thought was not comprehensible in his time. Past the invisible
bridge that Nietzsche between the great empiricist and himself lie those to Democritus, to
Empedocles and to Heraclitus.
For Nietzsche, knowledge begins with the sacrifice of things themselves, and of thingsin-themselves, and ends with self-sacrifice for the creation of culture—the philosopherphilologist must begin by sacrificing the world onto which he projects his image, and to end by
sacrificing himself, thus his knowledge, from the very core of its creation. This sacrifice, which
doubles and triples and multiplies itself ad infinitum across history, across time and becoming,
must take place in the sphere of the tragic, as a work of art—for the philosopher’s task is to
harness the force [Kraft] of illusion present in all humans in order to create monstrous life by
reopening the chasm of the primordial.
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In another fragment of 1870, Nietzsche poses a question: “What form of knowledge does
art justify?” to which he replies: “The tragic science [die t r a g i s c h e Wissenschaft], which
plunges like Empedocles into Etna” (KSA 7:7 [101]). This tragic science, then, is precisely that
of becoming—it is a thinking of the movement of time as the fundamental life-force.

The Tragic Rhythm of Becoming

My heart, my heart, (θυµέ, θυµ[έ]) confounded by
woes (κήδεσιν) beyond remedy, rise up and defend
yourself, setting your breast against your foes as
they lie in ambush and standing steadfastly near the
enemy. Do not exult openly in victory and in defeat
do not fall down lamenting at home, but let your
rejoicing in joyful times and your grief in bad times
be moderate. Know what sort of rhythm (ῥυθµός)
holds human beings.
Archilochus, frag. 128701
Nietzsche’s early writings contain a multitude of thoughts on rhythm, and a consideration
of rhythm as the internal dynamic of forces that makes life possible. Between 1870 and 1873, he
wrote a great deal on the subject of ancient rhythm, and, in the name of the “Philologist of the
Future,”702 regarded this field of investigation as that by which his philological project of
demonstrating the immeasurable breadth of the abyss separating the moderns from the ancients
could finally be accomplished. He defines rhythm as the essential component of the experience
of time, as the movement by which the most profound desires and drives surface. Hence rhythm
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defines, or circumscribes, the life of a man, a people, a culture, as the motion by which their
plastic force becomes manifest. Nietzsche had planned to write a book called “Prolegomena to a
Theory of Rhythmics in Antiquity,” of which two successive chapters were to be entitled
“Philosophy of Rhythm” and “Physiology of Rhythm.”703 This physiological account of rhythm
identifies the body as the locus of rhythmic life. Nietzsche writes, in his proposition of the
“physiological foundation and explanation of rhythm (and its power [Macht])” that: “The entire
body contains a countless number of rhythms,” thus, an innumerable quantity of modes of
experience.704 And further, that “physiologically, life is … a continuous rhythmical movement of
cells. The influence of rhythm seems to me to be an endlessly small modification of this
rhythmical movement.”705 This inherently biological nature of rhythm is, then, what renders
music, for Nietzsche, the most approximately universal element in tragic drama as, strictly
speaking, its tragic core. This then is a scientific re-thinking of the Schopenhauerian concept of
music as the absolutely universal representation of the will.
Nietzsche writes, in a fragment from 1870:
What does music do? It sets off contemplation in the will. It contains the general forms of
all conditions of desire: it is through and through symbolic of the drives, and as such
thoroughly comprehensible in its simplest forms (time signature [Takt], rhythm
[Rhythmus]) to everyone. It is thus always more general than any particular action:
therefore it is more comprehensible to us than any particular action: music is thus the key
to the drama.
KSA 7:7 [23]706
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Porter writes: “Takt, which covers ‘time,’ ‘measure,’ or ‘beat,’ but also ‘tact’ and feeling, derives
from the Latin tangere, ‘to touch,’ and Nietzsche never loses sight of this sensuous connotation
either.”707 The very heart, the very mechanism of rhythm is hence tied to sensation and therefore
to bodily drives.
For Nietzsche, rhythm is none other than the form that sensation—αἴσθησις (also
perception)—takes in the experience of time. It is the fundamental beat, the internal measure of
experience. Nietzsche thus determines music as “more universal than a single action” precisely
because its rhythms “represent [darstellend]” the various human “drives [Triebe]” (KSA 7:7
[23]). In 1871, Nietzsche writes in his notebook: “Rhythm [Takt] is to be understood as
something utterly fundamental, i.e., as the most primary sensation of time, as the very form of
time” (KSA 7:9 [116]).708 If Nietzsche claims that it is the task of music to “set off contemplation
in the will,” this will is, however, no longer that of Schopenhauer, for it is historically
determined, circumscribed by the bodies in which this “will” resides. Indeed, this will only exists
through its self-manifestation, its self-symbolization in music. Nietzsche thus refers to music as
the “most universal” element in drama, that is—it is universal only in a relative and not an
absolute sense, as in the case of Schopenhauer, for whom the “music” exhibits “the will itself”709
and this will is conceived as eternal, never becoming subject to the fluctuations of time and
history.
The philosopher as tragic hero is timeless—he is an island of respite from the ceaseless
hurricane of becoming. It is his task, precisely, to deliver his people from the Parmenidean myth
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of being into that very becoming; thus the attempt to deliver man into the perfect unity of lost
Nature necessarily fails, for such a unity is, in truth, a mere myth. Rather, the tragic hero must
ascend out of the torrent of becoming that strives toward unity precisely in order to bring about
the revelation of that becoming—in order to unveil to a people the true nature of time; that it is
without origin and without telos, but rather that it is the self-manifestation of bodies, which exist
without being bound per se by temporal or spatial laws, since these laws are its own production
—this time is, rather, constant flux. Nietzsche writes, in a fragment:
Sensation is the only cardinal fact with which we are acquainted, the only true quality. All
the laws of nature can be reduced to laws of motion: wholly without substance. Once this
is accomplished, the only thing we have established are the laws of sensation. Nothing at
all is thereby gained for the “in itself.” […] Sensation cannot be explained on the basis of
something else, since there is nothing else at all.
KSA 7: 27 [37]710
Thus sensation is the only possible ground for experience, and this is itself entirely relative; it is
a meeting of internal and external forces whose origins remain obscure. It is through sensation
that the illusions of time and of space originate. Indeed, for Nietzsche, time and space, like
causality, are metaphors—they are hypotheses derived from sensation. It is Nietzsche’s ambition
to utterly disprove and abolish the ideality of these structures in their determination as
metaphysical prerequisites to experience by both Kant and Schopenhauer: “Time in itself is
nonsense: time exists only for the sensate creature. The same is true for space. / Every structure
appertains to the subject. It is the registering of surfaces by means of mirrors” (KSA 7: 19
[140]).711 And again: “Time, space, and causality are only epistemological metaphors with which
we explain things. […] Temporal coexistence produces the sensation of space. […] Sensation of
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space first derived by means of metaphor from the sensation of time—or vice versa? / Two
causalities coexisting with one another” (KSA 7: 19 [210]).712 In declaring this, Nietzsche
complies with Democritus’ idea of time as phenomenal, a posteriori and merely psychological.
Sextus Empiricus attests that for Democritus: “Time is an appearance [phantasma] resembling
day and night.”713 Thus it has no actuality, but is, rather, a simulacrum issuing from the motion of
bodies. In Epicurus, who owes his theory of time to Democritus, this notion of the non-reality of
time is further explicitated: “Since [time] depends for its existence on the bodies whose motion
etc. it measures, it certainly cannot exist per se.”714 Nietzsche’s conception of time as metaphor,
and hence as the transport of bodies which create themselves as such out of sensation, as the
movement by which they arrive into the daylight of reason, hence derives from Democritus. 715
According to Nietzsche, Democritus believed that “[o]ur senses show us qualitatively
determinant differences,”716 but that “in reality atoms and the void” alone exist.717 Nietzsche
draws the following conclusion: “All qualities are conventions (νóµῳ); the ὄντα differ only
quantitatively. Thus all qualities should be reduced to quantitative differentials. They
differentiate themselves solely through shape (ῥυσµός, σχῆµα), arrangement (διαθιγή, τάξις), and
position (τροπή, θέσις) [… .]”718 Following Democritus, Epicurus claims that the “apparent
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repose of the earth lies in the commonality of movement.” For Democritus, atoms arise and
circulate in “combinations that lawfully dissolve and reconfigure themselves anew,” moving in a
“circular motion” which is produced by the “unequal acceleration” of atoms, since if they were
all to fall “with the same velocity,” then the appearance of “absolute rest” would come about.719
Hence the speeds of different atoms must differ quantitatively in order for movement to be
possible, i.e., in order for time and the qualitative, phenomenal world to appear. James Porter
writes that Nietzsche’s task is to demonstrate and affirm “the principle that all quality is
reducible to relations and proportions of quantity […], which are in turn volitilized by some
dynamic factor (be it motion, force, or will).”720 Nietzsche thus determines music as “more
universal than a single action” precisely because its rhythms “represent [darstellend]” the various
human “drives [Triebe]” (KSA 7:7 [23]). In a fragment from the Winter of 1872-1873 on the
advancement past Anaxagoras’ atomism accomplished by Empedocles and Democritus,
Nietzsche identifies these drives with Democritean atoms, defined there as “forces.” The
ambition of this fragment is to point out the need, in physics, for the “smallest possible number
of forces” and thus of the fewest amount of laws or “presuppositions” from which the existing
world is deduced. He writes that the “first unnecessary hypothesis to fall is Anaxagoras’s Νοῦς,
for its assumption are much too complicated to explain something as simple as motion. After all,
it is only necessary to explain two forms of motion, the movement of one object toward another
and the movement of one object away from another” (KSA 7: 23 [30]).721 Atomism thus requires
simply the explanation of motion—and for this, no all-encompassing metaphysical concept is
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necessary. The quantitative movement of atoms through empty space is circular. Nietzsche, as
we shall soon see, undertakes in 1873 to explain motion on an entirely temporal basis, entirely
subtracting space from this phenomenon. The goal of such an endeavor is to draw forth the
ancient perception of time, to return us to the body as a temporal phenomenon.
Aristoxenus, accordingly, and the other post-Democritean rhythmicists, viewed rhythm as
divided into temporal, rhythmic “atoms.” Democritus’ atomism, according to which only empty
space and atoms, the smallest constituent elements of matter, exist, was thus translated into
temporal terms in chronoi. Quoting Aristoxenus, Porter writes: “‘The first duration[s] that can be
grasped by perception,’ chronoi are the minima of rhythmical synthesis, or composition, that get
thrown into complex interrelations, the perceptual effect of which is rhythm. They are, in effect,
atoms of rhythm.”722 That which, then, corresponds to the void of Democritus is precisely the
pause in a rhythmic succession. Aristedes writes: “An empty duration is one without sound,
adopted to fill out the rhythm. A ‘pause,’ in the context of rhythm, is the smallest empty duration
chronos kenos elachistos.”723 Porter comments, however, that “all durations are ‘empty’ from a
certain perspective: they mark mere formal and abstract divisions in a system of relations.”724
Thus, like Hölderlin’s tragic transport, rhythmic movement in time, following this Democritean
rhythmics, is empty and unbounded. Rhythm, then, conceived as atomistic, is interrupted on
occasion by caesurae, empty spaces of the void—these elements make up the tissue of
experience. The intuition of such a rhythmic atomism is recovered by Nietzsche in an attempt to
found a temporal atomism; one that shall express the movement of the tragic.
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Nietzsche’s essential task in his philological study of rhythm was to demonstrate the
radical incommensurability of modern dynamic theories of rhythm with ancient quantitative
rhythm, indissolubly unified with rhythm as a bodily experience. In a letter to his mentor,
Ritschl, of December 30, 1870, he writes: “The more we draw on modern music for
understanding [classical] metrics, the farther we estrange ourselves from the reality of metrics in
antiquity.”725 He accuses modern classicists of imposing, in a Kantian manner, a “rhythm an
sich” onto antiquity. He thus tracks the genealogy in antiquity of the development of rhythm. The
shift, in his view, in this history, is that from a quantitative conception of rhythm to a qualitative
one. Originally, rhythm is conceived corporeally. It gradually becomes the means by which time
is divided through a rhythmics that is a “structure of signs” simultaneously “sensuous and
abstract.”726 Rhythm is first experienced in a manner that is purely temporal and quantitative, in
terms of dance, and later separates itself from its rootedness in the body to become an abstract
measure of time, as bodies, in turn, are conceived in terms of space. In accordance with this
movement toward a separation of rhythm from the body, the stress accent in the Greek language
overtakes the original tonal pitch accent, thus resulting in the loss of rhythm as absolutely
quantitative.727 Nietzsche writes: “Dance movement emancipates itself naturally from the
movement associated with keeping time [Taktbegewegung]. More accurately, ἄρσις [rising] and
θέσις [placing] are no longer meaningful to the art of dancing [viz., as a lifting and lowering of
the foot]; from now on they are only a measure of time [Zeitmesser].”728 In his essay, On the
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Theory of Quantitative Rhythm (Winter, 1870-1871), Nietzsche quotes Aristides to ground these
rhythmic terms in dance: “So ἄρσις is the bringing upwards of part of the body, whereas θέσις is
the bringing downward of the same part.”729 He then refers these upward and downward
movements back to Aristoxenus, rhythmically as “ὁ κάτω χρóνος and ὁ ἄνω χρóνος” (the
downward time and the upward time) and writes:
The combination of ἄρσις and θέσις is πούς [foot]. Important rule, that foot was
originally based on dance: the singer is governed by dance (which was not a whirl, but a
pleasant walk). When the measure was uneven, of course, there were also
correspondingly varied κινήσεις [movements] of the dancers. Gradually there developed
a separation of pure time-keeping and artistic performance, especially in pure
instrumental music.730
Through the system of time-keeping that measured rhythm by ictus and percussio (stress and
beat) rather than physical, rhythmic quantity, rhythmics was thus abstracted from the unity of
measure and dance, from the rising and falling of the feet, of the limbs, and, indeed, of breath.
Rhythm thereafter becomes measured according to sound; the rhythmics of postclassical
modernity begins here, which Nietzsche called “Latin vocalism”—the move away from temporal
quantity and toward accentuation.731 With the uprise of the word, and the syllable as measures of
time, “the robust feeling for time disintegrates in [everyday] speech,” such that the original pitch
accent and the ictus come into conflict with one another, “representing, as it were, a violent
survival of the world.”732 A transition thus occurs from the dithyrambic experience of rhythm to a
linguistic evaluation of rhythmics, which dominates primordial temporality.
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The origin of this shift, according to Nietzsche, is a division, which occurs with
Aristoxenus between rhythmed objects and rhythm itself: “rhythm is not identical with any of the
objects made rhythmic.”733 Rhythm acts upon both bodies and time, organizing the movement of
the former and dividing the latter into chronoi—durational segments of time. Rhythm requires a
rhythmed body in order to supervene on time and effect its division. Aristoxenus writes that the
“object made rhythmic [rhythmizomenon] must be capable of being divided into recognizable
parts, by which it will divide time.”734 Rhythm, which is the structure of sensation for humans,
by means of which they measure time, must yet exists separately as an abstract concept, after
Aristoxenus. It is for this reason that Nietzsche says that this rhythmicist “speaks in a
philosophical sense about rhythm.”735

Yet rhythm is not merely duration, but a whole

constellation of times and measures—thus it is a “structure of signs” that overtakes bodies and
makes them rhythmic.736 Thus rhythm becomes an abstract language which must exist, to a
certain extent, an sich. It is this phenomenon, then, that renders rhythm, independent of bodies,
universal. This transition can be understood in a parallel fashion to Nietzsche’s theory of the disunification of chorus and dialogue in tragedy effected by Euripides under the rationalist sway of
Socrates. In Sophocles, “thought still moves along the path of instinct”737 so that tragedy forms a
dissonant, harmonious whole, in the unity of choral lyric, dance and dialogue, such that the
“unity of the artistic organism” was the “goal” of tragedy.738 Euripides, on the contrary,
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employed “thought” in his tragedies, which came to overpower “the artistic instinct” which had
previously carried tragedy forward. While before Euripides, thought worked “in accordance with
instinct,” this was henceforth no longer the case: “in Euripides it [thought] will become
destructive to instinct.”739 The unity present in Sophocles then became, instead, the “effect,” due
to the fact that he employed “an aesthetic that placed itself in the spectator’s point of view.”740
This concern with a dramatic formula organized to produce a particular effect on spectators
separated from the action, rather than participating in it, was accordingly commended by
Aristotle who, with his obsession with effect that Goethe so deplored, called Euripides “the
τραγικώτατος (‘the most tragic poet’).”741 This change, furthermore, coincided with a movement
from the lyric to the epic sensibility, resulting in the dissociation of the chorus from the action: in
Euripides, “the sung parts are no longer related to the course of action any more closely than
with another tragedy [… .]”742 The chorus becomes an abstract idea, a musical interlude, no
longer necessary to the heart of tragedy.
In the same manner, rhythm and body are originally inseparable—it is only with
Aristoxenus—who is, indeed, another of Nietzsche’s transitional figures along with Sophocles,
Empedocles and Theognis743—that rhythm is theorized in separation from the body. For
Nietzsche, on the contrary, the universality of rhythm is yet paradoxically relative—it depends
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entirely on the rhythms of the bodies of a certain time, bodies which transform across history’s
movement of becoming. To deliver rhythm back into the body, its originary source—that is his
project. This entails, therefore, the reestablishment of the instinctive, agonal equilibrium between
Zeitleben and Tonleben which Nietzsche had also posited as the origin of rhythm. Rhythmics
must not be an abstract, philosophical language foreign to the body, but must become again what
Goethe had declared it to be: “‘The measure,’ Goethe said, ‘flows unconsciously from the mood
of the poet. If he thought about it while writing the poem, he would go mad and produce nothing
of value.’”744 Yet this unconscious harmony between rhythm and the body can only be brought
about from the point of view of an idealized system of rhythmics—hence, the metaphysical
element of this abstraction, this separation of life and ordering rhythmics, must come about
precisely through a sacrifice of that metaphysical element. Only thereby can a a return to the
primordial indissolubility of rhythm and the body come about. It is necessary, perhaps, then, to
travel through the madness of that dissonance, the tragic knowledge of the rules of rhythm, in
order for that instinctual, creative ἀγών shall once again come about.
In 1876, Nietzsche would write of music, in his Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions
(Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche), which appends Human All too Human, and in apparent
contradiction with his earlier vision:
Music is, in fact, not a universal, timeless language, as is so often said in its praise, it
corresponds, on the contrary, exactly to a particular measure of time, warmth and emotion
[einem Gefühls-, Wärme- und Zeitmaass] which involves a quite definite, individual
culture, determined by time and place, as its inner law [inneres Gesetz].745
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Here, it is the multiplicity of these inner laws in their power to determined a culture that renders
its music comprehensible and proper to a man, people, a culture. For the rhythms that measure
time are infinitely changeable, and therein lies their homeotic power. From Nietzsche’s early
thinking of music as the universal element in tragedy to his later renunciation of that universality,
the thread of thought, and indeed the justification, remains consistent; music is the most
universal part of drama because it calls to the depths of the body and measures itself in
accordance with that rhythm. Nietzsche’s shift, between the early and late thoughts on rhythm
brings that measure, that breath, into time, such that it takes place and unfolds as the secret text
of history, its hidden force in becoming. The shift is, indeed, a distancing from the
Schopenhauerean will—from the very word “will,” bearing the trace of Nietzsche’s predecessor,
such that the universal power of music, already relative in Nietzsche’s early writing, is
conceived, at this point, beyond the very terminology of the metaphysics of music.
The multiplicity and transformability of rhythm as the deepest expression of bodily
impulses had also been conceived by Nietzsche early, without reference to such metaphysical
concepts as the will. In an essay entitled “Rhythmic Investigations” [Rhythmische
Untersuchungen] (1870-1871), he writes the following, under the heading “The Power of
Rhythm:”
I suspect that the sensuous power of rhythm lies in the fact that the two rhythms that
work effects on each other determine [bestimmen] each other in such away that the
broader one divides the narrower one. The rhythmic movements of the pulse, etc. (the
pace) are apparently re-organized as the step accommodates itself to the beat. [...] And
since the entire body [Leib] contains an infinite number of rhythms in it, every rhythm
will make a direct attack upon the body. Everything suddenly moves according to a new
law: not, indeed, as if the old ones no longer dominate, but rather in that they are fixed
[or attuned, bestimmt]. 746
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What is here considered to be objectified and expressed in rhythm is not the will, but the
“pulse”—the internal biological measure of life. Nietzsche here takes Schopenhauer’s claim that
“music […] acts directly on the will, i.e., the feelings, passions, and emotions of the hearer, so
that it quickly raises these or even alters them”747 to its most radical conclusion and thereby
surpasses his master. For it is through the infinity of rhythms contained in the body, and the
“attack” of externalized rhythms upon the body that the very law internal to it is transformed.
This is not a matter of the elation or exaltation of the will through the stimulation of sentimental
faculties, but, rather, the establishment of an entirely new human measure through the
externalization of novel rhythm.
For Nietzsche, dissonance underlies all consonance in ancient rhythm, in much the same
manner as discord, for Heraclitus and for Empedocles, is the principle of life. Heraclitus says:
“That which opposes converges, and out of these diverging things the most beautiful harmony is
formed. And all things arise according to discord” (14 [A 5]).748 Discord [ἔρις], which constitutes
primordial contradiction, is also justice [δίκη]. In another fragment, we read: “And if it is
necessary that war be enchained, and that justice be discord, and that all things arise according to
oracles …” (14 [A 7]).749 Dionysian dissonance, discord, then, as the regulating, judging law of
life. Nietzsche had accordingly said of Heraclitus’ view of Πόλεµος as the father of all things: “it
is Hesiod’s good Eris transformed into the cosmic principle; it is the contest-idea of the Greek
individual and the Greek state, taken from the gymnasium and the palaestra. from the artist's
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agon, from the contest between political parties and between cities—all transformed into
universal application so that now the wheels of the cosmos turn on it.”750
Nietzsche writes: “Originally […] the note functions as a measure of time”751 —yet this primal
temporal function of the note becomes covered over in modern music, so that music selfrationalizes in tone. It is the gradual separation of Zeitleben and Tonleben that characterizes the
historical development into modernity—finally, Tonleben masters Zeitleben, so that the
temporality of music is forgotten as the ground rhythmic life. Nietzsche writes: “The soul of our
melody and harmony is expressed in the ictus of our compositions”752 —thus harmony, originally
born of dissonance, seeks later to overcome it, to exclude it from music. This dissonance, for
Nietzsche, must be recovered precisely so that consonance—the rhythmic element of the tragic
hero—may arise from it.

Interlude: Anaxagoras
Anaxagoras occupies the time between Heraclitus and Empedocles. Nietzsche explains
Anaxagoras‘ cosmogony in terms of the νοῦς and circular motion. For Anaxagoras, there is no
Becoming, but only Being, and that which is exists for all eternity. Following this, “everything is
the same in all of time.”753 Time does not move, but is an eternity of identity. It is an axiom of
the Ionians that, in Goethe’s words: “Like is only known by Like”—which idea finds itself
recovered by “an old mystic writer” in the words: “If the eye were not sunny, how could we
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perceive light? If God’s own strength lived not in us, how could we delight in Divine things?”
Goethe uses these words to demonstrate that “the eye […] is formed with reference to light, to be
fit for the action of light; the light it contains corresponding with the light without.”754 The
phenomenon of sight is a circular one, wherein internal and external light interpenetrate, and
semi-miraculously, with reference to a far divinity at its origin, color arises.
For Anaxagoras: “All difference concerns motion; motion is thus what it is to be
genuinely alive.”755 Vitality is motion, and living things move in such a way that they are ordered
into a “lawful regularity” by an eternal force. This force, pervasive Being, present at the heart of
life is “the intellect (νóος [in Attic, νοῦς], neither intellect, understanding, nor reason—
authentically Greek756—the power of language!)” The νοῦς “alone moves,” or rather, constitutes
the impetus to all motion, which motion organizes the “aftereffects of such an intellect [… .]”
The νοῦς, in the beginning, “produces a circular motion (or vortical movement, ἡ περιχώρησις)
on one point of mass, which immediately expands outward and pulls ever larger parts into its
range, moving ever farther outward.”757 The cosmos is created in a series of moving concentric
circles, the manifestation of universal vitality, forming rings. From out of a chaos of “primal
matter,”758 the elements are organized according to their density and luminosity; aether is the
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name for the warm, the light, the thin in things, air the name for the dark, the cold, the heavy:
“The thick and moist are driven to the center, thin and warm to the outside, by way of
momentum, just as the heavy is driven to the center.”759 Water and earth divide, the one pushing
outward and the other inward. Nietzsche insists that Anaxagoras is not a teleologist: the νοῦς
contains no purposiveness. Only in the sense that it is an eternally ordering force by its
incitement of circular motion is it “simultaneously efficient cause (causa efficiens) and final
cause (causa finalis), according to Aristotle’s Metaphysics.”760 The νοῦς was neither a principal
of individual purposiveness nor a “consciously knowing”761 entity. Rather, it was at once a
“ghost in the machine ([…] θεὸς ἐκ µηχανῆς)”762 and, as the active, moving principle in human
beings, “life” itself. 763 Thus, the cosmological creative force as the divinity present in all living
things. The grand ambition of Anaxagoras was “to explain the actual world with the fewest
possible nonphysical theories” for which “circular motion suffices; had he immediately imagined
an intellect with continually purposive ends, it would have become a mythological being, a god
—precisely what he dismisses.”764 Rather, the νοῦς is pervasive, eternally present and its
resulting “motion is a thing of regularity, and that is the origin of all order—one circular motion
continuing into eternity, which is the infinitude of the All.”765 There is no world process, for
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Nietzsche’s Anaxagoras, because there is no time, and no individual intentionality inherent in the
νοῦς, which is, nonetheless a force of the will to life freed of all ends, of all τέλος.
Nietzsche proclaims the scientific discoveries of Anaxagoras: “He discovers the laws of
conservation of force [Kraft] and that of the indestructibility of matter.” The νοῦς
metamorphoses, in Nietzsche’s reading, into Geist (Mind, Spirit) and Kraft (force). Because of
the eternity and infinitude of the νοῦς, which is to say, of the vital force in all things, in the
absolute absence of time, both matter and force are conserved in the cosmic eternity that is our
element. “All motion is either direct or indirect. The form of direct motion is organic life or
mechanical motion: the indirect is always [only] mechanical. In this regard we continually
maintain that a dichotomy between matter and spirit did not exist for him. Intellect is only the
finest (λεπτóτατον) and purest (καθαρώτατον) of all things and has all knowledge about
everything (γνώµην περì παντòς πάσην ἴσχει).”766 Force thus produces different movements in
the organon and in lifeless matter, yet treats them equally, indistinguishably, directly or
indirectly, moving all things. Force, this primordial figure, is, however, indistinguishable from
the life it sets in motion. Hence, for Anaximander, there is only simultaneity of circular motion in
space, where all things infinitely coexist. Nietzsche, in his study of Anaximander’s doctrine,
already insists on the unity, the non-opposition, of force (νοῦς) and motion, or matter. The νοῦς,
also called the will by Nietzsche, is a “self-caused motion”767 ; it does not exist in a pre-historical,
or rather, pre-vital, pre-cosmic eternity, but rather, its very eternity is its circular motion. To the
greatest extent possible, Nietzsche integrates this efficient or final cause into the vital motion it
creates, though this integration be, in the strictest sense, impossible. Nietzsche writes:
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“Representation and drive are both conjoined in one concept intellect (νοῦς and ψυχή): both are
effects of the life force [Lebenskraft], which is one in all things, meaning the unique thing that is
totally homogenous. All other things are heterogenous [… .] Intellect ‘is alone by itself.’”768 The
primordial phenomenon of this Lebenskraft, inserted by Nietzsche into the Anaximandrian
system, encloses thus simultaneously the Trieb and the Vorstellung (representation) it leads to.
Thus the homogenous, the νοῦς, also called by Nietzsche the primordial One in The Birth of
Tragedy is defined as this totality of force for life, its metaphysical strength behind appearance,
and this force is unified originally with the representation it makes of itself. In a fragment,
Nietzsche writes: “Preference of our age for powerful biases because they at least still betray
nature’s energy for life [Lebenskraft]: and the prerequisite is indeed nature’s energy [Kraft der
Natur]” (KSA 7: 30 [6]).769 Strength is thus defined in accordance with the power to harness and
use this energy for the capacity to represent, that is, to create. This creative representation is
accordingly that of illusion.

Nietzsche’s Temporal Atomism: Zeitatomenlehre
In 1873, Nietzsche wrote a meditation on time in his notebook, using the Neo-Kantian
philosopher, Afrikan Spir’s thesis, in his book Denken und Wirklichkeit (1873), that all time is
reducible to spatial dimensions, in order, precisely, to assert the contrary. Spir’s metaphysics, to
which Nietzsche refers in his discussion of Parmenides in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the
Greeks as a modern model for the pre-Platonic philosopher’s vision of the eternal “One,” has as
its basis the fundamental discontinuity and the ultimate non-correspondence between the world
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of appearances and the world of the Kantian in-itself. Spir claims that “no intermediate element
at all is possible between the unconditioned and the conditioned, since the concepts
‘unconditioned’ and ‘conditioned’ form an exhaustive disjunction.”770

As a result, the

unconditioned can in no way form the condition of the conditioned; it is, rather, supremely
unknowable and, in addition, has neither any direct relation to, nor any necessity for the
experience of the apparent world; intellectual intuition is hence neither possible nor necessary.
The only thing that can be assumed of the unconditioned world, according to Spir, is “that it must
accord with the logical principle of identity, and from this we can infer that it cannot contain
either plurality or change, since both of these would compromise its absolute identity.”771 It is for
this reason that Nietzsche will use Spir’s unconditioned, whose sole law is that of absolute
identity, as a model for Parmenidean Being. As a result of Spir’s banishment of the eternal,
noumenal sphere to a status of non-necessity with regard to experience, that sphere becomes, in
turn, a mere myth, and thus unveils metaphysics as such as a mere fable. The postulation of such
an unconditioned world reduces metaphysics to Nietzsche’s will to truth, and reveals it as a
manifestation of this drive which is, in essence, bodily.
Thus, for Spir, in the absence of any possible access to the unconditioned world, the
conditioned world is condemned to the temporal movement of becoming. Small writes: “Arguing
against both Kant and Herbart, Spir insists on the empirical reality of time, while denying its a
priori status.772 Kant's error, according to Spir, is to treat space and time on the same basis, a bias
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attributable to his love of symmetry.”773 While no empty time can be conceived, since succession
is immediate and given in experience, empty space can be conceived because space itself is
simply a construction. Summarizing Spir’s argument, Small writes: “Since time is nothing apart
from succession, we cannot imagine an empty space, and even assign it a definite size. Time is
thus neither something existing in its own right, nor a necessary form of intuition on the part of
the subject. It is an abstraction which expresses what given successions have in common with
one another.”774 From this results the impossibility of any absolute unit of time, hence its infinite
divisibility. While Aristotle had used the infinite divisibility of time and space to prove their
absolute continuity, Nietzsche, through Spir, will speak of this divisibility as one of the aspects of
the fundamental discontinuity of time. In a notebook, he jotted down: “Infinitude in nature:
nowhere does it have limits. Only for us is there finitude. Time infinitely divisible” (KSA 7: 19
[133]).775
Aristotle’s argument for the infinite divisibility of time and of space is based on the
observation that a moving object will always cover a distance twice as great as an object moving
twice as slowly, in the same span of time. He writes: “the quicker will divide the time and the
slower will divide the length. If, then, this alternation always holds good, and at every turn
involves a division, it is evident that all time must be continuous.”776 This continuity depends on
the assumption that the indivisibility of time would render the divisibility of space impossible
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and vice versa, such that in order for time and space to coexist, they must both remain infinitely
divisible; the existence of natural units of time and of space are contingent on one another.777
Spir, on the other hand, argues that time is a mere abstraction, that it possesses no natural
measure, and is rather inferred from the phenomenal experience of succession. For him,
therefore, the proof of the infinite divisibility of time contributes to the theory that time has no
existence in itself. Invoking an argument made by Sextus Empiricus, whose goal is to reinforce
the Aristotelian argument against the objection that certain objects merely appear to move at
different speeds while in truth they all move at the same rate, Spir writes: “With the rotation of
the earth, for example, a point on the equator moves with a million times greater speed than a
point located close to the pole: and yet both points complete their revolution in exactly the same
time, and occupy this time with the same continuity and uniformity. The slower moving point
never stands still, any more than the faster moving one. How then could the same time, if it were
not a mere abstraction but something distinct from real successions, be occupied by two so
different quanta of succession in a uniform and, to that extent, equal way? It would obviously be
impossible.”778 This argument serves to prove, thus, that from different quantities of succession
the same time-span is deduced and that, moreover, time is nothing but such a deduction, and is
hence an entirely empirical phenomenon, with no connection to the atemporal substratum of
noumena. Nietzsche transfers these considerations onto a meditation of motion as purely
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temporal, and of becoming as the only true phenomenon of life, which is nothing more than the
manifestation of various, constantly-changing forces.
Nietzsche, in his fragment on the reduction of all dimensions of movement to time, which
begins: “Motion in time” (KSA 7: 26 [12]),779 proposes the following: “Translation of all laws of
motion into temporal proportions. / The essence of sensation would then consist in gradually
sensing and measuring such temporal figures with more and more refinement; representation
constructs them as something coexistent and then establishes the development of the world on
the basis of this coexistence: pure translation into another language, into the language of
becoming” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).780 Following Spir’s denial of the ideality of space, Nietzsche posits
coexistence as a spatial fantasy, whose formation is strictly temporal; there is, strictly speaking,
“no spatial coexistence other than in representation [Vorstellung]” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).781 Nietzsche
thus expresses, or exposes, for himself, the necessity of a translation of the Anaxagorian
principle of motion in its circularity, which denies time and supposes the eternity of space and
the simultaneity of all things, into the Heraclitean language of pure temporality, pure becoming,
where eternity takes on the meaning of the incessant nature, the endlessness of movement and
the transfiguration of life defined as fire.
Nietzsche’s first step in this procedure is to prove the irreconcilability of spatial and
temporal laws with regard to motion. He begins his meditation by drawing a “spatial point A”
and a “spatial point B” in this notebook and assuming that each of them “has an effect” on the
other. He then claims that since the effect must “cover a distance,” a “period of time” is
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necessary to this effective movement, for lacking this dimension, “[c]onsecutive points in time
would merge with one another” in space. This collision would have as its result that neither of
the points would change; they would simply congeal with one another, thus rendering the
existence of A as an “effective force [Kraft]” impossible. Presuming, then, that A has an effect on
B in time, neither of these points remain the same following the event of this effect; rather, the
force of A is transformed by its temporal activity. “If we take what is effective in time, then what
is effective in the tiniest fragment of every moment in time always is something different.”
Nietzsche thus comes to the conclusion that “time demonstrates the absolute nonpermanence of
a force” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).782 Time, hence, is the manifestation of various, changeable forces
which, precisely because of the absence of space in their existence, have no identity with
themselves but, as atoms, move at constantly varying speeds, creating rhythms of distance in
their travel. Causality itself is annihilated by the very fact that it takes place in time, and that as
soon as motion occurs, its origin as such no longer exists but has transformed by its effective
action. Nietzsche then writes: “All laws of space are thus conceived as timeless, / which means
that they must be simultaneous and immediate.” The result of an actualization of these laws in
the absence of time would hence be: “The entire world with one strike. But then there is no
motion.” Since motion, i.e. the phenomenal rhythm of becoming, is the fundamental
phenomenon of life (for Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus as well as for Nietzsche), no
persistence of spatial laws is possible; motion is a purely temporal occurrence. “Motion struggles
with the contradiction that it is constituted according to the laws of space and that once we
assume time, these laws become impossible: that means that at one and the same time it is and is
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not.” Therefore, in order to overcome this contradiction, we must assume “that either space or
time is = 0.” If space were infinitely small, then the distance between atoms would also be
infinitely small—hence “all punctual atoms would merge at one point.”783 Nietzsche concludes
that “since time is infinitely divisible, the entire world is possible as a purely temporal
phenomenon, because I can occupy every point in time with one and the same spatial point and
hence can place it an infinite number of times.”784 Here, Nietzsche displaces the famous formula
of Lessing’s Laocoon, namely that: “succession of time is the department of the poet, as space is
that of the painter.”785 Concerning rhythm in tragedy, these terms of space and time take on a
different aspect—the former is measured by dancing bodies, while the latter is measured by
music. Just as, for Lessing, poetry is the realm of the purely temporal, wherein space = 0, while
painting is that in which it is time that = 0 and space alone exists so that these two aesthetic fields
display worlds utterly incommensurable to one another, Nietzsche translates these categories
onto song and dance, so that the temporal is that realm in which quantity alone exists while
quality interrupts this realm with bodily dissonance. And yet, suppose bodies were merely the
highest form of idealization, suppose they too were = 0 as spatial entities, and only existed in
truth temporally—dance as pure becoming: this is the possibility Nietzsche exposes for us.
If the tragic hero, the genius, the philosopher, attains a state of timelessness, there is then
a shift that occurs in tragic becoming, from one of pure time to one of pure space—at his highest
moment, the hero reduces time to nothing, and brings about an “entire world with one strike.”
And it is precisely this moment, this return to the Greek world of “space and light” divested for a
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golden instant of the pain and dissonance that is becoming, according to a new and different
rhythm that is prophetic for the hero, both of his downgoing and of its failure, its failure as a
task. For it is into the supreme affirmation of pure time, pure becoming that the hero, from this
highest point of ideality, must deliver his people.
Time, according Nietzsche, is absolutely heterogenous—his thinking of temporality has
as its goal to put force—the homogenous, for Anaximander, back into becoming, and the
multiplicity of all things. Nietzsche thinks time as becoming—against Parmenides, with
Heraclitus and Goethe: “All forces are merely a function of time [Alle Kräfte sind nur F u n k t i
o n d e r Z e i t]” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).786 Elaine P. Miller writes, in reference to this fragment:
“With the word Kraft, Nietzsche does not imply an original source; in addition, ‘forces’ are
always multiple and fleeting, constantly changing each other as they collide.”787 This hypothesis
is developed on the basis of the impossibility of “postulating a law of time.” For a vision of the
world as ordered by “the regularity temporal figures,” writes Nietzsche, would suppose a
“constant force” on the basis of coexistence. This constancy is disproved by time itself, in its
pure inconsistency. Force, thus, as a function of time, must by no means by constant but
“different” in “every tiniest moment”—therefore, Nietzsche postulates that there are only
“absolutely mutable forces” and these alone “can have an effect [… .]” The very idea of temporal
succession is refuted by Nietzsche, for two “successive temporal moments […] would merge
with one another. Thus, every effect is actio in distans, that is, by means of a leap” (KSA 7: 26
[12]).788
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The possibility, however, of this action is unprovable. Rather, the different speeds of time
we perceive are contained in the “nature of this effect” such that “force, as functions of time,
express themselves in the relationships to closer or more distant points in time: namely, fast or
slow. The force is based on the degree of acceleration.” The faster the acceleration, the more
proximal are the moments in time in their effect on one another. The more slowly this
acceleration takes place, “the greater the temporal interstices, the greater the distans.” In this
way, the most distant points in time combine in a relation of slowness, and “all slowness, of
course, is relative.” Insofar as time is measured “in terms of something that remains spatial,” a
“constant time” is presupposed between any two points in time: “But time is by no means a
continuum, rather, there are only wholly different points in time, no line. Actio in distans.” Hence,
in the same way: “No motion in time is constant.” (KSA 7: 26 [12]).789 The more slowly time
moves, in other words, the greater the distance between temporal moments, the more effectively,
the more intensely is the fundamental discontinuity, fundamental dissonance of time, and hence
of motion, which arises within the “[r]elationships among different temporal layers” felt. History,
then, bridges the greatest temporal distances, distances whose spatiotemporal origin, point of
beginning can only ever be imagined, as, by means of the necessary “reproducing being” which
“holds earlier moments in time next to the current ones[, … o]ur bodies are imagined” in these
moments (KSA 7: 26 [12]);790 the body, as a spatial entity, is mythical, inserted by imagination
into the representation of present moments as different from the past moments they are believed
to have issued from. Bodies are thus by no means heavy things in space; rather, they are a play of
transforming forces, which manifest in the form of ceaseless becoming, discontinuous time. In
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this vein, and following, too, a Heraclitean inspiration, Pierre Klossowski writes that for
Nietzsche: “The body is a result of chance: it is nothing other but the site of the encounter of a
collection of impulses individuated for that interval that forms a human life, but that have no
other aspiration than to de-individuate themselves.”791 This elucidates Nietzsche’s reversal of the
Hölderlinian perspective; for while, for Hölderlin, individuation in the absolute is the desire of
the discontinuous subject—his striving to escape the curse of time—for Nietzsche, the most
primordial drive is precisely the Dionysian instinct toward the loss of self and the rupture of
individuation. It is by means of this reversal, moreover, that Nietzsche poises himself for his
hyperbolic rejection of metaphysics, which is to say, first of all—of the metaphysical subject as
absolute.
In essence, Nietzsche expresses thus that time is not, indeed continuous “time” held
together by a spatial plane on which it is situated, but a disconnected non-series of innumerable
“points in time”—“thus, dynamic qualities must be presupposed.”792 Like Hölderlin’s tragic
transport, which measures the rhythm of the tragic drama in the temporality of the poem,
Nietzsche views time as the externalization of this internal game of forces. By his physiological
depiction of the genesis of becoming, he effects the re-internalization, back into the depths of the
body, re-imagined as a temporal entity, of the Heraclitean cosmic becoming and the
Empedoclean cosmic rhythm of breath. The doctrines of the two pre-Platonics that Nietzsche
envisioned as tragic philosophers, thus prophetically calling them by the name he would one day
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give himself, are thus re-thought on a ground of absolute immanence—the wide force-field of
becoming.
The diagram drawn by Nietzsche to illustrate this discontinuous time, and labeled “Time
line” shows a dotted vertical line, whose function is to display the disconnected temporal points,
with short diagonal slashes through it, demonstrating “temporal layers,” and, on its right side,
various near-circles of different dimensions, the largest being semi-circles (two), and the smallest
being nearly complete circles (KSA 7: 26 [12]).793 These excentric curves, then, represent the
motion produced by forces in their temporal mutability, and the inexplicable correspondence of
events in history, which form, thereby, a kind of spider’s web—a series of mad constellations,
which enclose the soul.
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Nietzsche then proposes the following: “Doctrine of temporal atoms [Z e i t a t o m e n l e
h r e]”

(KSA 7: 26 [12]).794 This doctrine translates the theory of atoms held by “atomic

physics,” as Parmedean “ὄντα”—thus as “unalterable” and incapable of having an “effect” into
temporal terms, which permits the espousing of the absolute mutability of forces (KSA 7: 26
[12]).795 Being therefore, on Parmenides’ terms, is equated with the spatial, while becoming, is
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equated with the temporal. Nietzsche’s doctrine of temporal atoms, thus, translates them from
spatial terms into the becoming of Heraclitus, and renders his very epistemology possible. He
writes: “the theory of temporal atoms ultimately coincides with the doctrine of sensation. The
dynamic point in time is identical with the point of sensation. For there is no simultaneity of
sensation” (KSA 7: 26 [12]). 796 Such an atomic theory opens history out onto the unforeseeable,
for if time is not a line but a non-linear series of singular points connected and separated across
its levels by circularities of varying completeness, no teleology is possible, no causality, no grand
metaphysical plan, no coincidence between thought and Being; there is no world process and no
absolute goal, no destination, no Judgement of humanity. Stars, then, meteors and comets are
nothing but temporal phenomena, occurring inexplicably across the wide skies of history’s
eventfulness.
Of Nietzsche, Blanchot writes: “History carries with it the moment that it goes
beyond.”797 And we might add that it carries with it, too, the moment that goes beyond it. That is
to say, the untimely, which pervades our experience of time, and never allows us any rest. For
time, in its very essence, is untimely—irreducible to spatial dimensions, its discontinuity has as
its effect that every point in time is un-isolable. Rather, each of these points is constantly
exceeding itself, beyond the possibility of recapture. No continuity of subjectivity is hence
possible; for the rhythmed individual, the individual subjected to the onrush of time is no
individual at all, but rather, is in a constant discontinuous ἔκστασις of self—an infinite
succession of selves, incapable of being drawn together, which thrust themselves into oblivion
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one after another, merely by being temporal entities. This ἔκστασις requires in the same moment
a forgetting of individuality and subjectivity and a calling into memory of a primordial
becoming. The fluid exchange between forgetting and remembering in ecstatic temporality takes
place for Hölderlin as well as for Nietzsche, yet in radically different ways.

Memory and Forgetting at Dawn
The mechanics of forgetting and remembering, which Nietzsche had called the operations
of plastic force, for which another name is rhythmic force, is at the very core of the problem of
the moderns’ relation to the ancients, and is thus essential to both Hölderlin and Nietzsche.
In his “Remarks on ‘Oedipus,’” Hölderlin writes that “in the scenes” of the tragic drama,
“the frightfully festive forms” constitute “language for a world where under pest and confusion
of senses and under universally inspired prophecy in idle time, with the god and man expressing
themselves in the all-forgetting form of infidelity [i n d e r a l l v e r g e s s e n F o r m d e r U
n t r e u e]—for divine infidelity [götliche Untreue] is best to retain—so that the course of the
world will not show any rupture and the memory of the heavenly ones will not expire.”798
Divinity must thus be retained in the mode of forgetting—the memory of the receding god must
take place in the emptiness of tragic transport—in the empty value of the tragic hero. Therein the
god must manifest himself as infidelity, that is, under the aspect of his flight. Hölderlin writes of
this unfaithful crossroads between the human and the divine: “At such moments man forgets
himself and the god and turns around like a traitor, naturally in a saintly manner.—In the utmost
form of suffering, namely, there exists nothing but the conditions of time or space [der Zeit oder
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des Raums].”799 Suffering thus in its supreme form comes about at the moment when the god,
withdrawing, leaves the trace of his memory in man as infidelity—a waning light—and there all
the regalia of life are stripped away until it is left bare, with nothing but the minimal structures of
experience (a priori for Kant), namely time and space, to hold it together. Yet the ideal value of
these elements, space and time, is undermined by Hölderlin as he replaces the “and” between
them (und) with an “or” (oder). A reversibility of the postulates that render experience—and
specifically tragic experience—possible thus undercuts the continuity of their coexistence, their
equal necessity. For while the divine takes on the aspect of the temporal, for Hölderlin, the
human is annulled as space.
It is to this tragic event, whereby man, whose striving for knowledge has exceeded
human measure and so turns against him and requires that he forget himself and forget the god
that Hölderlin’s intellectual intuition—that is, “the boundless union purifying itself through
boundless separation”800 which takes place in every tragedy—refers. Intellectual intuition itself,
therefore, requires this dialectical exchange of forgetting and memory between the divine and the
accursed human. For the hero must respond to divine infidelity with—precisely—infidelity: he
must become a “traitor.” The hero thus contains the infidelity of the god—retains it in his
memory by forgetting it, as the god betrays him. Through a double paradox, thus, the hero is
faithful to the god in his betrayal of him as the god is faithful to man by leaving the memory of
his infidelity at the heart of mortality. In his poem Mnemosyne, Hölderlin writes:
Ins Ungebundene gehet eine Sehnsucht. Vieles aber ist
Zu behalten. Und Noth dies Treue.
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There is a yearning that seeks the unbound. But much
Must be retained. And loyalty is needed.801
This loyalty, hence, works at the interior of infidelity, tempering the monstrous striving toward
the boundless, so that emptiness can tragically appear as the purificatory separation of the mortal
and the immortal—their simultaneous betrayal. The faithless loyalty to the betraying god must
take place precisely so that the absent god may be called back—so that the impossibility of the
god’s presentification in our time (indeed, in tragic time) may be invoked precisely as its
absence. Hölderlin is drawn back to Sophocles precisely because in his tragedies, the first flight
of the gods takes place—there, mourning comes to be as mourning of the divine, a mourning
which requires the constant work of a dialectic between past and present, to create a future, born
out of the incommensurable difference contained between them.
The Hölderlin writes of this tragic moment of the dialectic between forgetting and
remembering in tragedy:
Inside it, man forgets himself because he exists entirely for the moment, the god [forgets
himself] because he is nothing but time [weil er nichts als Zeit ist]; and either one is
unfaithful, time, because it is reversed categorically at such a moment, no longer fitting
beginning and end; man, because at this moment of categorical reversal he has to follow
and thus can no longer resemble the beginning in what follows. […] Thus Oedipus
himself stands in the tragedy of “Oedipus.”802
If in the transport of the tragedy, the god is time, thus fundamentally unfaithful, the tragic hero,
the spatial element in this intuitive organization, is mortal space, and there, full of the
disappearing god in the word he speaks—in the absence spoken through the word Woe—he must
come to = 0, and retain this memory in order to temporalize, and thus save the accursed world to
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which he belongs, under the shadow of receding divinity. Yet to save requires at once the failure
to save.
For Hölderlin, a dialectic between Mnemosyne and Lethe takes place at the heart of
tragic becoming. A feeling of timelessness is recovered through a pseudo-Platonic anamnesis, a
recovering of the absent god out of many layers of forgetting. This illusion of nature reattained is
rendered possible through the deliverance to primordiality that art—and tragic poetry, in
particular, provides the occasion for. It is for this reason that a tension is constantly retained
between circularity and excentricity in Hölderlin’s work. For the art work anamnetically conjures
the unity between the divine and the human, only to undermine this unity by the κάθαρσις of
separation.
Hölderlin’s essay, Becoming in Dissolution (1800), on the transition from the decline of a
nation to its rebirth and revitalization, and thus also on the movement by which the ideal passes
into the real by means of the tragic hero, presents a phenomenological explication of this
dialectic between the old and the new. It begins:
The fatherland in decline, nature and humanity insofar as they stand in a specific
reciprocal relation, one that constitutes a particular world that has become the ideal and
the very nexus of things; to that extent it is dissolving, so that from it and from the
generation that remains, along with the remaining forces of nature—nature being that
which constitutes the other principle, the real—a new world may take shape; it will be a
novel yet still reciprocal relation, precisely in the way that the decline itself came to pass
on the basis of a pure yet particular world. For the world of all worlds, which forever is
all in all, depicts itself only in the fullness of time—or in downgoing or in the moment,
or, considered more genetically, in the coming-to-be of the moment and the
commencement of time and world [… .] 803
The downgoing that brings an end to one world must coincide, thus, with the commencement of
another, and must even call this commencement into being. He writes: “the possibility of all
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relations prevails in the transitional period [… .]” In other words, the time of the downgoing,
which, in itself and insofar as it is by necessity a transition, already incarnates and initiates the
commencement of another world, and contains an infinity of possible worlds on the rise. From
this period, therefore, only “the particular mode of relating” must be drawn, such that only the
“finite effect” of all particular relations, seen in their collectivity as infinity, “comes to the
fore.”804 Only a single result of a given relation in the downgoing must be grasped in its finitude
and brought forth to exist as a particular commencement. The dissolution of the fatherland itself
is the self-creating, self-fulfilling prophecy of a coming unification in an unknown recreation of
the fatherland: “For how could the dissolution be apprehended without unification?”805 Here,
then, the dialectic of intellectual intuition holds the prophecy of a final unification—that is, a
circularity and a return to the unity of divine nature. Yet Hölderlin poses this in the questioning
mode—for the final resolution remains eternally uncertain, and there is no end in sight but an
excentric one.
“This downgoing or transition of the fatherland,” the poet writes, must be felt to all
“extremities of the subsisting world” in such a manner that “at the precise moment and to the
precise degree that the subsisting world dissolves, the incipient, youthful, possible world can also
be felt.”806 The death of subsisting life is but the announcement of a future, possible, potential
life, and the feeling of these two moments must measure them against each other—it is the
feeling, and not the knowledge or logical certainty, of a world to come that the dissolution of a
former world brings about. In this dissolution, the subsistent world communicates that which in
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its “relations” and “forces” is “unexhausted and inexhaustible”—the dissolution of the relations,
precisely, is felt through forces, “for nothing comes from nothing” and the negation of an actual
thing annuls the possible, too. “But the possible, which enters into actuality, and does so
precisely as the actuality is dissolving […] effects both the apprehension of the dissolution and
the remembrance of what is dissolved.”807 Just as, as Hölderlin would later write, divine and
mortal fidelity, the primordial memory of the divine inside the mortal, are only achieved through
the experience of infidelity; the possible can only pass over into the actual by an embrace of the
emptiness of the dissolution of actuality that simultaneously brings about the remembrance of the
finite actual of the past.
This dialectic between possibility and actuality is the source of the “thoroughgoing
originality” and “enduring creativity” of “every genuinely tragic language”: “the emergence of
the individual from the infinite, and the emergence of the finitely infinite, that is, of the
individual eternal, from both”808 —this individual, finite child of infinitude, “grasps” and
“animates” the incomprehensible and wretched nature of dissolution—“the death struggle itself,
which is grasped and animated by means of the harmonious, the comprehensible the living.”809
Dissolution, in other words, the universality of suffering in a declining fatherland, is only felt and
brought to life through its being lifted up into the ideality of a present harmony. From the initial
pain of dissolution, which is “felt in its depths by sufferer and spectator alike,” the “ideal” that
emerges, still undetermined, “radiates as the real nothing and as the dissolving that has been
caught in a state” at the midpoint “between being and nonbeing, that is, caught in the turning of
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necessity.”810 It is precisely this ideal that is embodied by the tragic hero, in whom the twilight of
his time is destined to become a dawn. The undissolved “new life” now becomes both “actually
and ideally old” and its dissolution becomes necessary, manifesting itself as such “between being
and nonbeing.” Yet, at this same instant of the coming of necessity, where the new becomes old,
“the possible is everywhere real and the actual ideal, and in free artistic imitation (nachahmen)
this is a frightful yet divine dream.”811
We may here grant ourselves the liberty to analogically relate these states of dissolution
and commencement, in their simultaneously self-actualizing ideality to Nietzsche’s two
“immediate art-states of nature [Kunstzuständen der Natur]”—the Dionysian and the Apollinian,
wherein “every artist is an ‘imitator’ [‘Nachahmer’], that is to say, either an Apollinian artist in
dreams, or a Dionysian artist in ecstasies, or finally—as, for example, in Greek tragedy—at once
artist in both dreams and ecstasies [… .]”812 In the original “barbarian” Dionysian revels, which
took place in absence of the Apollinian tempering force, “the most savage natural instincts were
unleashed, including even that horrible mixture of sensuality and cruelty which has always
seemed to me to be the ‘witch’s brew.”813 It is only upon Greek soil, following the grand
“reconciliation” of Dionysus and his enemy Apollo that the Dionysian “destruction of the
principium individuationis for the first time becomes an artistic phenomenon.”814 This artistic
phenomenon is music itself. And reestablishment of this individuality principle, the reparation of

810

Hölderlin, Empedocles, 154.

811

Hölderlin, Empedocles, 154.

812

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 2, 38.

813

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 2, 39.

814

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, § 2, 39, 40.
298

the “veil of maya”815 torn away in the ἔκστασις, the self-exceeding of the Dionysian revelers in
the symbolic appearance of the Apollinian dream thus relates by analogy to the creation of a new
world, of a coming fatherland, for Hölderlin. Yet Hölderlin’s proposition entails a dialectical
view of history—one that moves teleologically from dissolution to commencement, and inside of
which the hero plays the role of bringing about this dialectical transition, in much the same
manner as Hegel, five years after Hölderlin’s essay on the declining fatherland, would write, with
regard to Socrates, who is a “genuinely tragic” figure in his view: “This is the position of heroes
in world history in general; through them, a new world rises.”816 Indeed, a trace of this historical
dialectic remains in Nietzsche’s view of the tragic hero—yet this trace, as we shall see, is
precisely the element that must be sacrificed through his heroic self-sacrifice. Yet the Duplicität
between the Apollinian and the Dionysian constitutes an eternal struggle—ἀγών, Kampf—
underlying all of life across history and temporality, wherein neither side is ever eradicated or
surpassed, precisely because the nature of duplicity is such that the Dionysian and the Apollinian
are necessary to one another for life to exist. Nietzsche writes of the Apollo: “his entire existence
rested on a hidden substratum of suffering and of knowledge, revealed to him in the Dionysian.
And behold: Apollo could not live without Dionysus!”817 It is because the Dionysian reveals the
very primordial ground—rife with suffering and contradiction—that the Apollinian seeks to hide
with its beautiful appearance that this originary ecstatic force is vital to it.
Hölderlin’s “ideational dissolution,” whose points of birth and demise are already “fixed,
located, secured” by necessity, presents itself as “what it properly is, namely, a reproductive act
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by means of which life traverses all its points [… .]”818 It attains the totality of life, the sum of
these points, by dissolving “its attachment to each in order to reproduce itself in the next” such
that “the dissolution becomes increasingly ideal as it removes itself from its point of
commencement, or, by contrast, increasingly real as the production advances, until in the end,
out of the sum of these sensations of passing away and originating, run through infinitely in a
single moment, a feeling of life as a whole comes to the fore [… .]”819 And the only thing
excluded from this sentiment of the totality of life is the “remembrance of what has dissolved, of
the individual,” which in its turn “unites with the infinite feeling of life by means of [this]
remembrance of dissolution itself [… .]” This movement between the finite past and the newly
infinite present must take place in such a way that “after the gaps between them have been filled
in, there should emerge from such unification and comparison” of past and present “the new state
proper the next step that is to follow upon what is bygone.”820 Within and through the
“remembrance of dissolution[,] the dissolution itself” thus comes to be the “inexorable bold act
that it properly is.”821 In order for the proper of dissolution to be the commencement of a new
world, this dialectic of forgetting and remembering of the past that is dissolving—indeed, the
retaining of remembrance within the emptiness of dissolution—must take place in such a way
that memory is the fully mobile center of becoming. It is through the ideal memory of a past
communing with the actuality of that past within dissolution that the passage is effected from
decline to rise. Only thus does the present itself come to contain anything proper.
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The ideational dissolution, whose moving force is divine and not human, and which is
therefore more determinable than the real, passes thus in two directions: initially, from “the
infinitely present to the finite past [… .]” This happens in such a way that everything “(1) within
each point of the same dissolution and production; (2) between one point in its dissolution and
production and every other point; (3) between each point in its dissolution and production and
the total feeling of dissolution and production,” is ever “more infinitely interlaced.”822 That is to
say, then, that “everything is more infinitely permeated touched implicated in pain and in joy, in
strife and at peace, in motion and at rest, in configuration and disfiguration, so that celestial fire
rather than an earthly blaze is at work.”823 The divine, Empedoclean disharmony between
opposite eternal operations is thus at work within the celestial fire of transition. The dissolution
“passes through everything that lies between the first two points that are capable of dissolution
and production, namely, between the opposed infinitely new and the finite old, between the
totality of the real and the ideal particular.”824
Secondly, and after the completion of this first passage, the ideational dissolution moves
in the reverse direction, “from the infinite to the finite [… .]” In this sense, it distinguishes itself
from the real in that the “actual dissolution” appears as “the real nothing” from ignorance as to
its commencement and end so that every subsistent particular thing takes on the appearance of
the “be-all-and-end-all”—it is thus a “sensuous idealism or Epicurianism” depicted by Horace in
his formula “Prudens futuri temporis exitum” (“wise is the future event”). Because the actual
dissolution is this nothing while the ideational dissolution is the “coming-to-be of the ideal
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individual in the direction of the infinitely real, and of the infinitely real in the direction of the
individual ideal” which gains in “harmony” and “import” as it grows and increases, this latter is
thought as “a transition from one subsistent state to another [… .]” This subsistent, too, is
augmented in spirit in the degree that it is thought to have “originated from that transition” and
its direction in such a way that the ideal individual’s dissolution appears “as burgeoning [and] as
growth; the dissolution of the infinitely new comes to appear […] as love” and the two together
appear at once “as a (transcendental) creative act” of which the essence is “to unite the ideal
individual with the real infinite” and of which the result is “the real infinite unified with the ideal
individual” so that the infinitely real and the infinitely ideal take on the life and configuration of
one another, “uniting in a mythic state in which the transition, along with the opposition of the
infinitely real and the finite ideal comes to an end [… .]”825 This cessation takes place insofar as
the life of the infinitely real is maximally enhanced and the finite ideal becomes more tranquil. 826
In the “lyrical” infinitely real, and in the “epic” individual ideal, “the state in question
unites the spirit of the one with the sensuous concreteness of the other. The mythic state, in both
cases, is tragic” to the extent that the infinitely real and the finite ideal are in both cases united.
The lyric and epic “differ merely by degree [… .]” In the period of transition, “spirit and sign,”
defined respectively as the “material of the transition” in union with “the infinitely real,” and
“the infinitely real” with “the finite ideal” (“the transcendental” united with “the isolated”), are
both together “like ensouled organs within an organized soul, that is, they are a one in
harmonious opposition with itself.”827 This harmonious opposition between spirit and sign, each
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in themselves a harmonious opposition, then, brings the tragic transition into being, because
gives rise to the person of the tragic hero (who = 0) and unites the finite, the individual—with
the infinite—the real of futurity, thus making this hero the very figure in whom transition
becomes possible.
From this organization of the transitional movement of the downgoing and
commencement of the fatherland, Hölderlin draws a plan for the genesis of genius. “From this
tragic unification of the infinitely new and the finite old there then develops a new individual,
such that the infinitely new, by means of its having taken on the configuration of the finite old,
individualizes itself now in its proper configuration.”828 The infinity of the novelty brought about
by the tragic unification, thus, can only become individual and novel of itself—which is to say, in
a manner proper to itself, by assuming the configuration of the concretized past individual
preserved in remembrance, and by simultaneously re-appropriating this very form, which, in fact,
it itself has created in the downgoing so that this may belong exclusively to it. The genius is he
who goes down, and can resurface as the commencement of an entirely new world, yet only by
the transitional solidification, imitation, and invention of the past world in its finitude. The
infinity of the future comes at the expense of that of the past, by working against the current of
the surpassed world which alone allows for it to be broken with. Only such a genius—individual,
radiant with celestial fire—can transform the fatherland into its proper self. So Hölderlin’s
Hyperion writes to his Diotima: “O genius of my people! O soul of Greece! I must descend, I
must seek you in the realm of the dead.”829 For Hades is the destination of all downgoing, and
conversely the source of all life—the house of Gaia.
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The new individual who results from the transitional period strives, thereafter, towards
isolation and liberation from infinity in the same degree as the old individual struggles to
universalize itself and dissolve itself “in the infinite feeling of life.” The “moment” in which the
new individual’s time ends is that at which the “infinitely new comports itself toward the old
individual as the dissolving yet unknown power” in the same way that, in a preceding time, the
new, as an unknown power, comports itself toward the “finite old [… .]”830 A confrontation
occurs between these two periods, wherein firstly the individual (unique) seeks to dominate the
infinite (whole) and secondly, the infinite strives to achieve dominion over the individual, “the
whole over the unique.”831 The transition from this “second period”832 to the third takes place “in
the moment at which the infinitely new comports itself as the feeling of life (as I) toward the
individual as object (as not-I).”833
Then, after the “opposition of the characters has tended toward reciprocity and reversal,”
the “tragic unification of both” occurs—a tragic union of the characters, akin in a deep sense to
the ecstatic commingling of bodies and souls in Nietzsche’s choral tragedy.834 The end here, then,
is circular once more—tragic separation ends in tragic unification, which is the very foundation
of the new life which dissolution had promised. And yet this union is not the regaining of the
ground of nature but is tragic. In Hölderlin’s “Sketch toward the Continuation of the Third
Version” of The Death of Empedocles, never to be actualized, he outlines a third scene, between
Manes and Empedocles, as follows: “lyrical heroic / Manes, who has experienced all, the seer,
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astounded by Empedocles; speeches and by his spirit, says that Empedocles is the one who has
been called, the one who kills and who gives life, the one in and through whom a world dissolves
and in the same instant renews itself. / The human being who felt his country’s downgoing so
mortally was also thus able to sense its new life.”835 Here the dialectical structure of the
Trauerspiel of Empedocles is clearly laid out: it is through prophecy—the counter-rhythmic
rupture, the caesura in the drama—that the hero is determined and destined to go down, to set
like the betraying sun, which contains within itself the very promise, the necessity of “new
life”—a new nature, and, indeed, a new culture on the horizon of the tragedy of time.
It is perhaps telling that Hölderlin never finished his Empedocles, and thus never fully
embraced the failure of his tragic hero—his high untimeliness—as Nietzsche would and, without
fail, maintained his ambiguity as to the tragic outcome. For he would ever retain his faith in the
possibility of a circular path, a path that would lead his declining time back to the αἰών of the
Greeks. His Empedocles would never relinquish the dialectical promise of bringing about a
revived harmony through his self-sacrifice. Yet perhaps it is equally telling that Hölderlin did not
end his Trauerspiel with the attainment of such harmony. For as he would later write, in the
“Notes” to Oedipus Tyrannos, the tragedy, in mourning, is that we must retain the god in his
flight. Nietzsche, for his part, was firm in his perspective: “The failed reformer is Empedocles;
when he failed only Socrates was left” (KSA 7: 6 [18]).836 The failure of that tragic hero thus led
not to a new, ideal unification, but to degeneracy, embodied in the figure of Socrates. Nietzsche,
indeed, viewed Hölderlin’s own decline in madness—perhaps a self-sacrifice—not as a saving,
redemptive act, but as a sign of weakness, a failure. In his third Untimely Meditation on
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Schopenhauer, Nietzsche of “Our own Hölderlin and Kleist” as examples of geniuses who had
succumbed to the temptation of self-destruction, in the manner of Schopenhauer’s tragedy, faced
with their degenerate age. These were men who “died of their own unconventionality and could
not endure the climate of what is called ‘German culture’”—to these men, he opposes the
“natures of iron—Beethoven, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Wagner” who alone possess the
strength of spirit to survive their twilight times.837 It is a different kind of failure, however—a
failure leading into the mouth of the river of becoming, that Nietzsche’s conception of the tragic
hero aims to attain.
Lacoue-Labarthe formulates the paradoxical logic of the circularity between nature and
man, an essential truth for both Hölderlin and Nietzsche, and by which process man must create
nature precisely in his emptiness:
The “logic” of the open-ended exchange of the excess of presence and of the excess of
loss, the alternation of appropriation and disappropriation—all that we might baptize,
following Hölderlin’s terminology (and for lack of anything better) the “hyperbologic,”
together with everything that holds it still within the framework of the “homeotic”
definition of truth—who knows if this is not the (paradoxical) truth of aletheia?838
Lacoue-Labarthe also calls this “hyperbologic” by the name, “mimetologic.”839 This logic is
common, then, to Hölderlin and Nietzsche as moment of caesura—the moment in which the
tragic hero arises as the divide between the ancient and the modern, who, by becoming empty, is
able to receive the foreign time of the gods, the time of the ancients into his heart and thus
transform it through his very descent in self-sacrifice, thus opening new paths for the
transfiguration of truth and, above all, of the binding force of community—of love. Yet while this
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love, for Hölderlin, requires the constant mimetic calling-into-presence of an absent god, even
after the failure of self-sacrifice, for Nietzsche this sacrifice is to be final: it must be the absolute
sacrifice of the metaphysical, and with it, of the human being bound by myth, who thus
undergoes a dissolution into nihilism, precisely by the dissonance between his reality, which is
nothing other than the temporal rhythm of becoming, and the metaphysics to which he blindly,
feverishly clings as consolation in order to go on living. Only through the purificatory selfsacrifice of the philosopher as tragic hero can the revelation of the movement of tragic time as a
constant sacrifice of selves come about as the binding force of a people to come. The sacrifice,
for Nietzsche, thus, must be the final failure of the project to return to a metaphysically idealized
nature.
It is, perhaps, the homeotic nature of truth that Hölderlin and Nietzsche share most
profoundly—for they both theorize the re-creation of nature and its truth—indeed, of origin—
within the flux of history. Yet while, for Hölderlin, this always necessitates the rapprochement of
the human with the chimera of divinity, for Nietzsche, it takes place within the rhythmic forces
of the body—it is a biological time that is transformed through the power of the dying hero.

Primordial Becoming
The Nietzschean epistemology is based on the primordial character of memory. This
proposition, then, replaces the concept of origin (Ursprung) with a metaphysical role for memory
(Gedächtniß) which thence subtracts itself from the biological aspect of life as its supreme
metaphysical aspect: “Memory has nothing to do with nerves, with the brain. It is a primordial
characteristic [Ureigenschaft]. For the human being carries around with him the memory of all
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previous generations. / The mnemonic image [Gedächtnißb i l d] something that is very artificial
[Künstliches] and rare” (KSA 7: 19 [162]).840 This memory thus reaches back into the regions of
primordial becoming, the becoming of Heraclitus and of all the pre-Platonic Greeks—it accesses
this unknowable time and through this capacity awakens the philosopher—the possessor of tragic
knowledge—to his task. It is this knowledge, this ancient memory that comes to light through
Nietzsche’s conception of anamnesis, which bears in common with that of Hölderlin the notion
of a present emptiness filled up with the calling into being of a primordial temporality through a
metaphysical memory such that the very contents of this memory are transformed on a plane of
immanence. In a fragment of 1876, Nietzsche writes: “All man’s goals and purposes were once
also conscious to his ancestors, but they have been forgotten. The directions followed by man
greatly depend on the past: the Platonic ἀνάµνησις. The worm moves in the same direction even
when its head has been cut off” (KSA 7: 23 [10]).841 It is only by means of this Nietzschean
rethinking of “Platonic ἀνάµνησις” that art—through new mnemonic images, can come about as
physiological ordering functions—as biological necessities. This transfigured anamnesis is
precisely the scene of the ἀγών between past and future with which Nietzsche replaces the
Hölderlinian dialectic. It is that which makes untimeliness itself possible. Let us recall
Nietzsche’s letter to Rohde, in which he says: “Dearest friend, what I learn and see, hear and
understand is indescribable. Schopenhauer and Goethe, Aeschylus and Pindar are still alive—
only believe.”
This access to the most primordial past, the most ancient time of knowledge, comes to
constitute, for Nietzsche, one of the very structures of consciousness, on the same level as
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sensation. He writes: “Consciousness commences with the sensation of causality, which means
that memory is older than consciousness. […] But memory must be part of the essence of
sensation; hence

must <be> a primordial characteristic [Ureigenschaft] of things. […] The

inviolability of the laws of nature means: sensation and memory are part of the essence of things.
The fact that a substance reacts in a certain way to contact with another substance is a matter of
memory and sensation. […] But if pleasure, displeasure, sensation, memory, reflex movements
are all part of the essence of matter, then human knowledge penetrates far more deeply into the
essence of things” (KSA 7: 19 [161]).842 If this memory is thus primordial, this means that the
invisible bridges from genius to genius are metaphysical phenomena—they form an ideal path,
which must only be accessed and followed by the philosopher.
Memory, however, is impossible, we remember, without forgetting. Therefore, each
primordial pool of memories is eternally shifting, being rethought, recreated and reestablished,
and for this reason the space of the Ur itself is at once historical and suprahistorical; it is
contained within historical time precisely by virtue of the fact that it exists, by definition, outside
historical time. In other words, that which exists as memory only takes place within time itself, as
a projection into a primordial sphere. And because it is such a projection, it indeed exists outside
time, before time. This movement of memory, endlessly permeated by forgetting, is thus cyclical,
or circular, and yet never returns to itself as identity—rather, once it has returned to itself, in a
process whose beginning is strictly nonexistent, the identical, even if it is posited, has once again
receded into impossibility, such that any pronunciation of it as an event necessarily pronounces
itself as difference within, beyond, before and after, the identical. The place where origin springs

842

Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings, 52.
309

from, qua idea, transforms indefinitely as the surface-force of reason, of art and of science,
transforms. This process is a circular one, such that as soon as the same occurs, it has already
recurred, yet the memory of it, in its supreme infidelity, has changed, and has changed it. The
infidelity takes place between what the Greeks called divinity and the human sphere. Goethe
speaks as follows: “The Divinity works in the living, not in the dead; in the becoming and
changing, not in the become and fixed. Therefore Reason, with its tendency toward the divine,
has only to do with the becoming, the living; but Understanding with the become, the already
fixed, that it may make use of it. […] We steer hypotheses to imaginary islands; but the proper
synthesis will probably remain an undiscovered country; and I do not wonder at this, which I
consider how difficult it is to obtain any synthesis even in such simple things as plants and
colors.”843
The physiological substratum of the conceptual, in Nietzsche, has as its consequence that
the primordial memory, the primordial becoming that lies in the depths underlying consciousness
can only come into the light of day, light of mind, according to a contingency of astral
proportions. Thus does the philosopher bring the ancients into being once again through a
poetical process of remembrance, according to his own physiology. The primordial essence of
their thought and of their tragedy is recreated according to a rhythm foreign to it, an untimely
rhythm, through the modern body, and is thus transformed; we cannot know the bodies of the
ancients, but through our bodies the Ursprung of the tragic arrived, that arcing experience that
we share with the Greeks by remembering it, brought about anew, unforeseeably each time. The
path to that common tragic space is opened by the specific employment, that is, explicitations, of
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the subterranean musicalities and rhythms of our bodies in art (or writing), the reflection of our
living.
For Hölderlin, the result of the Trauerspiel is that the absent god must ever be called
back, invoked again in the form of his temporal disappearance, so that mourning, the mother of
joy, may come about. Indeed, this invocation is of the highest necessity—it is the only means by
which love can bind mortals, this creation of the eternal beauty out of the tragic dialectic
between finite past and infinite future. Thus the Hölderlinian anamnesis serves the purpose of
bringing the god back into being, reviving the memory of divine infidelity, which is,
paradoxically, that to which man must be endlessly faithful and unfaithful, that which his
emptiness must contain in order that nature—a new nature, second or third or fourth, may rise up
on the horizon. This creation of nature through the call to a betraying god is the task of art itself.
For Nietzsche, on the other hand, there is no recourse to divinity. Rather, by means of the
reemployment of an infinite plasticity, the Dionysian must newly become a primordial, basic
physio-biological instinct by means of art insofar as this provokes and accomplishes a return to
primordial becoming, primordial memory through a process of anamnesis. That is, for Nietzsche,
divinity must be un-deified and returned to its ecstatic origin in the body. Yet, by means of this
anamnesis, the origin is transformed. The instincts too, must take on a new form, depending on
the current physiological constellation and its agonal relation to the ancient one. Out of this
artistic ἀγών shall be born the unheard-of—the new culture born out of the rhythmic spirit of
music.
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The New History
Rhythm forms the bodily experience and the temporality of becoming, and becoming, in
turn is the inner pulse of history. Foucault, in his essay on Nietzsche, calls history “the very body
of becoming.” He continues: “only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of
origin.”844 By refusing metaphysical historicism, both in the form of progress and in the form of
an early formulation of the eternal return of the same, through an affirmation of becoming in the
constantly transfigured primordial space of memory and forgetting, Nietzsche creates a
conception of the tragic capable of affirming life as a temporal phenomenon. He thus proposes,
against all determining historicism, a counter-dialectics of tragic excentricity wherein the circular
movement between man and nature is interrupted by the appearance of the tragic hero, the
philosophical genius who embodies the eternity posited by any metaphysics and, in sacrificing
himself, sacrifices that very metaphysics, thus transforming the rhythm of becoming. The
“ideality of misfortune” and of suffering845 which for the Greeks was the force of tragedy
becomes for us the embrace of suffering, of excentric temporality and of the impossibility of any
complete subjectivity—an early version of the Nietzschean amor fati, which constitutes the
joyful affirmation of life as time, in the amorous surpassing of the Greeks and their pessimism,
indeed in the triumphant reversal of that pessimism into an embrace of the tragedy of becoming.
There is, hence, for Nietzsche, no origin of time—no absolute beginning—no
Anaximandrian ἄπειρον, no Anaxagorean νοῦς from which the whole of existences issues, and
which subtracts itself from time as its necessary cause. There are only primordial instincts—
sensations that become images through imitation, and which make up the dense mass of objects
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that furnish consciousness (and earlier: pre-consciousness) with the capacity to produce
knowledge, and to produce art. Nietzsche criticizes all teleology, all theories of an absolute
beginning containing within them an absolute end. It is for precisely this reason that Nietzsche
opposes all theories of a logical and necessary succession of philosophers. In a fragment, he
writes: “1. No διαδοχαí. / 2. The various types” (KSA 7: 19 [169]).846 He also wrote an essay in
1872 on The διαδοχαí of the philosophers, whose central task was to expose the extent to which
the “diadocographers” had perverted the chronologies of the ancient philosophers in order “to
establish their διαδοχαí” and the “extraordinary differences” between these historians and the
contrary chronologies established by their “wiser” critics.847 Moreover, it was Nietzsche’s
intention, in this essay, to prove how “dangerous” it is “to use different series of chronological
combinations and thus to establish by means of intermediary figures an artificial harmony.”848
The history of the pre-Platonics, in fact, for the moderns, is in no way harmonious and necessary
but rather, it is of a supreme dissonance, and insurmountably fragmentary.
In concurrence with Rohde, Nietzsche chose Apollodorus as his preferred ancient
historian of the lineages of philosophers precisely because he “denied the connections of
disciples to masters and [among others] rejected the Anaximander-Anaximenes διαδοχή.”849 The
very notion of a necessary historical succession of ancient philosophers leading to a τέλος
implicitly contained in the ἀρχή is thus, in Nietzsche’s eyes, a corruption of these philosophers
themselves. In opposition to such a theory of historical necessity, Nietzsche proposes, in the
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fragment above, a typology of the pre-Platonics; rather than claiming a historical connection
from teachers to students between these philosophers, he cultivates each of them as a man and an
exemplary worldview which may be used, in the balance each of them contains between
metaphysics and science, for the foundation of a new nature which shall also be a new culture.
The proper, approximate measure of mythical and scientific conceptions of life can thus be
attained by this philological practice, which views history not as a progression, but as a series of
invisible bridges, forged through the practice of memory counterbalanced by necessary
forgetting, across which stretches the historical connective tissue of the ancient thinkers’ genius.
For Nietzsche, we may hazard to presume, these essential types for his time would be embodied
by Heraclitus, Empedocles and Democritus. An atomistic philosophy of becoming combined
with the theory of nature as art results from such a powerful combination—the formula for an
artistic creation of the world and a dissolution of the plane of experience to purely temporal
dimensions.
Nietzsche’s view of history is founded on the basis, as I have said, of a double refutation.
Firstly, he refutes the circular view of history as an eternal repetition of the same events. Long
before Nietzsche had the idea of the eternal return of the same as “the highest formula of
affirmation that is at all attainable”850 —uttered through the mouth of a demon and of Zarathustra
—-he encountered various versions of this thought. His early position with respect to these
theories of the singular idea of the eternal return is characterized by an intense fascination and a
vehement refusal, which itself constitutes the affirmation of life as constant becoming, excentric
temporality, which never arrives at its origin but confronts us, instead, with a series of sacrifice,
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irrecuperable past selves. And suppose Nietzsche’s later assertion of the affirmative character of
this thought referred, rather, to an evolved version of affirmation through refusal. The ambiguity
ever endures. Secondly, Nietzsche shall refute the belief in progress—the modern teleology of
history and culture—the undying faith in an absolute goal, Christian or otherwise, of the evermoving world process.
In a fragment contemporary to his second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche quotes a
passage from Hume: “‘Ask yourself,’ says Hume, ‘ask any of your acquaintances, whether they
would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next twenty, they say,
will be better:
‘And from the dregs of life hope to receive
What the first sprightly running could not give’”851 (KSA 7: 29 [86]).852
Nietzsche uses this Humean instinct, this characterization of the man resistant to the eternal
return of the same to define the “historical man” whose will drives toward progress, the
furthering of history: “These men we call historical men. A glance into the past drives them on
toward the future, inflames their courage to go on living, kindles their hope that justice will
someday come, that happiness lies hidden on the other side of the mountain they are
approaching. These historical men believe that the meaning of human existence will increasingly
be revealed in the process of life [… .]” He then says of this man that: “In spite of their history,
they have no idea how unhistorically they think and act, and how their pursuit of history serves
not pure knowledge, but life.”853 This then is the Emersonian man, the man of progress, who
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drives his idealist ship toward an unattainable horizon, carrying the weight of history on his
shoulders even as he submerges himself in the waters of Lethe: “souls never touch their objects.
An innavigable sea washes with silent waves between the things we aim at and converse
with.”854 This is the attitude of the advancement of a world process and of progress toward a
future goal whose very charm is its illusory character.
To these historical men Nietzsche opposes “supra-historical men” who refuse the eternal
return of the same in favor of an a-temporal present, paralyzed between past and future, living in
the shadow of a grand, inimitable history: “What could ten more years teach them that the last
ten could not?”855 To characterize this attitude, Nietzsche turns to Leopardi:
Nothing is worth your moving.
Earth is unworthy of your sighs. Life
is bitterness and boredom, nothing more.
And the world is foul.
Now be still.856
Refusing, then, at once the paralysis of the supra-historical man—his “nausea” and “wisdom”—
Nietzsche proposes that we “rejoice in our unwisdom” in the manner of “progressive men” and
yet refuse all theories of historical process toward a goal. He writes, furthermore: “if historical
scholarship is to be a beneficent enterprise, holding future promise, it must itself move in the
wake of a fresh and powerful torrent of life [neuen Lebensströmung]—for instance, a newly
emerging culture [einer werdenden Cultur].”857 This Lebensströmung must move, indeed, by the
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rhythm of a newly awakened, newly recognized torrent of becoming—it is through such a shift
in the torrent’s rhythm, toward the reestablishment of the primordial ἀγών between Zeitleben and
Tonleben, through a process of anamnesis that reaches into the coming-into-being of philosophy
operated by the tragic hero in his moment of timelessness that this culture must rise into the
future like a flaming sun. Nietzsche develops thus his counter-dialectics of history and of life,
which informs the tasks of philosophy and philology. Therein the primordial [Ur] is eternally in
creative combat with the historical, in the service of life. And here, life itself is conceived in a
circular manner: for just as it only thrives by means of illusions, the surface-forces of art and
knowledge (thus: of language), its essence lies in the depths, and its symbol is the Dionysian
primordial One.
There are two movements where history is concerned: one, the Emersonian, whose
essence and whose drive is the will to progress, and another, the Humean, or rather, the one
borrowed from Hume, against which historicism defines itself, and which is an early incarnation
of the eternal return. 858 Nietzsche’s epistemology itself abounds in spheres and circular
economies, indeed, whose circularity must be broken out of for the future to arise. In the essay,
“Circles” Emerson writes: “The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second;
and throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end. It is the highest emblem in the
cipher of the world.”859 This then is the very principle of Nietzsche’s anthropomorphism: that the

858

There are a multitude of other sources read by the young Nietzsche from which may have later drawn to create
his theory of the eternal return of the same. See D’Iorio, Nietzsche à Sorrente, 207ff. and Paolo d’Iorio, “The Eternal
Return: Genesis and Interpretation,” trans. Frank Chouraqui, from Fr. “Nietzsche et l‘éternel retour. Genèse et
interprétation,” in Nietzsche. Cahiers de l’Herne (Paris: l‘Herne, 2000): 361-389 and its expansion in “Cosmologia e
filosofia do eterno retorno em Nietzsche,” trans. Ernani Chaves and Rosistera Pereira de Oliveira in Scarlett Marton
(éd.), Nietzsche pensador Mediterrâneo. A recepção italiana, ed. by Scarlett Marton (São Paulo: Discurso Editorial,
2007).
859

Emerson, “Circles,” Essays: 225-238, 225.
317

human eye, in its circularity, projects itself, its circular image, onto the entire cosmos, thus
circumscribing the universal movement of all things and making itself the key to nature, to
divinity. Nietzsche’s vision of the new anthropomorphism, which the death of metaphysics shall
require, however, will be of a nature entirely different from that to which the world has so long
been beholden—therein, outside the sphere of the divine, the movement shall be one of
excentricity—the tragic beat of time.
In his second Untimely, Nietzsche also attacks Eduard von Hartmann as a dialectician and
teleologist. Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869) had combined the Hegelian Idea
with the Schopenhauerian Will, to form a cosmogony whose movement was circular, beginning
at a fixed point, and returning to this point again and again in a circular world process. The
illogical principle of the will and the logical principle of the idea formed together the cosmic
Unconscious; at the “moment of initiative,” the “empty will” (will without object) began to will
from out of a static eternity, and thereafter combined with the idea, thus beginning the world
process. These two forces, logical and illogical, competing with one another, as the former
strives to correct the latter, cause the world to pass through three “stages of illusion” until a
“senile state” is reached, and a desire for rest envelops all the world.860 This is brought about by
the idea’s creation of a “will to nothingness” that negates the will to life, and from this negation
results the “collective decision that leads to the destruction of the whole universe”861 at which
point the will returns to its static eternal state within “pure power itself [… .]”862 This state must
then be willed as a pure redemption from temporality and world process, a liberation from the
860

Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophie des Unbewussten. Versuch einer Weltanschauung (Berlin, Carl Duncker‘s
Verlag, 1869): 626, in D’Iorio, “The Eternal Return,” 22.
861

D’Iorio, “Eternal Return,” 23.

862

Hartmann, Unbewussten, 662.
318

dolorous fight between the logical idea and the illogical will, and thus from illusion, in absolute
willing, absolute power and negation. This cosmogony is based on the thesis that, because it is
impossible and contradictory to posit an infinity extending into the past, an absolute beginning of
the world process must necessarily have taken place. Hartmann comes to this conclusion out of
the polemic between Kant and Schopenhauer concerning the beginning of the world. Kant’s
demonstration of the first cosmological antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason runs as follows:
Thesis: “The world has a beginning in time, and in space it is also enclosed in
boundaries.” Proof: “For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in time, then up
to every given moment in time an eternity is elapsed, and hence an infinite series of states
of things in the world, each following another, has passed away. But now the infinity of a
series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed through a successive
synthesis. Therefore an infinitely elapsed world-series is impossible, so a beginning of
the world is a necessary condition of its existence, which was the first point to be
proved.”863
This antinomy results in reason’s capacity to believe in an absolute beginning of the world that
cannot be rigorously rationalized, because the thesis dialectically transforms into its opposite,
and, like Icarus, falls from the intelligible it strives towards into the sensible world. Such a belief
in a beginning to the universe is thus morally necessary, for Kant, to the human animal and its
development. Yet the dialectic of pure reason, by which it relates to pure Ideas, is such that it
falls equally into the opposite belief, in the infinity of time and space, the limitlessness of the
universe. According to this thesis (that is to say, antithesis), since there must have been an
infinity of time before the beginning of the cosmos, this infinite void would render any beginning
impossible. Hence, no universal beginning has ever taken place, and time extends infinitely into
the past. However, because on the “battlefield” of reason’s antinomies the victory always belongs
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to the “side which has been permitted to make the attack” it is the thesis of an absolute beginning
of the universe, extending reason into the intelligible realm, that prevails over the antithesis of
past and future infinities, which confines itself to the spatiotemporal sphere experience.
Schopenhauer attacks the Kantian thesis of this first antinomy by exposing the fact that
the proof of this thesis replaces “the beginninglessness of the series of conditions or states” with
“the endlessness (infinity) of the series [… .]” However, Schopenhauer points out: “the end of a
beginningless series can always be thought without detracting from its beginninglessness, just as
conversely the beginning of an endless series can also be thought.”864 This thinkability, for
Schopenhauer, entirely delegitimizes Kant’s antinomy of reason since its very purpose is to
confront reason with the impossibility of thinking its own theses, thus pushing it across the limit
between thought and faith. Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche with him, thus posits the impossibility
of a beginning of the world process. Against the “regressive” infinite movement posited by
Schopenhauer, which he calls a mere “ideal postulate,” Hartmann proposes his thesis of the
world’s “progressive movement”865 which is, on the contrary, real. He believes that the reality of
time necessitates positing an absolute beginning and an absolute end to the world process, thus
returning to the thesis of the first Kantian antinomy of reason. The flaw of Hartmann’s logic,
however, is that he attempts to prove his thesis of an end of the world process by the process
itself. This end, which should result in absolute freedom from illusion, the pure empty power of
the will, succumbs once again to the union of will and idea, and the world process recommences
with the struggle between logic and illogic, which plunges the cosmos again in illusion.
Therefore: “Hartmann‘s view is that the world process leads into a final state absolutely identical
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to the initial state.”866 Such is the manner in which universal history endlessly repeats itself, as
every time the world comes again to a static state, “we are still haunted by the specter of a new
will and of another beginning of the world process.”867

Hartmann struggles with the

contradiction between an absolute liberation from illusion and suffering and the implication of
his own theory, that the world process eternally recommences. If the will, according to him, were
entirely bound by time, the world process would be obliged to repeat eternally and identically,
yet because the will, in its origin, is both anterior to time and its cause, the probability of cosmic
recurrence is not 1 but 1/2, and is again diminished by 1/2, at the event of every recurrence.868
In a set of fragments from 1873, Nietzsche attacks Hartmann as an unsuccessful
“imitator” of Schopenhauer (KSA 7: 28 [6]),869

for pretending to a knowledge of the

unconscious, which “by its very nature is something that is unknown,” to such an extent that he
even considers it to be the matrix of the world process, and for believing this fact to be doubly
demonstrable, both “on the basis of the past, ex causis efficientibus,” and “on the basis of the
future, ex causa finali [… .]” Nietzsche continues, with vicious sarcasm: “H<artmann> lets the
light of the Last Judgement shine upon our age” such that “it appears that it is now approaching
humanity’s age of manhood, that joyous state in which there is nothing but solid mediocrity
[…]” (KSA 7: 29 [59]).870 And this is, indeed, Hartmann’s own Christian language, for he writes,
in Nietzsche’s transcription: “the complete victory of the logical over the illogical must coincide
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with the temporal end of the world process, with the Last Judgement (!!)” (KSA 7: 29 [52]).871 In
the second Untimely Meditation, he criticizes Hartmann, the would-be philosopher of the
unconscious, as an unconscious “philosophical parodist” and calls his doctrine a “parody of
world history.”872 “For every individual the unconscious parodist required ‘the full surrender of
his personality to the world process.’”873 Nietzsche also writes of Hartmann, with venomous
vehemence: “Disgusting book! Disgrace to our age! […] Hartmann’s philosophy is the scowl of
Christianity, with its absolute wisdom, its Last Judgement, its redemption, etc.” (KSA 7: 29
[52]).874 It is contra this pseudo-scientific, Christianized philosophy of history as either an
eternal recurrence or an inevitable, teleological progression toward a restored Christian eternity,
that Nietzsche’s vision of history as becoming, with the tragic philosopher at its crux, will surge
forth to put an end to all metaphysical historicism and which will hence forge the path to his later
explicit conception of philological-philosophical genealogy.
Against Hartmann’s conception of an absolute beginning and an absolute end to the world
process, Nietzsche opposes Schopenhauer’s theory of an infinity of the past, and of the
consequent impossibility of a completion of infinity. Since an eternity has elapsed up until the
present moment, Schopenhauer claims: “everything that can or should become must have
become already.”875 In other words, this infinity of elapsed time entails “the exhausted possibility
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of events.”876 In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche allies this theory with that
of Parmenides and the Eleatics, according to which: “‘There can be no time, no motion. no
space, for we can only imagine all these to be infinite. Whether infinitely large or infinitely
divisible, everything infinite has no being. It does not exist.’ But no one who interprets the
meaning of the word ‘being’ strictly, who takes the existence of a contradiction such as a finished
infinity seriously as an impossibility, can doubt this.”877 Nietzsche refutes this theory of infinity’s
impossibility in harmony with Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus, all of whom endorse
the “reality of motion” as deduced from “reality of thought,” and thus of thought as motion.878
According to this argument, thought is itself successive, i.e., subjected to becoming and hence
incapable of solidifying any thought into “Being,” against which Parmenides counters the idea
that thought is stagnant and what appears to us as succession is merely a representation of
succession. Nietzsche refutes this thesis, in turn, through an appeal to Spir.
Spir, arguing against Kant, claims that the “idea [Vorstellung] of succession […] is not in
itself successive; consequently it is completely different from the succession of ideas
[Vorstellungen].”879 In addition, according to this hypothesis, the representation of succession is
possible only based on the reality of thought as movement. Spir continues by asking: “how can
the beginning and the end of conscious life itself, together with all its inward and outward senses,
exist only in the interpretation of the inward sense? The actual fact is that one absolutely cannot
deny the reality of change. If you throw it out the window it will slip back in through the
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keyhole.” For only the proposition that “our ideas appear to us as they are” can found the critique
of reason, since it alone allows us to “make […] valid assertions about them” and thereby
produce an “epistemology” as well as a “‘transcendental’ examination of objective validity.”880
Nietzsche thus, with Spir, opposes the Parmenidean idea of a timeless eternity in which Being
would subsist in absolute manner by means of an argument that subsumes the very event of this
thought in the becoming that it both denies and presupposes. Constant change, then, is the
essential truth of all movement for Nietzsche, and if an infinity has already elapsed, this is
merely an expression of the indestructibility of forces and matter posited by Heraclitus, by
Anaxagoras, by Empedocles and Democritus. The movement of history is rather the eternal
transformation of these originary bodily forces as functions of time. And in the movement of
history, the ancient forces of life must, by a process of remembrance at once active, biological
and metaphysical or philosophical, be transformed into forces of the future. The body itself,
through a mimetic, homeotic, hyperbological approach to history, must become foreign to itself,
such that its very physiology, and therefore too the illusions it must generate and by which it
lives, are transfigured.
Yet this constant change, for Nietzsche, in no way amounts to a logical, linear or causal
motion that could be described as a process. On the contrary, this change neither originates nor
terminates. And, as Paolo D’Iorio points out, Nietzsche ultimately rejects Spir’s Neo-Kantian
theory, because rather than renouncing the metaphysical organization of the world into noumena
and phenomena, it proposes, in opposition to the “Kantian and Schopenhauerian dualist model” a
three-tiered model. In this model, there exists, between “the authentic dimension” of the thing-in-
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itself and the level of “the subject’s representation” as reality, a third, “intermediary ontological
level,” upon which things really exist but not as things in themselves; rather, they exist in an
“inauthentic and contradictory way.”881 This tripartition is just as unacceptable for Nietzsche as
the thing-in-itself/appearance division of Kant and the will/representation division of
Schopenhauer.
In the second Untimely, Nietzsche pronounces this injunction: “Assess your height as a
man of knowledge by your depth as a man of action. True, you climb up toward heaven and on
the sunlight of knowledge, but you also sink downwards toward chaos.”882 To ascend in flight on
the wings of knowledge requires a descent into the real, the chaotic pandemonium of reality, the
torrent of becoming—only through this constant ἀγών between reality and thought, between
action and contemplation, or again, between the novel and ancient wisdom can a culture come
about, can the new history arise. Nietzsche, thus, through this critique of the teleological and
Christian tones of Hartmann’s doctrine, defines his own conception of history, his own
epistemology and cosmogony, against it.
Hartmann is important because he deals a deathblow to the idea of a world process
simply by being consistent. In order to be able to endure it he must base it on the τέλος of
conscious redemption and freedom from illusions on our willingness to embrace decline.
But the end of humanity can occur at any moment due to a geological cataclysm: and all
that illusionlessness would presuppose more highly developed moral and intellectual
energies: which is wholly improbable: on the contrary, when they become old, the
illusions are likely to become all the more powerful and old age, to conclude with a
return to childishness [K i n d i s c h w e r d e n].
KSA 7: 29 [52]883
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Nietzsche points out that this doctrine of eternal return of the identical, wherein the state of ennui
and yearning for eternity and stagnancy that the realms of pure illusion lead instead to the
repetition of the same series of events ad infintum, contradicts the progressive, teleological
doctrine of liberation that Hartmann proposes. In place of this double-bind, Nietzsche proposes
his idea of a system of invisible bridges connecting geniuses across history, and history’s role of
serving and furthering their community. He writes: “We want to refrain from all constructions of
human history and not pay any attention whatsoever to the masses, but instead only to the widely
dispersed individuals: they form a bridge above the turbulent stream. They do not further a
process; rather, they live conjointly and concurrently, thanks to history. / It is the ‘republic of
geniuses’” (KSA 7: 29 [52]).884 This doctrine opposes itself to progress as well as to return—
there is no universal history, but rather, history binds great men, great geniuses and tragic heroes
together and draws them into circular, temporal and trans-temporal communication with one
another. In the second Untimely, Nietzsche prophesizes: “The time will come when we will
wisely avoid all interpretations of the world-process, or even human history; when historians
generally will no longer consider the masses, but rather those individuals who form a kind of
bridge over the wild torrent of Becoming [Brücke über den wüsten Strom des Werdens
bilden].”885 The beings who spring forth out of that torrent refute, refuse and overcome the logic
of their century; they are supremely discontinuous with the homogeneity of the world in which
they are embedded—they defy the dialectic that precipitates the race of modern men by their
very existence. Nietzsche declares: “the goal of humanity cannot lie at the end of history, but
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only in the highest human exemplars.”886 These men are tragic. They are tragic heroes precisely
because they arise out of the tragedy of the age and exist in antagonism against it. From the
raging tumult of Becoming they awake, open their eyes and seize life, a life unknown to the
world in which they come to be, and according to a necessity beyond necessity, beyond the
teleological, dialectical movement to which everything around them is subordinated. In a
fragment of 1872, Nietzsche writes of the philosopher as the “self-revelation of nature’s
workshop” who exists with the “artist” in a sphere “above the tumult of contemporary history
[Über dem Getümmel der Zeitgeschichte]” and “beyond need [abseits der Noth].” He proposes:
“The philosopher as the brake shoe on the wheel of time” (KSA 7: 19 [17]).887 In apparent
contradiction with the proposition that the philosopher-genius exists of necessity, he here is
posited as a being beyond necessity. Here arises Nietzsche’s ambivalence with regard to the
possibility of necessity beyond metaphysics—it is a torturous ambiguity, and if the tragic hero is
necessary this is because his is the greatest, most dangerous task—the task of bringing death to
metaphysics for a people: “Philosophers appear in times of great danger—when the wheels keep
turning faster—they and art take place of disappearing myth. But they are thrown far ahead of
their time, because they only gain the attention of their contemporaries very slowly” (KSA 7: 19
[17]).888 Like comets, these men are precipitated outside themselves and beyond their time. They
follow the path of excentricity, and their immediate failure as reformers—after the fashion of
Empedocles and, indeed, of Hölderlin, constitutes at the same time their greatest power. For they
are destined to be misunderstood by the human beings, submerged in metaphysics, who surround
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them. It is by thrusting themselves outside of history that they open wide the possibility of a new
history, of a new life liberated from metaphysics, in which art and science collaborate to reveal
the sacrificial movement of the long tragedy of time.
These philosophers are heroes because they are self-generative, because their plastic
force affirms itself in the face of the lawful lawlessness according to which their world functions.
To the masses, they appear to be random, to be wandering in want of any direction but in truth,
they live according to a natural law that they themselves bring into being by their selfengendering—this law, of the highest metaphysical strength, must be sacrificed in accordance
with their downgoing. The genius who miraculously issues out of the mire of a time not his own,
a barbarian time ruled and pervaded by philistines, is destined to be destroyed by this time,
precisely because he is a bridge to a future time, a time unknown, and because he contains within
him the fire of the great life-force of both the past and the time to come. Thus he must sacrifice
himself so as to come into being as this bridge. Indeed, this sacrifice is destined to be
misunderstood by his people—the philosopher as tragic hero is destined to fail in giving rise to a
newly harmonious whole—this too is his tragedy—and yet! It is in this very failure that his
power lies—for the significance of this sacrifice is to be grasped by a time to come, the portent
of the death of metaphysics, of the return of becoming to the temporal rhythm of the body.
Nietzsche opposes to Hartmann’s philosophy “our doctrine that consciousness is
promoted and developed only by ever loftier illusions.” This doctrine of illusion as the material
of life is not, however, one of progress, but rather, Nietzsche believes that our illusions have
become greatly impoverished since the age of the Greeks: “our illusions are more inferior and
more vulgar than theirs.” “We” are thus, if anything, in a process of regression, beginning in the

328

time of the Greeks, and yet illusion is inescapable—it is vital, binding force; the very stuff of life
and its movement. Modern man lives in a “twilight atmosphere”889—the task of untimeliness is
to resist this twilight, overcome it into dawn, to transform from “latecomers” into “forerunners”
by “creating new generations.”890 There is no eternity, and likewise, there is no teleological
unfolding—rather, all hinges upon the force of the illusions we are capable of producing. For
“illusions are the only expression for an unknown state of affairs” (KSA 7: 29 [52]).891 Thus, in
another fragment, Nietzsche writes:
Truth as a cloak for completely different impulses and drives.
The pathos of truth is related to belief.
The drive for lies fundamental.
Truth is unknowable. Everything knowable semblance. Significance of art as truthful
semblance.
KSA 7: 29 [20]892
At stake in the new history is precisely the possibility of this truthful semblance—the creation of
art as, at once, the creation of new truths, truths understood to be illusions and hence lies, but
which nonetheless carry the force to bind a people together—to affirm its culture as a dissonant
harmony, a paradoxically fragmentary whole. The tragic hero is, perhaps, the highest
manifestation of the “pathos of truth” together with the “drive for lies”—that is, the most
supreme and sovereign work of art.
Since there is no absolute point of origin—no beginning of cosmic time, there can be no
return in an identical sense; rather, any return, in the absence of origin, would necessarily
articulate its difference with the past cosmic movement, and because it would be washed over
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with the waters of Lethe, it could never reach, by any measure, the point from which it took off
—the configuration of life, between the primordial and the manifest, would have already
infinitely changed, beyond itself. Origin—Ursprung—conceived as primordial becoming, which
must be drawn into the consonance of the present through a procedure of anamnesis—is thus,
rather, the space of transformation—of a primordial experience that must be recreated at every
turn in an untimely fashion—that is, in accordance and in disaccord—in dissonant consonance
with the time to which it belongs. The actual finds refuge in this reversal of origin—hence, the
whole army of truths that follows in an excentric movement must transform itself as well in the
aftermath of a transfigured force—a transfigured nature of which this army is the manifestation.
As an alternative, a true path, against both progress, which is a philistine idea hingeing on
modern pathos, and the eternal return of the same, Nietzsche advances this other temporal
movement of rhythmic, tragic becoming, between art and nature, which returns every time to a
different origin.
Time itself is the metamorphosis of origin, and this origin does not find itself at the
beginning of life and time (αἰών), but rather pervades it and arises as the shift from one form of
becoming to another. In “The Rhine,” Hölderlin wrote: “Ein Rätsel ist Reinentsprungenes”—“An
enigma are those of pure origin.” And then: “Even song may hardly unveil it.”893 To penetrate
into this enigma, this riddle, as Oedipus, the suffering human being solves the riddle of the
human being posed to him by the monstrous sphinx—this requires at once the recreation of that
origin, that purity, in a new sense. This is itself the beginning of tragic knowledge—the excessive
self-consciousness, rising into universality, which necessitates the hero’s downgoing. Origin is
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liberated by Nietzsche from its function as cause—just as Heraclitus denied any end to the game
of the cosmic child, just as Empedocles had refused to admit of the purposiveness of time and
motion. The tragic philosopher, in this light, has as his great task to embody the timelessness, the
dream of eternity that his people hangs onto as a myth which renders the suffering of life
possible, and, in sacrificing himself, to sacrifice this metaphysical myth as well to the foundation
of a new culture. Let us not forget the philosopher’s injunction: “You should not flee into some
metaphysics, rather, you should actively sacrifice yourself for the emerging culture [euch der w
e r d e n d e n K u l t u r thätig opfern]!” (KSA 7: 19 [154]).894

Sacrifice of the Last Philosopher
While for Hölderlin, the transition from twilight to dawn accomplished by the selfsacrifice of the tragic hero is brought about by means of a tragic dialectics, for Nietzsche it is of
another nature, and rather than bringing joy through mourning, it brings life-affirmation through
Dionysian suffering, precisely because life itself is suffering—is the constant, tragic sacrifice of
one self to give rise to the next, through the temporal fragmentation of the subject and the return
to the Dionysian instinct, the instinct toward the embrace of life through pain, the purificatory
experience of being-torn-to-shreds in tragedy. In the world of individuation, as we have seen, it is
an individual, a hero possessing monstrous wisdom—whose wisdom is so great that it is tragic—
who must undergo the tragic fate of Dionysus, and, for Nietzsche, it is his task, as the last
philosopher, to bring about, with his self-sacrifice, the death of the very timelessness, the relic of
ancient mythic metaphysics that he lives within. For tragic knowledge is specifically defined by
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Nietzsche as the knowledge that metaphysics is no longer possible. To bring this knowledge to a
people, that it may found a new culture, which shall at once be a new nature, requires a selfsacrifice and a deliverance into fragmentary time, time no longer conceived in metaphysical
terms, as an a priori condition of experience, or as the motion of a teleological world-process,
but a discontinuous time of which all inner forces—and first of all the plastische Kraft—are
functions. To become timeless out of the flux of becoming and then to die as timelessness itself
—that is fate of the philosopher as tragic hero. Nietzsche writes, in a fragment of 1871:
“Intention of Nature to come to perfection. The genius is, from this perspective, timeless
[zeitlos]. The goal is ever reached” (KSA 7: 18 [3]). The perfection of nature by the creation of a
new culture, hence, depends on the timelessness of the genius—this genius is, indeed, the
necessary component, the axis of this natural-cultural creation.
Nietzsche follows, at least to a certain extent, the vision of the philosopher as tragic hero
that Hölderlin had sketched in his Ground of Empedocles as well as Schopenhauer’s conception
of the genius as the individualization of the universal will. In a fragment of 1872, Nietzsche
writes of the “philosophical genius” that “he has nothing to do with the the chance political
situation of a people; on the contrary, in comparison with his nation [Volk] he is timeless
[zeitlos].” Nietzsche then insists that this genius is by no means attached to his people by chance,
but rather that, of absolute necessity, “what is specific in this people comes to light here as an
individual: the drive of the people becomes a universal drive, applied to solving the riddle of the
universe.” He finishes the note with the following declaration: “The philosopher is a means for
coming to rest in the rushing current” (KSA 7: 19 [16]).895 The tragic hero is thus necessary and
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universal, yet, again, only in the sense and the degree in which he embodies and manifests the
drives, the specific rhythm of his people; again, Nietzsche’s metaphysical, Schopenhauerean
instinct is tempered by his philological conception of history and of culture as incommensurably
different at different times, in different places, and of the human body as infinitely changeable.
There is a “teleology of the philosophical genius” (KSA 7: 19 [16])896 that Nietzsche calls it his
“task” to comprehend and, therefrom, to bring about. This teleology, then, is the modern remnant
of the Greek µοίρα which, in ancient tragedy, constituted the power to which the hero had to
freely subjugate himself and thus sacrifice himself, in order to restore the harmony of his people
with the divine. It is as a timeless being—in whom time, in other words, = 0—as a creature that
provides rest from the ceaseless torrent of becoming, preparing a new world to come into being
“with one strike” that the hero must sacrifice himself, in order to thrust his people into an
affirmation of their suffering, to change the strength of the forces that form the rhythm of their
becoming.
Because, in the Nietzschean-Heraclitean becoming, every moment brings with it a new
self, such that the previous moment and the previous self must be sacrificed in the onrush of
temporality, time itself is tragic. It is, indeed, a series of self-sacrifices between which no
continuity of subject can be drawn, extending into infinite futurity. The past, therefore, is
irredeemable, irrecuperable, except by means of a mythical process of anamnesis, which is a
conjuring into the present, itself mythical, of origin. In the absence, however, of such a force of
magic—in the absence of a ground of metaphysics to call back the past—thus, from the
perspective of temporal atomism, the past sacrificed selves remain inaccessible. The tragic hero,
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by his excess of self-consciousness, accepts these sacrifices as his own, takes responsibility for
them and, in his tragic song of downgoing, performs this sacrifice in as an absolute event. This
sacrifice itself is the very self-sacrifice of metaphysics—the sacrifice of all hope of redemption,
precisely as a timeless archetype of that hope. Thereby does he mark the difference between the
old and the new. It is for this reason that the tragic hero becomes timeless precisely as the
untimely embodiment of his world. He contains within himself the primordial memory of the
Greeks, of the whole history of metaphysics—it is as the timeless retainer of this history that he,
the most conscious of men—so conscious that he becomes multiple—sacrifices himself. He
sacrifices himself, indeed, as the last philosopher and the last human being—as the absolute
metaphysical subject.
Schopenhauer had defined the genius not only by his excess of knowledge, but also by
the fact that his intellect is the master of his will: its very origin. He writes: “genius consists in
the knowing faculty having received a considerably more powerful development than is required
by the service of the will, for which alone it originally came into being. […] Genius, therefore,
consists in an abnormal excess of intellect that can find its use only by being employed on the
universal of existence. In this way it then applies itself to the service of the whole human race,
just as does the normal intellect to that of the individual.”897 We recall that this is precisely
Schopenhauer’s formula of the tragic—the mastery of will by the intellect it produces, which
results in the will, represented by the characters in tragic drama, being torn to pieces and
dialectically sublating itself in order to give rise to a new world—indeed, to a new nature, after
the fashion of tragic sacrifice. And it is indeed this nature of the genius—that his knowledge—his
897
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propensity to discover the solution to the enigma of the universe—that lends him his instinct
toward self-sacrifice. In his third Untimely Meditation, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche
names this instinct as the third great danger that threatens the philosophical genius from within.
This danger he calls by the name of “moral and intellectual hardening.” Out of his inescapable
“fate of solitude,” the genius “breaks the bond that linked him to the ideal” and, in dejection, the
“uniqueness of his nature” having become “an individual, isolated atom,” resolves himself to
sacrifice. He is, in other words, in the manner of Hölderlin and Kleist, “destroyed through his
uniqueness,” and “he can perish through his self as he can by sacrificing himself [im Aufgeben
seiner selbst]”—therefore, Nietzsche writes, “living means, in short, to live in danger.”898 It is
from the “peaks of tragic contemplation”899 that the courage of the genius—the philosopher who
embodies the grace and curse of his age—in other words, whose actual existence contains within
it the infinity of possibilities for the future “culture,” conceived as a “new and improved physis,”
as Nietzsche had prophesized it to be at the close of the second Untimely,900 must show itself and
prepare the hero for his self-sacrifice. After his rejection of Schopenhauerean metaphysics, the
possibility of the philosopher’s attainment of universality is cast into obscurity, for Nietzsche.
This is the question that will ceaselessly occupy him for the rest of his philosophical life.
Nietzsche had again invoked the vision of the tragic hero as the figure who brings about
the dialectical transition from decline to salvation in The Birth of Tragedy, speaking of Sophocles
—the only truly tragic tragedian:
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Sophocles understood the most sorrowful figure of the Greek stage, the unfortunate
Oedipus, as the noble human being who, in spite of his wisdom, is destined to error and
misery but who eventually, through his tremendous suffering, spreads a magical power of
blessing that remains effective even beyond his decease. The noble human being does not
sin, the profound poet wants to tell us: though every law, every natural order, even the
moral world may perish through his actions, his actions also produce a higher magical
circle of effects which found a new world on the ruins of the old one that has been
overthrown. That is what the poet wants to say insofar as he is at the same time a
religious thinker. As a poet he first shows us a marvelously tied knot of a trial, slowly
unraveled by the judge, bit by bit, for his own undoing. The genuinely Hellenic delight at
this dialectical solution [dialektischen Lösung] is so great that it introduces a trait of
superior cheerfulness into a whole work, everywhere softening the sharp points of the
gruesome presuppositions of this process.901
Through the process of the Nietzschean anamnesis, this transition, however, is once again
transfigured. And it is perhaps as a tragic hero, identifying himself melodically with his own last
philosopher—the modern Oedipus—that Nietzsche takes on the role of receiving the temporal
withdrawal of the Greek ideal, of delivering it into the flux of his becoming, incommensurable
and absolutely different, that Nietzsche transforms the role and the significance of tragic
sacrifice. For that his task is to push metaphysics off into the abyss he stands before is no secret
—yet perhaps, the knotted heart of an enigma.
Standing at the midpoint between art and nature, between the mortal and the divine, like
Hölderlin’s Empedocles, and made monstrous by the excess of his self-knowledge, the
Nietzschean hero must thus sacrifice himself to bring about a new world. This vision of tragic
self-sacrifice, out of the “terrible loneliness” that fills the heart of the “last philosopher” and
plunges him in “oblivion” (KSA 7: 19 [126])902 thus follows the dialectic of sacrifice, of
dissolution in becoming that teleologically brings about the commencement that Hölderlin and
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Hegel had theorized, and yet his very sacrifice, for Nietzsche is also the sacrifice of the dialectic
as such, ending excetrically in the fragmentation of the subject, who no longer possesses the
capacity that he had for Hegel to become the absolute. Because this sacrifice, for Nietzsche,
essentially fails in its attempt to restore absolute harmony, the very power of the tragic hero’s
self-sacrifice is that it displays the ultimate, inevitable failure of the dialectic. Hence the tragic
philosopher—the last philosopher—tragically travels an excentric path. As a comet shooting
across a sky of fading stars, he brings about the necessity of an affirmation of this failure—the
plunging into tragic becoming of his people and of the very culture that his death announces. For
it is only by the voluntary dissolution of joyful consonance back into dissonance that this
dissonance itself, bearing the traces of Heraclitus’ war and Empedocles’ strife, may become for a
future culture the very primordial source of joy. Culture itself, then—tragic culture, capable of
this affirmation of life in the tragedy of becoming, in a transfigured temporality composed of
dissonant atoms, beyond the sphere of the subject, tied indissolubly to the dream of a saving god
—requires in its soul the death of metaphysics. It is the infidelity of the modern demigod, his
disappearance into the darkly gold and volcanic, excentric sphere of Zagreus, that is the portent
guaranteeing the arrival of this absolute surpassing. The hero’s vertigo is ours—at the mouth of
the abyss into a mortal future, filled with the tremors of monstrous uncertainty, the promise of
community unveils itself—the supreme birth of fragmentary truth as the manifestation of
transformed drives, the ancient issuing from the new and binding fragmentary creatures, divested
of eternity, in a newly Dionysian rhythm of song and dance, illuminated once more by a red and
rising dawn.
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Coda
And yet, the demand remains, out of the mouth of Nietzsche’s Oedipus, for a sacrifice of
the human being—of humanity itself—to be brought about by the last of the human beings, the
tragic hero himself.
In Nietzsche’s drafts for a tragic drama of Empedocles, written in 1870 and doubtless
inspired by Hölderlin, he transforms the self-sacrifice of Empedocles into the demand for a
sacrifice of the entire Agrigentian people, befallen by plague. In one outline for this unwritten
work, we read: “He [Empedocles] resolves while at a funeral ceremony to annihilate his people,
in order to free them from their misery” (KSA 7: 5 [116]).903 In another of these outlines we find
written: “He resolves to annihilate his people, because he has seen that they cannot be healed.
The people are gathered around the crater: he grows mad, and before he vanishes proclaims the
truth of rebirth. A friend dies with him” (KSA 7: 5 [118]).904 This madness also mirrors the fate
of Hölderlin, the modern tragic hero, whose failure resounds incessantly in Nietzsche’s heart.
This plague just might be an allegory for metaphysics itself. For, in the same fragment, he writes:
“Departure from religion, through the insight that it is deception” (KSA 7: 5 [118]).905 The bridge
between Nietzsche and Hölderlin comes gracefully to light through the lucidity of this mad
Empedocles in his intention to self-sacrifice, to put to death the myths of a twilight world,
bringing about a new world purified of illusion and bathed in the rays of a future Heraclitean sun.
Yet Nietzsche surpasses his predecessor by this leap from the self-sacrificing hero to the selfsacrificing nation. To free a people utterly from the myth of the human being, which turns it
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against life incurably, would require the self-sacrifice not only of a man, but of a whole people, a
whole culture—the entire mass of those who call themselves “human.”
In his Daybreak (Morgenröthe) of 1881, Nietzsche would propose, in an aphorism
entitled “A tragic end for knowledge,” this “one tremendous idea,” by whose force “every other
endeavor” would be “thrown down”—“the idea of self-sacrificing mankind [s i c h o p f e r n d e
n M e n s c h h e i t]” in the name of attaining “the knowledge of truth [… .]”906 This truth, a
truth beyond all metaphysical truths, outside the solar systems of myth in which men hide
themselves, would require the most tragic “drive to knowledge” of all. For humanity to sacrifice
itself to truth as a work of art—“with the light of an anticipatory wisdom in its eyes”—this
would be, paradoxically, the highest affirmation of life. This idea, moreover, would present the
unification of the young Nietzsche’s instincts to art and to philosophy and, in the same strike, the
most hyperbolic proposition for the overcoming of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical determination
of the genius as universal. And yet the means to this self-sacrifice of humanity, for Nietzsche,
remain unthinkable:
Perhaps, if one day an alliance has been established with the inhabitants of other stars for
the purpose of knowledge, and knowledge has been communicated from star to star for a
few millennia: perhaps enthusiasm for knowledge may then rise to such a high water
mark!907
Perhaps it is the very task of the self-sacrificing philosopher as comet to ignite the fire of this
future drive to the truth, to prepare for the tragic downgoing of humanity itself.
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